John Michael Stevens, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] John M. Stevens was arrested for killing his grandmother Betty Stevens (“Betty”) and charged with murder and felony murder.¹ Stevens has a lengthy history of mental illness, criminal activity, and illegal substance use. He raised the defense of insanity at trial. A jury returned a verdict of guilty but mentally ill on both counts. During sentencing, the trial court merged felony murder into the murder conviction, then sentenced Stevens to sixty years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) for Betty's murder. Stevens raises three issues on appeal, which we restate as:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when instructing the jury on voluntary intoxication?

2. Did the trial court subject Stevens to double jeopardy?

3. Does Stevens’ sentence warrant revision under Appellate Rule 7(B)?

[2] We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it instructed the jury, and we do not discern a double jeopardy violation. As we also decline to revise the sentence, we affirm the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Stevens first received mental health treatment around 2001 when he was approximately twenty years old. His symptoms are consistent with a diagnosis of Schizophrenia, and he has been hospitalized at various times for care.² He was involuntarily hospitalized from December 2021 to January 2022, then discharged to Betty's house.³

[4] On the morning of June 3, 2022, Stevens called 9-1-1 to report Betty's death. Stevens informed the emergency operator his grandmother had “died of old age” and asked that a coroner retrieve her body. Ex. Vol. 5, page 5 at 00:40–00:49 (9-1-1 call recording). He explicitly requested “no officers” be sent to the property. Id. at 1:30–1:40. Upon arrival, the officers encountered Stevens outside Betty's property, and he was placed under arrest.⁴ Officers found Betty's body in the backyard of the adjacent property. Betty was eighty-five years old at the time of her death.

[5] A forensic pathologist determined Betty died of asphyxia by strangulation with blunt force trauma to the head as a contributing factor. She had injuries to her left eye, and abrasions on her neck and face. Her left pinky was nearly amputated. In addition, officers recovered a backpack at the scene containing mail addressed to Betty and a credit card in her name. Stevens used the credit card to make a purchase at a nearby gas station the night before he called law enforcement.

[6] A month after the arrest, the State charged Stevens with murder and felony murder.⁵ His appointed counsel moved for an evaluation to determine Stevens’ competency to stand trial. As required by statute, the trial court appointed psychologist Kevin Hurley and psychiatrist George Parker to evaluate Stevens. The two doctors initially determined Stevens was competent to stand trial. However, in January 2023, following a second round of evaluations, Drs. Hurley and Parker found Stevens no longer competent. Over the following twenty-four months, the two doctors attempted or successfully conducted examinations of Stevens, and at various points found him competent and not competent for trial. During those months, Stevens had multiple admissions to the Logansport State Hospital where he underwent treatment to restore competency. Stevens’ last pre-trial admission at Logansport ended around April 2024 with his competency restored. He subsequently filed notice of his intent to reassert a defense of mental disease or defect at trial.⁶ He was tried in January 2025.

[7] Both Dr. Hurley and Dr. Parker testified during Stevens’ trial regarding his history of mental illness. Dr. Parker testified he believed Stevens “retained a basic ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the alleged offenses.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 156. Dr. Hurley presumed Stevens’ sanity because he lacked “sufficient evidence to opine [Stevens] was unable to appreciate the ․ wrongfulness” of his conduct. Id. at 228. The two doctors also discussed Stevens’ struggles with substance use. In particular, Dr. Hurley testified Stevens reported using drugs in the weeks leading to Betty's death, including spending the night before the murder “in a hotel room with two people ․ using alcohol and K-2 or Spice[.]” Id. at 196.⁷

[8] Based on the doctors’ testimony, the State moved to instruct the jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a charge for murder. The State argued the instruction was needed because the jury should know defendants “still are held accountable” for crimes committed while voluntarily intoxicated. Id. at 234. Stevens objected. Stevens argued the testimonial evidence was insufficient to tender the instruction. See id. He reasoned his own statement to Dr. Hurley was “not particularly reliable” and because the State presented “no evidence” regarding Betty's exact time of death, it was improper to assume “he was intoxicated at the time of the offense.” Id. at 234–35. Stevens did not raise additional grounds for objecting to the instruction beyond insufficient evidence. The trial court overruled the objection and gave the instruction. The court found Dr. Hurley's testimony offered “at least some amount of evidence” Stevens was voluntarily intoxicated at the time of the murder. Id. at 235. The trial court further indicated it included pattern instructions regarding Stevens’ insanity defense “in their entirety” for the jury to consider. Id.

[9] The jury found Stevens guilty of murder and felony murder but mentally ill at the time of the offense. The trial court did not enter judgment of conviction. During a later sentencing hearing, the court noted judgment of conviction could not “be entered on” both murder and felony murder so the court “merge[d]” the convictions. Tr. Vol. 4 at 48. The trial court “enter[ed] judgment of conviction as guilty but mentally ill” for murder. Id. As for Stevens’ sentence, the court found Stevens’ history of mental illness “a pretty significant mitigating factor[.]” Id. at 47–48. But the court found several aggravating factors: the victim's age, Stevens’ criminal history, and Stevens was on probation at the time of the murder. After concluding the “aggravating factors” outweighed the “mitigating factor[,]” the trial court sentenced Stevens to sixty years executed in the DOC.⁸

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when instructing the jury on voluntary intoxication.

[10] At trial, Stevens objected to instructing the jury on voluntary intoxication because he claimed the State failed to offer sufficient evidence for the court to do so. On appeal, Stevens reasserts his insufficient evidence argument but adds one additional ground for alleged error: the instruction was misleading and incomplete. See Appellant's Br. at 18–24. We address each argument in turn.

The instruction correctly stated the law and was supported by the evidence.

[11] The trial court gave instruction No. 13 to the jury, which stated:

Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a charge of Murder. You may not take voluntary intoxication into consideration in determining whether the Defendant acted knowingly or intentionally as alleged in [the murder and felony murder counts].

Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 16.

[12] We review a claim of error in instructing the jury for an abuse of discretion. Dunn v. State, 230 N.E.3d 910, 914 (Ind. 2024). This Court considers whether the instruction correctly states the law, is supported by the evidence, and is covered in substance by the other jury instructions. McCowan v. State, 27 N.E.3d 760, 763–64 (Ind. 2015).

[13] Under Indiana Code Section 35-41-2-5, intoxication “is not a defense in a prosecution for an offense” and cannot be considered when “determining the existence of a mental state that is an element” of that offense. The trial court's jury instruction No. 13 mirrored the language of Section 35-41-2-5 and correctly stated the law. See Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 16; see also Sanchez v. State, 749 N.E.2d 509 (Ind. 2001) (affirming the constitutionality of Section 35-41-2-5). As the State suggests, the trial court had the “duty to inform the jury” on the relevant law so it could reach “a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Appellee's Br. at 19 (citing McCowan, 27 N.E.3d at 764).

[14] Furthermore, the evidence before the trial court supported instructing the jury on voluntary intoxication. Dr. Parker provided testimony regarding Stevens’ long history of drug use. See Tr. Vol. 3 at 159–60. Dr. Hurley similarly testified Stevens reported using drugs in the weeks leading up to the offense, including the night before the murder, which he spent “in a hotel room with two people ․ using alcohol and K-2 or Spice[.]” Id. at 196. The trial court determined Stevens’ statements to Dr. Hurley offered “at least some amount of evidence” Stevens used intoxicants around the time of Betty's death. Id. at 235. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See McCowan, 27 N.E.3d at 763.

Stevens waived additional grounds for alleged error.

[15] Even so, Stevens contends jury instruction No. 13 was also misleading and incomplete. See Appellant's Br. at 18. More specifically, he suggests the instruction “forbade the jury from considering intoxication as a factor in [his] mental illness by flatly informing the jury that intoxication was not a defense when ․ there is evidence in the record which shows that voluntary intoxication may very well provide a defense when combined with an insanity defense.” Id. at 24. According to Stevens, his mental illness directly contributed to his pattern of substance use. See id. at 23.

[16] “No party may claim as error the giving of an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.” Ind. Trial Rule 51(C); see also Luna v. State, 758 N.E.2d 515, 518 (Ind. 2001) (holding defendant waived claims when he had not clearly identified “the grounds for the objection made on appeal” during trial). In this case, Stevens did not object to instruction No. 13 on grounds that it was incomplete or somehow misleading to the jury. Nor did he argue his mental illness rendered his intoxication involuntary, as he appears to do before this Court. See Appellant's Br. at 23–24. His sole objection to instruction No. 13 was that it was unsupported by the evidence. See Tr. Vol. 3 at 233–34. To the extent he alleges on appeal new grounds for holding the trial court abused its discretion when instructing the jury, those arguments are waived. See Luna, 758 N.E.2d at 518.

The trial court's instruction did not constitute fundamental error.

[17] Waiver notwithstanding, Stevens argues instructing the jury on voluntary intoxication created fundamental error. He claims the instruction at issue “prevented him from presenting his symptoms—which included substance abuse—as factors in support of his insanity defense.” Appellant's Br. at 26. And by “informing the jury that it could not consider factors ․ crucial for their consideration,” Stevens continues, “the trial court deprived [him] of his due process right to present a defense.” Id.

[18] We may review an instruction for fundamental error as a narrow exception to waiver. Dunn, 230 N.E.3d at 914 (citing Miller v. State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 874 (Ind. 2022)). “The fundamental error exception to waiver is ‘extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’ ” Shields v. State, 248 N.E.3d 1246, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Matthews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006)), trans. denied. A defendant asserting fundamental error “can prevail only if the jury charge as a whole ‘was so misleading as to make a fair trial impossible or blatantly violate[s] basic due process’ ” Dunn, 230 N.E.3d at 915 (quoting Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1285 (Ind. 2014)).

[19] Stevens raised the defense of insanity, and the trial court included the relevant pattern instructions for the jury to consider. The defendant bears the burden of establishing the defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 35-41-4-1(b) (1978). The defendant must show that, as a result of mental disease or defect, he “was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the offense.” I.C. § 35-41-3-6(a) (1984).⁹ The trier of fact decides the question of insanity. Berry v. State, 969 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. 2012).

[20] Here, Dr. Parker testified Stevens “retained a basic ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions” at the time of the murder. Tr. Vol. 3 at 156. In support of his opinion, Dr. Parker pointed out Stevens indicated to the 9-1-1 operator “his grandmother had died of old age which was clearly not true.” Id. at 157. In addition, Dr. Parker found it important that Stevens explicitly requested “no officers” be sent to the scene of the murder. Id. at 158. For his part, Dr. Hurley presumed sanity because “there wasn't enough evidence in the available records or ․ the data [he] got from the interview ․ that [Stevens] was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness” of his actions at the time of the offense. Id. at 228. And according to Dr. Hurley, Stevens acknowledged using drugs led to “bad decision making.” Id. at 231. The jury in its role as the trier of fact found Stevens guilty but mentally ill. Nothing prevented the jury from determining whether Stevens’ “conduct was the result of a diseased mind—regardless of the source of the disease—or was the result of voluntary intoxication.” Berry, 969 N.E.2d at 43 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Upon review, we are not persuaded instructing the jury on voluntary intoxication constituted fundamental error. See Dirig v. State, 268 N.E.3d 1239, 1249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (identifying no fundamental error after considering “the jury instructions as a whole”).

The trial court did not subject Stevens to double jeopardy.

[21] Stevens next asserts the trial court violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy by merging, not vacating, his felony murder conviction. See Appellant's Br. at 36. Because the sentencing order and abstract of judgment say the felony murder conviction was merged, Stevens argues this Court “should remand ․ with instructions to vacate” that conviction. Id. at 38; see also Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 63, 68.

[22] Indiana's protection against substantive double jeopardy prohibits “multiple convictions for the same offense in a single proceeding.” A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1066 (Ind. 2024); see also Ind. Const. art. 1, § 14. We review double jeopardy claims de novo. A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1064.

[23] “[A] defendant's constitutional rights are violated when a court enters judgment twice for the same offense, but not when a defendant is simply found guilty of a particular count.” Green v. State, 856 N.E.2d 703, 704 (Ind. 2006). And a defendant cannot be sentenced for murder and felony murder when the case involves the homicide of only one individual. Martinez Chavez v. State, 534 N.E.2d 731, 739 (Ind. 1989). “On the other hand, a merged offense for which a defendant is found guilty, but on which there is neither a judgment nor a sentence, is unproblematic as far as double jeopardy is concerned.” Green, 856 N.E.2d at 704 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Laux v. State, 821 N.E.2d 816, 819 (Ind. 2005) (discerning no double jeopardy violation when the trial court merged the felony murder and murder convictions, then entered judgment on the murder conviction only).

[24] Here, the jury rendered a verdict of guilty of both murder and felony murder. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted “judgment of conviction” could not be entered for both counts. Tr. Vol. 4 at 48. The court subsequently merged felony murder into the murder conviction, then entered judgment and a sentence for murder. See id. As such, there is no double jeopardy violation. See Wilson v. State, 39 N.E.3d 705, 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (because the felony murder “count was merged, rather than reduced to judgment, and [defendant] was never sentenced for felony murder,” no double jeopardy violation occurred), trans. denied.¹⁰

Stevens’ sentence does not warrant revision under Appellate Rule 7(B).

[25] Finally, Stevens asks us to revise his sentence. The Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision as provided by rule. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The principal role of appellate review is to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct sentence in each case. Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 288 (Ind. 2022). Therefore, “we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019) (per curiam).

[26] “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The two prongs of 7(B) review are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conner v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.

[27] The question “is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 228 (Ind. 2015) (quoting King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)) (emphasis omitted). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us a revised sentence is warranted. Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024).

[28] A person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between forty-five and sixty-five years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. I.C. § 35-50-2-3 (2015). Stevens received an above advisory but below maximum sentence of sixty years, all executed.

The nature of the offense does not warrant revision.

[29] As to the nature of the offense, Stevens concedes the crime he committed was “violent[,]” but suggests “his level of participation ․ is much less than a person who is not suffering from profound and debilitating mental illnesses.” Appellant's Br. at 35. The Indiana Supreme Court has recognized the role of a defendant's mental illness “in the commission of a crime may, in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances,” be considered when evaluating the nature of the offense under Rule 7(B). Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 229 (Ind. 2015). In the case at hand, Stevens was staying in the backyard of his eighty-five-year-old grandmother's house the day he murdered her. An autopsy revealed Betty died of asphyxia by strangulation with blunt force trauma to the head as a contributing factor. She suffered injuries to her left eye, neck, and left hand. Stevens admitted using drugs the night before the murder and used Betty's credit card at a gas station before calling emergency services. Stevens retained the “basic ability” to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions when he committed the offense. Tr. Vol. 3 at 156. This case does not present “exceptional and extraordinary circumstances” where the nature of the offense merits relief. Id.

The character of the offender does not warrant revision.

[30] Stevens has not provided compelling evidence portraying the nature of his offense in a positive light; therefore, to prevail he must make an even stronger showing about his character. See Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127. Instead of making this showing, Stevens posits the trial court “failed to assign” sufficient weight to his mental illness in sentencing him. Appellant's Br. at 30. To the extent Stevens argues about the weight and balancing of factors, that is an abuse of discretion argument. See Keller v. State, 987 N.E.2d 1099, 1121 n.11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. This Court has long held “inappropriate sentence and abuse of discretion claims are to be analyzed separately.” See, e.g., King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Anglemeyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). We therefore focus our analysis on whether Stevens’ sentence was inappropriate.

[31] Stevens has a lengthy record of criminal activity, including numerous misdemeanor and felony convictions going back to the year 2000. He killed his elderly grandmother while on probation. Despite being aware of the seriousness of his illness, Stevens did not seek appropriate treatment in the weeks and days before committing the murder. In sum, Stevens cannot demonstrate “substantial virtuous traits” or “persistent examples of good character” sufficient to overcome the nature of his offense. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. His sentence is not an outlier warranting revision.

Conclusion

[32] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury and did not subject Stevens to double jeopardy. And we decline to use our authority under Appellate Rule 7(B) to revise Stevens’ sixty-year sentence for murder.

[33] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1(1) & (2) (2018).

2.   His longest hospitalization was at the Evansville State Hospital, where he was held for eleven years. See generally Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 85–92, 204–13.

3.   Stevens did not have a place of his own. Betty owned two properties with connecting backyards in Evansville at 410 and 412 East Michigan Street. She resided at the 410 address. Stevens appears to have been sleeping in Betty's backyard. Stevens received mail at the property, but was not permitted inside the house.

4.   At the time of the arrest, Stevens was on probation pursuant to a plea agreement he accepted in April in which he pleaded guilty to intimidation, criminal trespass, and resisting law enforcement. Stevens’ criminal record stretches back to the year 2000, and includes multiple misdemeanor and felony convictions. See Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 45–50.

5.   Stevens was also charged with ten other counts which alleged: one count of battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official; one count of attempted battery by bodily waste; and eight counts of intimidation. These other counts were bifurcated from the murder and felony murder charges and are not at issue on this appeal.

6.   Stevens first submitted notice of the same in January 2023. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 65. He withdrew the defense July 5, 2024, and resubmitted it six days later. See id. at 164, 172–73.

7.   Dr. Hurley described K-2 or Spice as a “synthetic cannabinoid.” Id. Dr. Parker described the drug as “particularly bad” for its tendency to “make people psychotic[.]” Id. at 170.

8.   At that point, the State asked for—and the court granted—dismissal of all remaining charges.

9.   Mental disease or defect is defined as “a severely abnormal mental condition that grossly and demonstrably impairs a person's perception, but the term does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated unlawful or antisocial conduct.” I.C. § 35-41-3-6(b).

10.   Although we discern no double jeopardy violation here, we frequently address the confusion caused by use of the word “merge.” To avoid this unnecessary confusion, we urge trial courts to use the term “vacated” instead.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Chief Judge Tavitas and Judge Bailey concur. Tavitas, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.