Daniel J. Bradley, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Daniel J. Bradley appeals his conviction and sentence for burglary, as a Level 2 felony; unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, as a Level 4 felony; and possession of methamphetamine, as a Level 6 felony. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Bradley raises two issues for our review:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for burglary.

2. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On June 30, 2023, Laura Wood was staying at the home of her sister, Kristine Smith. Wood had purchased some High Noon seltzers, and she put the unopened package in Smith's refrigerator in her garage. Wood then took other seltzers that Smith had and put them in a cooler. That evening, Wood and Smith took the cooler of alcoholic beverages on a boat with some friends.

[4] When Wood and Smith returned, which was shortly after midnight on July 1, they attempted to enter the garage via the service door. However, the door was locked, which was “abnormal” because the door was unlocked when they had left earlier. Tr. Vol. 3 at 48. Smith and Wood entered Smith's house in order to open the garage using the remote control. When the garage door opened, Smith returned to the garage and noticed that some things “were out of place[.]” Id. at 84. She noticed an extension cord sitting behind her car and a can of High Noon on a drawer. At that point, Smith asked Wood to come outside. Smith then walked through the garage to the service door to turn on the lights. Once the lights were on, she saw a man, later identified as Bradley, “laying [sic] on the floor” not moving. Id. at 86. Wood and Smith left the garage and called the police.

[5] Officers with the Elkhart City Police Department responded to Smith's house. When Corporal Jordan Sears arrived, he observed that the garage was “fairly organized,” with everything in “its own place” except for the back wall. Tr. Vol 2 at 159. On that wall, Corporal Sears observed “a bunch of tools and plastic bins and different things like that on top of the cabinet, just strewn about; like gone through.” Id. at 160. The cabinets were “open,” with bins and tools “clumped up on there,” and there was “a random baby doll” on the back shelf. Id. at 170. That area of the garage looked like it had been “ransacked[.]” Id. at 225.

[6] Corporal Sears then saw Bradley on the ground unconscious. He also observed that Bradley had a “gun inside of a holster” on his left hip. Id. at 171. After securing the firearm, the officers were able to determine that the gun was loaded, with a round in the chamber. The officers also noticed that Bradley had only one boot on.

[7] As Corporal Sears secured the firearm, Bradley began to wake up. Bradley initially told the officers that his name was Jason Smith but provided officers with his correct name when asked a second time. The officers secured Bradley and helped him up. Bradley told the officers that he was “drunk” and “couldn't walk.” Id. at 178. Then, as the officers escorted Bradley out of the garage, Bradley told the officers to “not forget his boots[.]” Id. at 179. During a subsequent search of his person, officers found a bag that contained methamphetamine.

[8] After the officers removed Bradley, Smith walked through her garage. She noticed that, in the back, “almost every single thing from [her] cabinets” was “in piles on top of the cabinet.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 94. She saw that the “drawers were empty” and that the “cabinets were almost empty[.]” Id. Smith and Wood left the house and stayed with a friend for a few hours.

[9] Later that morning, Smith returned to her house and found a pair of black Nike shoes in her garage that did not belong to her, and she discovered that a pair of black motorcycle boots that had belonged to her late husband were missing. An officer was able to confirm that the missing boots were at the jail where Bradley was taken.

[10] The State charged Bradley with burglary, as a Level 2 felony (Count 1); unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, as a Level 4 felony (Count 2); and possession of methamphetamine, as a Level 6 felony (Count 3). Thereafter, the court held a bifurcated jury trial on Bradley's charges. During the first phase of the trial, Smith testified to the state of her garage on July 1, 2023, and she testified that “it was hard to stay” at her house “after this happened,” so she moved to a new home. Tr. Vol. 3 at 115.

[11] At the conclusion of the first phase, the jury found Bradley guilty of Counts 1 and 3. Then, following the second phase, the jury found him guilty of Count 2. At a sentencing hearing, the court found as mitigating the remarks of Bradley's attorney, that Bradley has “addictions [sic] issues and mental health issues,” and that he had “completed a number of educational programs while incarcerated.” Id. at 239. As aggravating factors, the court noted Bradley's criminal history, the fact that he was on bond at the time of the current offenses, that he has prior violations of probation and community corrections, that Smith had been “traumatized,” and that Bradley was intoxicated at the time of the offenses. Id. The court sentenced Bradley to concurrent terms of twenty-six years on Count 1, ten years on Count 2, and two years on Count 3. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[12] Bradley first contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for burglary, as a Level 2 felony. Our standard of review on a claim of insufficient evidence is well settled:

For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we look only at the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).

[13] To show that Bradley committed burglary, as charged, the State was required to prove that he broke and entered Smith's garage with the intent to commit a theft therein and that he was armed with a deadly weapon. See Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1(3)(A). On appeal, Bradley does not dispute that he entered Smith's property or that he had a firearm. Rather, he only challenges the evidence to show that he intended to commit a theft while in Smith's garage.

[14] In discussing the “intent to commit a theft” element of burglary, our Supreme Court has stated:

Evidence of intent “need not be insurmountable,” but there must be a “specific fact that provides a solid basis to support a reasonable inference that the defendant had the specific intent to commit a felony[.]” The evidentiary inference pointing to the defendant's intent must be separate from the inference of the defendant's breaking and entering. The inference of intent must not derive from or be supported by the inference of breaking and entering. In other words, the evidence must support each inference—felonious intent and breaking and entering—independently, and neither inference should rely on the other for support. This is not to say, however, that the same piece of evidence cannot support both inferences.

Requiring independent evidence of intent is necessary to maintain the distinction between burglary and other criminal offenses involving property invasion such as criminal trespass, or residential entry. Permitting the felonious intent element to be inferred from the inference of breaking and entering would render the intent element meaningless and read it out of the statute.

Baker v. State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Ind. 2012) (citations omitted). Here, Bradley maintains that the State's “theory of burglary intent depended on asking the jury to infer theft-intent from the same circumstances that established unauthorized entry and presence in the garage.” Appellant's Br. at 14. Stated differently, he asserts that the State did not provide independent evidence of his intent to commit theft. We cannot agree.

[15] In Baker, the defendant entered a church and opened several kitchen cabinets and drawers but did not remove anything. 968 N.E.2d at 228. The Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction for burglary. In reaching that holding, the Court stated:

Here, there was evidence that the defendant had been in the church kitchen and opened several cupboards and drawers while there. This evidence, standing alone, permits a reasonable inference of the defendant's felonious intent at the time of entry. Looking through the kitchen cupboards and drawers was not a necessary step in the act of breaking and entering the church. It was an additional act, separate and distinct from the breaking and entering, in which the defendant chose to engage. The opening of cabinets and drawers by an intruder suggests, among other things, that the person opening them was looking for something to take. From this, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant broke and entered the church with an intent to commit theft. That there was no evidence that the defendant had rummaged through the drawers or cabinets, as the defendant argues, is of no consequence. The act of opening the drawers and cabinets alone was enough to support an inference of intent to commit theft. Evidence of rummaging would simply bolster the already reasonable inference of intent.

Id. at 231 (emphases added).

[16] Similarly, here, there is evidence that Bradley opened drawers and cabinets in Smith's garage and that he opened her refrigerator. Those actions were not a necessary step in the act of breaking and entering the garage but were additional steps in which Bradley chose to engage. As in Baker, the fact that Bradley opened cabinets and drawers suggests that he was looking for something to take. And that evidence, alone, supports a reasonable inference that he broke into Smith's garage with the intent to commit theft.

[17] However, in addition to simply opening cabinets, drawers, and the refrigerator, there is evidence that Bradley rummaged through Smith's cabinets and drawers and actually took Smith's property. Indeed, Smith testified that her drawers were empty and her cabinets were mostly empty and that her items were in “piles” on top of the cabinet. Tr. Vol. 3 at 94. In addition, Bradley drank one of Smith's High Noon seltzers. And Smith testified that a pair of her late husband's motorcycle boots were missing, which officers were able to find at the jail after Bradley was arrested. That additional evidence of rummaging bolsters the already reasonable inference of intent. See Baker, 968 N.E.2d at 231.

[18] The evidence most favorable to the verdict shows that Bradley entered Smith's garage and “ransacked” it. Tr. Vol. 2 at 225. In addition, Bradley took property that belonged to Smith. A reasonable jury could conclude from that evidence that Bradley intended to commit a theft when he entered Smith's garage. Bradley's arguments on appeal are simply a request for this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. We therefore affirm Bradley's conviction for burglary, as a Level 2 felony.

Issue Two: Sentencing

[19] Bradley next contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” This Court has recently held that “[t]he advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Sanders v. State, 71 N.E.3d 839, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). And the Indiana Supreme Court has recently explained that:

The principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers ․ but not achieve a perceived “correct” result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Defendant has the burden to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind.), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 642 (Ind. 2017) (omission in original).

[20] Indiana's flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court's judgment “should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[21] The sentencing range for a Level 2 felony is ten to thirty years, with an advisory sentence of seventeen and one-half years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4.5. The sentencing range for a Level 4 felony conviction is two years to twelve years, with an advisory sentence of six years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5. And the sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is six months to two and one-half years, with an advisory sentence of one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). Following a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Bradley to enhanced terms of twenty-six years on the Level 2 felony, ten years on the Level 4 felony, and two years on the Level 6 felony. The court then ordered the sentences to run concurrently, for an aggregate sentence of twenty-six years.

[22] On appeal, Bradley contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses because “no person was physically harmed,” he “committed no acts of violence,” and he “did not destroy any property.” Appellant's Br. at 19. And he maintains that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character because his “significant” criminal history is “deeply intertwined with long-standing substance abuse and instability” and because he “engage[d] in programming while incarcerated[.]” Id. at 20.

[23] However, Bradley has not met his burden on appeal to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate. With respect to the nature of the offense, Bradley entered Smith's garage without her permission, while intoxicated, and while possessing a fully loaded firearm and methamphetamine. In addition, Bradley took a pair of boots from Smith and drank a can of her alcohol. And he “ransacked” her garage. Tr. Vol 2 at 225. While we acknowledge that he did not harm anyone, the potential for harm was great given that he had a firearm while intoxicated. Further, Bradley's actions caused Smith so much anxiety following the offenses that she had to move to a new home. Bradley has not presented any compelling evidence portraying the nature of the offenses in a positive light. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[24] As for his character, Bradley has a criminal history that includes twenty prior felony convictions and eight prior misdemeanor convictions. In addition, he was on parole at the time he committed the instant offenses. And he has previously violated the terms of his probation on four occasions and the terms of his placement on community corrections on two occasions. Bradley has not presented compelling evidence portraying substantial examples of virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character. Bradley's sentence is not inappropriate.

Conclusion

[25] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Bradley's conviction for burglary, as a Level 2 felony. And Bradley's sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. We therefore affirm his conviction and sentence.

[26] Affirmed.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J. concur.