James Orlando Washington, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Ron Neal, Appellee-Defendant (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] James Orlando Washington (“Washington”) appeals the denial of his Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, which challenged the order dismissing his complaint against the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it dismissed his complaint. However, because we find that his appeal was not timely filed, we dismiss the appeal.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Washington is an inmate incarcerated in the DOC at the Indiana State Prison in Michigan City, Indiana. On June 21, 2024, Washington was charged with a conduct violation for possession and/or use of a cell phone/wireless device. Washington claimed that he did not receive notification of this conduct violation charge until July 22, 2024, which was thirty-one days later.

[3] On March 20, 2025, Washington filed a complaint against the warden, Ron Neal (“Neal”), in the LaPorte Circuit Court, alleging that prison officials violated Indiana Code section 11-11-5-5, which required the DOC to charge an incarcerated individual with a conduct violation within ten days of the date it becomes aware of the alleged misconduct. Washington requested a declaratory judgment be entered and that the conduct report be vacated.

[4] Neal filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(1), alleging that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Washington's claims over the DOC's disciplinary action. On May 6, 2025, Washington filed an amended complaint, again requesting a declaratory judgment establishing a “right to be charged within ten [ ] days.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on May 19, 2025.

[5] On June 10, 2025, Washington filed a motion for relief from judgment under Trial Rule 60(B)(1) and (8). In his motion, Washington argues that the trial court has jurisdiction over his complaint because Indiana Code section 34-14-1-2, the Uniform Declaratory Act, created “a private right of action” for his claim and that his complaint also alleged a negligence claim because he alleged that “the defendant had a duty to Washington under Indiana common law to follow DOC policy, which is mandatory to be followed.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 25. The trial court denied Washington's motion for relief from judgment, stating that the previously granted dismissal stood. Washington now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Initially, we note that Washington has chosen to proceed pro se. A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his or her pro se status. Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations omitted). These consequences include waiver for failure to present cogent arguments on appeal. Id. at 984.

[7] Although appealing after the denial of his motion for relief from judgment, Washington does not explicitly challenge the trial court's order denying his Trial Rule 60(B) motion and the trial court's accompanying findings and conclusions related to the application of that rule. Instead, he devotes his entire brief to his challenge of the trial court's dismissal order, arguing that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over his claims.

[8] As a result, Washington's challenges to the dismissal order are not properly before this court. Indiana Appellate Rule 9(A)(1) states in relevant part: “A party initiates an appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk (as defined in Rule 2(D)) within thirty (30) days after the entry of a Final Judgment is noted in the Chronological Case Summary.” Here, the CCS notes that the trial court entered the order granting Neal's motion to dismiss on May 20, 2025. Therefore, Washington had thirty days, or until June 19, 2025, to timely file his notice of appeal. Washington did not file a notice of appeal within thirty days after the entry order granting dismissal of his complaint. Therefore, he has forfeited his appeal of that judgment. See Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(5) (providing that “[u]nless the Notice of Appeal is timely filed, the right to appeal shall be forfeited except as provided by P.C.R. 2”). A Trial Rule 60 motion does not toll the deadline for initiating an appeal of the underlying judgment. See Ind. Trial Rule 60(B) (“A motion under this subdivision (B) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.”); In re Paternity of P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ind. 2010) (providing, “a motion for relief from judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) is not a substitute for a direct appeal”). An untimely filed notice of appeal does not deprive us of jurisdiction, and we may still consider an untimely initiated appeal if there are extraordinary compelling reasons to do so. Blinn v. Dyer, 19 N.E.3d 821, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). However, no such extraordinary compelling reason is present here. Accordingly, by failing to timely appeal the dismissal of his complaint, Washington has forfeited his right to raise on appeal his challenges to the order of dismissal.

[9] To the extent that Washington raises any claim of error relating to the trial court's denial of his Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, he has waived such arguments by failing to include cogent argument in support of any such claims in his brief. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring that each contention in the appellant's brief be supported by cogent argument and citations to applicable authority and to the record); Isom v. State, 170 N.E.3d 623, 653 (Ind. 2021) (finding argument waived when there was a failure to develop a cogent argument). Although Washington stated in his notice of appeal that he was appealing from the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment, he makes no mention of Trial Rule 60(B) or assertions pertinent to that rule in his brief. Instead, he argues only that the trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction, and his appeal is just an appeal of the merits of the dismissal order. Therefore, Washington has waived any assertions as to the denial of Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment.

[10] Because Washington did not timely file his notice of appeal as to the order dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, he has forfeited any appeal of that order, and he does not raise any cogent argument to the only order that he has timely appealed, the denial of his motion for relief from judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss his appeal.

[11] Dismissed.

Foley, Judge.

May, J., and Altice, J., concur.