Jeffery Lynn Edwards, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A jury found Jeffery Lynn Edwards, Jr., guilty of Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine ¹ and Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended,² and based on his prior convictions, determined he was a habitual offender.³ Edwards presents two issues on appeal:

1. Did the State establish a proper chain of custody, therefore laying a proper foundation to admit the methamphetamine and laboratory report?

2. Did the State present sufficient evidence to support the habitual offender enhancement?

[2] We hold the State laid a proper foundation, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. We therefore affirm Edwards’ conviction for possession of methamphetamine. But as the State concedes, it presented insufficient evidence to support the jury's habitual offender finding, and we therefore reverse and remand for retrial on the enhancement, should the State so choose.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In the early morning hours of August 16, 2024, Officer Jordan Allen of the Madison County Sheriff's Department (“MCSD”) was patrolling the interstate when he saw a car swerving between lanes. Officer Allen executed a traffic stop, and the driver—later identified as Edwards—pulled over. After ordering Edwards out of the car, Officer Allen learned Edwards’ license was suspended and there was an active warrant for his arrest. The officer patted Edwards down, handcuffed him, and placed him under arrest. Officer Allen called for a tow truck and inventoried the car.⁴ Among the personal effects in the car, the officer found items which “raised concerns ․ related to methamphetamine,” including Excedrin—which can be used to make meth—and aluminum foil—which could be used as a filter to smoke it. Tr. Vol. 2 at 58–59.

[4] Officer Allen drove Edwards to the county jail, where Deputy Conner Jackson started the intake process while Officer Allen completed paperwork. Deputy Jackson had Edwards change into a jail uniform, then prepared to administer a body scan, which is “essentially an X-ray[.]” Id. at 174–75. On the completed scan, Deputy Jackson noticed “something odd” that looked like “oval shaped rings” in Edwards’ groin area. Id. at 66, 189. Deputy Jackson moved Edwards back to the central booking room and sat him on a wooden bench. As Deputy Jackson spoke with Officer Allen about the body scan results, video cameras in the booking room captured Edwards reaching into his pants and bringing his hands to his mouth. Neither officer observed Edwards’ actions.

[5] After consulting with Officer Allen, talking to his supervisor, and giving Edwards “an opportunity to come clean ․ [about] whatever he may have had,” Deputy Jackson and another officer took Edwards back to a changing room to conduct a strip search. Id. at 192. Edwards pulled his pants and underwear down about halfway, then “very suddenly and aggressively grabbed his groin area and his shirt,” started “pulling his shirt all around,” was “jerking in all different directions, and his hands went up right into his face area.” Id. at 193. The officers placed Edwards in handcuffs and moved him into a segregation cell. There the officers removed Edwards’ pants and “rolled him from side to side” but the search revealed nothing. Id. at 195. Nor did Edwards speak, although he was sobbing and “it was kind of muffled.” Id. at 196. As they left the room, one officer noticed Edwards’ mouth was “puffed out.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 39.

[6] Deputy Jackson moved Edwards back to the booking room and sat him on a bench. At that point, Officer Allen saw Edwards had “kind of a bulge in his cheek.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 69. Deputy Jackson asked Edwards to open his mouth. Edwards sat hunched over and did not respond, so another officer pushed Edwards upright and Deputy Jackson saw a “clear baggy or ․ saran wrap substance hanging out of” Edwards’ mouth. Id. at 197. As another officer held Edwards, Deputy Jackson pressed his thumbs into Edwards’ cheeks to try to force out the substance. Deputy Jackson “was able to use [his] thumb to flick . . two baggies out of [Edwards’] mouth” but could still feel a large item inside. Id. at 198. Jail officers wrestled Edwards to the ground and eventually removed a third, larger baggie. Edwards then became vocal, “screaming and yelling ․ profanities,” and was bleeding from his mouth. Id. He was transported to the hospital as a precaution in case of drug overdose and medically cleared.

[7] The baggies—one large and two small—were placed on the booking room counter. One small bag contained a brown leafy substance Officer Allen suspected was marijuana. The other two bags held a “white crystallized substance” he believed was methamphetamine. Id. at 68. Officer Allen collected the evidence in a brown paper bag and took it to the evidence room. There, he photographed the baggies and their contents. He conducted a field test of the smaller bag of crystallized substance, which tested positive for methamphetamine. He did not field test the larger bag, as it was covered in blood. The larger bag was sent to the Indiana State Police Laboratory (“ISP Lab”) for testing. It contained 25.75 grams of methamphetamine.

[8] By amended information, the State charged Edwards with Level 3 possession of methamphetamine based on his possession of at least ten but less than twenty-eight grams on the property of a penal facility, and Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended.⁵ On a separate charging instrument, the State alleged he was a habitual offender.

[9] The case went to trial, with Edwards proceeding pro se. As to the chain of custody, Officer Allen stated he brought the three baggies recovered from Edwards’ mouth to the MCSD evidence room, where he photographed them and field tested one of the smaller bags. He placed the baggies into three separate evidence bags, heat sealed each bag, initialed the corners, marked them with the case number, and logged them into evidence. Officer Allen explained that after the baggies were logged into the evidence locker, the “property room boss remove[d] them and [sent] them to the lab for testing.” Id. at 71. He identified that person as Doug Beltz. Officer Allen also stated that on the day of trial, he retrieved State's Exhibit 7—a manila envelope containing all three baggies in the sealed evidence bags—from the MCSD evidence locker and brought it to the courtroom. The sealed bags within Exhibit 7 bear Officer Allen's initials on the corners and MCSD evidence tags. The larger baggie (the only one sent to the ISP Lab) also displays an ISP Lab identification label, the initials placed by the forensic scientist after analysis, and the scientist's tape seal. When the State introduced Exhibit 7, Officer Allen identified the contents as the same evidence recovered from Edwards’ mouth on August 16, 2024, based on the appearance and labels.

[10] On direct examination, George Bloom, a forensic scientist at the ISP Lab, testified evidence sent for testing is “oftentimes hand delivered by officers” or it “can also be delivered by [the] U.S. Postal service.” Id. at 147. He explained the general procedures used to document the chain of custody within the ISP Lab, as well as the procedures he followed when he handled the evidence in this case. When he received the large bag for testing, he “verified that the package was in a proper sealed condition, meaning that there were no gaps in any heat seals,” and the officer's initials were placed over the seals. Id. at 148–49. He determined the evidence “was not tampered with or open.” Id. at 164. In the courtroom, Bloom identified the large baggie from Exhibit 7 as the same evidence he received for testing, in the same condition as he first received it “with the addition of my taped seal after analyzing it[.]” Id. at 150.

[11] When the State offered the contents of the large baggie into evidence as part of Exhibit 7, Edwards objected based on “the chain of custody” but did not elaborate. Id. at 153. The trial court overruled the objection. When the State offered the ISP Lab report showing the large baggie contained 25.75 grams of methamphetamine, the trial court admitted the report over Edwards’ same objection.

[12] On cross-examination, Edwards elicited testimony from Bloom that the evidence in this case “was brought ․ in person by a[n] individual of the name[ ] Doug Beltz” and “transferred to our evidence specialist, Jacob Crouch.” Id. at 160–61. Bloom testified that after testing was complete, Beltz picked up the evidence from the ISP Lab. Id. at 161. The jury found Edwards guilty as charged.

[13] The trial moved to phase two. To support the habitual offender enhancement, the State sought to prove Edwards committed the following prior unrelated felonies:

• Under cause number 29C01-1907-F4-5728: On July 14, 2019, Edwards committed Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine and was convicted and sentenced for that offense on June 18, 2020.

• Under cause number 32D02-1007-FB-7: On July 9, 2010, Edwards committed Class B felony burglary and was convicted and sentenced for that offense on March 22, 2011.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 73. The State presented certain certified and authentic documentary evidence pertaining to these cases. As to the burglary conviction, the State introduced the Hendricks Superior Court's sentencing order dated March 22, 2011. However, the document the State submitted did not include the trial court's signature. The jury found Edwards was a habitual offender.

[14] Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced Edwards to eleven years for possession of methamphetamine, plus thirteen years for the habitual offender enhancement, and a concurrent sentence of one year for driving while suspended, for an aggregate sentence of twenty-four years.

The State established a proper chain of custody to admit the methamphetamine.

[15] A chain of custody objection relates to the foundational admissibility of physical evidence. Perry v. State, 267 N.E.3d 20, 32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. “We review challenges to the admission of evidence for an abuse of the trial court's discretion.” Jones v. State, 218 N.E.3d 3, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. We reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights. Id.

[16] “An exhibit is admissible ‘if the evidence regarding its chain of custody strongly suggests the exact whereabouts of the evidence at all times.’ ” Id. (quoting Culver v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (Ind. 2000)). The extent of foundation the State must lay depends on whether the item to be admitted is fungible or nonfungible. K.W. v. State, 216 N.E.3d 505, 516 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Dudley v. State, 480 N.E.2d 881, 898 (Ind. 1985)), trans. denied. “For fungible items, such as blood and drugs, an adequate foundation is laid when the whereabouts of an exhibit is shown from the time it came into the possession of the police.” Id. (citation omitted). To establish a proper chain of custody, the State must give reasonable assurances the evidence remained in an undisturbed condition. Troxell v. State, 778 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Ind. 2002). But the State need not establish a perfect chain of custody. Id. Once the State strongly suggests the exact whereabouts of the evidence, any gaps go to the weight of the evidence and not to admissibility. Id. Moreover, we presume officers exercise regularity in handling evidence and due care in conducting their duties. Id. To mount a successful challenge to the chain of custody, a defendant must present evidence that does more than raise a mere possibility the evidence may have been tampered with. Id.

[17] Here, the trial testimony established Officer Allen bagged, heat sealed, initialed, and logged the evidence at the MCSD property room. From there, Beltz was the officer responsible for the MCSD property room. Officer Allen testified Beltz removed the evidence and took it to the ISP Lab for testing. Bloom, the forensic scientist, stated the ISP Lab logs showed Beltz delivered the evidence in person. When Bloom received the evidence, he examined the heat seals and officer's initials on the bag and saw no signs of tampering. Bloom testified to the chain of custody as the evidence moved throughout the ISP Lab. After testing, Bloom tape sealed and initialed the evidence. ISP Lab records show Beltz picked up the evidence. Officer Allen then retrieved the evidence from the MCSD evidence locker the morning of trial. During trial, Officer Allen and Bloom testified Exhibit 7 was the same evidence collected and analyzed.

[18] Edwards asserts the “defect in the chain of custody is the gap between when the [large baggie] was put in the sheriff's evidence or property room [until] it was delivered to the state police lab for testing and then from when ․ it was picked up and returned to the sheriff's department.” Appellant's Br. at 11. He notes Beltz—who managed the MCSD property room and transported the evidence to the ISP Lab—was not called as a witness, and further there was “no evidence of what safeguards were in effect for the Sheriff's property room to preserve the evidence.” Id. at 12.

[19] In support of his argument, Edwards cites Graham v. State, 255 N.E.2d 652 (Ind. 1970). During an investigation in that case, police collected a Juicy Fruit gum wrapper containing a white powdery substance suspected to be heroin. According to police property room records, the gum wrapper was deposited in the evidence room the day it was seized. But before testing, it was checked out by one police officer and returned six days later by another. Three months later, the lab tested the sample, and the lab's report formed the basis of the defendant's conviction for possession of heroin. Neither officer testified at trial about the wrapper's whereabouts during those six days it was checked out before testing. The Graham Court held “the unaccounted for absence of a police exhibit of this nature for six days and six nights” was a complete break in the chain of custody, the lab report should have been excluded, and the defendant's conviction was reversed. Id. at 655.

[20] Although Beltz did not testify, we agree with the State the “absence of Beltz's testimony does not equate to a defect or a break in the chain of custody.” Appellee's Br. at 14. Officer Allen's and Bloom's testimonies and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom strongly suggested the evidence remained in the MCSD evidence locker from the time Officer Allen deposited it until Beltz transported it to the ISP Lab for testing. Unlike the “unaccounted for absence” in Graham, 255 N.E.2d at 655, there was no evidence in this case to suggest the evidence was removed from the MCSD evidence locker prior to testing.

[21] Moreover, we presume officers exercise regularity in handling evidence and due care in conducting their duties. See Troxell, 778 N.E.2d at 814. Here, Edwards points to no irregularities in the MCSD's normal procedures for handling evidence that needed to be explained. Nor does he identify facts tending to show the evidence in this case was tampered with. The “mere possibility” evidence may have been tampered with is insufficient to overcome the presumption of regular handling and due care. Id. Because the State strongly suggested the evidence's whereabouts at all times, it laid a sufficient foundation to permit admission of the evidence, and any gaps go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. See id.

[22] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 25.75 grams of methamphetamine and ISP Lab report.

Insufficient evidence supported the habitual offender enhancement.

[23] Edwards next argues the evidence presented was insufficient to support the jury's habitual offender finding. The sentence of a person convicted of a Level 3 felony may be enhanced by an additional fixed term of up to twenty years if the defendant is found to be a habitual offender. I.C. § 35-50-2-8(i). To prove Edwards was a habitual offender as alleged, the State was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt Edwards was previously convicted of two unrelated felonies, and at least one of the prior unrelated felonies is not a Level 6 or Class D felony. I.C. § 35-50-2-8(b).

[24] The “State must introduce into evidence proper certified and authenticated records of the defendant's prior felony convictions in order to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of those prior convictions.” Dexter v. State, 959 N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ind. 2012). To constitute substantial evidence of probative value sufficient to sustain a habitual offender enhancement, a judgment must be signed by the trial judge. Id. at 239.

[25] To prove Edwards’ prior conviction for felony burglary, the State introduced Edwards’ fingerprints, palm prints, mugshots taken around the time of his arrest; a certified copy of the charging information; and the first page of a certified copy of the sentencing order dated March 22, 2011. The sentencing order references Edwards’ guilty plea and judgment of conviction, but the order in the record is not signed by the trial court. And because no other certified and authenticated records established the fact of his burglary conviction, the State presented insufficient evidence of probative value to sustain the habitual offender finding. See id. (holding an unsigned order of judgment is not probative of the fact of a prior felony conviction). Accordingly, we reverse the enhancement.

[26] Edwards contends he may not be retried on the habitual offender allegation. See Appellant's Br. at 15 (citing Abdullah v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding the defendant may not be retried where the trial court relied on an abstract of judgment lacking a judicial signature as support for its findings the defendant was a serious violent felon and a habitual offender)). But the Indiana Supreme Court has since held “retrial on a sentencing enhancement based on a prior conviction is permitted even where the enhancement is reversed because of insufficient evidence.” Dexter, 959 N.E.2d at 240. Accordingly, the State may retry Edwards on the habitual offender enhancement. See id.

Conclusion

[27] The State established a proper chain of custody and thereby laid a proper foundation, such that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the methamphetamine and lab report. The State presented insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding Edwards is a habitual offender, and therefore we reverse the enhancement and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

[28] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a) & (d)(1) (2014).

2.   I.C. § 9-24-19-2 (2016).

3.   I.C. § 35-50-2-8(b) (2023).

4.   There was also a passenger in Edwards’ car. When the officer patted the passenger down, a glass pipe with burnt residue fell out of his pants. There was an active warrant out of Illinois for the passenger's arrest, but Illinois declined to extradite him. Officer Allen decided to release him. But because the passenger did not have a license, another officer took him to a gas station to wait for a ride rather than let him drive Edwards’ car.

5.   The State also charged Edwards with Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia but later moved to dismiss those charges.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.