Donovan Wilson, Appellant/Cross-Appellee-Petitioner, v. State of Indiana, Appellee/Cross-Appellant-Respondent. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary and Issue

[1] In 2020, a jury convicted Donovan Wilson (referred to as “Wilson” or “petitioner”) of Level 1 felony child molesting for molesting his then eight-year-old stepdaughter, A.N.,¹ and he was sentenced to thirty years in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). On direct appeal, we affirmed his conviction. Wilson v. State, 21A-CR-131 (Ind. Ct. App. August 11, 2021) (mem.), trans denied. In 2022, Wilson filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing held in 2025, the post-conviction court denied Wilson's petition.

[2] Wilson, pro se, now appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, raising several issues for our review, which we restate as: (1) whether the post-conviction court erred in concluding that Wilson's trial counsel was not ineffective; (2) whether the post-conviction court's findings of fact were supported by the evidence; (3) whether the post-conviction court failed to consider certain evidence Wilson considered exculpatory; and (4) whether the post-conviction court improperly denied his motion to compel the production of recordings of his jailhouse phone calls. The State cross-appeals, arguing that Wilson's appeal should be dismissed because he failed to file a timely Notice of Appeal from the post-conviction court's denial of relief.

[3] We decline the State's invitation to dismiss Wilson's appeal and instead address the issues he raises. Concluding that (1) Wilson received effective assistance of trial counsel, (2) the evidence supported the post-conviction court's findings of fact, (3) the court properly considered Wilson's claimed exculpatory evidence, and (4) the court properly denied his motion to compel, the post-conviction court did not clearly err in denying Wilson post-conviction relief. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] The facts of the underlying criminal case that are relevant to this appeal are set out in Wilson's direct appeal as follows:

In February 2020, twenty-eight-year-old Wilson and his then wife, Ashlay, lived in Gary, Indiana, with their five children. Wilson was the biological father of four of the children and stepfather to then eight-year-old A.N. Ashlay is A.N.’s biological mother.

On the evening of February 9, 2020, Wilson was at home in the basement that he had turned into his “man cave[.]” Record of Jury Trial Proceedings (“Jury Tr.”), Volume 4 at 10․ Most of the basement was visible from the top of the basement stairs.

As the children prepared for bed, Wilson's two sons and A.N. went downstairs to say goodnight. Shortly thereafter, the boys returned upstairs; A.N. did not. Ashlay waited five minutes before going downstairs to check on A.N. When she reached the third or fourth stairstep, Ashlay saw Wilson sitting on the edge of the couch with A.N. bent over between his legs. Ashlay saw that A.N.’s pajama pants were at her ankles and Wilson had his hand on her back, moving her back and forth. Wilson was not wearing a shirt.

Ashlay shouted Wilson's name and immediately ran down the stairs. Wilson answered in an aggressive manner, “What.” Id. at 15. He then jumped up, pulled up his pants, charged at Ashlay, then proceeded up the stairs. A.N. was shaking and looked “really scared[.]” Id. at 14.

Ashlay had A.N. pull up her pants, and the two went upstairs. Ashlay then told A.N. to go to her room and that she would “handle things from there.” Id. Ashlay told A.N. not to open the door unless she heard a female voice.

Ashlay left the house and ran down the street to a family member's home for help. Ashlay then returned to her house to collect the children․

A family member called the police, and, shortly thereafter, the police and an ambulance arrived. A.N. refused to speak with the police. Ashlay, upset and crying, told the police that Wilson had penetrated A.N. and molested her. Wilson was arrested.

A.N. was first taken to a Gary hospital for a sexual examination; however, the hospital could not perform the examination because A.N. was too young. A.N. was then transferred to a hospital in Mishawaka and examined by a sexual assault nurse examiner (“SANE nurse”) who administered a pediatric sexual assault kit at around 6:00 a.m. on February 10. During the examination, A.N. used the term “middle part” to describe female genitalia and “peanuts” to describe male genitalia. Id. at 59, 60. A.N. told the SANE nurse that Wilson had put his “peanuts” in her “middle part” and “bottom” and that it hurt. Id. The nurse observed redness in A.N.’s inner vaginal area. The nurse performed swabs of A.N.’s internal and external genitalia to collect DNA for the sexual assault kit. Once the kit was completed, it was sealed and handed over to the police.

The swabs were subsequently analyzed by a forensic DNA analyst and compared with buccal and penile swabs obtained from Wilson. The analyst testified at trial that results from the following swabs demonstrated very strong support for the probability—that is, that it was at least one trillion times more likely—that the DNA found originated from Wilson: internal vaginal swabs, internal anal swabs, and swabs from both the front and rear of A.N.’s underwear.

On February 11, 2020, the State charged Wilson with child molesting as a Level 1 felony. On February 18, 2020, Detective Sergeant Jeremy Kalvaitis with the Lake County Sheriff's Department Special Victims Unit conducted a forensic interview with A.N. During the interview, Kalvaitis asked A.N. if something happened to her recently, and A.N. answered that after she had gone downstairs, Wilson turned her around and pulled down her pants and underwear. Confidential Exhibit, Volume 3 at 3, State's Exhibit 12A at 8:04, 9:54, 10:12. Kalvaitis asked A.N. what happened next, and she replied, “I forgot.” Id. at 8:47. A.N. did remember that her mother came downstairs, shouted Wilson's name, and began to cry. Id. at 9:00. A.N. told Kalvaitis that Wilson was “on the couch,” and she then described the layout of the basement and its contents. Id. at 10:08. A.N. told Kalvaitis that Wilson put his “peanuts in [her] butt” and “around” her “middle part.” Id. at 11:33, 13:12. She said that she could “feel it” and that she told Wilson to stop, but Wilson told her to “be quiet.” Id. at 12:07, 12:19, 12:27. When Kalvaitis asked if Wilson's pants were pulled down, A.N. answered that his pants were pulled down to his knees. Id. at 12:42.

Kalvaitis gave A.N. a drawing that contained an outline of a girl, and A.N. placed a circle around what she referred to as her “middle part” and an “X” over what she referred to as her “butt.” Id. at 13:46, 14:24, 14:46. Kalvaitis then drew a stick-figure image meant to depict Wilson and asked A.N. to circle where on the figure Wilson's “peanuts” were located. Id. at 15:24, 15:44. A.N. placed a circle between the stick-figure's legs. Id. at 15:52. Near the end of the interview, A.N. told Kalvaitis that when Wilson's “peanuts” were in her “butt” and “around” her “middle part,” Wilson was sitting on the couch; she was standing in front of Wilson; she had her back toward Wilson; and she was watching the television. Id. at 22:40.

On October 29, 2020, the State filed a motion under the protected person statute for admission of A.N.’s recorded forensic interview. See Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6 (2016). On November 6, 2020, the trial court held a protected person hearing, during which the State presented the testimony of a Department of Child Services therapist, Ashlay, A.N., and Kalvaitis. Wilson's counsel questioned each witness at the hearing, including A.N. A.N. testified that she did not remember ever being in the basement with Wilson or experiencing any inappropriate touching from him. Both parties presented arguments, which included Wilson's argument that the statements A.N. made during the interview were not sufficiently reliable. Following the hearing, the trial court granted the State's motion to admit the recorded interview, finding that A.N. was unavailable as a witness and the State “met its burden of proof that the time, content, and circumstances of the prior recorded statement provide[d] sufficient indications of reliability to be admissible at trial.” [Public Access Version of] Appendix of the Appellant, Volume Two at 60-61.

Wilson, 21A-CR-131, at *1-*2 (internal footnote omitted).

[5] Attorney Roseann Ivanovich (“Trial Counsel”) represented Wilson during his three-day jury trial that began on November 9, 2020. The State offered into evidence both an unredacted and a redacted version of A.N.’s recorded forensic interview as State's Exhibits 12 and 12A, respectively. In the unredacted version of the interview, A.N. disclosed, among other things, that the inappropriate touching that occurred on February 9, 2020, was not the first time Wilson had molested her. Only the redacted version of the interview was published to the jury after the trial court gave a limiting instruction regarding that exhibit.

[6] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Wilson guilty as charged, and on December 23, 2020, the trial court sentenced Wilson to thirty years executed in the DOC. Id. at *3. Wilson appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted A.N.’s forensic interview into evidence because, as Wilson claimed, the interview lacked sufficient indications of reliability. We affirmed Wilson's conviction, concluding that the interview contained sufficient indications of reliability and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it. Id. at *6.

[7] In December 2022, Wilson, pro se, filed a verified post-conviction relief (“PCR”) petition, which he amended in October 2023. Wilson alleged that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, claiming his counsel's performance was deficient in numerous ways. The post-conviction court (hereinafter, “the PCR court”) held an evidentiary hearing on January 9 and September 10, 2024, bifurcating the hearing to allow Wilson time to obtain recordings of certain jailhouse phone calls that he believed supported his PCR claims.

[8] On March 7, 2025, the PCR court issued its written order, containing findings of fact and conclusions of law, denying Wilson's amended PCR petition. The PCR court concluded that Wilson was not prejudiced by any of the claimed deficiencies in his trial counsel's defense of him and added that “even if” Wilson was able to establish that his attorney's representation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, Wilson could not “establish that he was prejudiced given the significant evidence of his guilt presented at trial.” Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (“Appealed Order”) at 23, ¶ 70.² The Appealed Order was entered in the chronological case summary (“CCS”) on March 7, 2025, making Wilson's Notice of Appeal due by April 7. The CCS indicates that the trial court clerk issued notice of the Appealed Order to Wilson twice, on March 8 and again on March 10. See Appellant's [PCR] Appendix, Volume 2 at 17.

[9] On April 1, 2025, Wilson, again proceeding pro se, mailed his Notice of Appeal, indicating his intent to appeal the Appealed Order, to the trial court clerk—along with a request to proceed in forma pauperis. The trial court clerk filed the Notice of Appeal on April 2, and on April 10, the PCR court granted Wilson's request to proceed in forma pauperis. Wilson, however, did not file his Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of this Court—as required by Appellate Rule 9(A)(1)—until April 29, twenty-two days after it was due.

[10] On June 2, 2025, this Court dismissed Wilson's appeal because it was untimely. About a week later, on June 10, Wilson tendered a motion to reconsider the dismissal.³ On July 7, a Motions Panel of this Court ordered the filing of Wilson's motion, granted it, and reinstated his appeal. Wilson now appeals the denial of his PCR petition. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Wilson argues that the PCR court erred by denying him post-conviction relief. On cross-appeal, the State urges this Court to revisit our Motions Panel's decision to reinstate Wilson's appeal. The State argues that Wilson's appeal should be dismissed because his Notice of Appeal was not timely filed and there were no extraordinarily compelling reasons why his forfeited right to appeal should have been restored. While we do not do so lightly, it is well-established that we retain the authority to reconsider rulings by the Motions Panel while an appeal remains pending. Beasley v. State, 192 N.E.3d 1026, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.

[12] Because the issue raised by the State would be dispositive of Wilson's appeal, we consider it first. We conclude that extraordinarily compelling reasons did exist to warrant reinstating Wilson's forfeited appeal.

I. Extraordinarily Compelling Reasons Existed to Warrant Restoring Wilson's Forfeited Appeal

[13] The State contends that there are “no extraordinarily compelling reasons in this case that warrant excusing the late notice of appeal[,]” Wilson should be “held to the same legal standards as a licensed attorney and is not entitled to any special treatment from this Court[,]” and “[n]o circumstances outside [Wilson's] control prevented him from being able to file a timely notice of appeal.” State's Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant (“Appellee's Br.”) at 17. The State asserts that Wilson “received prompt notice of the order denying his post-conviction petition,” evidenced by the trial court clerk sending Wilson “[a]utomated notice of the order[,]” and then notifying Wilson “via email with a copy of the order[.]” Id. at 17; see also Appellant's PCR App., Vol. 2 at 17.

[14] Wilson, on the other hand, argues that it was “within [this Court's] power” to reconsider and reinstate his appeal; the “appellate rules exist to facilitate the orderly presentation and disposition of appeals”; and Indiana Appellate Rule 1 provides “a mechanism allowing this court to resurrect an otherwise forfeited appeal.”⁴ Appellant's Reply Brief at 4, 5. Wilson maintains that he has “always” communicated with the courts via United States Postal Service; the “State knows” that he “is currently incarcerated and doesn't have access to the internet” and cannot “send or receive email”; and he has limited access to the prison law library and could be “waiting a few weeks at least” before gaining access.⁵ Id. at 6.

[15] In deciding the matter of Wilson's late Notice of Appeal, we are mindful that under Indiana law, “ ‘a pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.’ ” Stark v. State, 204 N.E.3d 957, 963 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014)). As with a trained attorney, a pro se litigant is responsible for “following procedural and evidentiary rules.” Jefferson v. State, 891 N.E.2d 77, 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Piper v. State, 770 N.E.2d 880, 883 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied), trans. denied.

[16] To initiate an appeal, a party must file a notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of a final judgment is noted in the CCS. Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(1). “[A] party loses his or her right to appeal for failing to file timely a Notice of Appeal.” In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. 2014). In this case, Wilson filed his Notice of Appeal twenty-two days late; thus, he forfeited his right to appeal. See App. R. 9(A)(5) (“Unless the Notice of Appeal is timely filed, the right to appeal shall be forfeited except as provided by P.C.R. 2.”).

[17] However, our Supreme Court explained in In re Adoption of O.R. that this forfeiture is not a jurisdictional defect that deprives us of our authority to entertain the appeal. O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 971. Indeed, in limited circumstances, a party can file a belated notice of appeal under Indiana Post–Conviction Rule (“PCR”) 2, which “allows belated appeals in certain criminal cases.” Dawson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 841, 846 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), opinion adopted, 943 N.E.2d 1281 (Ind. 2011) (per curiam). This rule, however, does not permit a belated notice of appeal from PCR proceedings. See Huguley v. State, 967 N.E.2d 572, 574-575 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding, PCR 2 does not apply to appeals from PCR proceedings), trans. denied.

[18] Still, we may resurrect an otherwise forfeited appeal pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 1, which provides that we may permit deviation from the Appellate Rules. O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 972 (citing App. R. 1). In such circumstances, the party that has forfeited its right to appeal must demonstrate that there are “extraordinarily compelling reasons” to restore the forfeited right. Id. at 971. We determine whether the party qualifies for this limited exception by considering the following: whether the party worked diligently to prosecute his appeal; the nature of the party's rights at stake; whether there is a “unique confluence” of factors giving rise to a strong desire to decide the case on the merits; and any obvious injustice. Id. at 972; Cannon v. Caldwell, 74 N.E.3d 255, 258-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). As our Supreme Court noted in State v. B.H., “[t]he narrow exception reinstating otherwise forfeited appeals effectively ‘acts as a fail-safe’ when dismissal would be ‘shockingly unfair.’ ” 260 N.E.3d 953, 959 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Sevion v. State, 223 N.E.3d 1154, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)).

A. Diligent Prosecution

[19] Wilson's pro se Notice of Appeal was due by April 7, 2025. On April 1, still within the thirty-day time limit, he attempted to initiate the appeal process—albeit by mailing his Notice of Appeal to the trial court clerk, along with a request to proceed in forma pauperis. The trial court clerk filed the Notice of Appeal on April 2. On April 9, the PCR court issued an order, indicating that Wilson had filed a pro se Notice of Appeal, and the court directed the trial court clerk to, among other things, assemble the record and file a Notice of Completion of Clerk's Record by May 8. On April 10, the court issued a separate order, granting Wilson's request to proceed in forma pauperis.⁶

[20] In his Reply Brief, Wilson proffers that he filed his Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of this Court on April 29, after eventually gaining access to the prison law library. He recounts the difficulty in accessing the prison law library as follows:

[I]f you don't have a deadline date[,] you will have to wait and see if they have available space for you because the library [(indecipherable word)] to the ones with active cases in court first and with limited computers and space in the library with two different cell houses fighting for space ․ [and] with only two days a week your [sic] allowed to come to the library[,] you could be waiting a few weeks at least to get in.

Appellant's Reply Br. at 6.

[21] There is no doubt that Wilson's Notice of Appeal was late. And Wilson's process in initiating his appeal was flawed, to say the least. However, his attempt to initiate his appeal was not insignificant, and the twenty-two-day delay in filing the Notice of Appeal does not appear to be entirely his fault, as his access to the prison law library was limited. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Wilson did work diligently to initiate his appeal.

B. Nature of Rights at Stake

[22] As for the rights at stake, we are mindful of our Supreme Court's recent decision in B.H. and the high standard it sets for establishing extraordinarily compelling reasons to reinstate a forfeited right to an appeal. 260 N.E.3d 953. In B.H., the State missed the deadline for filing an appeal from the trial court's denial of the State's request to file a juvenile delinquency petition but argued that its forfeited appeal should be reinstated. Id. at 955-56. The B.H. Court dismissed the State's appeal, concluding that the State failed to present “any extraordinarily compelling reasons to restore its right to appeal,” and the State's appeal did not involve a fundamental liberty interest. Id. at 959. Here, by contrast, Wilson has liberty interests at stake, as he is currently serving a thirty-year sentence in the DOC. See, e.g., Weaver v. State, 725 N.E.2d 945, 947 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (addressing appeal on merits in part because appellant's liberty interest in not being incarcerated was at stake). And through this appeal, Wilson requests the vacation of his conviction and sentence.

C. Unique Confluence or Obvious Injustice

[23] Next, we consider whether there is a unique confluence of a liberty interest and other factors in this case, O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 972, or any obvious injustice in not restoring Wilson's forfeited right to appeal, Cannon, 74 N.E.3d at 258-59. Here, there is no obvious injustice in the PCR court's denial of Wilson's post-conviction relief, so this factor works against restoring the forfeited appeal.

[24] However, there exists a unique confluence of factors giving rise to a strong desire to decide this case on the merits. Wilson showed diligence in prosecuting his appeal, and his loss-of-liberty interest is not insignificant. Furthermore, as we noted above, supra ¶ 18, this Court may restore a forfeited appeal and reach the merits of a case when there are “extraordinarily compelling reasons” to do so. O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 971. And “[t]hese reasons are ‘not determined solely from the perspective of the litigant,’ but also include this Court's interest in ‘judicial economy and bringing finality to proceedings’ ” by post-conviction petitioners. Clemons v. State, 260 N.E.3d 1010, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Morales v. State, 19 N.E.3d 292, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied). And as the O.R. Court noted, “our procedural rules are merely means for achieving the ultimate end of orderly and speedy justice.” 16 N.E.3d at 972 (internal quotations omitted).

[25] Based on the foregoing, and in light of the facts and circumstances of this case, including the unique confluence of Wilson's not insignificant loss-of-liberty interest and his diligence in prosecuting his appeal, as well as this Court's interest in judicial economy and finality, we conclude that “extraordinarily compelling reasons” exist here that warranted the reinstatement of Wilson's appeal. Id. at 971. We therefore decline the State's invitation to revisit the Motions Panel decision to reinstate Wilson's appeal, and we now turn to the issues Wilson raises on appeal.

II. The PCR Court Did Not Clearly Err in Denying Wilson's PCR Petition

[26] Wilson argues that the PCR court should have granted him post-conviction relief based on his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Wilson also challenges the PCR court's findings of fact as not being supported by the evidence. And he claims that in denying him post-conviction relief, the PCR Court failed to consider certain evidence Wilson considered exculpatory and that the PCR court improperly denied his motion to compel the production of recordings of his jailhouse phone calls.

[27] We reiterate that Wilson has chosen to proceed pro se, and he is held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. Evans v. State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. “We will not become a party's advocate, nor will we address arguments that are inappropriate, improperly expressed, or too poorly developed to be understood.” Barrett v. State, 837 N.E.2d 1022, 1030 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[28] “[P]ost-conviction proceedings do not grant a petitioner a ‘super-appeal’ but are limited to those issues available under the Indiana Post–Conviction Rules.” Shepherd v. State, 924 N.E.2d 1274, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citation omitted), trans. denied. “In post-conviction proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.” Isom v. State, 170 N.E.3d 623, 632 (Ind. 2021), reh'g denied. “Where, as here, the petitioner is appealing from a negative judgment denying post-conviction relief, he must establish that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court's decision.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

[29] When the PCR court makes findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with PCR Rule 1(6), we will reverse the findings and judgment “only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1279 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 682 (Ind. 2017)). We do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. See Bradbury v. State, 180 N.E.3d 249, 252 (Ind. 2022) (explaining post-conviction court is “sole judge of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses”) (citation omitted), cert. denied. And we do not defer to the PCR court's legal conclusions. See Bobadilla, 117 N.E.3d at 1279.

A. Wilson Received Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel

[30] We first address Wilson's claim that Trial Counsel was ineffective. When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Humphrey, 73 N.E.3d at 682. First, “the defendant must show deficient performance: representation that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the defendant did not have the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. (quoting McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. 2002)). Second, “the defendant must show prejudice: a reasonable probability (i.e. a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quoting McCary, 761 N.E.2d at 392). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Middleton v. State, 72 N.E.3d at 891, 891-92 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) (citing Campbell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 271, 274 (Ind. 2014)).

[31] Failure to establish either of the two parts will cause the claim to fail. French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002). “Indeed, most ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be resolved by a prejudice inquiry alone.” Id. Therefore, if we can dismiss an ineffective assistance claim on the prejudice part, we need not address whether counsel's performance was deficient. Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 645 (Ind. 2008).

[32] “There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics and these decisions are entitled to deferential review.” Weisheit v. State, 109 N.E.3d 978, 983 (Ind. 2018) (internal citations omitted) (citing Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 746-47 (Ind. 2002), cert. denied), cert. denied. Moreover, “isolated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective.” Id. at 984 (citing Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 747).

[33] Here, Wilson specifically argues that Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to: (1) introduce into evidence the unredacted version of A.N.’s forensic interview; (2) solicit impeachment testimony from Wilson's now ex-wife, Ashlay; (3) pursue whether certain alleged inconsistent testimony offered by Detective Sergeant Jeremy Kalvaitis constituted perjury; and (4) revisit admitting evidence of Wilson's alleged voluntary intoxication after the trial court had ruled against Wilson on the matter. We address each argument in turn.

1. A.N.’s Unredacted Forensic Interview

[34] We first address Wilson's claim that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce into evidence the unredacted version of A.N.’s forensic interview as a defense to the child molesting charge. Wilson claims that the redacted parts of the interview contained exculpatory evidence. We disagree and conclude that Trial Counsel's decision regarding the redacted portions of the interview constituted a reasonable trial strategy that we will not second-guess.

[35] During the forensic interview, A.N. disclosed that the inappropriate touching that occurred on February 9, 2020, was not the first time Wilson had molested her and that he had done so many times before, in different rooms within the house. Petitioner's [PCR] Exhibit 1 (Unredacted) at 10:57:55-10:59:30. At trial, the State sought to present this prior-bad-acts evidence pursuant to Evidence Rule 404(b) covering character evidence and crimes or other acts, and Trial Counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude that evidence. The trial court granted the motion in limine.

[36] The State redacted those portions of the interview referencing the past acts of molestation by Wilson, as well as a later portion of the interview where A.N. provided vague and confusing answers to questions posed to her. In that later portion of the interview, the interviewer ⁷ asked A.N. if she knew whether her “Dad” had done this to anyone else and whether “anything like this” had ever happened to her “before,” to which she replied “no,” and then “yeah” respectively to the questions. Id. at 11:16:53-11:17:09. Upon additional questioning by the interviewer about the previous experience, A.N. gave vague and confusing answers, saying both that it did not happen with “somebody else” and that it did not happen with “Dad”; she could not remember what happened because it was a “long time ago”; it happened with “just me”; and that she knew it happened because she could “remind myself in my head,” but she could not tell the interviewer about it. Id. at 11:17:00-11:18:38.

[37] A.N. added during the redacted conversation that it was “just with me and my mom.” Id. at 11:17:48. On appeal, Wilson contends that the redacted parts of the interview contained exculpatory evidence, and he maintains that A.N.’s reference to her mother is evidence that A.N.’s mother molested A.N. and not Wilson.

[38] The PCR court found that Wilson failed to show that “the information he now complains of was exculpatory.” Appealed Order at 13, ¶ 18. And regarding A.N.’s statement that referred to her mother, the court found the statement to be “far from a clear accusation that her mother had molested her.” Id. at 13, ¶ 17. The PCR court added:

Even if interpreted as such, the petitioner has not established how this would exculpate him. For the vast majority of the victim's interview, she recounted accusations of molestation against the petitioner. And did not recant those claims. Rather, the Court construes the victim's statements to be in response to the [interviewer's] inquiry whether she had been molested on prior occasions, separate from the incident with petitioner that she had already told the [interviewer] about. Therefore, even if the Court were to ignore the overall context of the interview and adopt the petitioner's interpretation of this portion of the victim's statements, it would still not exculpate him.

Id. And the court's findings are supported by the record.

[39] At the PCR evidentiary hearing, Trial Counsel testified that she viewed the redacted statements as consistent with her motion in limine, which sought to prevent the State from presenting evidence of Wilson's prior bad acts. Trial Counsel further testified that there was “more than one way to look at what” A.N.’s statements meant and that she thought A.N.’s redacted statements “would be confusing to a jury[,]” adding later in the hearing that, in counsel's opinion, “juries can make suppositions and speculate.” [PCR] Transcript, Volume 2 at 54, 58, 82.

[40] Furthermore, “the decision whether to utilize exculpatory evidence ․ is a matter of trial strategy.” Fisher v. State, 878 N.E.2d 457, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Reynolds v. State, 536 N.E.2d 541, 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), trans. denied), trans. denied. Here, however, Trial Counsel did not indicate that she believed the evidence in question was exculpatory. Instead, she testified that the redacted portions of the forensic interview were not relevant to Wilson's defense and that A.N.’s statement regarding her mother could be interpreted in different ways. Indeed, when Trial Counsel was asked if it was her “strategy that that portion [of the unredacted version of the interview] was too prejudicial to play in front of the jury, counsel testified, “Yes. Because ․ it refers to other incidents.” PCR Tr., Vol. 2 at 80. And when Trial Counsel was asked if that was the reason she “wanted that particular portion redacted[,]” counsel answered, “Yes.”

[41] In light of the foregoing, it was a reasonable trial strategy for Trial Counsel to view the redacted portions of the interview as unfavorable to Wilson's defense and, therefore, not seek introduction of those redacted portions into evidence. And “[r]easonable strategy is not subject to judicial second guesses.” Ingalls v. State, 187 N.E.3d 233, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), trans. denied. Wilson has failed to demonstrate that Trial Counsel's performance was deficient in this regard. Thus, we conclude that Trial Counsel was not ineffective for failing to introduce into evidence the unredacted version of the forensic interview as a defense to the child molesting charge.

2. Failure to Solicit Impeachment Testimony

[42] During Wilson's jury trial, Wilson's now ex-wife, Ashlay, testified that she saw Wilson molesting A.N. Wilson now asserts, as best we can tell, that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to seek impeachment testimony from Ashlay by questioning her “about how there was no DNA of the alleged victim found on Wilson” when “Ashley stated she saw Wilson penetrating A.N.” Appellant's Br. at 7.

[43] We note that Wilson has failed to present a cogent argument for this issue, supported by authority and citations to the record; so this issue is waived, and we need not address it. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (“The argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on, in accordance with Rule 22.”).

[44] Waiver notwithstanding, the record reveals that during the jury trial, Trial Counsel thoroughly cross-examined Ashlay about the incident involving A.N., which Ashlay witnessed. Trial Counsel also cross-examined at length the forensic DNA analyst who testified to the very strong support that the DNA found on A.N.’s internal vaginal and anal swabs, as well as the swabs taken from her underwear, originated from Wilson. While it is possible that Trial Counsel could have sought to impeach Ashlay by questioning her on whether A.N.’s DNA was found on Wilson, Wilson has not articulated the advantage to such questioning. And Ashlay, a layperson, would not have possessed the expertise to answer the science-based questions. Additionally, “the nature and extent of cross-examination is a matter of strategy delegated to trial counsel.” Robles v. State, 612 N.E.2d 196, 198 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). Thus, we conclude that Trial Counsel's failure to solicit this type of impeachment testimony from Ashlay did not amount to ineffective assistance.

3. Alleged Perjured Testimony

[45] Wilson next argues that Trial Counsel was ineffective for merely suggesting that Detective Sergeant Jeremy Kalvaitis’ testimony was inconsistent instead of calling to the jury's attention that Kalvaitis, according to Wilson, committed perjury by lying on the stand. At trial, Trial Counsel cross-examined Kalvaitis, asking him the following: “[A]t one point [during the forensic interview], you had asked A.N. were there any parts of your body that his peanuts touched and she answered, no, correct?” Jury Tr., Vol. 4 at 115. Kalvaitis replied, “I believe what was asked was [were] there any other parts of her body.” Id. Trial Counsel accepted that answer and continued her cross-examination of Kalvaitis. Based on that exchange, however, Wilson now argues that Kalvaitis's answer constituted perjury because during the forensic interview, Kalvaitis asked A.N., “[W]ere there any parts of your body that his peanuts touched?” and A.N. answered, “[N]o.” Pet.’s PCR Ex. 1 (Redacted) at 11:05:27-11:05:31. In other words, Wilson argues that the perceived inconsistencies between Kalvaitis’ testimony at trial and what he said during A.N.’s interview constituted perjury, and Wilson contends his attorney was ineffective for not adequately pursuing the matter. We disagree.

[46] Relevant to this appeal, a person commits perjury by “mak[ing] a false, material statement under oath or affirmation, knowing the statement to be false or not believing it to be true[.]” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-1 (2014). “To constitute perjury, the statement must be ‘a statement of fact and not a conclusion, opinion, or deduction from given facts.’ ” J.R.B. v. State, 244 N.E.3d 439, 443 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), as amended (Sept. 19, 2025) (quoting Barker v. State, 681 N.E.2d 727, 729 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)). It has long been held that confusion or inconsistency alone is not enough to prove perjury. Lawson v. State, 199 N.E.3d 829, 835 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Daniels v. State, 658 N.E.2d 121, 123 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)), trans. denied.

[47] Kalvaitis began his answer with “I believe,” indicating he was providing an opinion. And his memory of the questions he asked during the interview was not wrong. Indeed, later in the forensic interview, Kalvaitis did ask A.N. the following: “[W]ere there any other parts of his body that touched any other parts of your body?” and A.N. replied, “No.” Pet.’s PCR Ex. 1 (Redacted) at 11:06:50-11:06:56 (emphasis added). Thus, while Kalvaitis’ testimony might have been inconsistent and perhaps exhibited some confusion on his part, the testimony did not amount to perjury. Therefore, Trial Counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue the matter.

[48] And to the extent that Wilson argues that Trial Counsel should have objected to the State's use of the alleged perjured testimony, we note that “when a petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to mount an objection at trial, in order to show prejudice petitioner must prove that the trial court would have sustained the objection.” Passwater v. State, 989 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Ind. 2013) (citing Lowery v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1031, 1042 (Ind. 1994), cert. denied). “Absent such a showing, the petitioner cannot satisfy the second prong of Strickland and thus may not prevail on his ineffective assistance claim.” Id. Wilson has not shown that the trial court would have sustained an objection to Kalvaitis’ testimony. Therefore, he cannot prevail on this claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

4. Evidence of Voluntary Intoxication

[49] Trial Counsel sought to introduce evidence of Wilson's alleged intoxication when the molestation occurred and opposed the State's motion in limine to exclude that evidence. After jury selection, the trial court heard arguments on the State's motion. Trial Counsel acknowledged that the voluntary intoxication evidence would not constitute a defense but argued that the evidence would “lend itself to more fully explain[ ] what was going on in the household at the time[.]” Jury Tr., Vol. 3 at 233. The trial court granted the State's motion in limine and precluded Trial Counsel from introducing evidence of Wilson's alleged intoxication. The court indicated that Trial Counsel could revisit the matter later in the trial and make an offer of proof. Trial Counsel did not do so.

[50] Wilson now argues that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to revisit introducing the voluntary intoxication evidence and then, if the trial court had ruled the evidence inadmissible, making an offer of proof. We disagree. The trial court correctly ruled that evidence of Wilson's alleged voluntary intoxication was inadmissible. Indeed, Indiana Code section 35-41-2-5 (1997) provides that intoxication is not a defense in a prosecution for an offense and may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state that is an element of the offense unless the defendant meets the requirements of section 35-41-3-5 [concerning involuntary intoxication]. Ind. Code § 35-41-2-5. The trial court had already ruled against Wilson regarding the voluntary intoxication evidence, and it is doubtful that the court would have ruled in his favor even if Trial Counsel had sought to revisit the matter. Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to revisit, and, if necessary, make an offer of proof for, the introduction of evidence of Wilson's alleged voluntary intoxication.

B. The Evidence of Record Supports the PCR Court's Findings of Fact

[51] Wilson challenges the PCR court's findings of fact as not being supported by the evidence. We will reverse the PCR court's findings and judgment “only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Bobadilla, 117 N.E.3d at 1279 (quoting Humphrey, 73 N.E.3d at 682). We do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. See Bradbury, 180 N.E.3d at 252.

[52] Wilson takes issue with the PCR court's Finding of Fact Number (“Finding No.”) 19, which states that the “State presented overwhelming evidence of the petitioner's guilt at trial, including eyewitness testimony from Ashlay Wilson, the victim's recorded [forensic] interview, and DNA evidence inculpating the petitioner.” Appealed Order at 13, ¶ 19. According to Wilson, this finding is clearly erroneous because the PCR court failed to consider evidence that the SANE nurse who examined A.N. told Ashlay that A.N.’s hymen was intact, evidence that A.N.’s DNA was not found on Wilson's penile swabs, as well as evidence that, Wilson maintains, showed that the DNA of a “third person” “closely related” to A.N. was found on A.N. Appellant's Br. at 10. Wilson's argument misses the mark.

[53] Ample evidence was presented during the jury trial to support the PCR court's Finding No. 19. Ashlay saw Wilson with his pants down and A.N., with her pajama pants at her ankles, bent over between Wilson's legs. During her forensic interview, A.N. told the interviewer that Wilson put his “peanuts” in her “butt” and “around” her “middle part.” Jury Tr. Ex. 12A. And the DNA forensic analyst testified to the very strong support that the DNA found on A.N.’s internal vaginal and anal swabs, as well as the swabs taken from her underwear, came from Wilson. Wilson's challenge to this finding is merely a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Bradbury, 180 N.E.3d at 252. Therefore, we conclude that the PCR Court's Finding No. 19 is supported by the evidence and is not clearly erroneous.

C. The PCR Court Properly Considered and Assessed Wilson's Evidence

[54] In addition to his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims and challenge to the PCR court's Finding No. 19, Wilson contends that the PCR court erred by failing to properly consider and assess the evidence that he presented at his hearing in support of his PCR petition. Specifically, Wilson argues that the PCR court: (1) failed to properly assess certain statements Ashlay made during jailhouse phone calls with Wilson; (2) based its findings of fact on what Wilson believed to be Kalvaitis’ and Ashlay's perjured testimony; and (3) prevented Wilson from having Trial Counsel read an excerpt from caselaw addressing voluntary intoxication. We address these arguments in the order presented.

1. Jailhouse Phone Calls Between Wilson and Ashlay

[55] On the second day of Wilson's PCR hearing, he introduced into evidence a disc containing recordings of three jailhouse phone calls that took place between him and Ashlay, though he only asked the PCR court to review the recording of the second phone call, which had occurred on November 22, 2020. See Pet.’s PCR Ex. 14 – Part 2 at 58:55-59:12. The State separately introduced into evidence two of the three recordings of the phone calls as State's PCR Exhibit 1 (which contained a slightly longer version of the November 22 recording than that submitted by Wilson) and State's PCR Exhibit 2 (the call placed on December 9, 2020). See State's PCR Ex. 1 at 58:45-59-12; State's PCR Ex. 2 at 19:50-20:13.

[56] Wilson now argues that the PCR court erred in denying him post-conviction relief because the court, according to Wilson, failed to properly consider the statements Ashlay made in the November 22 jailhouse phone call, specifically, “where Ashlay explained” to Wilson that she “not only knew Wilson never penetrated [A.N.] but also told prosecution [that] Wilson never penetrated [A.N.]” Appellant's Br. at 10 (footnote omitted). However, aside from his bald assertion, Wilson does not develop his argument or cite case law to support it. Still, we conclude that the PCR court did not err in this regard.

[57] The PCR court had continued the PCR hearing so that Wilson could obtain the recording of the phone call in question. On the second day of the hearing, the court admitted the recording over the State's objection, stating that Wilson was “offering this evidence apparently to try to impeach Ms. Wilson[,] is how I'm taking this.” PCR Tr., Vol. 2 at 95. We presume that the PCR court properly considered and assessed the evidence. See, e.g., Tharpe v. State, 955 N.E.2d 836, 842 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (observing that there is a presumption that “the trial court knows and follows the applicable law”), trans. denied.

2. Detective Sergeant Jeremy Kalvaitis’ and Ashlay's Testimony

[58] Though far from clear, Wilson next appears to argue that the PCR court erred by basing its findings of fact on what Wilson believed to be Kalvaitis’ perjured testimony. Specifically, Wilson argues that the PCR court “abused its discretion” by allowing Kalvaitis’ inconsistent testimony—characterized by Wilson as “false evidence”—“into [the court's] findings of fact[.]” Appellant's Br. at 11. Wilson maintains that he was “prejudiced” by the PCR court because, per Wilson, the court “agree[d]” that Kalvaitis’ testimony was inconsistent yet “failed to correct Kalvatis[’] perjury from the jury.” Id. Wilson also argues that the PCR court prejudiced him by “not acknowledging that Ashlay Wilson and [Kalvaitis] both testified about things they both knew not to be true[.]” Id. at 12.

[59] Again, however, Wilson has failed to develop his argument. He does not direct us to the specific finding(s) of fact that he challenges; he presents no evidence to support his claim that Ashlay's testimony was inconsistent or perjured; and we have already determined that Kalvaitis’ testimony did not amount to perjury. See supra ¶ 47. Thus, we cannot say that the PCR court erred or prejudiced him as Wilson claims.

3. Voluntary Intoxication

[60] During direct examination of Trial Counsel at Wilson's PCR hearing, Wilson sought to have Trial Counsel read an excerpt from Orta v. State, 940 N.E.2d 370 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans denied, a decision addressing, among other things, voluntary intoxication as a defense. Wilson believed that having Trial Counsel read the case during the PCR hearing would refresh her memory and allow him to “properly question counsel” as to why counsel did not, during the jury trial, “correct [the S]tate or the [trial] court” regarding “their misuse or misunderstanding” of the Orta case. Appellant's Br. at 11. The PCR court did not allow Wilson to proceed, telling him “[w]e're not in a position to have [Trial Counsel] read the case. What you're showing is several pages long. If she doesn't remember, she doesn't remember.” PCR Tr., Vol. 2 at 65. Wilson now argues that the PCR court “prejudiced” him “by not allowing [him] the chance to have” Trial Counsel read an excerpt from Orta. Appellant's Br. at 11.

[61] We first note that Wilson's reliance on Orta is misplaced. Contrary to Wilson's belief, Orta does not stand for the proposition that a defendant can testify to his level of intoxication and is only precluded from arguing it as a defense. Instead, relevant to this appeal, Orta holds that “if the substantive law renders the evidence irrelevant, which is what the statute does to Orta's claim of voluntary intoxication, there is no [state constitutional right] to present it.” Orta, 940 N.E.2d at 376. Thus, this Court in Orta concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion “by not allowing Orta to elicit testimony in support of an impermissible defense.” Id. And in light of that holding, we cannot say that Wilson was prejudiced by the PCR court's decision to stop Trial Counsel from reading an excerpt from Orta. No error occurred here.

D. The PCR Court Properly Denied Wilson's June 2024 Motion to Compel the Production of Wilson's Jailhouse Phone Calls

[62] Lastly, Wilson contends that the PCR court erred by denying his motion to compel a subpoena for recordings of his jailhouse phone calls, which the court treated as a motion to compel the production of documents. In July 2023, Wilson filed a request with the PCR court to issue a subpoena for the jailhouse phone calls he placed to Ashlay on November 22 and December 9, 2020. In November 2023, the PCR court granted Wilson's request and directed the State to comply with it. Later that month, the State filed a notice of compliance stating that the jail had no record of any phone calls placed by Wilson to Ashlay's telephone number between the dates Wilson had provided.

[63] The first day of Wilson's PCR hearing, however, the court determined that the jail's search for the phone records was hampered because Wilson had not provided a phone number for Ashlay. The court then offered, and Wilson agreed, to a bifurcation of the PCR hearing to give Wilson another opportunity to subpoena recordings of the phone calls.

[64] In January 2024, Wilson filed another request for a subpoena for the same jailhouse phone calls, this time providing the correct phone number to which he had made the calls. The PCR court again granted the request. In April, the State filed a notice of compliance indicating that the recordings from three jailhouse phone calls to Ashlay—two calls placed on November 22, 2020, and one call placed on December 9, 2020—had been given to Wilson.

[65] In June 2024, Wilson filed another motion to compel the production of documents, claiming that he had not received the phone calls he had requested and asking for “EVERY” phone call made on November 22 and December 9, 2020. Appellant's PCR App., Vol. 2 at 127. The State responded, stating that it had already provided the phone calls to Wilson, and the PCR court denied Wilson's motion to compel.

[66] Wilson now claims on appeal that the PCR court “prejudiced” him when it denied his June 2024 motion to compel. However, he presents no argument explaining how he was prejudiced. Nonetheless, we cannot agree with his claim. On the second day of the PCR hearing, Wilson introduced into evidence the disc containing the jailhouse phone calls between him and Ashlay that were placed on the two identified dates. And the only additional evidence Wilson sought to bring before the court at the hearing was additional testimony from Ashlay.

[67] The record shows that Wilson had already received the subpoenaed evidence when he filed his June 2024 motion to compel. Therefore, the PCR court properly denied Wilson's motion to compel the production of the jailhouse phone calls.

Conclusion

[68] In summary, Wilson has not established that the evidence presented at the PCR hearing as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the PCR court. Wilson's trial counsel was not ineffective; the evidence supported the PCR court's findings of fact; the PCR court properly considered Wilson's claimed exculpatory evidence; and the PCR court properly denied his motion to compel. Therefore, the PCR court did not clearly err by denying Wilson's petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

[69] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   During the proceedings, A.N. was also referred to and identified as “A.T.” In this memorandum decision, we refer to the victim as “A.N.”

2.   Wilson did not include the Appealed Order in his Appendix for this appeal, instead attaching it to the end of his Appellant's Brief. When citing to the Appealed Order, we reference the Appealed Order's page numbers, not the page numbers associated with Appellant's Brief.

3.   The State did not file a response to Wilson's motion to reconsider the dismissal of his appeal. Wilson's motion lacked a certificate of service indicating that he had served it on the State, thus hindering the State's ability to file a response.

4.   Indiana Appellate Rule 1 reads as follows: “These Rules shall govern the practice and procedure for appeals to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The Court may, upon the motion of a party or the Court's own motion, permit deviation from these Rules.”

5.   Wilson is serving his executed sentence at the Indiana State Prison in Michigan City, Indiana.

6.   On May 9, 2025, the PCR court issued an order vacating its April 9 order, based on an advisement from the trial court clerk that Wilson had not filed a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of this Court.

7.   Detective Sergeant Jeremy Kalvaitis conducted A.N.’s forensic interview.

Robb, Senior Judge.

May, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.