Troy Briscoe, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Troy Briscoe appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon as a level 4 felony. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On February 13, 2023, Sabrina Cowan was shot and died. During an investigation, law enforcement identified Briscoe as a suspect. On February 28, 2023, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Sergeant Brian Clark located Briscoe at an apartment on 36th Terrace in Marion County. Shortly after 3:00 p.m., Indianapolis Police Detective Sean Baukat made contact with Briscoe and placed him in handcuffs. At that time, four other officers and civilians were present.

[3] At 4:04 p.m. on February 28, 2023, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Detective Christopher Winter applied for a search warrant, which a judge denied.¹ Detective Winter reached out to the lead detective who provided additional facts. At 4:39 p.m. on February 28, 2023, Detective Winter applied for a second warrant, included additional facts in the affidavit, and specified that a previous affidavit had been submitted to another judge. According to the affidavit, officers in the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department were dispatched on a welfare check to 3556 West 12th Street at 9:28 p.m. on February 13, 2023. Officers responded to 3555 West 12th Street and spoke with Mrs. Magee who had no idea of anyone needing assistance. At 9:53 p.m., officers were dispatched to a person down at 3563 West 12th Street. Upon arrival, officers were flagged down by neighbors and directed to an unconscious female, later identified as Cowan, lying in the yard. Neighbors informed officers that Cowan lived at 3563 West 12th Street. Officers initially believed Cowan was overdosing but learned, after Cowan was transported to the hospital, that she had been shot. Cowan was pronounced dead at 10:48 p.m. Officers returned to the scene and secured it with crime scene tape. Detective James Hurt spoke with several neighbors, some of whom wished to remain anonymous, who stated that they heard a loud boom and someone screaming. Detective Hurt spoke with Mrs. Magee, who had cameras on her residence.

[4] Detective Herr and Detective Winter interviewed a friend of Cowan, Ms. Sanchez, and her niece, both of whom stated they were scared and did not want to become involved. Ms. Sanchez stated that her niece dropped off Cowan at her house around 8:30 p.m. and Cowan's boyfriend, “Breezy,” a “black male, tall, average build, with a fade, and tattoos on his arms and on his stomach” was at Cowan's residence. Exhibits Volume I at 8. Ms. Sanchez informed detectives that Breezy was violent and had previously threatened to kill Cowan. Upon a search of Cowan's residence following the issuance of a warrant, detectives located several items of evidence, including a shell casing.

[5] Detective Hurt called and spoke with Cowan's mother, Mrs. York. Mrs. York told Detective Hurt that she reached out to Breezy approximately a month to a month and a half earlier to speak with Cowan, who did not have a phone at that time. Mrs. York stated that she “saved the number” and the “telephone number she called was [xxx-xxx-xx]62.” Id. Mrs. York “stated Cowan eventually borrowed her daughter's phone and was the same phone she had at the time of her death” and “stated [Cowan's] phone number was [xxx-xxx-xx]48.” Id.

[6] On February 18, 2023, Detective Winter enlisted the help of Detective Toms with processing Cowan's cell phone. Detective Toms downloaded data from Cowan's phone. Detectives examined the data and discovered that Cowan's phone contacted the number xxx-xxx-xx26.² Detectives learned through searching several databases that this same number was associated with Briscoe, who detectives later identified as Breezy. Detectives were able to view data from Cowan's cell phone and associate the number of xxx-xxx-xx26 to database searches that linked this number to Briscoe.

[7] The affidavit asserted that “[a] witness known to police came forward and gave a statement to Detective Hurt” in which the person said that “Breezy's real name is Troy Briscoe and he has a baby mamma that lives on W 36th Terrace.” Id. Detective Hurt “interviewed other witness [sic] that stated they have seen or been told that Briscoe has been know[n] to carry a firearm.” Id. Officers “picked up a witness known to police,” and she “took Officers to an apartment complex on W 36th Terrace,” “showed them the apartment,” and stated that “Breezy was known to carry a firearm.” Id. Detectives conducted a database search of addresses for Briscoe and found an address of 5068 West 36 Terrace Apartment C. “Officers then conducted a surveillance and observed a male matching Briscoe's description.” Id. “Officers observed the male coming in and out of 5068 W 36 Terrace Apartment C.” Id. “Upon the male coming out of the apartment, Officers stopped him and confirmed his identification as Troy Briscoe,” and “Briscoe was detained and transported to the Homicide office for questioning.” Id.

[8] Detective Winter requested a search warrant to enter and search 5068 W 36th Street Apartment C for firearms or firearm related evidence that could match the casing recovered from the scene. At 5:04 p.m. on February 28, 2023, Judge Terrance Tharpe issued a search warrant. Sergeant Clark located a firearm near a pair of men's underwear on top of a dresser in the main bedroom, which contained men's clothing including pants, underwear, and t-shirts. An analysis of the DNA recovered from one of the swabs of the firearm's magazine base, top round, and round head stamps, indicated that the DNA profile was “interpreted as a mixture of two individuals” and that “[t]he DNA profile is at least one-trillion times more likely if it originated from Troy Briscoe and one unknown individual than if it had originated from two unknown, unrelated individuals.” Transcript Volume II at 133.

[9] On March 1, 2023, the State charged Briscoe with unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon as a level 4 felony. On June 13, 2023, Briscoe's counsel, Attorney Jonathan Gotkin, filed a “Motion to Suppress Search Warrant and Firearm,” which argued in part that “[t]here was no probable cause to believe that a crime was happening at 5068 W. 36th Terrace, Apt C.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 93-94 (capitalization omitted).

[10] On July 21, 2023, the court held a hearing. On August 9, 2023, the court denied the motion to suppress. On August 22, 2023, the court granted a motion to withdraw filed by Attorney Gotkin.

[11] On March 10, 2024, Briscoe's counsel, Attorney Celeste Jaffe, filed a “Motion to Suppress Search Warrant,” which requested suppression of “the warrant and firearm due to the unreasonableness of the State's conduct in filing the warrant nearly two hours after [Briscoe] had been detained and taken to the IMPD homicide unit.” Id. at 135-136 (capitalization omitted). After a hearing, the court denied Briscoe's motion to suppress.

[12] On July 17, 2025, the court held a bench trial. The court found Briscoe guilty as charged and sentenced him to six years.

Discussion

[13] Briscoe phrases the issue as whether the trial court violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution when it admitted evidence discovered during an unlawful search after an unlawful seizure. “Where a defendant does not perfect an interlocutory appeal from a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, but objects to the admission of the evidence at trial, the issue on appeal is more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial.” Danner v. State, 931 N.E.2d 421, 426 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied; see also Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013). Generally, we review the trial court's ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1115, 1134 (Ind. 1997), reh'g denied. We reverse only when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997), reh'g denied. We may affirm a trial court's decision regarding the admission of evidence if it is sustainable on any basis in the record. Barker v. State, 695 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ind. 1998), reh'g denied. We review de novo a ruling on the constitutionality of a search or seizure, but we give deference to a trial court's determination of the facts, which will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008); see also Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014) (holding that the ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of law that we consider de novo).

[14] Briscoe challenges the admission of the evidence under: (A) the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and (B) Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

A. Fourth Amendment

[15] Briscoe argues that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. He contends that the affidavit indicated police identified him as Breezy “but the link for that conclusion is not clear” and “appears to be based on cell phone evidence and anonymous witness statements, neither of which are sufficient.” Appellant's Brief at 15. He also argues that the good faith exception does not apply because the affidavit was so lacking in probable cause.

[16] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that “[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ․” U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. This constitutional requirement “is further codified in the Indiana Code, which lists the information that must be included in an affidavit supporting a search warrant.” Bunnell v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1231, 1234 (Ind. 2021) (citing Ind. Code § 35-33-5-2). “Although the statute requires the affiant to provide the ‘facts known to the affiant through personal knowledge,’ it does not go so far as to require the affiant to explain how they learned those facts.” Id. at 1235.

[17] “Probable cause is ‘not a high bar.’ ” Hodges v. State, 125 N.E.3d 578, 581-582 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014)). It “is cleared when the totality of the circumstances establishes ‘a fair probability’—not proof or a prima facie showing—of criminal activity, contraband, or evidence of a crime.” Id. at 582 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 238, 243 n.13, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983)). “Accordingly, probable cause does not establish guilt. In fact, innocent activity will often supply a basis for showing probable cause.” Id. “The probable-cause standard is also ‘a fluid concept.’ ” Id. (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-371, 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, 103 S. Ct. 2317)). “It is ‘not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules,’ and it cannot be quantified into percentages.” Id. (quoting Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371, 124 S. Ct. 795 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, 103 S. Ct. 2317)). “This is because probable cause ‘turn[s] on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts,’ and it depends on the totality of the circumstances, viewed as a whole.” Id. (quoting Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371, 124 S. Ct. 795 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, 103 S. Ct. 2317)).

[18] When reviewing for probable cause, we “view the circumstances from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, keeping in mind that both inferences based on the officer's own experience and common-sense conclusions about human behavior may affect whether the officer had probable cause.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). “We focus on whether the reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of the evidence support the finding of probable cause.” McGrath v. State, 95 N.E.3d 522, 528 (Ind. 2018). “Rather than consider post hoc justifications for the search, we evaluate only the evidence presented to the issuing magistrate.” Id. “As a reviewing court, our duty ‘is simply to ensure that [there was] a substantial basis’ for finding probable cause.” Watkins v. State, 85 N.E.3d 597, 603 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317). “We owe ‘great deference’ to the initial probable-cause determination, and will not invalidate warrants by interpreting probable cause affidavits ‘in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.’ ” Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S. Ct. 2317).

[19] To the extent the affidavit asserted information obtained through anonymous sources, we note that “[a]n anonymous tip cannot, standing alone, support a finding of probable cause.” McGrath, 95 N.E.3d at 528. “Instead, the reliability of hearsay from a source of unknown credibility depends on other factors, including (1) the basis of the informant's knowledge or (2) corroboration through independent police investigation.” Id. “Other elements may come into play depending on the facts of the case.” Id. These factors may include the informant's accurate prediction of otherwise unforeseeable criminal activity. Id. at 528 n.4. Ind. Code § 35-33-5-2(b) provides that, when based on hearsay, the affidavit must either “contain reliable information establishing the credibility of the source and of each of the declarants of the hearsay and establishing that there is a factual basis for the information furnished” or “contain information that establishes that the totality of the circumstances corroborates the hearsay.”

[20] According to the affidavit, law enforcement investigated Cowan's murder which occurred on February 13, 2023. Sanchez stated that her niece dropped off Cowan at her house around 8:30 p.m. and that Cowan's boyfriend, “Breezy,” a “black male, tall, average build, with a fade, and tattoos on his arms and on his stomach” was at the residence. Exhibits Volume at 8. Sanchez also informed detectives that Briscoe was violent and had previously threatened to kill Cowan. Law enforcement discovered a shell casing at Cowan's residence. An examination of Cowan's phone revealed contact with a phone number identical to the phone number mentioned by Cowan's mother except for the final two digits being transposed. The detectives learned through searching several databases that this same number was associated with Briscoe, who detectives later identified as Breezy. A witness known to police gave a statement to a detective indicating that Breezy's actual name was Troy Briscoe and that he had “a baby mamma that lives on W 36th Terrace.” Id. Detectives conducted a database search of addresses for Briscoe and found an address of 5068 West 36 Terrace Apartment C. Officers conducted surveillance and observed a male matching Briscoe's description “coming in and out of 5068 W 36 Terrace Apartment C.” Id. “Upon the male coming out of the apartment, Officers stopped him and confirmed his identification as Troy Briscoe,” and “Briscoe was detained and transported to the Homicide office for questioning.” Id.

[21] Under the circumstances, we conclude that law enforcement had probable cause to believe that evidence of the murder would be found in the apartment. See Allen v. State, 798 N.E.2d 490, 497-499 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that there was a substantial basis upon which to conclude there was probable cause to believe weapons were at the apartment and permitting search for murder weapons at apartment of one suspect's cousin where suspects began spending time after the series of murders that began two months prior to the execution of the search warrant and noting that “handguns and rifles are the type of property that a person reasonably could be expected to keep for at least a period of a month and a half”); Foster v. State, 633 N.E.2d 337, 344-345 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the facts found in the affidavit and reasonable inferences provided a substantial basis for the court's determination of probable cause and holding that a handgun, unlike controlled substances that can be expected to be consumed or distributed, was the “sort of property that the perpetrator reasonably could be expected to keep” and concluding that warrant for search of suspect's residence issued twenty-eight days after murder was not stale), trans. denied.

[22] Even assuming that a lack of probable cause existed, we cannot say that reversal is warranted. “Suppression of illegally obtained evidence is not required ‘if the police relied on the warrant in objective good faith.’ ” Heuring v. State, 140 N.E.3d 270, 276 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Jackson v. State, 908 N.E.2d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2009) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984))). The good faith exception is not available in some situations, including where (1) the magistrate is “misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth,” or (2) the warrant was based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Jackson, 908 N.E.2d at 1143 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S. Ct. 3405). The good faith exception to the warrant requirement has been codified by Ind. Code § 35-37-4-5.

[23] Briscoe does not argue that the judge was misled by information in the affidavit Detective Winter knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard for the truth.³ As explained above, the affidavit in support of the warrant listed the information obtained by Sanchez, Cowan's mother, the investigation at Cowan's residence, an examination of Cowan's phone, an examination of several databases indicating that the phone number used to contact Cowan was associated with Briscoe, information from a witness known to police, a search of a database resulting in the discovery of an address for Briscoe, and surveillance of the address resulting in law enforcement observing Briscoe at that location. We conclude that the search warrant was not based upon an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable and that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is applicable. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence discovered at the apartment under the Fourth Amendment.

B. Indiana Constitution

[24] Briscoe argues that “[s]eizing [him] and searching his apartment unreasonably intruded upon his life under Article 1, Section 11.” Appellant's Brief at 19. Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

[25] “The legality of a governmental search under the Indiana Constitution turns on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of the circumstances.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). “[T]he totality of the circumstances requires consideration of both the degree of intrusion into the subject's ordinary activities and the basis upon which the officer selected the subject of the search or seizure.” Id. at 360. Reasonableness of a search or seizure turns on the “balance of: 1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Id. at 361. When evaluating the degree of concern, “we consider all the information available to the officer at the time of the search or seizure.” Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 191 (Ind. 2021) (citing Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 943 (Ind. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2468 (2021)). When evaluating the degree of intrusion, “we evaluate this factor from the defendant's perspective” and “consider the intrusion into both a defendant's physical movements and privacy, focusing on how officers conducted the search or seizure.” Id. at 192 (citing Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 944-945).

[26] With respect to the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation had occurred, the record reveals that law enforcement were investigating Cowan's murder and knew that Briscoe had been Cowan's boyfriend, he had been violent, he had threatened to kill Cowan, and he was at Cowan's residence on the evening she was murdered. Accordingly, the degree of concern was high.

[27] Concerning the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, the record reveals that law enforcement handcuffed and detained Briscoe shortly after 3:00 p.m. while others were present, confirmed his identity, and transported him for questioning. Within approximately two hours, law enforcement obtained a warrant at 5:04 p.m. to search the apartment and executed the search only after receiving the warrant.

[28] As for the extent of law enforcement needs, officers were investigating Cowan's murder and they had information that Briscoe had been violent, threatened to kill Cowan, and was known to carry a firearm. Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the search was reasonable and did not violate Briscoe's rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.⁴

[29] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Briscoe's conviction.

[30] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record does not contain the initial application for the warrant or the denial.

2.   This first eight digits matched the numbers provided by Mrs. York.

3.   To the extent Briscoe argues that the second warrant application was submitted to a different judge, we note that the Electronic Search Warrant Submission Form acknowledged this. Specifically, the form indicates an affirmative answer to the question of “Has this affidavit been submitted before to another judge*?” Exhibits Volume I at 6 (capitalization omitted). It states: “(*Please note: If previously submitted to a judge, any additional submissions should be directed to the same judge if at all possible.)” Id. (capitalization omitted). On the form, Detective Winter specified the name of the judge that did not issue a search warrant based upon the earlier submission.

4.   To the extent Briscoe cites Buckley v. State, 886 N.E.2d 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), we find that case distinguishable. In Buckley, following a traffic stop, law enforcement towed the vehicle of a murder suspect before any warrant had been issued, detained the defendant for almost four hours before obtaining warrants, and detained the defendant for approximately six hours before executing the search warrant and finding a handgun in the vehicle. 886 N.E.2d at 12-13.

Brown, Judge.

Altice, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.