Rodney R. Jett, Sr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Rodney R. Jett, Sr. appeals his convictions for Level 5 felony possession of cocaine and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Jett raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether officers violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution when they removed him from his vehicle and searched him.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Shortly before 7:00 a.m. on January 7, 2024, the Richmond Police Department received a report of an unconscious person in the driver's seat of a vehicle that was stopped in or near the five-point intersection of Ft. Wayne Avenue, North 8th Street, and E Street. Richmond Police Department Officer Jared Smith and another officer promptly arrived at the intersection and observed “a silver Cadillac that was pulled out into the intersection past the stop sign.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 150. The vehicle was “in [the] lane of travel,” and other vehicles “were having to go around” it to get through the intersection. Id.

[4] Officer Smith pulled his patrol car behind the stopped vehicle, approached the driver, and observed Jett apparently unconscious in the driver's seat. The engine of Jett's vehicle was running, and no one else was inside the vehicle. Officer Smith “knocked on the window several times trying to gain any sort of response” from Jett. Id. at 151.

[5] Eventually, Jett came around and opened the driver's side door. He then “began to speak,” informing Officer Smith that “he had probably taken too much medication and must have nodded o[ff],” but he was “fine” now. Id. at 23, 151-52. Officer Smith observed that Jett “seemed disoriented” and “lethargic,” and Jett needed “a while to get his bearings together to know where he was at.” Id. at 152.

[6] Officer Smith asked Jett to exit the vehicle because Jett had “admit[ed] that he ․ ha[d] taken medication” prior to operating the vehicle, and Officer Smith needed to “make sure that he was safe to drive.” Id. at 153. Officer Smith had also received a report from dispatch that Jett had “mental health issues,” and Officer Smith wanted “to check on [Jett's] welfare ․” Id.

[7] But Jett refused to exit the vehicle. Officer Smith and his colleague then forcibly removed Jett from his vehicle, and Officer Smith began a pat-down of Jett for weapons. As Officer Smith began the pat-down, and prior to Officer Smith reaching Jett's pockets, Jett “informed [Officer Smith] that he ha[d] crack in his pocket ․” Id. at 154. Jett added that “he's an addict but not a liar.” Id. Officer Smith then removed what he recognized based on his training and experience to be crack cocaine from Jett's right front pants pocket. In Jett's left front pocket, Officer Smith located and removed “a glass smoking device with burnt residue” inside it. Id. at 157.

[8] The State charged Jett with Level 5 felony possession of cocaine and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Officer Smith testified at Jett's ensuing jury trial. When Officer Smith began to discuss the results of the pat-down, Jett objected to the admission of that evidence under the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11. The trial court overruled Jett's objections, and the jury found him guilty as charged. The court entered its judgment of conviction and sentenced Jett accordingly.

[9] This appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

[10] Jett argues that the trial court erred in the admission of the evidence because the State violated his constitutional rights when it seized the evidence out of his pants pockets. As our Supreme Court has made clear:

On appeal, an abuse-of-discretion standard applies to a trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence, with reversal warranted only if the trial court's ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights. Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014). But when, like here, the trial court's determination involves the constitutionality of a search or seizure, that determination is a question of law to which a de novo standard of review applies. Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008).

McCoy v. State, 193 N.E.3d 387, 390 (Ind. 2022).

[11] Jett's arguments on appeal are based on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. As we have explained:

Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article [1], Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution protect “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const. [a]mend. IV; Ind. Const., art. [1,] § 11. These protections against unreasonable governmental searches and seizures are a principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct. Friend v. State, 858 N.E.2d 646, 650 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 54 (Ind. 1995); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)). When the police conduct a warrantless search, the State bears the burden of establishing that an exception to the warrant requirement is applicable. Id.

Bulthuis v. State, 17 N.E.3d 378, 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

Officer Smith acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment.

[12] We first address Jett's argument that Officer Smith violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Jett's only argument on appeal is that Officer Smith's removal of Jett from the vehicle and the initiation of the pat-down were not within the emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment. Under that exception, an officer may briefly detain an individual when the officer has “an objectively reasonable basis for believing that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger.” M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 332 (Ind. 2016).

[13] But the State's argument on appeal is more broad than simply relying on the emergency-aid exception. In its brief, the State also argues that, notwithstanding the emergency-aid exception, Officer Smith also had “reasonable suspicion to briefly detain” Jett on the belief that “criminal activity may [have been] afoot.” Appellee's Br. at 10-11. That exception is based on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and operates independently of the emergency-aid exception. And, in his Reply Brief, Jett does not argue that the State's alternative rationale under Terry is not properly before us.¹ Accordingly, we proceed under the straight-forward and usual Terry stop analysis.

[14] As our Supreme Court has summarized:

An officer can stop a person if the officer “observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). While this stop requires less than probable cause, an officer's reasonable suspicion demands more than just a hunch: “the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.” Id. at 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868.

Johnson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1199, 1203-04 (Ind. 2020) (alteration original to Johnson).

[15] There is no question that Officer Smith had reasonable suspicion to engage in an investigative stop of Jett's vehicle. Jett's vehicle was stopped in a lane of travel at a five-point intersection, which caused other motorists to have to maneuver around his vehicle. No one suggests in this appeal that Jett's vehicle was lawfully parked. Thus, Officer Smith's investigation of Jett's vehicle was reasonable.

[16] Likewise, Officer Smith reasonably removed Jett from the vehicle. After Officer Smith had approached Jett's vehicle, he observed Jett unconscious in the driver's seat with no other occupants in the vehicle. After some effort, Officer Smith was able to awaken Jett from his slumber. Jett then informed Officer Smith that he had taken “too much medication,” which must have caused him to lose consciousness while he had been operating his vehicle. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 152. At that point, Officer Smith had reasonable suspicion to believe that Jett may have committed an offense, e.g., Class C misdemeanor operating while intoxicated under Indiana Code section 9-30-5-1(c) (2023). Further, Officer Smith observed, notwithstanding Jett's self-assessment that he was “fine,” that Jett was “disoriented,” “lethargic,” and needed “a while to get his bearings together to know where he was at.” Id. at 23, 152. Based on both those observations and Jett's admission to having taken too much medication, Officer Smith also had reasonable suspicion to believe that Jett could not lawfully continue to operate the vehicle.²

[17] Nor can we say that Officer Smith's initiation of a pat-down of Jett resulted in reversible error. Pat-downs require an independent and articulable factual basis. See State v. Cunningham, 26 N.E.3d 21, 26 (Ind. 2015). However, after Officer Smith had initiated the pat-down of Jett but before Officer Smith had reached Jett's pockets, Jett admitted to Officer Smith that he had crack cocaine in his pocket. We therefore conclude that Jett's admission provided an independent factual basis for the seizure of the cocaine and the related seizure of the glass pipe. Accordingly, the evidence was not seized pursuant to an unlawful pat-down but, instead, pursuant to a voluntary admission. Cf. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 271-72 (Ind. 2013) (recognizing that suppression of the evidence is not required either “when the connection between the illegal search or seizure and the discovery of the evidence has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint of the illegal action” or when “the derivative evidence obtained has an independent source” of discovery). Further, we do not find Jett's suggestion that his admission was coerced by the initiation of the pat-down to be persuasive. Accordingly, Officer Smith did not violate Jett's Fourth Amendment rights.

Officer Smith acted reasonably under Article 1, Section 11.

[18] We thus turn to Jett's argument that Officer Smith violated his rights under Article 1, Section 11. As our Supreme Court has explained:

Although Article 1, Section 11 of our state's constitution is worded nearly identically to its federal counterpart, we interpret it independently and ask whether the State has shown that a particular search or seizure was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances. Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 942 (Ind. 2020). In doing so, we employ the framework provided in Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005). We evaluate the reasonableness of a law enforcement officer's search or seizure by balancing three factors: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Id. at 361.

Ramierz v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 191 (Ind. 2021).

[19] We thus initially consider Officer Smith's degree of concern or suspicion that a violation had occurred. Under this factor, “we consider all the information available to the officer at the time of the search or seizure.” Id. And we conclude that Officer Smith's degree of concern or suspicion was high. He observed a stopped vehicle in a lane of travel at a five-point intersection; an unconscious driver who, when awakened, admitted to possible intoxication and continued to demonstrate symptoms commonly associated with intoxication; and who, upon having been forcibly removed from the vehicle, admitted to possessing crack cocaine.

[20] We also conclude that the degree of Officer Smith's search and seizure of Jett was only minimally intrusive. Approaching Jett at the driver's side window was not problematic. Removing Jett from the vehicle based on Jett's apparent intoxication was reasonable. And the pat-down did not meaningfully interfere with Jett's constitutional rights.

[21] Finally, the extent of law enforcement needs throughout the encounter was high. Jett was obstructing traffic, apparently intoxicated, and there was no one else to operate the vehicle. Further, even if the need for the pat-down specifically was low, that is a nonstarter given Jett's pre-discovery admission to possessing crack cocaine.

[22] In sum, balancing the Litchfield factors shows that Officer Smith acted reasonably under Article 1, Section 11 and, thus, did not violate Jett's rights under that provision.

Conclusion

[23] For all of these reasons, we affirm the admission of the evidence and Jett's convictions.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Our Supreme Court has decided the lawfulness of a search under Terry notwithstanding that “the parties and the courts below largely focused on whether” a different exception to the Fourth Amendment should have applied. Johnson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1199, 1203 (Ind. 2020).

2.   We also acknowledge that “[a] routine traffic stop presents enough concern for officer safety that it may justify the minimal additional intrusion of ordering a driver ․ out of the car.” State v. Cunningham, 26 N.E.3d 21, 26 (Ind. 2015) (quotation marks omitted).

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.