Greggory J. Cataldo, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In early March of 2024, Greggory Cataldo violently attacked Jay Baumgart outside of a Cass County gas station. The State charged Cataldo with Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury and Level 6 felony strangulation, and alleged that Cataldo was a habitual offender. A jury trial commenced on July 9, 2025, and, while deliberating, the jury sent several questions to the trial court. The trial court responded by instructing the jury to reread their instructions and continue deliberating. Neither the State nor Cataldo's counsel had any objections to this response, and the jury found Cataldo guilty of Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury and that he was a habitual offender. Cataldo now contends that the trial court's response to the jury questions amounted to fundamental error. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the evening of March 3, 2024, Baumgart and his girlfriend, Riley Wilson, stopped at a gas station in Cass County to get snacks. After Wilson observed Cataldo and Davina Conley arguing outside, she asked Baumgart to check on Conley. Shortly after Baumgart did so, Cataldo stepped out of the car and began punching Baumgart. After Cataldo landed multiple punches to Baumgart's head, Baumgart, fearing for his life, yelled to Wilson to grab his gun from the car, and Cataldo released him and left. On March 11, 2024, the State charged Cataldo with Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury and Level 6 felony strangulation. On June 3, 2025, the State filed the habitual offender enhancement.

[3] A jury trial commenced on July 9, 2025. The trial court instructed the jury that, “[t]o overcome the presumption of innocence, the State must prove [Cataldo] guilty of each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” Tr. Vol. II p. 209. Regarding Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury, the trial court instructed the jury that, “[t]he crime of Battery is defined by law as follows: A person who knowingly or intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits Battery, a Class B Misdemeanor. The offense is a Level 5 felony if it results in serious bodily injury to another person.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 114. Further instructions provided:

Before you may convict [Cataldo], the State must have proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

[Cataldo];

Knowingly or intentionally

Touched [Baumgart];

In a rude, insolent, or angry manner; and

The offense resulted in serious bodily injury to [Baumgart]

If the State failed to prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant not guilty of Battery, a Level 5 Felony, as charged in Count 1.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 114.

[4] Before the trial court provided the final jury instructions, neither the State nor Cataldo requested an instruction or verdict forms for the lesser offenses included in Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury. In the final jury instructions, the trial court instructed the jury, “[t]o return a verdict, each of you must agree to it.” Tr. Vol. III p. 107. The trial court also instructed the following:

The bailiff is available to assist you with personal needs but cannot answer any questions about the case. Any question for the Court must be in writing and given to the bailiff. The Court often is not allowed to answer your questions except by rereading all of the jury Instructions. Because the Court has given you those Instructions, you may be able to answer your questions by reviewing them.

Tr. Vol. III p. 108. Neither the State nor Cataldo objected to the trial court's final jury instructions.

[5] While deliberating, the jury sent the following questions to the trial court: “We feel battery was the class B misdemeanor, but not felony. Can we convict of a misdemeanor? Disagree on severity? If we can't agree, can we go home and sleep on it?” Tr. Vol. III p. 118. While discussing the matter with the parties, the trial court suggested, “I think I should say, ‘please reread your Instructions and continue deliberating.’ ” Tr. Vol. III p. 118. Neither the State nor Cataldo's counsel had any objections to this response.

[6] The jury found Cataldo guilty of Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury and that he was a habitual offender. On September 11, 2025, the trial court sentenced Cataldo to an aggregate ten years of incarceration.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Cataldo contends that the trial court's refusal to affirmatively answer the jury's questions was fundamental error. Specifically, he argues that the jury's question sought clarification on a point of law arising in the case and the trial court was “obligated to answer it.” Appellant's Br. p. 13. We review the trial court's manner of instructing the jury for an abuse of discretion. Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 195 (Ind. 2021).

[8] Indiana Code section 34-36-1-6 provides the following:

If, after the jury retires for deliberation:

(1) there is a disagreement among the jurors as to any part of the testimony; or

(2) the jury desires to be informed as to any point of law arising in the case;

the jury may request the officer to conduct them into court, where the information required shall be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the parties or the attorneys representing the parties.

When the jury seeks information regarding a point of law, a trial court must “respond to a jury's question when it determines, in its discretion, that the question concerns a point of law involved in the case.” Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 197 (quotations and citations omitted). The jury asked three questions in this case: (1) if it could convict Cataldo on misdemeanor battery, (2) if it could disagree on severity, and (3) if it could “go home and sleep on it[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 118.

[9] The trial court, after consulting with the parties, instructed the jury to reread the instructions and continue deliberating. Cataldo did not object to the trial court's response to the jury's questions. Because Cataldo did not object to the trial court's instructions below, our review is restricted to whether the trial court's response amounted to fundamental error.

[10] Fundamental error “is an ‘extremely narrow doctrine.’ ” Dean v. State, 222 N.E.3d 976, 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Isom v. State, 170 N.E.3d 623, 651 (Ind. 2021)), trans. denied. “An error is fundamental if it made a fair trial impossible or was a ‘clearly blatant violation [ ] of basic and elementary principles of due process’ that presented ‘an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.’ ” Miller v. State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 874 (Ind. 2022) (quoting Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 2009)).

[11] It is well-settled that a trial court does not fundamentally err by not providing the jury with instructions on lesser-included offenses sua sponte. See, e.g., Metcalf v. State, 451 N.E.2d 321, 326 (Ind. 1983); Barthalow v. State, 119 N.E.3d 204, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019); Lane v. State, 953 N.E.2d 625, 631 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Moreover, as the State points out, Cataldo pursued a self-defense claim and an “all-or-nothing” trial strategy, as he did not request a separate lesser-included offense instruction before the jury deliberated nor after hearing the jury's questions. “A trial judge is not required to take an active part in the trial of the cause to assist or to override counsel in the strategies employed in [․] objecting or failing to object and in generally managing and directing the lawsuit.” Henderson v. State, 271 Ind. 633, 636, 395 N.E.2d 224, 227 (1979).

[12] “It is the duty of a trial judge to preside in a strictly impartial manner and to refrain from undue interference and participation in the proceedings.” Id. Where a trial court “could recognize a viable reason why an effective attorney might not object, the error is not blatant enough to constitute fundamental error.” Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 974 (Ind. 2014). We agree with the State that Cataldo's choice not to seek a lesser-included instruction after the jury's questions, “was a strategic decision that should not have been second guessed by the trial court.” Appellee's Br. p. 15.

[13] Furthermore, the trial court's response did answer the jury's questions, as the instructions provided already contained the information the jury requested. The jury had been instructed that it had “the right to determine both the law and the facts” and to “consider all the instructions both preliminary and final together.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 110, 111. The jury had been instructed on the elements of Class B misdemeanor battery and Level 5 felony battery, and that in order to convict Cataldo of Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury, it was required to find that the State had proven each element, including that the offense had resulted in serious bodily injury to Baumgart, beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the trial court's response to the jury's questions made a fair trial impossible. See Miller, 188 N.E.3d at 874. Cataldo has failed to establish fundamental error.

[14] Cataldo's argument that the trial court's response resulted in structural error is likewise unpersuasive.¹ Structural error is a “limited class of fundamental constitutional error[ ]” that requires “automatic reversal without the need to show prejudice.” Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 653 (Ind. 2018) (quotation and citation omitted). These errors “affect the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted). Some structural errors “always result in prejudicial harm to the defendant[,]” while other structural errors “may arise when it threatens an interest other than protecting the defendant against wrongful conviction” or where the precise effect of the violation is unascertainable. Id.

[15] Again, the trial court's response to the jury's questions did not affect the jury's ability to resolve Cataldo's claim of self-defense, and it certainly did not affect the jury's ability to find Cataldo guilty, or not guilty, of Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury. The jury was correctly informed by the preliminary and final instructions that the State had to prove each element of the charged crime in order to find Cataldo guilty, and it appears that the jury determined as much. See Ward v. State, 138 N.E.3d 268, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“Jurors are presumed to follow a trial court's instructions.”). Cataldo has also failed to show that the trial court's response, to which he did not object, amounted to structural error.

[16] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent that Cataldo contends that the trial court “barred the jury from exercising its independent decision-making authority[,]” Appellant's Br. p. 15, we fail to see how the mandatory language in Sample v. State, 932 N.E.2d 1230 (Ind. 2010) compares to the trial court's instruction in this case. In Sample, the trial court's instruction included that the jury “must” find Sample to be a habitual offender if it found that he had two prior unrelated felony convictions. Id. at 1232. In this case, the trial court provided no such instructions minimizing the jury's discretion in deciding on the law, and Cataldo points to none. In fact, the preliminary instructions instructed the jury that it had “the right to determine both the law and the facts.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 110.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur