M.P. (Mother) Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] M.P. (Mother) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to her minor child, E.M. (Child). Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Child was born to Mother and J.M. (Father)¹ on April 3, 2018. The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a child in need of services (CHINS) petition in February 2021 after assessing a report that Father discarded methamphetamine and other controlled substances from his vehicle during a traffic stop and that Child was unrestrained in the front passenger seat. Mother was incarcerated in the Pike County Jail at the time.² Later that same month, Mother was charged in a new criminal case with three drug-related charges under Cause 42C01-2102-F5-30 (F5-30).³

[4] On May 24, 2021, Mother appeared by phone from jail for an initial hearing on the CHINS petition and admitted Child was a CHINS. The court took Mother's admission under advisement pending a fact-finding hearing as to Father. After Father entered a stipulation to the CHINS petition in October 2021, the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS. The court entered a dispositional order on November 15, 2021, ordering Mother to participate in services, maintain sobriety, and comply with the case plan. The court also ordered DCS to provide Mother with virtual visitation with Child while Mother was incarcerated and supervised visitation upon her release.

[5] Mother was released from incarceration in February 2022 and began engaging in services. At a June 13, 2022, review hearing, the court found that Mother had complied with the case plan, obtained full-time employment, secured appropriate housing, reinstated her driver's license, obtained reliable transportation, consistently participated in relapse-prevention services, attended “90 meetings in 90 days,” and submitted negative drug screens. Exhibits Vol. 1 at 184. The court also found that Mother attended all scheduled visits and had progressed to extended unsupervised visits on Saturdays. Based on Mother's progress, the court approved DCS's request for a trial home visit, which began on June 24, 2022.

[6] On August 16, 2022, DCS filed a motion to terminate the trial home visit, citing several reasons:

• On the morning of July 7, 2022, Child, then four years ol was home alone for approximately fifteen minutes and was found alone in an alley outside the apartment.

• Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and/or THC on several occasions.

• Mother lost her job and moved in with Child's paternal uncle to avoid eviction.

• Child was supposed to attend weekly speech therapy, bu Mother had taken him to only one appointment since the trial home visit began.

After a hearing, the trial court granted DCS's motion, and Child was placed in kinship care. Mother admitted that she stopped participating in services after the trial home visit ended.

[7] In early July 2023, the trial court approved Child's placement in a trial home visit with Father, which the court extended in September. At a permanency hearing held in October 2023, the court found that Father was compliant with the case plan but that Mother was non-compliant because she was not participating in services or visiting with Child. The following month, Mother pled guilty in F5-30 to Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and was sentenced to two years, all suspended to supervised probation.

[8] On January 3, 2024, DCS moved to terminate Child's trial home visit with Father due to Father failing multiple drug screens. Following a hearing, the trial court granted DCS's motion, and Child was placed with his current foster placement.

[9] On January 4, 2024, Mother was reincarcerated in the Knox County Jail on new criminal charges, which charges also served as a basis for a probation violation in F5-30. After Mother admitted to violating her probation, the court revoked her probation and ordered her to serve the remainder of her sentence in F5-30 in the Knox County Jail. While in jail, Mother cooperated with DCS and participated in available services, including home-based casework and therapy to address post-release planning, housing, coping skills, and resourcing.

[10] The trial court held a permanency hearing on March 25, 2024, following which the court approved a concurrent permanency plan of reunification and termination and adoption. In April 2024, DCS moved to suspend Mother's visitation because Mother was incarcerated and Child's therapist recommended against Child visiting Mother in jail.⁴ At a hearing on DCS's motion, the court approved an agreement between the parties that Mother would write three letters a month to Child, and DCS would facilitate such communication by providing Mother with stationery and stamped envelopes. Child's therapist then shared the letters with Child during Child's monthly therapy session. Mother also spoke with Child over the phone during one of his counseling sessions.

[11] On August 21, 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. Upon her release from the Knox County Jail in November 2024, Mother immediately reported to DCS and submitted a drug screen. Family Case Manager Bridget Wright (FCM Wright), who started managing Mother's case in January 2024, was on an extended leave when Mother was released. The FCM managing FCM Wright's cases instructed Mother to come back the following week when FCM Wright was to return. Mother did not return and did not thereafter consistently stay in contact with FCM Wright. When FCM Wright and Mother did communicate, Mother would not provide an address where she was staying. Service providers also tried to locate Mother but were unsuccessful. As a result, services for Mother were put on hold.⁵ Mother also stopped sending letters to Child.

[12] The court held a fact-finding hearing on the termination petition across five separate days—November 4, 2024,⁶ January 23, 2025, February 14, 2025, April 11, 2025, and May 14, 2025. Mother testified that about a week after her November release, she moved to Illinois with a friend, but moved back to Indiana after a short time because she could not get services in Illinois. Mother admitted that around Christmas 2024, she had a relapse because she was unable to see Child and due to some issues with her parents. Mother continued to use drugs for four to six weeks.

[13] In early January 2025, FCM Crystal Mefford took over for FCM Wright. At that time, Mother's whereabouts were unknown and FCM Mefford was unable to make contact with her given the information provided. FCM Mefford eventually met with Mother at the January 23 hearing, at which time FCM Mefford advised Mother to resume writing letters to Child and discussed available services. Mother was directed to submit drug screens twice a week, but Mother did not call in to see if she needed to screen after January 2025. Mother also did not write to Child, her participation in home-based services was “hit or miss,” and she did not follow through with setting up therapy appointments. Transcript Vol. 3 at 54.

[14] In March 2025, Mother was arrested and incarcerated in Vigo County. She was later charged with dealing methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine, unlawful possession of a firearm, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of marijuana. Mother did not notify FCM Mefford of her arrest, and FCM Mefford only became aware of Mother's arrest when she saw it on the news.

[15] Following Mother's most recent incarceration in Vigo County, FCM Mefford did not offer services to Mother “given the circumstances” of this case and because it was her understanding that the Vigo County Jail did not allow DCS to provide services. Id. at 65. For the April 11 and May 14, 2025, hearing dates, Mother was transported from the Vigo County Jail. Mother testified at the April 11 hearing and stated that she was voluntarily participating in a twelve-week substance abuse program as well as AA/NA meetings while in jail. She testified that she was also participating in “seeking safety,” a program focusing on PTSD and trauma that she had experienced in her life. Id. at 156.

[16] On September 26, 2025, the court issued its order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child. The court made numerous findings, including that the CHINS case had been open since February 2021 and Child had spent a majority of those years outside parents’ care; DCS had provided multiple services to Mother, which were unsuccessful; Mother failed to take full advantage of the provided services “in spite of the case being open for four years”; and Mother failed to maintain sobriety, stability, or contact with Child. Appendix Vol. II at 34. The court also found that Mother could not provide for Child's basic needs; that she had been in and out of incarceration throughout the CHINS case; and that she had not addressed her long-term substance abuse, criminal behavior, and lack of stability. Based on these and other findings, none of which Mother challenges, the trial court concluded that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or continued placement outside the home will not be remedied and that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's wellbeing. The court also concluded that DCS has a satisfactory plan for Child to be adopted by his current foster placement and that adoption was in Child's best interests. Mother now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Standard of Review

[17] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, and thus we will consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019). In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside its judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[18] Our review for clear error is confined to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). Reviewing whether the evidence “clearly and convincingly” supports the findings, or the findings “clearly and convincingly” support the judgment, is not a license to reweigh the evidence. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014) (observing that weighing the evidence under the clear and convincing evidence standard applicable to termination cases is the trial court's prerogative, not ours). Further, we must accept any unchallenged findings as true. See Matter of To.R., 177 N.E.3d 478, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

Discussion & Decision

[19] Although parental rights are of constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In addition, a court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding the termination. In re J.W., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

[20] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, DCS must allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the existence of one or more of the circumstances described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) (Subsection (d)); (2) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child; and (3) termination is in the child's best interests. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c); Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2. Subsection (d) contains thirteen circumstances supporting termination, of which the following three were alleged by DCS:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office ․ for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a [CHINS]; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d).

[21] We initially observe that the trial court improperly applied the former version of I.C. § 31-35-2-4, which was substantially amended in early 2024. The trial court did not consider the circumstance set out in Subsection (d)(2) as alleged by DCS, which we note appears to have been clearly established by DCS. Regardless, the other two alleged circumstances were found by the trial court to have been proven, and if we affirm one of these, we need not address the other. See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[22] Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal from or continued placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied. In making such a determination, a trial court engages in a two-step analysis: (1) ascertaining what conditions led to the child's placement and retention outside the home and (2) determining whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. The latter step requires the trial court to “judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.” J.W., 259 N.E.3d at 1045 (quoting In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied).

In so doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through DCS. A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change.

Id. (brackets omitted). Further, it is within the trial court's discretion to disregard efforts made shortly before the termination hearing and to weigh more heavily the parent's history of conduct prior to those efforts. P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799.

[23] Mother first argues that the reason for Child's removal was due to Father's conduct during a traffic stop involving illegal substances while Child was unrestrained in the front seat of the vehicle. Mother points out that she was incarcerated at the time and thus, her substance abuse was not specified as a reason for Child's continued placement outside her home. We disagree.

[24] Mother was incarcerated when DCS got involved with the family and remained incarcerated throughout the first year of the CHINS proceedings. During that time, Mother was charged with drug-related offenses that preceded the CHINS action. Upon her release from incarceration, Mother participated in services and progressed to a trial home visit with Child. This trial was short-lived as Mother relapsed, thereby negating the progress she had made. Child was removed from Mother's care and thereafter, Mother did not engage in services and did not visit Child for more than a year. It was not until Mother was reincarcerated on new criminal charges in January 2024 that she made a renewed effort toward reunification. Mother's criminal conduct and repeated drug use were clearly reasons for Child's continued removal from Mother's home.

[25] As to the second consideration, Mother argues that she had “previously demonstrated the ability to remedy the conditions that led to removal” and points out that “during her subsequent periods of incarceration,” she engaged in services. Appellant's Brief at 15. Mother's argument leaves out a key consideration—the positive progress upon which she relies was two years prior to the filing of the termination petition and three years prior to the fact-finding hearing. She also does not acknowledge that she relapsed soon after Child was placed with her for a trial home visit. After Child's removal from her care in August 2022, Mother did not participate in services, did not visit with Child, was in and out of jail, and she continued to engage in criminal conduct. Mother only started participating in services after the termination petition was filed and she was incarcerated yet again. Mother remained incarcerated during the pendency of the termination fact-finding hearing. The CHINS matter had been pending for more than four years. Based on the evidence, the trial court did not err in concluding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside Mother's home will change. Having concluded as such, we need not address the trial court's conclusion regarding Subsection (d)(4). See J.W., 259 N.E.3d at 1045 (noting that DCS is required to prove only one of the circumstances listed in Subsection (d) in support of its petition to terminate parental rights). Mother does not challenge the trial court's conclusion as to the existence of a satisfactory plan and the best interests of the Child. We therefore affirm the trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights.

[26] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court also terminated Father's parental rights, but he does not participate in this appeal.

2.   In November 2016, Mother was charged with Level 5 felony escape for running away from lawful detention. Mother pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced to four years, with one year in community corrections and three years suspended to probation. Mother gave birth to Child in 2018. In September 2019, the State moved to revoke Mother's probation based on Mother committing a new criminal offense. In November 2020, Mother admitted to violating her probation and the trial court ordered her to serve two years in the Department of Correction. This is the sanction Mother was serving when DCS became involved with the family.

3.   Specifically, the State charged Mother with Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine, Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class A misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, which alleged offenses dated back to September 1, 2020.

4.   Child was having problems with regulating his emotions and would exhibit negative behaviors, such as headbutting, hitting, and kicking, after having contact with Mother. After visits with Mother were stopped, Child's negative behaviors improved.

5.   FCM Wright explained that when the services were put on hold, the referral remained in place but service providers were not required to attempt to meet with Mother.

6.   Although this date is not noted in the termination order, the chronological case summary indicates that the court held a fact-finding hearing, during which the court took judicial notice of the underlying CHINS and paternity cases. A transcript of this hearing was not included on appeal.

Altice, Judge.

Brown, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.