IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.M. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] M.J. (“Mother”) appeals the Allen Superior Court's order terminating her parental rights to her child. She argues that the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) failed to prove that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the removal of child from her care would not be remedied and that termination of her parental rights was in the child's best interests.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] When Child was born in October 2023, he tested positive for amphetamines, and Mother's two older children had each already been adjudicated a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). One of Child's older siblings also tested positive for substances at birth, which resulted in that child's CHINS adjudication. Both Mother and J.M., Child's father (“Father”), had a prior history with DCS due to their substance use.¹ Mother admitted that she used fentanyl the day after Child was born. Child suffered from withdrawal symptoms shortly after his birth.

[4] DCS filed a CHINS petition shortly after Child's birth. After Child was released from the hospital, Child was placed in the same foster home with his two older siblings. The juvenile court adjudicated Child a CHINS on November 14, 2023. In its dispositional decree, the court ordered Mother to participate in many services including, inpatient treatment at an approved licensed agency, a drug and alcohol assessment and follow the recommendations from that assessment, enroll in an approved licensed agency home based services program, enroll in individual counseling, and submit to random drug screens. Mother was also ordered to obtain stable housing.

[5] At a CHINS review hearing in September 2024, the court noted that Mother had finally begun to participate in some of the required services and regular visitation with Child. Mother also completed an intensive outpatient treatment program. But after that brief period of improvement, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and stopped participating in services and visitation with Child. Mother's lack of participation coincided with Father's release from incarceration. Also, in November 2024, Mother's and Father's parental rights were terminated for their two older children. Mother failed to participate in any services, submit to drug screens, or visit with Child from November 2024 to May 2025.

[6] DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child on January 8, 2025. The juvenile court held the termination factfinding hearing on June 3 and 10, 2025. Child had not been in Mother's home or care since birth, and he was twenty-months old. The homebased services case manager believed that Mother had made some progress with budgeting and obtaining food stamps, but Mother's employment, transportation, and housing remained unstable. Mother also failed to regularly communicate with DCS and her service providers.

[7] Child suffers from neonatal abstinence syndrome and participates in physical therapy to assist him with his symptoms, which include stiffness, difficulty moving, and eating. Child also has an abnormally shaped mouth and participates in occupational therapy. Child is doing well in his foster care placement where he is placed with his biological siblings. Child's foster parents spend over an hour each day working with Child on his speech and motor skills. The foster parents indicated their desire to adopt Child. The family case manager and the guardian ad litem testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 76, 87.

[8] Mother testified that her lack of participation in services and visitation with the children from November 2024 to May 2025 was due to leaving the state for a family emergency, specifically, Father's mother was ill, and after she returned to Indiana, she had her own health issues. Id. at 105-06. Mother completed an intensive outpatient treatment program in August 2024 but did not participate in inpatient treatment as recommended by the drug and alcohol assessment. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine in October 2024 and either failed or refused to submit to additional drug screens until June 2025.

[9] The court issued its order terminating Mother's parental rights on September 8, 2025. The court concluded that DCS had proven that there was a reasonable probability that the reasons for Child's removal and continued placement out of Mother's home would not be remedied. Specifically, the court concluded that Mother's “inability to provide a safe, stable, drug-free home environment that existed” when the underlying CHINS proceedings commenced “continued to exist at the time of the hearing on the Petition for Termination.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 50. The court further concluded that terminating Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. Id. at 57.

[10] Mother now appeals the termination of her parental rights to Child.

Standard of Review

[11] Indiana appellate courts have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In analyzing the juvenile court's decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the court's judgment. Id. In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[12] To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the juvenile court's findings of facts and conclusions of law. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. If the evidence and inferences support the court's termination decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. Furthermore, Mother does not challenge any of the trial court's findings, and therefore, we accept unchallenged factual findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

The juvenile court's order terminating Mother's parental rights is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[13] It is well-settled that the parent-child relationship is one of society's most cherished relationships. See, e.g., In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana law thus sets a high bar to sever that relationship. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to prove that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(3) (2024).

[14] In addition, DCS was required to prove the existence of one or more of the following circumstances relevant here:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(2)-(4).² Here, the trial court found that DCS proved that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside of Mother's home will not be remedied.³ See Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 49-50.

[15] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of a parent is wholly inadequate for a child's very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148. It is instead sufficient to show that the child's emotional and physical development are put at risk by the parent's custody. Id. If the court finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

[16] Mother claims that DCS failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside of her home will not be remedied. Consideration of this argument involves a two-step analysis: first, identifying the conditions that led to removal, and second, determining whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will be remedied. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014). In the second step, the trial court determines a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions; in other words, the court must balance a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. In conducting its analysis, the trial court may also consider the reasons for the child's continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[17] Child was removed from Mother's care because Mother was unable to provide Child with a safe, stable, and drug-free home. Mother cites to her own testimony in support of her argument that DCS failed to prove that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside of her home will not be remedied. Her argument is simply a request to reweigh the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, which our court will not do.

[18] During the underlying CHINS proceedings, Mother successfully completed an intensive outpatient substance abuse program but tested positive for methamphetamine after completing that program. Mother did not submit to any drug screens after that positive test in October 2024. Mother then failed to participate in services and visitation with Child from November 2024 to May 2025. In the months leading up to the termination hearing, Mother did not participate in any programs or counseling to address her substance abuse issues, and her claim that she is sober is not supported by the evidence. See Matter of C.C., 153 N.E.3d 340, 349 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (observing that a “parent who screens positive for illegal substances and is ordered to submit to drug screens, may not refuse to submit to drug screens and expect to maintain [her] parental rights”). Throughout these proceedings, Mother also lacked a stable home, and the juvenile court found that Mother's testimony to the contrary was not credible. Mother's decision to fail to participate in any services for seven months prior to the termination also support the trial court's conclusion that Mother has not remedied and will not remedy the conditions that led to Child's removal from her home.

[19] Mother also argues that DCS failed to prove that termination of her parental rights was in Child's best interests. In determining what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A parent's historical inability to provide “adequate housing, stability, and supervision,” in addition to the parent's current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Id.

[20] When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. Moreover, this Court has previously held that recommendations of the family case manager and court-appointed special advocate to terminate parental rights, coupled with evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. Id.

[21] Relying again on her own testimony, Mother claims that termination of her parental rights was not in Child's best interests because she “had resolved the conditions that gave rise to the removal of” Child and “was living a sober life style in a stable residence.” Appellant's Br. at 16. As we observed above, Mother is simply requesting that we reweigh the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, which we will not do. Further, we observe that Child has special needs that Mother has never shown that she can meet. The court specifically found that

[o]ver the course of the underlying CHINS proceedings, [Mother] struggled with transportation, and had difficulties maintaining stable cellular phone service. At trial, the mother testified that she missed drug screens through Cordant because she had transportation difficulties, because her phone wasn't working or because there was no working wi-fi. The lack of transportation, a working phone or phone that had wi-fi has significantly interfered with the parent's ability to attend hearings and to participate in services. Given the child's special needs and numerous appointments for his medical condition(s), it is not likely that [Mother] would be able to ensure that the child regularly attended and participated in medical and other necessary appointments. After considering the testimony and evidence submitted at trial, the Court finds that [Mother] did not regularly participate in and/or benefit from services that were offered and/or provided by the DCS. [Mother] did not visit the child for approximately seven (7) months ․ and did not participate in any of the child's therapy appointments.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 48-49. Mother was also unable to provide a stable home for Child. In addition, both the DCS case manager and the guardian ad litem believed that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests.

[22] For all of these reasons, we conclude that DCS proved that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests.

Conclusion

[23] The juvenile court's order terminating Mother's parental rights is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The court also terminated Father's parental rights, but he does not participate in this appeal.

2.   This version of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 was effective from March 11, 2024 to June 30, 2025; therefore, the termination proceedings in this case proceeded under that version of the statute.

3.   The State claims that the juvenile court also concluded that DCS met its burden of proving the elements enumerated in subsection (d)(2) and argues that Mother does not challenge that conclusion on appeal. Therefore, because DCS is required to only prove one of the circumstances is subsection (d), the State contends Mother has waived her argument that DCS failed to meet the requirements of subsection (d). Paragraph TT, to which the State refers, is somewhat confusing as to whether the trial court was making a conclusion under subsection (d)(2) or (d)(3). Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 56. In that paragraph, the court found that Child was removed from Mother's home for more than 15 of the recent 22 months as is required by subsection (d)(2). However, the remainder of that paragraph tracks with the language of subsection (d)(3). Moreover, in paragraph KK of the court's order, the court found that DCS had proved the circumstance enumerated in subsection (d)(3). Id. at 49-50. Therefore, we conclude that Mother has not waived her argument by only challenging the trial court's findings and conclusions addressing subsection (d)(3).

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.