Cody Dean Waldrip, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After threatening to kill multiple people over a two-day period, Cody Waldrip was charged with two counts of Level 6 felony intimidation. At his initial hearing, he asserted his right to a speedy trial under Criminal Rule 4(B) and informed the trial court of his intention to represent himself. However, the next day, the court appointed him counsel. Before withdrawing his appearance, defense counsel filed a motion to continue Waldrip's next hearing and did not object when it was set on a date outside the speedy trial period.

[2] At the next hearing, Waldrip renewed his request to represent himself. The court advised him of his rights, accepted his request, and granted counsel's motion to withdraw. Waldrip also moved for dismissal of his case under Rule 4(B), which the court denied. Waldrip proceeded to trial pro se and was found guilty on both counts. He appeals his convictions, arguing the trial court erred in denying his Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Over two days in August 2023, Waldrip threatened to kill three different people. First, on the 29th, Waldrip called the Monroe County Board of Commissioners’ office and proceeded to yell and swear at, and then threaten the administrative assistant, Dina DeLawter-Myers. Before hanging up, he said, “I'll fucking kill you, bitch.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 205. He then called back and left four voicemails in which he identified himself and continued yelling and swearing. See State's Exhibit 2. The next day, Waldrip sent Brett Rorem,¹ a former Bloomington police officer, a Facebook message that said, “I am going to KILL you.” Exhibits at 3. After sending the message, Waldrip posted a screenshot of the message to his own Facebook profile. See id.2

[4] On September 1, the State charged Waldrip with two counts of Level 6 felony intimidation,³ one for threatening DeLawter-Myers and the other for threatening Rorem. At his initial hearing on September 5, Waldrip appeared pro se and filed a Criminal Rule 4(B) motion for a speedy trial. In discussing his representation in this case and a related misdemeanor case (both of which were pending in Monroe Circuit Court 2), he told the court he wished to represent himself. In response, the court said, “[W]e will put a note because [the judge of Circuit Court 2 ⁴ ] has to go over some additional advisement of rights for you representing yourself. Once C02 gets that request ․ they will send up the trial date and set hearing[ ]s accordingly.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 12. At the end of the hearing, the court told him if he “chang[ed] his mind about wanting to represent himself ․ [he would] need to wr[i]te [Circuit Court 2] and ask them to appoint [him] outside counsel ․” Id. The court also explained that it could not set a trial date at that time because a special judge would be appointed to oversee the case “due to the allegations [involving] a Monroe County employee.” Id. at 6. It ordered that Waldrip remain in custody and scheduled his next hearing for October 30. Id. at 13.

[5] On September 6, the trial court appointed him outside pauper counsel, who entered his appearance in the case that same day. The special judge was appointed on September 8 and assumed jurisdiction three days later. On September 19, Waldrip filed multiple pro se documents stating he wished to represent himself, he did not agree to any continuances, and that he had requested a speedy trial. A week later, he filed another document with similar assertions. On September 28, the trial court rescheduled the October 30 hearing for November 3 “[d]ue to unavailability of the [c]ourtroom ․” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 50. The next day, defense counsel moved to continue the November 3 hearing due to a scheduling conflict. The court granted the motion and continued the hearing to December 1, which was outside the Rule 4(B) seventy-day period. On October 5, defense counsel filed a second motion to continue the hearing citing another scheduling conflict.

[6] On October 6, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw his appearance noting that he had visited Waldrip, who said he “did not want counsel representing him in these matters and that he wishe[d] to represent himself.” Id. at 58. The court did not rule on this motion or on the October 6th motion to continue. On November 28, defense counsel filed another motion to continue the hearing. The court granted it and rescheduled the hearing for December 15.

[7] On December 15, Waldrip filed a pro se “motion to discharge and dismiss” pursuant to Rule 4(B) asserting that because he had not been brought to trial within seventy days of his speedy trial motion, his case should be dismissed. Id. at 65. He added he had “been in jail 101 days” since he filed that motion. Id. At the hearing that same day, when Waldrip started to explain his speedy trial and representation concerns, the trial court explained,

Here's the way that this works. Because either [at] your request or [because] the Court found it necessary to appoint [counsel] to you during those periods of time, you were unable to file any pro se motions, okay[?] ․ [S]o you've been represented by counsel. The motions that have been filed have not been ruled upon by the Court because you've been represented by counsel.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 18. The court then asked Waldrip if he still wished to represent himself. Waldrip answered affirmatively, and the trial court granted defense counsel's motion to withdraw. The court advised Waldrip of his rights, warned him of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se, asked him questions about his level of education and knowledge about criminal trials, and then confirmed that he still wanted to represent himself.

[8] Then the court turned to Waldrip's motion to discharge and dismiss, saying,

Here's what we're going to do, Mr. Waldrip. Although you were represented by counsel throughout the duration of these causes, you've asserted your right to represent yourself. I will grant your request to be discharged from the jail. I will deny your request to dismiss these charges against you. We are now going to set these matters for jury trial.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 37. He proceeded to trial pro se ⁵ and, while testifying on his own behalf, admitted to the charges. The jury found him guilty on both counts. The trial court sentenced him to two 730-day sentences to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of 1,460 days executed in the Department of Correction. Waldrip now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Waldrip argues the trial court erred in denying his Criminal Rule 4(B) motion to discharge and dismiss. Waldrip properly asserted his right to a speedy trial at his initial hearing on September 5 when he was not yet represented by counsel. However, we must address a threshold matter regarding his subsequent representation before turning to the merits of Rule 4(B). Waldrip seems to suggest on appeal that he was wrongfully appointed counsel. To the extent he makes such an argument, we disagree.

[10] Although Waldrip voiced his desire at his initial hearing to proceed pro se, the judge of Circuit Court 9, who presided over that hearing, responded by informing him that she would “put a note because [the judge of Circuit Court 2] ha[d] to go over some additional advisement of rights for [him] representing himself.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 12. “[B]efore a defendant waives his right to counsel and proceeds pro se, the trial court must determine that the defendant's waiver of counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Jackson v. State, 992 N.E.2d 929, 932 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Specifically, the court must “ ‘acquaint the defendant with the advantages to attorney representation’ and the disadvantages and the dangers of self-representation.” Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1132, 1138 (Ind. 2003)); see Marshall v. State, 180 N.E.3d 411, 415 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“The defendant should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”). There is no script a court must follow in fulfilling this duty, but it must come to a “considered determination” that the defendant understands and intends to waive their right to counsel. Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1126 (Ind. 2001). “This determination must be made with the awareness that the law indulges every reasonable presumption against a waiver of this fundamental right.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).

[11] Here, Waldrip expressed his desire to represent himself, but the trial court left the advisement of his rights and the determination of whether he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel for the special judge who would ultimately preside over his cases from Circuit Court 2. Indeed, this advisement and discussion did not occur until he was before that judge on December 15. So, although the court acknowledged his request to represent himself at the initial hearing, it could not properly proceed as though he had waived his right to counsel. Thus, the court appropriately appointed him counsel in the interim. See Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6(a) (requiring courts to appoint indigent criminal defendants counsel).⁶ Waldrip has failed to show why this was error. As such, we find he was properly represented by counsel from September 6 to December 15.

[12] Turning then to Rule 4(B), because the facts are undisputed and this case merely presents a question of law, our standard of review is de novo. Van Hawk v. State, ___ N.E.3d ___, 2026 WL 320194, at *5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). “Criminal Rule 4 places an ‘affirmative duty’ on the State to bring a defendant to trial.” Talbott v. State, 204 N.E.3d 288, 296 (Ind. Ct. App 2023) (quoting Cundiff v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1026, 1028 (Ind. 2012)), reh'g denied, trans. denied. At the time Waldrip asserted his right to a speedy trial, Rule 4(B)(1)⁷ provided that

[i]f any defendant held in jail on an indictment ․ shall move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such motion, except where a continuance within said period is had on his motion, or the delay is otherwise caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such seventy (70) calendar days because of the congestion of the court calendar.

[13] Waldrip invoked this right on September 5, and thus the State was required to bring him to trial within seventy days, which would have been November 14, 2023. However, a defendant who has requested a speedy trial “must maintain a position which is reasonably consistent with the request that he has made.” Talbott, 204 N.E.3d at 297 (quoting Hahn v. State, 67 N.E.3d 1071, 1080 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied). During his proceedings, Waldrip did not maintain a consistent position on his request to have a speedy trial. Although Waldrip's initial motion for a speedy trial was properly asserted before he was represented by counsel, he was ultimately represented by counsel. And defense counsel moved to continue the October 30 pretrial conference and did not object when it was reset beyond the seventy-day deadline. “[A] defendant who ‘seeks or acquiesces to the setting of a hearing beyond the time limitations of Criminal Rule 4(B) necessarily agrees to be tried beyond such date.’ ” Van Hawk, 2026 WL 320194, at *6 (quoting Talbott, 204 N.E.3d at 299); see Goudy v. State, 689 N.E.2d 686, 691 (Ind. 1997) (holding that “defendant waived his earlier speedy trial request by acquiescing in the setting of an omnibus date, and by necessary implication, a trial date, beyond the seventy-day limit permitted by Criminal Rule 4(B)(1)”), reh'g denied. Indeed, the seventy-day requirement is no longer applicable “where a continuance within said period is had on [defendant's] motion, or the delay is otherwise caused by his act ․” Ind. Crim. Rule 4(B)(1). In light of the defense's continuance and his lack of objection to a hearing date outside the 4(B) window, Waldrip effectively abandoned his speedy trial request and waived his Rule 4(B) challenge for appeal.

[14] We acknowledge that Waldrip filed multiple motions and objections related to these issues, but he was represented by counsel when he did so. Represented defendants may only “speak[ ] to the court through counsel.” Keener v. State, 267 N.E.3d 1137, 1143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Anderson v. State, 160 N.E.3d 1102 (Ind. 2021) (mem.)), trans. denied. “This means that when a defendant has counsel, any objection to a trial setting based on a Criminal Rule 4 deadline must be made through that counsel.” Id. Thus, his pro se objections could not serve to preserve his position for his original speedy trial request.

[15] Waldrip also makes much of the fact that the trial court “discharged” him but did not dismiss his case. However, the court specifically said, “I will grant your request to be discharged from the jail [but] deny your request to dismiss these charges.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 37 (emphases added). The context of the court's statement shows the court used the word “discharge” in reference to releasing Waldrip from custody rather than ordering that the charges against him be dropped. The court clearly indicated Waldrip was not entitled to discharge of his case, and we find no error in that conclusion considering Waldrip did not preserve his motion for appeal.

Conclusion

[16] For the reasons above, we affirm the trial court's denial of his Rule 4(B) motion to dismiss.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the time, Brett Rorem had a Facebook profile using the name “Brett Jones” for privacy purposes. See Exhibits at 3; see also Tr. Vol. 2 at 188.

2.   That same day, Waldrip commented on an ACLU Indiana Facebook post to which a woman named Megan replied with a laughing emoji. Waldrip then tagged her in several comments indicating he would “ERASE [her] Bloodline.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 204. After she reported those comments to Facebook, Waldrip sent multiple private Facebook messages to her saying, “HaHaHa ․ Megan UGLY BITCH NOBODY ․ HaHaHa” and “I WILL KILL YOU UGLY WHORE.” Ex. at 6 (ellipses in original). However, Waldrip was not charged with any offenses related to these messages.

3.   Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(4), (b)(1)(A).

4.   The judge of the Monroe Circuit Court 9 presided over Waldrip's initial hearing.

5.   In May 2024, the court reappointed counsel at Waldrip's request. However, after defense counsel lost contact with Waldrip and he failed to appear for a hearing in February 2025, the court granted counsel's motion to withdraw his appearance on account of “a breakdown in the attorney client relationship.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 91. Waldrip then reasserted his right to represent himself and continued to trial pro se in July.

6.   While the trial court did not specifically address Waldrip's indigency at the initial hearing, Waldrip and the State confirmed he had been appointed a public defender in his related misdemeanor case. Although that public defender had sought to withdraw her appearance, there was a note in the misdemeanor case that Waldrip should be appointed outside pauper counsel. Thus, the court could've presumed Waldrip's indigency in this matter.

7.   An amendment to Criminal Rule 4(B) took effect on January 1, 2024. For purposes of this appeal, we reference the version that was in effect at the time Waldrip asserted this right in September 2023.

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.