Benjamin Tyler Haines, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary 1

[1] On February 5, 2023, Wells County Sheriff's Deputy Desmond Carter observed a dark-colored sedan driven by Benjamin Haines traveling toward him at 114 miles per hour. Deputy Carter turned his vehicle around to pursue the sedan and activated his emergency lights. After some time, Deputy Carter came across Haines's vehicle, overturned, with no driver inside. The State ultimately charged Haines with multiple offenses, and a jury found Haines guilty of Level 5 felony resisting law enforcement, Level 6 felony criminal recklessness, Class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident and Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. The trial court found that Haines had committed Class C infraction disregarding a stop sign and Class C infraction speeding. The trial court sentenced Haines to an aggregate term of six years of incarceration. Haines contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to prove that he had committed Level 5 felony resisting law enforcement and that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On February 5, 2023, around 12:38 a.m., Deputy Carter was northbound on a country road in Wells County. The visibility that night was “perfect[,]” with no fog, “no crops in the field[,]” and “no clouds in the sky.” Tr. Vol. III p. 5. Deputy Carter could see “two to three miles” away. Tr. Vol. III p. 5. At the time, the roads were dry in some parts and “slick [․] with ice” in others. Tr. Vol. III p. 5.

[3] While driving, Deputy Carter observed a dark-colored sedan driving toward him at 114 miles per hour. Deputy Carter turned around to pursue the sedan, driving “[a]pproximately 115 to 120 miles per hour” in the pursuit. Tr. Vol. III p. 9. He was unable to close the gap between his vehicle and the sedan at this speed. As the sedan was traveling on the road, Deputy Carter could see the taillights of the vehicle, “approximately a mile and a half” away. Tr. Vol. III p. 7. Deputy Carter was “able to maintain visual on the vehicle at all times.” Tr. Vol. III p. 6.

[4] Once he “realized that [he] wasn't able to catch up to the vehicle,” Deputy Carter activated his emergency lights. Tr. Vol. III p. 6. Deputy Carter observed the sedan turning right and “could see the headlights and taillights of the car.” Tr. Vol. III p. 7. As Deputy Carter continued to pursue the vehicle, “at one point, it just went completely dark; [Deputy Carter] no longer could see the headlights or taillights.” Tr. Vol. III p. 8. Once Deputy Carter could no longer see the vehicle, “due to department policy, [he] terminated the pursuit” and deactivated his emergency lights. Tr. Vol. III p. 10.

[5] At some point, Deputy Carter observed flashing lights, tire tracks “that went down into the ditch”, debris, and a “knocked over” utility pole near Marzane Road. Tr. Vol. III p. 12. He also observed that the stop sign that would have been at the intersection had been “run over” and “completely displaced.” Tr. Vol. III p. 13. As Deputy Carter turned on to Marzane Road, he observed an overturned vehicle, which was the vehicle he had been pursuing. Deputy Carter approached the vehicle and observed “blood all around the vehicle” and footprints in the snow. Tr. Vol. III p. 15. Deputy Carter was unable to locate the driver of the vehicle.

[6] A debit card, driver's license, and multiple other cards bearing Haines's name were found inside the vehicle. Police also found a “large quantity” of marijuana, THC cartridges, dryer sheets, and over $4000.00 in cash inside the vehicle. Tr. Vol. III p. 115. Outside of the vehicle, police found “loose sandwich baggies.” Tr. Vol. III p. 23. The owner of the vehicle, Derek Lorton, later informed police that Haines had been driving his vehicle in the three days before February 5, 2023.

[7] The State eventually charged Haines with Level 5 felony resisting law enforcement, Level 6 felony criminal recklessness, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, Class B misdemeanor reckless driving, Class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident, Class A infraction disregarding a stop sign, and Class C infraction speeding.

[8] A jury trial commenced on May 19, 2025. At trial, Deputy Carter testified that he had turned on his emergency lights while he pursued the sedan and had maintained sight of it. He testified that, during the pursuit, when he could no longer see the headlights and taillights of the sedan, there was “nothing to obscure his vision at [that] point” and “[t]he only explanation [․] would be that the headlights and taillights [had been] turned off.” Tr. Vol. III p. 9. Detective Quinton Greer testified that, on a clear night like the night in question, “[y]ou can see ․ for miles the – the red and blue lights on a vehicle[,]” referring to the visibility of the emergency lights of a police vehicle. Tr. Vol. III p. 219.

[9] The jury found Haines guilty as charged of all but the infractions, the trial court found that Haines had committed Class C infraction for speeding and Class C infraction for disregarding a stop sign, and the trial court vacated Haines's conviction for Class B misdemeanor reckless driving. After Haines's initial sentencing hearing and sentencing, the trial court sua sponte found that its sentencing order contained an error and set the matter for resentencing. A second sentencing hearing was held on July 9, 2025, after which the trial court sentenced Haines to six years of incarceration for Level 5 felony resisting law enforcement, 180 days for Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, 180 days for Class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident, and two-and- one-half years for Level 6 felony criminal recklessness. The trial court ordered all sentences to run concurrently for an aggregate term of six years.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[10] Haines contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to prove that he had committed Level 5 felony resisting law enforcement.² Specifically, Haines contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Deputy Carter had “properly alert[ed]” him to pull over his vehicle. Appellant's Br. p. 15.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007) (brackets, citations, emphasis, and quotations omitted). In other words, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility” and “affirm the judgment unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016).

[11] To prove that Haines had committed Level 5 felony resisting law enforcement with a vehicle, the State was required to prove that Haines had knowingly or intentionally fled “from a law enforcement officer after the officer ha[d], by visible or audible means, including operation of the law enforcement officer's siren or emergency lights, identified himself [․] and ordered [Haines] to stop[,]” had used a vehicle in the commission of the offense, and had a prior unrelated conviction for resisting law enforcement with a vehicle. Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3), (c).

[12] Haines disputes only “that Deputy Carter turned on his emergency lights, when Haines was in proximity to [him], in order to properly alert Haines to pull over[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 15. Haines argues that State's Exhibit 8 “clearly contradicts [Deputy] Carter's trial testimony” and “clearly demonstrates that [Deputy] Carter failed to activate his emergency lights, while in close proximity to Haines, so as to notify Haines to pull over his vehicle.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. The State argues that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Deputy Carter properly notified Haines to pull over, pointing to Deputy Carter's testimony at trial that he had activated his emergency lights while Haines was within his view and testimony that it had been the middle of the night, that the sky had been clear, and that emergency lights had been visible for miles on that night.

[13] We agree with the State that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Haines's conviction, and we disagree with Haines's argument that State's Exhibit 8 “clearly contradicts” Deputy Carter's testimony. The video exhibit shows Haines's vehicle approaching and passing by Deputy Carter's vehicle, Deputy Carter's vehicle turning around, and the vehicle's emergency lights activating a short time after. Nothing in the video contradicts Deputy Carter's testimony. Haines's argument is nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958; see also Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 699 (Ind. 2017) (concluding that the same deferential standard of review as to other evidence applies to video evidence, unless the video evidence indisputably contradicts the trial court's findings such that no reasonable person can view the video and come to a different conclusion).

[14] Furthermore, circumstantial evidence also supports Haines's conviction. After Deputy Carter activated his emergency lights, Haines turned off the headlights and taillights on his sedan, indicating that Haines had seen the emergency lights and was further attempting to flee by hiding his location. Haines also disappeared after wrecking the sedan, again, indicating that he was aware of the police pursuit. “Evidence of flight may be considered as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt.” Brown v. State, 563 N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ind. 1990). The evidence is sufficient to support the jury's determination that Haines had committed Level 5 felony resisting law enforcement. Haines's claim to the contrary amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.

II. Appropriateness of Sentence

[15] Haines also contends that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. The trial court sentenced Haines to six years of incarceration for the Level 5 felony resisting law enforcement, with the sentences for all other charges to be served concurrently. The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is between one and six years, with the advisory sentence being three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6.

[16] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” In analyzing such claims, we “concentrate less on comparing the facts of [the case at issue] to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, and what it reveals about the defendant's character.” Paul v. State, 888 N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quotation omitted), trans. denied. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Sanchez v. State, 891 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[17] The nature of the offense is “found in the details and circumstances of the commission of the offenses and the defendant's participation.” Croy v. State, 953 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Furthermore, “we focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Norton v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1285, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quotation and citation omitted).

[18] Haines specifically argues that the “nature of his offense is essentially a victimless crime (other than himself and the car owner) that involved no physical violence and only minor property damage.” Appellant's Br. p. 20. We disagree. Haines endangered Deputy Carter in committing his offenses and continued to flee after he crashed the sedan. Furthermore, police recovered a large amount of marijuana, THC cartridges, dryer sheets, over $4000.00 in cash, and loose sandwich baggies in and around the vehicle, and Haines crashed into a stop sign and utility pole as a result of his dangerous driving. Haines's sentence is not inappropriate considering the nature of his offenses.

[19] Haines also argues that his character supports a lesser sentence than he received. “The character of the offender is found in what we learn of the offender's life and conduct.” Croy, 953 N.E.2d at 664. Haines admits that he has “several juvenile adjudications and multiple adult convictions comprising both misdemeanor and felony convictions, along with various probation violations” but contends that his criminal history does not support the sentence he received. Appellant's Br. p. 20.

[20] Haines has eight prior felony convictions, including one for the same kind of resisting conduct as here, five prior misdemeanor convictions, and multiple juvenile-delinquency adjudications. Haines's criminal history reflects poorly on his character and supports the sentence he received. See Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.”). Haines's argument that he has “positive attributes for this Court's consideration[,]” is likewise unpersuasive. Appellant's Br. p. 20. Haines concedes that he has “demonstrated a lack of remorse in this matter,” but believes that his lack of remorse is “understandable considering the events as they played out.” Appellant's Br. p. 20. Haines had also previously violated his terms of probation and failed to appear for a hearing in another case in 2024, and Haines's behavior in this case further reflects poorly on his character, considering that the trial court noted on record that Haines was “among, if not the most, difficult offend – defendant I've had in court [․] in my career.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 230. Haines's six-year aggregate sentence was far below the nine-and-one-half year maximum he could have received for his felonies and misdemeanors.³

[21] Haines has failed to convince us that his character did not warrant imposition of the sentence that he received, and, in light of the nature of his offenses and his character, he has failed to convince us that his sentence is inappropriate. See Sanchez, 891 N.E.2d at 176.

[22] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Haines also contends that, “by not properly activating his emergency lights,” Deputy Carter, “committed his own offense by operating his police vehicle at a high rate of speed and at a complete disregard for others on the roadway.” Appellant's Br. p. 13. Haines contends that “[Deputy] Carter was in the wrong for his actions [․] and thus Haines cannot be held responsible for any allegations that he fled from [Deputy] Carter on the day in question.” Appellant's Br. p. 17. Counsel for Haines, however, concedes “that he cannot find any statutory or case law that supports Haines’[s] request to this Court to reverse his conviction for Count I, based on this reasoning[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 17. The State “is also unaware of any authority that would support” this position and argues that this argument is waived for failure to support with citation. Appellee's Br. p. 12. We agree with this State on this point. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 822 N.E.2d 193, 202–03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“Generally, a party waives any issue raised on appeal where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citation to authority and portions of the record.”), trans. denied.

3.   Again, the trial court sentenced Haines to six years of incarceration for the Level 5 felony resisting law enforcement, 180 days for Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, 180 days for Class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident, and two-and-one-half years for Level 6 felony criminal recklessness. The sentencing range for the Level 6 felony was between six months and two-and-one-half years, with the advisory sentence being one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 (2023). For the Class B misdemeanors, the maximum sentence is 180 days. Ind. Code § 35-50-3-3. As a result, Haines could have received an aggregate sentence of nine-and-one-half years.

Bradford, Judge.

Altice, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.