IN RE: E.B. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In January of 2025, J.B. (“Father”) slipped on the staircase inside his home while carrying two-month-old E.B. (“Child”). That same day, Father had another incident on the staircase while holding Child, in which he fell down the entire flight of stairs. M.C. (“Mother”) and Father (collectively, “Parents”) assessed Child and determined that she was not injured. Eight hours later, Child began vomiting and was taken to the hospital, where it was determined that she was suffering from bleeding in her brain. Child was released to Parents’ care after surgery and necessary medical care. Two months later, Father fell again with Child in his arms, and the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) petitioned to have Child found to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”) based upon the injuries Child had sustained from the incidents with Father. After a fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court entered an order adjudicating Child as a CHINS. Mother and Father each contend that the evidence did not support the juvenile court's conclusion that Child is a CHINS. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the morning of January 11, 2025, while carrying two-month-old Child (d/o/b October 30, 2024), Father slipped on two steps on the staircase inside of the family home and believed that Child's head had “grazed” a wall. Tr. Vol. II p. 32. Mother and Father “didn't see any signs of trauma or concern at that point.” Tr. Vol. II p. 32. That evening, Father fell down the stairs again while carrying Child, this time falling down the entire flight of stairs. Father “ran into and destroyed” a bookcase at the bottom of the stairs during the second fall, which caused him to bleed. Tr. Vol. II p. 63. After the fall, Parents evaluated Child and again observed no signs of trauma. Hours later, Child began vomiting, at which point Parents took her to the hospital.

[3] At the hospital, medical staff determined that Child had a brain bleed, and Child was transported by helicopter to Riley Children's Hospital. Child was diagnosed with a traumatic brain injury consisting of subdural hematoma, subarachnoid hemorrhage, and retinal hemorrhages. The injury was flagged as a “near fatality” by medical professionals. Tr. Vol. II p. 54. Child's injuries were listed as indeterminate as to their cause “as her injuries could [have been] consistent with either abusive head trauma or a fall down the steps.” Ex. Vol. p. 5. Medical providers completed a skeletal survey of Child, in which no fractures were identified.

[4] Child was hospitalized for approximately one week and released back to Parents’ care. On February 5, 2025, doctors determined that Child would need surgery to drain fluid from her brain. Doctors also implanted a shunt in Child's head to drain excess fluid. In light of the severity of Child's injuries, the shunt could be permanent, and Child has a risk of having pressure headaches from the shunt.

[5] On March 11, 2025, Father again fell from “a step or two” with Child in his arms. Tr. Vol. II p. 34. Father called 911 and Child's neurosurgeon and reported the fall to family case manager (“FCM”) Ethan Held. Father was “not sure if she ever hit the wall.” Tr. Vol. II p. 67. Child did not sustain any new injuries from this fall, but a second skeletal survey indicated that Child had had “fractures on her rib.” Tr. Vol. II p. 46. Doctors were unable to determine whether those fractures had come from the initial fall or a later date. The same day, Father was drug screened and tested positive for THC. DCS obtained an order removing Father from the home.

[6] DCS petitioned to have Child found to be a CHINS on March 12, 2025, based upon the injuries Child had sustained from the incidents with Father. On March 18, 2025, the juvenile court held a preliminary inquiry hearing during which DCS requested services for the family, including a clinical assessment, family-preservation services, and supervised visitation for Father. DCS initially requested the family preservation services for Mother because, at the time, Father “was the only one working at the time” and DCS “wanted to make sure [Mother] had access to resources[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 37. Mother “stated that she did not need it and that she could do things by herself [․] and she knows how to handle herself.” Tr. Vol. II p. 37.

[7] With court approval, Father moved into a new, one-story home with the family. In April of 2025, DCS referred Father for a diagnostic assessment, which resulted in Father's diagnosis for persistent depressive disorder. Father was recommended to participate in parenting classes, home-based casework, and individual counseling. On April 10, 2025, DCS amended its CHINS petition.

[8] On June 17, 2025, the juvenile court held a fact-finding hearing, during which Mother testified that she refused to submit to a drug screening and would not do so without a court order. FCM Held testified that “DCS has no concerns about Mother's ability to provide and care for” Child and that Mother is an appropriate caregiver. Tr. Vol. II p. 46. He also testified that they “did not feel that there was any need for any sort of services” for Mother and that she had “admitted to using THC products that they bought legally from stores[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 47.

[9] FCM Held also testified that “navigating steps” was an issue for Father that the family had not taken measures to remedy. Tr. Vol. II p. 48. When asked whether moving into a home with no stairs would remedy the issue, FCM Held testified that “there's steps outside in the community though all the time.” Tr. Vol. II p. 48. Guardian ad litem (“GAL”) Laurie Gray testified that she believed Parents had remedied the situation “by moving to a house without that staircase” and that she did not believe that there were any services that Parents needed that they would not be able to provide to their children, including Child, on their own. Tr. Vol. II p. 88.

[10] On July 3, 2025, the juvenile court found Child to be a CHINS. The juvenile court found that the parties had placed significant emphasis on whether the falls had been accidental and whether the stairs in the home had been dangerous and determined that those facts were not dispositive of whether Child was a CHINS. The juvenile court also found that “[m]oving to a home without stairs or getting different shoes does not resolve the fact that drug use is occurring in this home and that Father was positive for marijuana for at least one of these falls.” Appellant J.B.’s App. Vol. II p. 97. The juvenile court also expressed concern that Child “suffered a significant fall at two months old during which Father [․] suffered injuries and the parties did not seek medical care until after [Child] was vomiting eight hours later.” Appellant J.B.’s App. Vol. II pp. 97–98. The juvenile court further found that Father was suffering from depression and needed therapy that he had requested but was not receiving.

[11] The juvenile court found that Child will require “long term medical monitoring as a result of her injuries[ and] requires a home free from substance use and caregivers that are able to provide safe supervision and timely seeking medical treatment.” Appellant J.B.’s App. Vol. II p. 98. On August 1, 2025, following a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court entered its dispositional order, in which it ordered Parents, inter alia, to refrain from criminal activity and maintain clean, safe, and appropriate sustainable housing at all times.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Father contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that Child was a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. Mother contends the same. We note that parents do not specifically challenge any of the juvenile court's findings ¹ , which we therefore accept as true. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992).

[13] “The purposes of a CHINS case are to help families in crisis and to protect children, not punish parents.” Matter of D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “[A]s a general rule appellate courts grant latitude and deference to trial courts in family law matters.” Id. “This deference recognizes a trial court's unique ability to see the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and scrutinize their testimony, as opposed to this court's only being able to review a cold transcript of the record.” Id.

[14] When reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. When a trial court supplements a CHINS judgment with findings of fact and conclusions law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. We consider, first, whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the judgment. We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it was clearly erroneous. A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. In re D.J. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577–78 (Ind. 2017) (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).

[15] Under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, a child is a CHINS if, before the child becomes eighteen years of age,

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

The final element “guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families where parents lack the ability to provide for their children, not merely where they encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014) (quotation and emphasis omitted).

[16] Mother contends that “there was no evidence presented during the [f]act finding hearing that [P]arents were failing to provide [C]hild with the necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision.” Appellant M.C.’s Br. p. 10. Father makes the same argument. Parents both point to the testimony of various providers that Child's injuries had been the result of an accident and that the family had remedied the conditions that had resulted in DCS involvement.

[17] We have little hesitation in concluding that Child's physical or mental condition was seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of Parents’ actions (or inactions) in the early months of 2025. Child was a two-month-old infant who had suffered a “near fatality” on January 11, 2025. Tr. Vol. II p. 54. Child's injuries were listed as indeterminate as to their cause “as her injuries could [have been] consistent with either abusive head trauma or a fall down the steps.” Ex. Vol. p. 5. Child was hospitalized for approximately one week following the incident, required surgery to drain fluid from her brain, and had a shunt implanted in her head to drain excess fluid, which may be permanent.

[18] Even more alarming was the fact that, after the second fall, from which Father himself had suffered injuries, Parents had not sought medical care for Child until eight hours later, when she had begun vomiting. As it happened, Child had suffered subdural hematoma, subarachnoid hemorrhage, and retinal hemorrhages and required emergency transport by helicopter to the hospital. Parents’ delay reflects a failure to provide necessary medical care to Child who could not communicate distress.

[19] Two months after the fall that had resulted in Child's traumatic brain injury, Father again fell from “a step or two” with Child in his arms. Tr. Vol. II p. 34. The same day, Father was drug screened and tested positive for THC. Mother admitted to also using THC products “that they bought legally from stores[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 47. Whether Father's falls were accidental does not take away from the fact that Child suffered a traumatic brain injury from one of those falls, Father had fallen with Child in his arms three times, and Parents had continued to use substances in the home after Child's serious injury, with Father's drug screen returning positive after, again, his third fall with Child. Furthermore, while Child did not sustain any new injuries from the third fall, a second skeletal survey indicated that Child had suffered “fractures on her rib” at some point. Tr. Vol. II p. 46. Doctors were unable to determine whether those fractures had occurred in the initial fall or at a later date.

[20] The CHINS statute does not require that a court wait until a tragedy occurs to intervene. In re A.H., 913 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Rather, a child is a CHINS when he or she is endangered by parental action or inaction. Id. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the record and findings support a conclusion that Child was seriously impaired or endangered while in Parents’ care due to their actions and/or inactions while she was wholly dependent on their care. Parents’ arguments concerning the testimony of the GAL and other providers amounts to nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577–78.

[21] Mother contends that the “conditions which gave rise to the DCS investigation and involvement were fully resolved” prior to the fact-finding hearing. Appellant M.C.’s Br. p. 13. Father similarly argues that he “addressed all of the concerns of DCS and it had no other services to offer or recommend.” Appellant J.B.’s Br. p. 16. These arguments ignore Father's unresolved mental-health and safety issues, Parents’ substance use, Mother's testimony that she refused to submit to a drug screening and would not do so without a court order, and Mother's statement that she did not need services and “that she could do things by herself [․] and she knows how to handle herself.” Tr. Vol. II p. 37. Parents’ arguments also ignore FCM Held's testimony that “navigating steps” was an issue for Father that the family had not remedied, and that “during that third fall [Father] did have other items in his hand and so we felt that the family had not taken the coercive action to remedy that issue.” Tr. Vol. II p. 48.

[22] Moreover, with regard to the juvenile court's determination that the coercive intervention of the court was required, we have little trouble concluding that the juvenile court did not err in this regard. DCS is permitted to intervene in a family's life when that family cannot meet the child's needs without the coercive intervention of the court. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1286. When determining whether coercive intervention is necessary, “the question is whether the parents must be coerced into providing or accepting necessary treatment for their child.” Matter of E.K., 83 N.E.3d 1256, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.

[23] Again, Mother refused to submit to a drug screen absent a court order despite admitting to consuming THC products and stated that she did not need services because she could do things by herself. Father was not engaged in therapy prior to State involvement, tested positive for THC after the third fall with Child, and, again, had fallen down the stairs at least three separate times with Child in his arms, with the second time resulting in Child's traumatic brain injury. Parents have failed to establish that the juvenile court abused its discretion in concluding that coercive intervention is necessary. Parents’ arguments concerning the testimony of various providers amount to nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577–78. We conclude that the evidence and findings amply support the juvenile court's conclusion that Child was a CHINS.

[24] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent that Father challenges the findings generally, Father has waived this issue by failing to make a cogent argument. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.