Jeremy David Houston, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jeremy Houston met Erin Kidwell at a company picnic in 2015, and the pair eventually started dating and living together. Kidwell's oldest daughter, K.K., initially had a poor relationship with Houston, but in or around December of 2021, that changed. Houston subsequently engaged in numerous sexual touchings with K.K., at one point threatening to harm her if she reported his actions. Despite Houston's threat, K.K. eventually reported Houston's conduct, after which Houston indirectly sent sexually explicit messages to K.K. and made false reports of criminal behavior by Kidwell. Eventually, Houston violated protective orders that had been issued for the protection of Kidwell and K.K. by contacting K.K. and entering Kidwell's home.

[2] Houston was charged with numerous offenses, and, following a jury trial, was convicted of thirteen counts, including three counts of Level 3 felony child seduction, three counts of Level 4 felony child molesting, Level 4 felony burglary, Level 5 felony child solicitation, Level 5 felony stalking, Level 6 felony residential entry, Class A misdemeanor false informing, and two counts of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. Houston was sentenced to an aggregate sixty-two-year sentence.

[3] Houston contends that some of his convictions violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain some of his convictions. Because we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the challenged convictions but that some of Houston's convictions violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] K.K. was born on July 10, 2009. Houston was born on November 6, 1984. Kidwell met Houston in the summer of 2015, when they both attended a company picnic for their employer. Kidwell and Houston eventually started dating and moved in together in September of 2017.

[5] At the time Kidwell and Houston began dating, Kidwell had two children: K.K. and a son, C.K. During the course of their romantic relationship, Kidwell and Houston had a daughter, N., together. Once Kidwell and Houston had begun dating, Houston “immediately had a say so in everything[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 178. Houston assumed childcare responsibilities for K.K. and her siblings while Kidwell worked on Sundays from 7:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Houston also contributed to the family household financially and, on occasion, would help clean and organize the family home.

[6] When Kidwell and Houston began dating, Houston's relationship with K.K. and C.K. “wasn't very good. He was very mean to” them “because, like, [they] weren't his own.” Tr. Vol. II p. 169. However, around December of 2021, Houston's relationship with K.K. changed “out of the blue.” Tr. Vol. II p. 170. The change occurred “overnight, he started being extra nice to [K.K.],” taking her to buy expensive beauty products, to Indiana University and Colts games, and to get her nails done. Tr. Vol. II p. 127. For Valentine's Day in 2022, Houston took K.K. to get her nails done but did not get anything for Kidwell

[7] Houston began spending a lot of time in K.K.’s room and Kidwell would have “a hard time getting him to come out of her room. Usually, he was just standing [in] the doorway looking at her, talking to her, watching a movie, or, or just whatever. [Kidwell] had a hard time getting him to go away so [K.K.] could go to sleep for school.” Tr. Vol. II p. 127. At some point, Kidwell observed Houston rubbing K.K.’s feet while K.K. “laid on her stomach” on Kidwell and Houston's bed. Tr. Vol. II p. 128. Houston explained that K.K. had “said her feet were cold, so I'm rubbing them.” Tr. Vol. II p. 128. Kidwell was alarmed by the foot rub because Houston had not been nice to K.K. before and because Houston had “a foot fetish.” Tr. Vol. II p. 134.

[8] On another occasion, Houston took K.K. and her friend M.H. to eat at a restaurant while Kidwell stayed home with C.K. and N. At the time, K.K. was twelve years old and M.H. was thirteen years old. While at the restaurant, Houston asked the girls if they had “been involved with sexual, like, stuff” or had “ever had sex[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 173. K.K. responded no, and the girls went to the bathroom because they felt uncomfortable.

[9] In a text message on February 14, 2022, Houston told K.K. that “I hope you know and believe without a doubt that you're an amazing, smart, talented, and beautiful young lady” and that he loved and appreciated her. Ex. Vol. V. p. 23. K.K. thought that the text message was unusual because Houston had “never really said, I love you” to her. Tr. Vol. II p. 178.

[10] During the timeframe of January to February of 2022, Houston began touching K.K. inappropriately while Kidwell was at work. On one occasion, Houston put “his hand on [K.K.’s] thigh and then he would take it off and then he would [put] it back on and then go up more.” Tr. Vol. II p. 191. On another occasion, when K.K. was wearing short Nike Pro spandex shorts, Houston “had his hand on [K.K.’s] thigh and was taking it off and then he would put back on higher and pretend it's an accident. And then he would, like, rub up and down and then eventually rubbed into pants and grabbed [K.K.’s] butt.” Tr. Vol. II p. 193. Houston put his hand inside K.K.’s pants and rubbed up and down before grabbing K.K.’s “butt.” Tr. Vol. II p. 194. This touching made K.K. “feel very uncomfortable” and “very confused.” Tr. Vol. II p. 194.

[11] On another occasion K.K. was in Houston and Kidwell's bedroom playing on a computer or video game, when Houston sat down next to K.K., placed his hand “inside” K.K.’s pants, and began rubbing K.K.’s “inner thigh and was rubbing up and down” and his fingers “touched the exterior of [K.K.’s] vagina.” Tr. Vol. II p. 197. K.K. felt “[u]ncomfortable” and “annoyed.” Tr. Vol. II p. 198. The touching stopped when K.K. left the room.

[12] On yet another occasion, K.K. was in her mother's bedroom playing either a computer or video game, sitting sideways in a chair with her legs and bare feet hanging over the side. Houston, who was sitting by K.K. on the floor, began rubbing K.K.’s feet with his hands. At some point, K.K.

felt something that wasn't a finger on my feet and I was just confused to be honest. So, I picked one of my feet up and I didn't, like, kick his chest as hard as I could, I just kind of, like, kicked him over to where he could fall over. And I saw that he had his penis out of his pants.

Tr. Vol. II p. 200. K.K. observed that Houston's penis was “erect.” Tr. Vol. II p. 201. K.K. “immediately got up and ․ burst into tears and ․ ran to [her] bedroom and locked the door.” Tr. Vol. II p. 202. Houston threatened K.K. that if she told anyone he would “beat [her] over the head with a baseball bat while [she] was sleeping.” Tr. Vol. II p. 204. Houston's threat scared K.K.

[13] Several days before February 24, 2022, K.K. awoke to find Houston staring at her. Houston left the room after K.K. told him to get out. The next day K.K. found a draft of an unsent text message on her phone that said “I want to eat your butt, over and over again, like, it was like, a whole paragraph of it.” Tr. Vol. II p. 187. K.K. deleted it and mentioned it to Houston, who admitted that he had written it.

[14] On the morning of February 24, 2022, around 2:00 a.m., K.K. woke up to see Houston “standing and looking at” her. Tr. Vol. II p. 210. Houston asked K.K. “hey do you want to go somewhere while your mom's asleep? We can go do whatever.” Tr. Vol. II p. 211. Houston left the room after K.K. responded that she was tired and “put the covers over [her] face.” Tr. Vol. II p. 211. Later that morning, K.K. saw a draft message on her phone to a phone number of “6969[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 212. The message said, “Y do u keep acting like you want to do things then telling me to go away when I try to?” Ex. Vol. V p. 52. The message indicated that the sender could “be as patient as I need to be[,]” referenced Kidwell's upcoming work schedule, and stated

I'll do anything you want to do, ANYTHING. I really want to eat your p[*]ssy and a[**] for real though. The only reason I'm not moving out is because if I do I don't think I'll be able to see you anymore. I only got in your phone because I felt like you were telling me to[.]

Ex. Vol. V p. 53. The message indicated that K.K. was “beautiful” and had “an amazing body from head to toe.” Ex. Vol. V p. 54. It instructed K.K. that

[i]f you want me to try to come in [your] room at night just leave your [LED] lights on to signal [you] want me to․ Red if you want me to come in tonight, green if [you] want me to get up at 5am and come in then, blue if you want to wait until this weekend.

Ex. Vol. V p. 54.¹ K.K. believed that the message had been written by Houston for her to read. She copied and pasted the draft into a text message that she sent to her own telephone number. After arriving at school, K.K., who was scared, showed the message to M.H. She also told a school counselor, who reported Houston's conduct to the authorities. Kidwell obtained orders for protection for herself and K.K. in March of 2022. Kidwell changed the locks on the home, where she and the children continued to live.

[15] In January of 2023, Kidwell became aware of a strange TikTok account that was following M.H. The account profile had content that was “really sexual” and contained content that could apply to specific persons. Tr. Vol. III p. 34. Kidwell and K.K. thought the sexually explicit posts were geared toward K.K. based on the context of things that were said. In the “bio” for the account it said, “I miss K.” Tr. Vol. II p. 225. There was a sexual video posted with a black screen that talked about her putting on a cheer uniform and “doing stuff” to her. Tr. Vol. II p. 225. Another post read

I wish we could go back to the last night/morning we had together. This time when you got on the floor on your hands and knees, I would grab you by the ankles and tear your shorts off. Then I would grab those perfect a[**] cheeks and pull your a[**] into my face and proceed to bathe your a[**], your a[**]hole with my tongue. I'd grab your cheeks tight and spread you open and stick my tongue as far into you as I could and drench your insides. Next, I'd stick my cock in your mouth so you could get it rock hard and slobbered. Then I'd get behind you and slowly shove my dick inside your a[**] until you could feel me in your stomach. I'd grab firmly onto your tits and clap your cheeks progressively harder until you begged me to stop. Then I'd spread your, spread your thighs out and lick your p[*]ssy inside out and shove my entire tongue inside you until you creamed all over it. Then I'd throw those pretty feet over my shoulders and force my long, throbbing, cock as deep inside that kitty as physically possible. I'd gentle tickle the back of your belly button and then start to tap on your liver slowly and progress to pound it harder and harder until you came on it. I'd pull it out and shove it into that pretty mouth so you could taste how good you are. Then I'd grab you by the hair and pull your head into me until I was in your esophagus and bust straight down your throat. Then we'd live happily ever after.

Tr. Vol. III pp. 123–24.

[16] Another post indicated that K.K.’s “entire body is perfect to me” and referenced the day Houston first met K.K. Tr. Vol. III p. 125. Houston also commented on his own posts about rubbing K.K.’s feet and that “I miss rubbing those perfect pretty little feet so bad. I got hard af that day.” Ex. Vol. V p. 147. Another comment read “I only sent M that request to get your attention bcuz I don't want to risk [Kidwell] finding this account if I send 1 from here to u.” Ex. Vol. V p. 142. The account, which had been created a month after Houston had moved out of Kidwell's home, was connected to Houston's phone number and the birthday listed on the account matched Houston's birthday.

[17] During the early morning hours on August 9, 2023, Houston called Kidwell and told her that he had just seen someone kidnap K.K. When Kidwell checked K.K.’s room, she was “laying there asleep.” Tr. Vol. II p. 136. Kidwell asked Houston how he could know that, and he responded that “he was watching for things outside of the house.” Tr. Vol. II p. 136. Kidwell looked out the window and observed that “his car was catty-cornered from” Kidwell's home. Tr. Vol. II p. 136. That same morning, Houston called police and reported that K.K. was “either being abducted or partaking in some type of” sex trafficking or prostitution. Tr. Vol. II p. 154. Hendricks County Sheriff's Deputy Alex Haak was dispatched to Kidwell's home and observed Houston “a couple houses down ․ in his vehicle.” Tr. Vol. II p. 156. Deputy Haak spoke with Kidwell and found that K.K. was asleep in the home. Deputy Haak found no evidence to suggest that K.K. “was being sex-trafficked.” Tr. Vol. II p. 158.

[18] After the first set of orders for protection expired, Kidwell obtained new ones for herself and K.K., which did not expire until August of 2025. The orders for protection prohibited Houston from “harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with” Kidwell and K.K. and ordered Houston to “stay away from [Kidwell's] residence and/or place of employment.” Ex. Vol. V. p. 13.

[19] In December of 2023, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) contacted Kidwell due to a report that had been made of “sex-trafficking in [Kidwell's] home.” Tr. Vol. II p. 141. Kidwell denied “sex-trafficking [K.K.].” Tr. Vol. II p. 141. Houston also called the FBI to report that K.K. “was being sex-trafficked by her mother” and was being sexually abused by Houston's brother and father. Tr. Vol. III p. 59. Houston later called the FBI to follow up on his initial report. The false reports required K.K. to talk to law enforcement and DCS workers and made her “very annoyed” and “sick and tired” of talking about Houston's false allegations. Tr. Vol. II p. 227.

[20] On February 6, 2024, Houston entered Kidwell's home at a time when K.K. was home alone. K.K. came out of the bathroom and found Houston in the home, standing approximately “maybe 10, 15 feet away from” her. Tr. Vol. II p. 233. K.K. screamed at Houston to “get out.” Tr. Vol. II p. 233. Houston questioned K.K. about why they had exchanged money for her “to have sex with [him] if [she was] not going to do anything.” Tr. Vol. II p. 233. K.K. was confused because “that never happened.” Tr. Vol. II p. 233. Houston then sprinted up the stairs while K.K. “sprinted out the back door” and hid behind an air conditioning unit. Tr. Vol. II p. 233. K.K. was “scared out of [her] mind” because she “wasn't sure what he was capable of doing. I was just really scared.” Tr. Vol. II p. 235.

[21] On February 7, 2024, the State charged Houston with the following:

Count 1 Level 3 felony child seduction Count 2 Level 4 felony child molesting Count 3 Level 3 felony child seduction Count 4 Level 4 felony child molesting Count 5 Level 3 felony child seduction Count 6 Level 4 felony child molesting Count 7 Level 4 felony burglary Count 8 Level 5 felony child solicitation Count 9 Level 5 felony stalking Count 10 Level 6 felony residential entry Count 11 Class A misdemeanor false informing Count 14 Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy Count 15 Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy 2

A jury trial commenced on April 28, 2025. During closing argument, the State acknowledged that some of the charges were overlapping and involved the same facts. The State also indicated that Houston had violated the order for K.K.’s protection by contacting and communicating with her on February 6, 2024, and had violated the order for Kidwell's protection by going to Kidwell's home on February 6, 2024. The State reiterated that one of the invasion-of-privacy charges related to the violation of the order for Kidwell's protection and the other related to the violation of the order for K.K.’s protection. At the conclusion of trial, a jury found Houston guilty of Counts 1 through 11 and Counts 14 through 15. On May 29, 2025, the trial court sentenced Houston to an aggregate sixty-two-year sentence.

Discussion and Decision

[22] Houston contends that a number of his convictions violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy and also that the evidence is insufficient to sustain many of his convictions. We address Houston's double-jeopardy arguments before turning to his sufficiency claims.

I. Double Jeopardy

[23] Questions of law, including double-jeopardy claims, are reviewed de novo. A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064 (Ind. 2024). “[S]ubstantive double jeopardy refers to claims related to multiple convictions for the same offense in a single proceeding.” Id. at 1066. “Substantive double jeopardy claims come in two principal varieties: (1) when a single criminal act or transaction violates a single statute but harms multiple victims, and (2) when a single criminal act or transaction violates multiple statutes with common elements and harms one or more victims.” Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 247 (Ind. 2020). “In either circumstance, the dispositive question is one of statutory intent.” Id.

[24] When a single criminal act or transaction violates multiple statutes with common elements, courts “first look to the statutory language” for each charge. Id. at 248. If the language of either statute “clearly permits” multiple punishments, there is no double-jeopardy violation. Id. However, if neither applicable statute clearly permits multiple punishments, either expressly or by unmistakable implication, we move on to the next step of the analysis.

[25] The next step is to determine whether one of the offenses is inherently or factually included in the other. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248.

“Included offense” means an offense that:

(1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less than all the material elements required to establish the commission of the offense charged;

(2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or

(3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to establish its commission.

Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168. “[T]o constitute an inherently included offense, it must fit within one of [the] enumerated subsections” of Indiana Code § 35-31.5-2-168. A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1067. “If neither offense is an included offense of the other (either inherently or as charged), there is no violation of double jeopardy and the analysis ends—full stop.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “But if one offense is included in the other, the court must proceed to Step 3.” Id.

[26] The third and final step of our substantive double jeopardy analysis gives the State the opportunity to rebut the presumptive double jeopardy violation. To do so, the State must demonstrate that it made clear to the fact-finder at trial that the apparently included charge was supported by independent evidence such that the State made a distinction between what would otherwise be two of the same offenses. However, if the State's evidence at trial shows only a single continuous crime, and one statutory offense is included in the other, the State may not obtain cumulative convictions.

Bolcerek v. State, 255 N.E.3d 1206, 1219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied. In cases “[w]here a defendant is found guilty of both the greater offense and an included offense, the proper procedure is to vacate the conviction for the included offense and to enter a judgment of conviction and sentence only upon the greater offense.” O'Connor v. State, 234 N.E.3d 242, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

A. Counts 1 Through 6

[27] Houston claims that his convictions for both Level 3 felony child solicitation and Level 4 felony child molesting, under Counts 1 through 6, violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy because Counts 1 and 2 are based on the same acts, Counts 3 and 4 are based on the same acts, and Counts 5 and 6 are based on the same acts. Specifically, Houston asserts that “Child Molestation is a lesser included offense of Child Seduction as all of the elements of the Child Molestation statute are included within the Child Seduction statute.” Appellant's Br. pp. 34–35.

[28] Again, the first step in our analysis regarding potential violations of the prohibitions against double jeopardy is whether the statutory language for each charge clearly permits multiple punishments, either expressly or by unmistakable implication. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 247. The State “agrees that in this case neither the child seduction nor the child molest statutes clearly permit multiple punishments, either expressly or by unmistakable implication.” Appellee's Br. pp. 31–32.

[29] The next step is to determine whether one of the offenses is inherently or factually included in the other. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248. The State acknowledges that “[h]ere the charging informations encompass the same facts. Each of the three sets of seduction and molest charges have the same date ranges, victim, perpetrator, ages, and acts of touching and fondling with intent to arouse sexual desires.” Appellee's Br. p. 32. The State therefore concedes that “[t]his counts as a presumptive double jeopardy violation at the second step of the analysis[.]” Appellee's Br. p. 32.

[30] The third step gives the State the opportunity to rebut the presumptive double-jeopardy violation by demonstrating that the charges were supported by independent evidence that would create a distinction between what would otherwise be the same offenses. Bolcerek, 255 N.E.3d at 1219. The State concedes that it explicitly stated below “that for each of the sets of seduction and molest convictions, they were based on the same act and that proof of the seduction count also constituted proof of the molest count.” Appellee's Br. p. 32. The State therefore agrees with Houston that “under Indiana's double jeopardy protections, the count with the lesser penalty, here the molest charges, should be vacated.” Appellee's Br. pp. 32–33. Given the State's concession that conviction for the lesser-included molestation charges in Counts 2, 4, and 6 violated the prohibitions against double jeopardy, we reverse Houston's convictions for Level 4 felony child molesting under Counts 2, 4, and 6 and remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate those convictions and sentences accordingly. See O'Connor, 234 N.E.3d at 247.

B. Counts 7 & 10

[31] Count 7 (Level 4 felony burglary) and Count 10 (Level 6 felony residential entry) both allege that on February 6, 2024, Houston did “break and enter the dwelling of” Kidwell. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 33, 36. Houston claims that residential entry is a lesser included offense of residential burglary and, as such, “[s]ince it is impossible to commit burglary without committing residential entry, the only appropriate remedy is to vacate the conviction for the lesser included offense of residential entry.” Appellant's Br. p. 39 (internal quotation omitted).

[32] Again, the first step in our analysis regarding potential violations of the prohibitions against double jeopardy is whether the statutory language for each charge clearly permits multiple punishments, either expressly or by unmistakable implication. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 247. The State concedes that “the two statutes do not clearly express an intent to allow multiple punishments.” Appellee's Br. pp. 40–41. The next step is to determine whether one of the offenses is inherently or factually included in the other. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248. As it relates to this step, the State concedes that “residential entry is an included offense of residential burglary because residential entry is proven by less than all of the material elements of burglary, the only difference being the intent to commit a felony in it.” Appellee's Br. p. 41.

[33] The third step gives the State the opportunity to rebut the presumptive double-jeopardy violation by demonstrating that the charges were supported by independent evidence that would create a distinction between what would otherwise be the same offenses. Bolcerek, 255 N.E.3d at 1219. At closing argument, the State acknowledged that “all the elements of the Residential Entry are included within the Burglary.” Tr. Vol. III p. 250. The State concedes on appeal that “[t]he conviction for residential entry therefore violated Indiana's double jeopardy protections and, as it is the conviction with the lesser penalty, should be vacated.” Appellee's Br. p. 41. Because we agree with the State, we reverse Houston's convictions for Level 6 felony residential entry and remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate that conviction and sentence accordingly. See O'Connor, 234 N.E.3d at 247.

C. Counts 9 & 15

[34] Count 9 (Level 5 felony stalking) alleges that Houston had stalked K.K. between December 1, 2023 and February 6, 2024, in violation of a protective order of which Houston had received actual notice. Count 15 (Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy) alleges that on February 6, 2024, Houston violated a protective order that had been issued for the protection of K.K. Houston claims that his convictions for both Count 9 and Count 15 violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy because invasion of privacy “is a lesser included offense of stalking[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 45.

[35] The stalking conviction was enhanced to a Level 5 felony as a result of his violation of the protective order. Thus, Houston's convictions for Level 5 felony stalking and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy involve an enhancement relationship rather than duel convictions for the same conduct and, “[u]nder Wadle, such enhancements do not implicate double jeopardy.” Fisher v. State, 264 N.E.3d 696, 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). In Wadle, the Indiana Supreme Court plainly stated that “an enhanced punishment, whether based on attendant circumstances or on a prior conviction, presents no double jeopardy issue at all.” 151 N.E.3d at 254 (internal quotation omitted). “Because the elevation is not a separate offense or conviction, double-jeopardy analysis is simply inapposite.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). The existence of the protective order in this case merely served to enhance the stalking charge from a Level 6 felony to a Level 5 felony. We therefore conclude that Houston's convictions under Counts 9 and 15 do not result in a double-jeopardy violation. See id.

D. Counts 14 & 15

[36] Houston also claims that his convictions for Count 14 (Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy–Kidwell) and Count 15 (Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy–K.K.) violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy. He argues that Counts “14 and 15 include almost identical charging information, with the exception of the individual that was protected.” Appellant's Br. p. 43. He argues that his violation of both orders for protection was alleged to have been completed by the same event, i.e., his arrival at and entry into Kidwell and K.K.’s home on February 6, 2024, and that the same facts were used to prove both offenses.

[37] Again, “[s]ubstantive double jeopardy claims come in two principal varieties: (1) when a single criminal act or transaction violates a single statute but harms multiple victims, and (2) when a single criminal act or transaction violates multiple statutes with common elements and harms one or more victims.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 247. While Wadle implicates the latter scenario, the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256 (Ind. 2020), implicates the former. The question presented under Powell “is not whether one offense is included in the other[.]” Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 263. “Instead, we ask whether the same act may be twice punished as two counts of the same offense.” Id. (internal quotations and footnote omitted).

[38] In resolving a claim of multiplicity, our task is to determine whether the statute permits punishment for a single course of criminal conduct or for certain discrete acts—the successive, similar occurrences—within that course of conduct. Put differently, we ask whether—and to what extent—the applicable statute permits the fragmentation of a defendant's criminal act into distinct units of prosecution.

This inquiry involves a two-step process.

First, we review the text of the statute itself. If the statute, whether expressly or by judicial construction, indicates a unit of prosecution, then we follow the legislature's guidance and our analysis is complete. But if the statute is ambiguous, then we proceed to the second step of our analysis.

Under this second step, a court must determine whether the facts—as presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial—indicate a single offense or whether they indicate distinguishable offenses. To answer this question, we ask whether the defendant's actions are so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction. If the defendant's criminal acts are sufficiently distinct, then multiple convictions may stand; but if those acts are continuous and indistinguishable, a court may impose only a single conviction. Any doubt counsels against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses.

Id. at 264–65 (internal citations and quotations omitted)

[39] As it relates to Counts 14 and 15, the State “agrees that the invasion of privacy statute does not expressly indicate a unit of prosecution.” Appellee's Br. p. 46. Turning to the first step of the Powell inquiry, we note that

[i]n determining whether a single criminal statute permits multiple punishments for multiple victims, Indiana courts (as with other jurisdictions) often distinguish conduct-based statutes from result-based statutes. A conduct-based statute, under our criminal code, consists of an offense defined by certain actions or behavior (e.g., operating a vehicle) and the presence of an attendant circumstance (e.g., intoxication). Under these statutes, the crime is complete once the offender engages in the prohibited conduct, regardless of whether that conduct produces a specific result (e.g., multiple victims). The focus—or gravamen—of the statutory offense is the defendant's actions, not the consequences of those actions. To be sure, a specific result or consequence (e.g., death or serious bodily injury) may enhance the penalty imposed. But multiple consequences do not establish multiple crimes, since the crime may still be committed without the consequence. Indeed, under a conduct-based statute, a single discrete incident can be the basis for only one conviction, no matter how many individuals are harmed.

A result-based statute, on the other hand, consists of an offense defined by the defendant's actions and the results or consequences of those actions. In crimes such as murder, manslaughter, battery and reckless homicide, the gravamen of the offense is causing the death or injury of another person, i.e., the result is part of the definition of the crime. In other words, the resulting death, injury or offensive touching is an element of the crime. And that crime is complete so long as the required actus reus and mental state are present. Under these statutes, then, where several deaths or injuries occur in the course of a single incident, the prohibited offense has been perpetrated several times over. The separate victims represent different offenses because conduct has been directed at each particular victim.

In short, crimes defined by conduct (rather than by consequence) permit only a single conviction (with multiple consequences resulting in enhanced penalties, not multiple crimes). But crimes defined by consequence (rather than by conduct) permit multiple convictions when multiple consequences flow from a single criminal act.

Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 265–66 (emphases in original, internal brackets, citations, and quotations omitted).

[40] The State argues that “because invasion of privacy requires the result that a protective order is violated, it is a result-based offense and multiple convictions are permitted.” Appellee's Br. pp. 46–47. Indiana Code section 35-46-1-15.1(a)(1) provides that a person commits Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy if the person “knowingly or intentionally violates ․ a protective order[.]” The gravamen of the offense is harm to the victim via a violation of a protective order. In other words, the resulting harm to the protected person is an element of the crime. Similar to other result-based offenses, violation of multiple protective orders allows for multiple convictions because separate victims represent different offenses as conduct has been directed at each particular victim.

[41] In this case, Houston was convicted of two counts of invasion of privacy after he violated two separate orders for protection. He violated one, which had been issued for the protection of K.K. by contacting and communicating with K.K. on February 6, 2024. He violated the second, which had been issued for the protection of Kidwell, by going to (and entering) Kidwell's home on February 6, 2024. Houston's convictions for two counts of the result-based crime of invasion of privacy did not violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy as his criminal acts are defined by consequence (rather than conduct), allowing for multiple convictions “when multiple consequences flow from a single criminal act.” Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 266.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[42] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007) (internal brackets, citations, emphasis, and quotations omitted). Stated differently, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility” and “affirm the judgment unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016).

A. Counts 1, 3, and 5

[43] Houston was convicted of Level 3 felony child seduction under Counts 1, 3, and 5. As for Count 1, the State alleged that

Between July 10, 2021 and July 9, 2022, in Hendricks County, Indiana [Houston], being at least eighteen years of age, and the custodian of [K.K.], a child thirteen years of age or younger, engaged in fondling or touching with said child with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either [Houston] or [K.K.].

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27. Counts 3 and 5 differed only in the dates: Count 3 alleged acts occurring between January 1, 2022 and February 28, 2022, and Count five alleged acts occurring between February 1, 2022 and February 28, 2022.

[44] The version of Indiana Code section 35-42-4-7 that was in effect at the time Houston was alleged to have committed the three acts of Level 3 felony child seduction provided that

a person who:

(1) is at least eighteen (18) years of age; and

(2) is the:

(A) guardian, adoptive parent, adoptive grandparent, custodian, or stepparent of; or

(B) child care worker for;

a child less than eighteen (18) years of age; engages with the child in sexual intercourse, other sexual conduct․, or any fondling or touching with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the adult, the person commits child seduction.

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-7(m) (2021). “Child seduction ․ is ․ a Level 3 felony if the child is thirteen (13) years of age or under and the person ․ engaged in any fondling or touching with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of: (A) the child; or (B) the person[.]” Ind. Code § 35-42-4-7(q)(5).

[45] Houston does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the touching element of Indiana Code section 35-42-4-7(m), claiming only that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for Counts 1, 3, and 5 because the State failed to prove that he was a custodian of K.K. The term “ ‘custodian’ means any person who resides with a child and is responsible for the child's welfare.” Ind. Code § 35-42-4-7(e). Additionally, we have concluded that

to be a custodian under the statute, a person responsible for a child's welfare, a person must occupy a position of trust and have the authority and responsibility to make decisions concerning the child's welfare, to act without guidance or superior authority, as a parent would or in loco parentis.

State v. D.M.Z., 674 N.E.2d 585, 590 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original), trans. denied.

[46] The evidence most favorable to the jury's finding of guilt on Counts 1, 3, and 5 demonstrated that Houston had lived with K.K. and had shared in the childcare responsibilities for her. Houston had regularly supervised K.K. on Sundays when Kidwell worked “from 7:30 a.m. to 6 p.m.” Tr. Vol. II p. 129. We agree with the State that the jury could reasonably infer that an adult who regularly supervises a minor for significant periods of time would have the authority to make decisions relating to the minor's welfare while in his care. Houston and Kidwell purchased a home together, wherein they lived as a family unit. Houston also financially contributed to and helped clean the home, further indicating a responsibility to care for K.K. In addition, K.K. testified that once Kidwell and Houston had started dating, Houston “immediately had a say so in everything.” Tr. Vol. II p. 178. The jury could infer that Houston's having “a say so in everything[,]” Tr. Vol. II p. 178, granted him an ability to act as a parent would, without guidance or superior authority, regarding K.K.’s welfare. See D.M.Z., 674 N.E.2d at 590. This evidence is sufficient to support the jury's determination that Houston was K.K.’s custodian.

[47] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Houston claims that he “was merely a romantic partner to [Kidwell] and they cohabitated in the home they purchased together.” Appellant's Br. p. 33. Houston asserts that he and Kidwell “were never married[,]” he “was not K.K.’s step-father,” and he “did not make decisions for K.K., did not ever take K.K. to the doctor[,] or make any decisions regarding what school [K.K.] would attend.” Appellant's Br. p. 33. Houston further asserts that “[t]here was no evidence presented that K.K. ever considered [him] as someone she could trust,” and he “did not have the authority or responsibility to make decisions regarding K.K. and only occasionally watched K.K.” while Kidwell worked. Appellant's Br. p. 33. Houston's self-serving claims in this regard amount to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.

B. Count 7

[48] Houston challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for Level 4 felony burglary, claiming that the charging information had contained a material variance and that the State had failed to prove that he had broken and entered Kidwell's dwelling with the intent to commit a felony therein. The charging information for this count provides that “[o]n or about February 6, 2024, in Hendricks County, Indiana [Houston] did break and enter the dwelling of [Kidwell], with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 33.

1. Material Variance in Charging Information

[49] Houston cites to Bays v. State, 240 Ind. 37, 46–47, 159 N.E.2d 393, 397 (1959) to support his argument that the charging information was insufficient because it did not specify which felony Houston had allegedly intended to commit when he had broken and entered Kidwell's home. See also Reed v. State, 438 N.E.2d 704, 706 (Ind. 1982) (“In a charge of burglary, it is not sufficient merely to allege an intent to commit a felony without specifying the particular felony intended.”). For its part, the State asserts that Houston has waived his variance claim because he did not specifically object on that basis or file a motion to dismiss at trial. Neff v. State, 915 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), adhered to on reh'g, 922 N.E.2d 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“Generally, a failure to challenge a defective charging information by way of a motion to dismiss before the trial court waives any such challenge on appeal.”), trans. denied. Waiver notwithstanding, we have indicated that “even where a charging instrument may lack appropriate factual detail, additional materials such as the probable cause affidavit supporting the charging instrument may be taken into account in assessing whether a defendant has been apprised of the charges against him.” State v. Laker, 939 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

[50] As it relates to the burglary charge, the probable-cause affidavit provided that on February 6, 2024, police were dispatched to Kidwell's home “on the report of a burglary in process.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 50. The probable-cause affidavit further provided that K.K. had reported that Houston had “made entry to the residence” and had made a comment about the exchange of money between the two in relation to Houston and K.K. engaging in a sex act, before running upstairs. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 50. Houston had arrived at the home a short time after K.K. had arrived home and after Kidwell's then-boyfriend, Corey Hardin, had left the home, suggesting that Houston had been “watching the house and knew exactly when [K.K.] would be home alone.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 50. Given Houston's comment about engaging in a sex act with K.K. and his entry into the home at a time when he knew she was home alone, the probable-cause affidavit sufficiently indicates that the alleged intended felony relating to the burglary charge involved committing a sex act with K.K. We therefore agree with the State that Houston “was adequately apprised of the nature of the felony so that he could prepare his defense.” Appellee's Br. p. 37.

2. Sufficiency of Evidence to Sustain Conviction

[51] Indiana code section 35-43-2-1 provides that “[a] person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony or theft in it, commits burglary, a Level 5 felony. However, the offense is: (1) a Level 4 felony if the building or structure is a dwelling[.]” “Using even the slightest force to gain unauthorized entry satisfies the breaking element of the crime. For example, opening an unlocked door or pushing a door that is slightly ajar constitutes a breaking.” Davis v. State, 770 N.E.2d 319, 322 (Ind. 2002) (internal citations omitted).

[52] In this case, K.K. testified that she had heard the door opening and had observed Houston inside the home, giving rise to the inference that Houston had broken and entered the home. See id. Houston also admitted that he had been inside the home on the day in question. K.K. testified that once inside the home, Houston had commented about the alleged exchange of money between the two in relation to Houston and K.K. engaging in a sex act before Houston had “sprinted up the stairs and [K.K.] sprinted out the back door.” Tr. Vol. II p. 233. K.K.’s testimony is sufficient to support the inference that Houston had intended to commit the felony of sexual misconduct with a minor while in the home. To the extent that Houston provided an alternative reason for his presence at the home on the date in question, that being to check on his and Kidwell's daughter, the jury was not obligated to credit Houston's self-serving version of the events. Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 636 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Houston's claims in this regard again amount to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.

C. Count 8

[53] Houston also claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for Level 5 felony child solicitation. The State alleged that “[b]etween February 1, 2022 and February 28, 2022, in Hendricks County, Indiana [Houston], being at least eighteen years of age, did knowingly or intentionally solicit [K.K.], a child under the age of fourteen, to engage in other sexual conduct, as defined in I.C. 35-31.5-2-221.5.”³ Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 34.

[54] The version of Indiana Code section 35-42-4-6 that was in effect at the time Houston was alleged to have committed Level 5 felony child solicitation provided that

A person eighteen (18) years of age or older who knowingly or intentionally solicits a child under fourteen (14) years of age, or an individual the person believes to be a child under fourteen (14) years of age, to engage in sexual intercourse, other sexual conduct․, or any fondling or touching intended to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person, commits child solicitation, a Level 5 felony.

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-6(b) (2021). “Solicit” means “to command, authorize, urge, incite, request, or advise an individual: (1) in person; (2) by telephone or wireless device; (3) in writing; (4) by using a computer network․; (5) by advertisement of any kind; or (6) by any other means; to perform an act described in subsection (b)[.]” Ind. Code § 35-42-4-6(a).

[55] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction, beyond stating the statutory definition for Level 5 felony child solicitation and the allegation as set forth in the charging information, Houston merely states “[a]gain, the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Houston] did commit child solicitation. The State's [(sic)] did not produce sufficient evidence that [Houston] solicitated K.K.” Appellant's Br. p. 36. The State, for its part, argues that Houston waived this argument by failing to present a cogent argument. Specifically, the State asserts that

[a]lthough [Houston] presents a two-sentence argument that the State failed to present sufficient evidence, he does not discuss any of the facts of the case to show what proof was missing on which element, nor does he cite any case law to either compare his case to or to support his contention. Because this Court is left with a bald assertion of insufficiency with no argument, this Court should not make itself a party and invent his argument for him.

Appellee's Br. p. 33 (internal citation omitted).

[56] While we agree that Houston failed to fully develop his claim that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, even a cursory review of the record convinces us that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Houston's conviction for child solicitation. The evidence establishes that K.K. awoke at about 2:00 a.m. on February 24, 2022, to find Houston in her bedroom, “standing and looking at” her. Tr. Vol. II p. 210. K.K. described the encounter, testifying that

[h]e had asked me, he was asking me and was, like, hey do you want to go somewhere while your mom's asleep? We can go do whatever. And I was, like, no I'm tired and I put the cover, I think I put the covers over my face or something. And then he was, like, okay then and then he walked out.

Tr. Vol. II p. 211. Later that morning, K.K. discovered a draft message on her cellular telephone to the number “6969” indicating “if you want me to do this to you, then put your LED lights on this color. He was, like, color coding my LED lights to what I wanted him to do to me.” Tr. Vol. II p. 212. Houston had previously admitted to having accessed and typing sexually explicit draft messages on K.K.’s cellular phone. We agree with the State that the jury could reasonably infer that Houston had intended for the draft message to be a direct solicitation for K.K. to engage in sexual acts and that Houston had intended for “6969” to be a sexually suggestive reference involving oral sex. The jury could also infer that the sexually explicit TikTok messages written by Houston had solicited K.K. to engage in sex acts with him. The evidence is sufficient to sustain Houston's conviction and Houston's claim to the contrary amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.

D. Count 9

[57] Houston also claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for Level 5 felony stalking. The State alleged that “[b]etween December 1, 2023 and February 6, 2024, in Hendricks County, Indiana [Houston] did then and there stalk [K.K.] while a protective order under IC 34-26-5 had been issued to protect [K.K.] from [Houston] and [Houston] had actual notice of said order.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 35. Indiana Code section 35-45-10-5 provides that “[a] person who stalks another person commits stalking, a Level 6 felony.” Ind. Code § 35-45-10-5(a). However, the offense is a Level 5 felony if it includes “[a] protective order to prevent domestic or family violence” or “a no contact order[.]” Ind. Code § 35-45-10-5(b).

[58] “ ‘[S]talk’ means a knowing or an intentional course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another person that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened.” Ind. Code § 35-45-10-1. “ ‘[H]arassment’ means conduct directed toward a victim that includes but is not limited to repeated or continuing impermissible contact that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress and that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress.” Ind. Code § 35-45-10-2. “Without question, the term ‘repeated’ in Indiana's anti-stalking law means more than once.” S.B. v. Seymour Cmty. Schs., 97 N.E.3d 288, 295 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied.

[59] The stalking charge alleged that Houston engaged in repeated acts of harassment that occurred between “December 1, 2023 and February 6, 2024.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 35. There is evidence that, during this time period, Houston had made false accusations to various law-enforcement and State authorities that Kidwell had been “sex-trafficking” K.K. and that K.K. had engaged in criminal behavior. Tr. Vol. II p. 226. Houston had also made sexually explicit posts and comments referencing K.K. on his TikTok account, and K.K. had been “very annoyed” by Houston's false accusations and the content posted on the TikTok account, which K.K. attributed to Houston. Tr. Vol. II p. 227. Houston points to K.K.’s testimony that she had been “very annoyed” and argues that the State had failed to show that K.K. had felt “terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened” as required by Indiana Code section 35-45-10-1.

[60] Houston's repeated acts of stalking K.K. had not stopped with the false accusations or posts on Houston's TikTok account but had culminated with his forced entry into K.K.’s home on February 6, 2024. With regard to the events on February 6, 2024, K.K. testified that she “was scared out of my mind. I wasn't sure what he was capable of doing. I was just really scared.” Tr. Vol. II p. 235. After fleeing her home, K.K. had hidden behind an air conditioning unit, telling Kidwell that she was “scared.” Tr. Vol. II p. 145. Hardin described K.K.’s demeanor following the interaction with Houston as “frantic.” Tr. Vol. III p. 3. In fact, K.K. had still been “rattled” and “shaken” hours later, and Hardin testified that “you could definitely tell it was a little traumatic for her, for sure.” Tr. Vol. III p. 4. The record demonstrates that Houston had engaged in repeated acts of harassment of K.K. and K.K.’s, Kidwell's, and Hardin's testimony is sufficient to support the jury's determination that K.K. was frightened by Houston's harassment. As such, we conclude that Houston's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his stalking conviction amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.

E. Count 11

[61] Houston also claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for Class A misdemeanor false informing. The State alleged that “[o]n or about December 20, 2023, in Hendricks County, Indiana [Houston] did give a false report of the commission of a crime knowing the report to be false said act resulting in a substantial hindrance to a law enforcement process and/or harm to [K.K.] and/or [Kidwell], an innocent person.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 37.

[62] The version of Indiana Code section 35-44.1-2-3 that was in effect at the time Houston was alleged to have committed Class A misdemeanor false informing provided that a person who “gives: (A) a false report of the commission of a crime; or (B) false information to a law enforcement officer that relates to the commission of a crime; knowing the report or information to be false ․ commits false informing[.]” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-3(d)(1) (2023). “However, the offense is a Class A misdemeanor if it substantially hinders any law enforcement process or if it results in harm to another person.” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-3(d).

[63] The evidence demonstrates that on August 9, 2023, Houston had called police to report that K.K. was being sex trafficked by Kidwell. In December 2023, DCS had contacted Kidwell out of concerns “that there may have been ․ sex-trafficking in [Kidwell's] home.” Tr. Vol. II p. 141. Houston had also reported the alleged sex-trafficking to the FBI. Both Kidwell and K.K. had denied that Kidwell had ever sex trafficked K.K. Houston's false accusations had resulted in harm to K.K. and Kidwell as it had resulted in an additional forensic interview for K.K. and law enforcement and DCS involvement for Kidwell.

[64] Houston claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for false informing because he had not known that his report was false. In support, he points to his trial testimony that he had received a message from a “Telegram account” indicating that Kidwell had been sex trafficking K.K. Tr. Vol. III pp. 180. Again, the jury was not obligated to credit Houston's self-serving version of the events. Kimbrough, 911 N.E.2d at 636. Houston's claims in this regard again amount to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.

Conclusion

[65] We affirm the judgment of the trial court with regards to Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, and 15. We reverse the judgment of the trial court with regards to Counts 2, 4, 6, and 10 and remand with instructions to vacate Houston's convictions and sentences for Counts 2, 4, 6, and 10.

[66] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Photographs of K.K.’s bedroom indicate that K.K. had LED rope lighting hanging on the walls in her room that could change colors.

2.   Houston was also charged under Counts 12 and 13 with two additional counts of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy and under Count 16 with Class B misdemeanor inappropriate communication with a child, but these three counts, as well as three subsequently-added counts charging Houston with Level 6 felony possession of child pornography, were dismissed by the State.

3.   “ ‘Other sexual conduct’ means an act involving: (1) a sex organ of one (1) person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (2) the penetration of the sex organ or anus of a person by an object.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-221.5.

Bradford, Judge

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.