C.J., Appellant-Respondent v. L.E., Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] C.J. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order denying his motion to withdraw his consent to the adoption of his ten-year-old son, B.E. (“B.E.”). He argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his consent. Concluding that the trial court did not err, we affirm the trial court's judgment.¹

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court erred when it denied Father's motion to withdraw his consent to B.E.’s adoption.

Facts

[3] The evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment reveal that B.E. was born in September 2014. Because of Father's “substance abuse issues” and “criminal involvement[,]” B.E. has lived his entire life with L.E., his maternal grandmother (“maternal grandmother”). (Tr. Vol. 2 at 8). In October 2018, the trial court appointed maternal grandmother to be B.E.’s legal guardian. Father established paternity of B.E. in February 2023, and, in March 2023, the trial court issued an order granting Father parenting time with B.E.

[4] In July 2023, Father signed a consent to B.E.’s adoption by maternal grandmother. That consent provides, in relevant part, as follows:

3. I believe that it would be in the best interest of [B.E.] to be adopted by [maternal grandmother] and [maternal step-grandfather].

* * * * *

5. I further consent to the voluntary termination of my parental rights including all rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, and obligations, including any rights to custody, control, visitation, or support pertaining to the relationship with [B.E.].

6. I understand that I have the right to consult with an attorney of my own choosing who represents me and my interests before signing this document.

* * * * *

8. I understand that this consent is permanent and cannot be revoked or set aside.

9. This consent to adoption is made by me (i) without coercion, threat, or duress, and (ii) after due consideration and deliberation. I realize that I am voluntarily and irrevocably relinquishing all rights which I may have as the parent and biological father of [B.E.][.]

(App. Vol. 2 at 23-24).

[5] In October 2023, maternal grandmother filed a petition to adopt B.E. Maternal grandmother attached a copy of Father's consent to her petition. In July 2024, nearly one year after Father had signed the consent to B.E.’s adoption, Father filed a motion to withdraw his consent. In this motion, Father alleged that his consent to B.E.’s adoption had not been voluntary. Specifically, Father alleged that, at the time that he had signed the consent, maternal grandmother had repeatedly told him that he “would be guaranteed open and liberal parenting time with [B.E.][.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 31). However, according to Father, in May 2024, maternal grandmother had begun denying Father parenting time with B.E. Father also argued that it was not in B.E.’s best interests to be adopted by maternal grandmother because she was physically disabled.

[6] During the June 2025 hearing on Father's petition to revoke his consent, thirty-four-year-old Father testified that maternal grandmother had promised him that if he signed the consent to B.E.’s adoption, she “wouldn't stop [him] from seeing [B.E.].” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 10). In addition, Father testified that maternal grandmother had promised him that he “would not be hit with child support[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 9).

[7] During maternal grandmother's counsel's cross examination of Father, that counsel reviewed Father's written consent to B.E.’s adoption with Father. Father acknowledged that when he had signed the consent, he had read it and had understood what he had signed. Specifically, Father acknowledged that he had: (1) consented to the voluntary termination of his parental rights, including his right to visit B.E.; (2) understood that the consent was permanent and could not be revoked or set aside; (3) understood that he was voluntarily and irrevocably relinquishing his parental rights; and (4) been fully aware of the implications of the consent.

[8] Following the hearing, in June 2025, the trial court issued an order finding that it was not in B.E.’s best interests to set aside Father's consent. In addition, the trial court further found “that parental remorse, after the fact,” did not support the vacation of a consent that had been “previously freely and voluntarily made.” (App. Vol. 2 at 44). One month later, in July 2025, the trial court issued an adoption decree.

[9] Father now appeals.

Decision

[10] At the outset, we note that maternal grandmother did not file an appellate brief in this matter. We do not develop arguments on behalf of an appellee who fails to file a brief. WindGate Properties, LLC v. Sanders, 93 N.E.3d 809, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). In such cases, we will reverse if the appellant establishes prima facie error, meaning error at first sight or error on the face of it. Id. However, even in light of this relaxed standard, we still have the obligation to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record to determine whether reversal is required. Id.

[11] Father argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his consent to B.E.’s adoption. Father, as the parent seeking to withdraw his consent to B.E.’s adoption, had the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. See In re Adoption of S.P., 172 N.E.3d 344, 351 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Ind. Code § 31-19-10-0.5). Where a ruling is entered against the party with the burden of proof, that party appeals from a negative judgment. Id. A party appealing from a negative judgment must show that the evidence points unerringly to a conclusion different from that reached by the trial court. Id. We will reverse a negative judgment only if the trial court's decision is contrary to law. Id. In determining whether a negative judgment is contrary to law, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. Rather, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the prevailing party together with all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. Id.

[12] “[A]n adoption obtained by fraud or duress, or other consent[-]vitiating factors would be subject to attack as any other judgment obtained through fraud, duress, or other such practices under Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 60(B)(3).”² Matter of Adoption of H.S., 483 N.E.2d 777, 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), reh'g denied. The gravamen of Father's argument is that his consent to B.E.’s adoption was obtained by fraud and duress because of maternal grandmother's false promises. Specifically, he contends that he “would not have consented [to B.E.’s adoption] but for [maternal grandmother's] promises of ongoing contact and no child support.” (Father's Br. 32).

[13] However, the trial court was under no obligation to credit any of Father's testimony and apparently did not. Specifically, the trial court found that Father had voluntarily executed the consent to B.E.’s adoption and that parental remorse after the fact did not support the vacation of a consent that was voluntarily made. Father's argument is simply a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See id.³

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This Court affirmed the trial court's denial of B.E.’s mother's motion to withdraw her consent to B.E.’s adoption under a separate cause number.

2.   Trial Rule 60(B) provides, in relevant part, that “the court may relieve a party ․ from a judgment [due to] ․ fraud ․, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party[.]” T.R. 60(B)(3).

3.   Father also argues that even if he validly consented to B.E's adoption, the trial court erred in finding that adoption was in B.E.’s best interests. “[I]n order to meet the burden of proving that allowing withdrawal of consent to adoption would be in the [child]’s best interests, the parent seeking to withdraw consent must specify precisely why it is in the child's best interest to permit him to withdraw his consent.” S.P., 172 N.E.3d at 353. Here, however, Father has not alleged with specificity why the withdrawal of his consent to B.E.’s adoption would be in B.E.’s best interests. Nor did he present specific evidence of same at the hearing. Without a more specific explanation, we fail to see how allowing Father to withdraw his consent to B.E.’s adoption was in B.E.’s best interests. We further note that ten-year-old B.E. has lived with maternal grandmother for his entire life.

Pyle, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.