Lamont J. Cooley, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Lamont J. Cooley appeals his conviction for murder, a felony. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Cooley raises two issues for our review, namely:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut his claims of self-defense and defense of others.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In early 2025, Anthony Wamue was struggling with addiction and was unhoused. On January 4, Wamue was staying in the family bathroom at Promenade Park in Fort Wayne. That night, Cooley, Brandi Summers, and Everett Brock went to the park and entered the family bathroom with Wamue.

[4] According to Brock, Wamue touched two women in the bathroom “inappropriately” and then turned toward Brock. Tr. Vol. 2 at 205. At that point, Wamue and Cooley started “tussling.” Id. at 202. Wamue “didn't do anything wrong” or make “any threats” to Cooley. Id. at 197-98. But Cooley pulled out a knife and stabbed Wamue five times. Cooley then kicked Wamue. Wamue could not “do anything back” but “just scream[ed].” Id. at 197. Cooley, Summers, and Brock left the area.

[5] At some point shortly after, someone found Wamue in the bathroom unconscious and called the police. Officers and medics arrived, and medics pronounced Wamue dead at the scene.

[6] The State charged Cooley with murder, a felony. During the ensuing jury trial, Brock testified about the offense. He also testified that Wamue did not have a knife in his hand “at any point.” Id. And he testified that, while Wamue had touched people inappropriately, he had not touched them “violently.” Id. at 205. Cooley's cellmate then testified that Cooley admitted to having stabbed Wamue but said that “he was protecting” Summers. Tr. Vol. 3 at 156.

[7] After the parties had presented their evidence, Cooley asked the court to instruct the jury on self-defense and voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense. The court denied Cooley's request regarding voluntary manslaughter but instructed the jury on self-defense. The jury found Cooley guilty as charged. The court entered judgment of conviction accordingly and sentenced Cooley to sixty years in the Department of Correction. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[8] Cooley first contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Our standard of review on a claim of insufficient evidence is well settled:

For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we look only at the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).

[9] On appeal, Cooley specifically asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut his self-defense and defense of others claims. “ ‘A valid claim of defense of oneself or another person is legal justification for an otherwise criminal act.’ ” Simpson v. State, 915 N.E.2d 511, 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Hobson v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1118, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). To prevail on such a claim, the defendant must show that he was in a place where he had a right to be; did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. See id.

[10] When a claim of self-defense or defense of a third person is raised and finds support in the evidence, “the State has the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. The State may meet its burden by either rebutting the defense directly or by relying on the sufficiency of the evidence in its case-in-chief. Id. Whether the State has met its burden is a question for the trier of fact. Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind. 1999). We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to rebut such defenses using the same standard as for any claim of insufficient evidence. Simpson, 915 N.E.2d at 514.

[11] Here, Cooley contends that he was legally justified in stabbing Wamue because he “was in a place where he had a right to be” and “did not provoke or instigate the violence.” Appellant's Br. at 12. And he maintains that he “had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm” because Wamue's behaviors were “erratic,” and because Wamue “put his hands on two women and then began to advance on Brock.” Id. at 13. Thus, he maintains it was necessary for him to take “action to defend both himself and Brock.” Id

[12] However, the evidence most favorable to the verdict demonstrates that Cooley, Summers, and Brock went to the public restroom where Wamue was living. Cooley and Wamue then started “tussling,” and Cooley stabbed Wamue, who was unarmed, five times and then kicked him. Tr. Vol. 2 at 196. In addition, Brock testified that Wamue “didn't do anything wrong” or make any threats to Cooley. Id. at 197. And Brock testified that, although Wamue touched the women inappropriately, he did not touch them “violently[.]” Id. at 205. Based on that evidence, a jury could infer that Cooley did not have a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm for either himself or others. Accordingly, the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Cooley's claims of self-defense and defense of others. Cooley's argument on appeal is merely a request for this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.

Issue Two: Jury Instruction

[13] Cooley next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense to murder. “Instructing the jury is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and we'll reverse only if there's an abuse of that discretion.” Cardosi v. State, 128 N.E.3d 1277, 1284 (Ind. 2019).

[14] Further,

[w]hen a defendant requests an instruction covering a lesser-included offense, a trial court applies the three-part analysis set forth in Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 566-67 (Ind. 1995). The first two parts require the trial court to determine whether the offense is either inherently or factually included in the charged offense. Id. If so, the trial court must determine whether there is a serious evidentiary dispute regarding any element that distinguishes the two offenses. Id. at 567; see also Brown v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1010, 1019 (Ind. 1998). Wright held that, “if, in view of this dispute, a jury could conclude that the lesser offense was committed but not the greater, then it is reversible error for a trial court not to give an instruction, when requested, on the inherently or factually included lesser offense.” Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567. Where a trial court makes such a finding, its rejection of a tendered instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Brown, 703 N.E.2d at 1019.

Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1271 (Ind. 2002) (footnote omitted). “In our review, we accord the trial court considerable deference, view the evidence in a light most favorable to the decision, and determine whether the trial court's decision can be justified in light of the evidence and circumstances of the case.” Leonard v. State, 80 N.E.3d 878, 885 (Ind. 2017) (quotation marks omitted).

[15] Voluntary manslaughter is an inherently lesser-included offense of murder. Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 485 (Ind. 2015). However,

[t]his is not a typical example of a lesser included offense in that what distinguishes voluntary manslaughter from murder is the existence of sudden heat, which is not an element of murder, but rather a mitigating factor in conduct that would otherwise be murder. Sudden heat occurs when a defendant is provoked by anger, rage, resentment, or terror, to a degree sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, prevent deliberation and premeditation, and render the defendant incapable of cool reflection. Thus, an instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense to a murder charge is warranted only if the evidence reflects a serious evidentiary dispute regarding the presence of sudden heat.

Id. at 485-86 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

[16] Cooley asserts that the evidence before the jury created a serious evidentiary dispute as to whether he had been provoked to stab Wamue. In particular, he contends that Wamue was “sexually assaulting the women in the bathroom” and that he “showed restraint and took no action until Wamue escalated the situation and came toward Brock with intent to do bodily harm to Brock.” Appellant's Br. at 16. And he maintains that the “ordinary man” would have been “objectively provoked” by Wamue's actions. Id.

[17] But, again, the undisputed evidence reveals that Cooley and Wamue started tussling after Wamue inappropriately touched women and then turned toward Brock. Next, instead of ending the tussle and walking away, Cooley stabbed Wamue five times. There is no indication in the record that Cooley was in such a state of terror or rage that he was rendered incapable of cool reflection. See Dearman v. State, 743 N.E.2d 757, 762 (Ind. 2001) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendant's request for a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter when the defendant and the victim got into a “scuffle” and the defendant struck the victim twice with a concrete block after the victim made sexual advances toward the defendant). And Wamue's actions—actions that were taken against other people and from which they could have easily walked away—would not have obscured the reason of an ordinary person provoking them into violence. We therefore conclude that there was no appreciable evidence of sudden heat and thus no serious evidentiary dispute on the element distinguishing murder from voluntary manslaughter. As a result, the court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to give Cooley's proffered jury instruction.

Conclusion

[18] The State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Cooley's claims of self-defense and defense of others. And the court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. We therefore affirm Cooley's conviction.

[19] Affirmed.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.