Montana A. Davis, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] A jury convicted Montana Davis (“Davis”) of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in catastrophic injury,¹ and the trial court sentenced her to thirty-five (35) years executed in the Department of Correction (“the DOC”). On appeal, Davis argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction; and (2) her sentence is inappropriate. Concluding that: (1) there is sufficient evidence to support Davis’ conviction; and (2) Davis has failed to show that her sentence is inappropriate, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issues

1. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support Davis’ conviction.

2. Whether Davis’ sentence is inappropriate.

Facts

[3] The facts most favorable to the judgment reveal that Davis and Austin Choate (“Choate”) began dating in 2021. Their daughter, P.C. (“P.C.”), was born prematurely in August 2022 and spent three months in the neonatal intensive care unit (“NICU”) at a Muncie hospital. When P.C. was discharged from the hospital in November 2022, a NICU nurse reviewed with Davis the instructions for caring for P.C. at home. At the time of P.C.’s discharge, the infant did not have any fractured bones.

[4] Following P.C.’s discharge from the hospital, Davis, who also had a three-year-old daughter and a two-year-old son from a previous relationship, was P.C.’s primary caregiver. Choate helped Davis care for P.C. when he was at home; however, he typically worked long hours, leaving the house before the children had awakened and returning home after they had gone to sleep. Davis frequently telephoned Choate while he was at work, and P.C. was “always” crying in the background. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 111). Choate noticed that Davis appeared to be “overwhelmed” by caring for the children while he was at work. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 113). In addition, Choate noticed that Davis was “real protective” of her two older children, but “when it ․ came to [P.C.][,] there was something a little off[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 113). Davis and Choate were P.C.’s only caretakers.

[5] When Choate returned home from work on January 25, 2023, P.C. was on the bed “doing what's called tummy time. Laying on her belly.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 114). Davis was sitting on the bed with P.C. Choate briefly left the bedroom, and when he returned, a crying Davis told him that she believed that she had broken P.C.’s arm when she had pulled it out from under the infant's stomach. According to Davis, she had heard “a pop.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 167). Although Choate told Davis that they should take P.C. to the hospital, Davis did not want to do that. When P.C.’s arm looked “swollen and stuff” the following morning, Choate took P.C. to the emergency room while Davis stayed at home. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 116).

[6] An emergency room physician's assistant (“the PA”) examined P.C. and ordered an x-ray of the infant's arm. The x-ray revealed that P.C. had a broken humerus, which is the long bone in the upper arm. Because “it's very unusual to have a fracture of a long bone in an immobile patient[,]” the PA suspected non-accidental trauma and ordered a skeletal survey, which involves taking images of “almost every bone in the body from head to toe.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 41, 42).

[7] The skeletal survey revealed that P.C. had more than twenty-five broken bones in various stages of healing. Specifically, P.C. had three skull fractures, fourteen or more healing rib fractures, healing fractures in both legs, and two possible spinal fractures. Based on her review of the skeletal survey, the PA believed “[t]hat there was definitely physical abuse.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 44).

[8] In addition to having more than twenty-five bone fractures, a CT scan revealed that five-month-old P.C. had “subdural hematomas, which is ․ bleeding on the brain.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 45). If not relieved, bleeding on the brain can lead to developmental delays, seizures, and death. Because P.C.’s injuries were “severe and life[-]threatening,” the five-month-old infant was transported by helicopter to Riley Hospital for Children (“Riley”). (Tr. Vol. 2 at 45).

[9] Following P.C.’s initial evaluation at Riley, Dr. Brian Leland's (“Dr. Leland”) addendum to P.C.’s admitting history and physical report provides as follows: “This patient suffers from a condition which does or has a high probability to acutely impair one or more vital organ systems, resulting in a sudden, clinically significant or life[-] threatening deterioration․ Admit to [pediatric intensive care unit] critically ill at risk of life threatening cerebral edema, seizures.” (Ex. Vol. 3 at 64).

[10] While P.C. was being transported to and evaluated at Riley, Muncie Police Department Lieutenant Linda Cook (“Lieutenant Cook”) interviewed Davis. During the interview, Davis placed her feet on the wall and sat with her back to Lieutenant Cook. Further, throughout the interview, Davis screamed at Lieutenant Cook, pounded on a table, mumbled, talked to herself, cursed, and called Lieutenant Cook profane names. Lieutenant Cook eventually told Davis that she was tired of Davis screaming at her and left the interview room.

[11] In February 2023, the State charged Davis with Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in catastrophic injury. During Davis’ three-day trial in April 2025, the jury heard the facts as set forth above. In addition, Dr. Leah Garvin (“Dr. Garvin”), a Riley physician, testified that P.C. had “28 definite fractures.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 96). Dr. Garvin also testified about P.C.’s specific injuries and their possible causes. For example, regarding P.C.’s fractured arm, Dr. Garvin testified that “an arm being moved out from under a baby during tummy time would not be enough force to cause this fracture.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 73). Rather, according to Dr. Garvin, this type of fracture either resulted from “a forceful impact” or “from a bending of the bone, which cause[d] ․ it to break in the middle.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 74).

[12] Dr. Garvin further testified that P.C.’s three skull fractures would have resulted from a “forceful impact to [her] head” and her lateral rib fractures would have resulted from a “forceful compression of [her] chest.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 75, 77). In addition, Dr. Garvin testified that P.C.’s posterior rib fractures were “very specific for abuse.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 80). Dr. Garvin also testified that P.C. had three healing fractures in her right leg and two to three healing fractures in her left leg. According to Dr. Garvin, the fractures in P.C.’s lower legs would have resulted from “either forceful jerking, yanking, or rotation of the leg[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 79). Further, according to Dr. Garvin, P.C. had two fractured vertebrae in her spine that could be consistent with P.C. “being slammed down on a changing table[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 81). In addition, during Dr. Garvin's testimony, the doctor used slides to show the jury P.C.’s scans and pointed out P.C.’s fractures.

[13] Dr. Garvin also testified that a brain MRI at Riley revealed that P.C. had suffered from abusive head trauma, which had formerly been called shaken baby syndrome. According to Dr. Garvin, as a result of the head trauma, P.C. had “quite a bit of pressure on both sides of her brain” and “the brain [wa]sn't getting enough oxygen.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 90). Dr. Garvin further testified that in order to relieve the pressure in P.C.’s brain, a pediatric neurosurgeon had placed “bur holes in each side of [P.C.’s] skull” to drain fluid and “potentially save [P.C.’s] brain.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 89, 90).

[14] Also, Dr. Garvin testified that all of P.C.’s injuries were consistent with inflicted injury and that the tests and labs revealed that P.C. had “normal and healthy” bones with no underlying bone disorder. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 94). In addition, Dr. Garvin's final report regarding P.C., which was admitted into evidence at trial, provides that “[c]hildren who have suffered early abuse or neglect are at increased risk for developing significant behavior problems including emotional instability, depression, and a tendency to be aggressive or violent with others. Troublesome behaviors may persist long after the abusive or neglectful environment has changed.” (Ex. Vol. 3 at 166).

[15] Davis also testified during the trial and denied causing the injuries to P.C. In addition, Davis testified that the night that she had heard P.C.’s arm pop, Davis had wanted to take P.C. to the hospital. However, according to Davis, Choate had not wanted to do that. Davis further testified that she had voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to her three children. The jury convicted Davis of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in catastrophic injury.

[16] During Davis’ May 2025 sentencing hearing, Davis testified that she had “evidence that did not get presented to the court” and that she did not want “to leave this courtroom as another seemingly unfit mother.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 201, 202). Davis’ mother and two sisters asked the trial court to be lenient when sentencing Davis.

[17] After hearing this testimony and reviewing Davis’ pre-sentence investigation report, the trial court found twelve aggravating factors and eight mitigating factors. Specifically, the trial court stated as follows regarding several of the aggravating factors:

As an adult, you've been charged with one misdemeanor, battery resulting in bodily injury, a class A misdemeanor, and the defendant was offered pretrial diversion as an alternative. The court gives this some weight․ I do think there's a distinct pattern or similar[ ] behavior, including the prior misdemeanor battery, and now neglect of a dependent involving your own infant child, and the court gives this much weight. I will find that you have issues controlling your behavior as evidenced by that custodial interview. I have been in the business of law in Delaware County for nearly 31 years, and I've worked with ․ Lieutenant Linda Cook ․ for so many of those years. I can tell you historically, I've never seen [Lieutenant] Linda Cook ever leave as frustrated from that interview as I saw during yours. You watch that and ․ that's the [Davis] that you showed the world that day, and I'll give this much weight because of your behavior․ I will look to the nature of the crime. I do think it's particularly heinous and disturbing. The minor child was in NICU from birth until November 11th, 2022. When she was released to you and her father, she was only in your care for 76 days. All this happened in 76 days until the father brought her to the emergency room as a five-month-old for a possible broken arm. This determined the child suffered 28 definite fractures, including three skull fractures with two subdermal hematomas, loss of brain matter, 11 fractures to the lateral ribs, five fractures to the posterior ribs, fractures to her right humerus, fractures to her left and right tibia and fibula, as well as two compression factors to the spine and I'll give this much weight[.] The court finds harm and ․ damages suffered by this young victim are significant and greater than the elements of the crime, even within the umbrella of the catastrophic injury. I'm especially concerned with the multiple brain bleeds caused [to] this young child․ I give the injuries to the young vulnerable victim who's left in the care of her mother, who should have protected her much weight.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 205-207). Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Davis to thirty-five (35) years executed in the DOC.

[18] Davis now appeals.

Decision

[19] Davis argues that: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction; and (2) her sentence is inappropriate. We address each of her contentions in turn.

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[20] Davis argues that there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction for Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in catastrophic injury. We disagree.

[21] “Our standard for reviewing evidentiary sufficiency challenges is well established, as we have made clear that it is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090 (Ind. 2025) (cleaned up). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (cleaned up). We review only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom and will reverse “only where it is shown that no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1090-91 (cleaned up).

[22] Indiana Code § 35-46-1-4(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person having the care of a dependent ․ who knowingly or intentionally ․ places the dependent in a situation that endangers the dependent's life or health ․ commits neglect of a dependent, a Level 6 felony.” “However, the offense is ․ a Level 1 felony if it is committed ․ by a person at least eighteen (18) years of age and results in the ․ catastrophic injury of a dependent who is less than fourteen (14) years of age[.]” I.C. § 35-46-1-4(b)(3).

[23] Davis first contends that there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction because “there was no testimony by any witness ․ that they saw her inflict any of the catastrophic injuries upon P.C.” (Davis’ Br. 9). It is true that the State presented no direct evidence that Davis inflicted the injuries on P.C. Rather, the State built its case on circumstantial evidence.

[24] Our Indiana Supreme Court has stated that “circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction.” Warren v. State, 725 N.E.2d 828, 834 (Ind. 2000). Specifically, the supreme court has explained as follows:

In a circumstantial case, no single piece of evidence in isolation – no smoking gun – is offered to persuade the jury to convict. Yet a jury may be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, by looking at a web of facts in which no single strand may be dispositive. Indeed, the evidence in the aggregate may point to guilt where individual elements of the State's case might not. Just as in the probable cause context, when presented with a sufficiency challenge, we look at the whole picture without taking a divide-and-conquer approach to individual pieces of evidence.

Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176-77 (Ind. 2022) (cleaned up).

[25] Here, our review of the whole picture reveals that after three-month-old P.C. had been discharged from the NICU, Davis, P.C.’s primary caretaker, became overwhelmed with caring for her two toddlers and infant P.C. while Choate worked long hours. When Davis called Choate at work, P.C. was always crying in the background. Further, although Davis was protective of her two older children, there was something a little bit off in her interactions with P.C. When Choate returned home from work on January 25, 2023, Davis told him that she believed that she had accidentally broken P.C.’s arm, but she did not want to take P.C. to the hospital. When Choate took the infant to the emergency room the following morning, a skeletal survey revealed that P.C. had more than twenty-five fractured bones in differing stages of healing. She also had bleeding and pressure on her brain. Due to her life-threatening injuries, P.C. was transported by helicopter to Riley. During an evaluation at Riley, doctors discovered that P.C., who had healthy bones and no underlying bone disorder, had twenty-eight bone fractures that were consistent with inflicted injury. In addition, because of the pressure in P.C.’s brain, a pediatric neurosurgeon placed holes on each side of her skull to relieve the pressure, drain the fluid, and potentially save her brain. By finding Davis guilty as charged, the jury was convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the evidence in the aggregate pointed to Davis’ guilt. We will not second guess that judgment by reweighing the evidence and assessing witness credibility. See Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090.

[26] In addition, Davis argues that there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction because “[t]here was no evidence that there was bodily injury so severe as to meet the definition of catastrophic injury.” (Davis’ Br. 10). Indiana Code § 35-31.5-2-34.5 provides that catastrophic injury “means bodily injury so severe that a person's ability to live independently is significantly impaired for a period of at least one (1) year. The term includes an injury causing blindness, deafness, paralysis, or an intellectual disability.”

[27] Davis specifically “submits that there was no evidence that any of the types of injuries listed in the [statutory] definition would have impaired P.C.’s ability to live independently as defined by statute.” (Davis’ Br. 10). In other words, Davis appears to believe that the injuries enumerated in the statute are the only injuries that may constitute catastrophic injury. However, “[a] general principle of statutory construction is that the term ‘include’ signals that the list that follows is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.” In re Payment of Attorney Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses, 7 N.E.3d 289, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (cleaned up).

[28] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that an initial evaluation of five-month-old P.C., who had been born prematurely and who had spent three months in the NICU, revealed that she had more than twenty-five bone fractures and had bleeding in her brain. Following her arrival at Riley by helicopter, Dr. Leland's addendum to her admitting history and physical report provided that she suffered from a condition that either did or had a high probability to acutely impair her vital organ systems, resulting in clinically significant or life-threatening deterioration. Dr. Leland's addendum further revealed that P.C., who was critically ill, was admitted to the pediatric intensive care unit with the risk of life-threatening conditions. According to Dr. Garvin, further evaluation at Riley revealed that P.C. had a total of twenty-eight bone fractures in differing stages of healing as well as pressure in her brain that had to be alleviated by a pediatric neurosurgeon drilling holes in her skull. In addition, Dr. Garvin's final report revealed that children who suffer early abuse are at increased risk for developing significant behavior problems that may persist long after the abusive environment has changed. Based on these facts and circumstances, we conclude that P.C. suffered a catastrophic injury. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence to support her conviction.

2. Inappropriate Sentence

[29] Davis also argues that her sentence is inappropriate. She specifically argues that her sentence is “excessive” and asks us to “remand this case to the trial court for re-sentencing.” (Davis’ Br. 12).

[30] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, we find that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. The defendant bears the burden of persuading this Court that her sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate turns on the “culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). Sentence modification under Rule 7(B) is reserved for a “rare and exceptional case.” Skeens v. State, 191 N.E.3d 916, 923 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (cleaned up).

[31] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we acknowledge that the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081. Here, the jury convicted Davis of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in catastrophic injury. The sentencing range for a Level 1 felony is between twenty (20) and forty (40) years, with an advisory sentence of thirty (30) years. See I.C. § 35-50-2-4(b). The trial court sentenced Davis to thirty-five (35) years executed in the DOC. This sentence is less than the forty-year maximum sentence that the trial court could have imposed.

[32] With regard to the nature of the offense, we note that while Davis was responsible for the care of her infant daughter, P.C., who had spent three months in the NICU, Davis engaged in behavior that caused P.C. to suffer twenty-eight bone fractures and bleeding on her brain. Specifically, Davis caused fractures in P.C.’s arms, ribs, legs, and spine. In addition, the bleeding in her brain necessitated pediatric neurosurgery to drain the fluid and potentially save her brain. We agree with the trial court that Davis’ actions are particularly heinous and disturbing.

[33] With regard to Davis’ character, we note that Davis’ criminal history includes one misdemeanor charge for battery that was disposed of through a pre-trial diversion program. The trial court found that this previous charge revealed a similar behavior to the offense in this case. We agree and conclude that this similar behavior reflects poorly on Davis’ character. We further note that throughout Davis’ interview with Lieutenant Cook, Davis, with her feet on the wall and her back to Lieutenant Cook, pounded on a table, mumbled, talked to herself, cursed, screamed at Lieutenant Cook, and called Lieutenant Cook profane names. Such behavior also reflects poorly on Davis’ character.

[34] Based on the nature of the offense and her character, Davis has failed to persuade this Court that her thirty-five-year sentence is inappropriate. We further note that this is simply not one of those rare and exceptional cases for which a sentence modification under Rule 7(B) is reserved. Therefore, we affirm Davis’ sentence.

[35] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4.

Pyle, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.