Timothy B. Helton, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Timothy B. Helton was convicted of murder and attempted murder, adjudicated a habitual offender, and sentenced to an aggregate term of 120 years in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). On appeal, Helton contends that the State failed to sufficiently rebut his claim of self-defense. He also challenges his sentence as inappropriate.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] On May 8, 2024, Jeffrey Crane visited the property of his cousin, John Grubb, who was incarcerated at the time. Grubb's wife Ashley and their daughters lived at this rural property in Bedford, and Crane went regularly to check on the property or work in the garage. The property had a gate at the end of the driveway that stayed locked and no trespassing signs posted on the gate and fence. Grubb ran an auto business out of his garage, and many vehicles remained on the property after he was incarcerated in 2023.

[4] While on Grubb's property that day, Crane observed an unfamiliar man, later determined to be Helton, walking off the property from a field and toward a car parked outside the gate. As Crane approached, Helton pulled out a gun and aimed it at Crane, threatening to kill him if he came closer. Helton indicated that there was a four-wheeler in the garage that belonged to him ¹ and that he was going to return with a truck and the four-wheeler better be at the gate or he would “come up there and shoot every motherf***er in the house.” Transcript Vol. 6 at 110. Crane then told Helton to come back with paperwork and the police and that if the four-wheeler was Helton's, he would help load it. While still holding him at gunpoint, Helton requested Crane's phone number. Crane provided a number that was a combination of his and Grubb's phone numbers. Before leaving, Helton reiterated that he would be back with a truck.

[5] Crane went to the house and alerted Ashley to the incident, and they spoke with Grubb, who was due to be released later that month. Grubb told them that there was no need to call the police and that he would handle the matter upon his release. Ashley watched surveillance footage and determined that Zavier Butler had also been on the property. The men had pushed the four-wheeler out of the garage and into a field. Crane returned the four-wheeler to the garage. Although they knew Butler, the person from whom Grubb had bought the four-wheeler, Ashley and Crane did not know Helton, but they eventually identified Helton through social media. It was determined that Jimmy Allgood, a friend and employee of Grubb, would stay at the home to protect Ashley and the girls until Grubb's release.

[6] The next day, Helton used his fiancé Shelby Murray's phone to call the phone number that Crane had given to him, which happened to be a number that belonged to 15-year-old boy, T.E. Instead of answering the call, T.E. sent a text inquiring who was calling. Helton identified himself as “Kenny” and stated that he had been at the house yesterday “about my Fourwheeler” and that he was still trying to find a truck to pick it up. Exhibits Vol. 2 at 209. T.E. played along as if he knew what Helton was talking about. The exchange continued:

I ain't mad at y'all I get it but that's my shit.

Ok i know u need some extra money to get a truck to come get it

I haven't even been out a week, I told my son I was gonna give him that Fourwheeler and he's expecting that. If I need money for a truck [Butler] is gonna pay for it. He started this shit. I should send him out there to get it so y'all could get your money back.

If you want I can try to bring him out there, I get it man. It's all dumb as hell.

Ya I know what u mean I would be aggravated to ya if you want just bring him out here

I'll try. How much did y'all pay for the quad because I might be able to see what I can do about seeing how much he's got

I can't remember off the top of my head. I'll have to look at the paperwork or something but I'll get back with you

Il try 2find him wipe him down and bring u the money bc im shity Frfr sorry about yesterday I'll c what I can do when I get a truck I'll let u no if u watch the cameras I was trying to n to find some1 I didn't want to do it like that I just wanted my 4wheeler

Ya I understand it's not your fault

I got my guys try n to run him down idk how long it will take maybe a min maybe a week but we will find him

Id. at 210-211 (messages from T.E. designated by additional indentation; grammar and spelling not corrected).

[7] Helton reached out by text two days later, stating that he was in Illinois but should be back Monday, May 13, and inquiring about when he could come by with a truck. T.E. indicated that he did not care and that anytime would work. On May 13 and 14, Helton messaged that he was in Bloomington looking for Butler but that he could not find him. In the early afternoon on May 15, Helton texted that he was going to try to get his uncle's truck. The following text exchange occurred between Helton and T.E.:

Ok cool sorry I haven't texted back I have been busy

Ya me too

Ya just text me when your on your way

Ok do u like to party a lil bit

Yea

Well I'll bring something up with me

Ok

A buddy of mine nos u guys said u guys r cool

Ya I would agree we are pretty cool

B cool dude

Id. at 201-04.

[8] Around noon on May 16, Helton wrote: “Time got away from me frfr im go n to try to get a truck soon as I can today and head that way I'll let u no when I do[.]” Id. at 204. A couple of hours later, Helton wrote: “Hey I got a truck u home[?]” Id. at 205. T.E. did not respond to this message nor to four other messages sent over the next two days. The last disregarded message Helton sent before heading over to Grubb's property was early in the morning on May 18.

[9] Helton and Murray were homeless, living in a car in Bloomington, but on May 17, they had driven to Bedford and spent the night with a relative. Christopher Cecil and Cecil's girlfriend accompanied Helton and Murray to Bedford, and they all used methamphetamine throughout the night and into the morning.

[10] Around 10:30 a.m., they drove past Grubb's property in a passenger vehicle, not a truck, and a minute later backed up to the gate at the end of the driveway. The women stayed in the vehicle, Murray in the driver seat, while Helton and Cecil went around the locked gate and walked up the driveway to the garage. Helton was armed with a handgun in the pocket of his sweatshirt.

[11] Unbeknownst to Helton, Grubb had been released from custody about two days earlier. Grubb was working that morning with Crane and Allgood to clean up the property. The three men were unarmed, and there were no firearms in the garage. Grubb, Crane, and Allgood were taking a break and eating Hostess cupcakes in the garage as Helton and Cecil approached the open garage door.²

[12] When Helton greeted the men, Crane recognized him from their previous encounter and said to Grubb, “hey, there's that mother**ker that pulled the gun on me.” Transcript Vol. 6 at 107. Helton raised a hand and stated that he was just there to talk. Allgood returned to working on a weed eater inside the garage, and Crane told Helton that it was up to Grubb as to whether he wanted to talk. Crane also said, “I bet you brought that gun though.” Id. at 116. Crane then walked back into the garage as Grubb, still eating a cupcake, and Helton began discussing the four-wheeler, with Grubb commenting that Helton had committed trespass. During the brief discussion, Grubb turned and walked to his right and reached for something on the garage shelf. Helton quickly pulled out his gun and shot Grubb in the side of his left shoulder and then in the chest as Grubb turned back around. Helton also shot into the garage at Crane, striking him in the leg and stomach. Helton and Cecil then ran back to the car, and Murray quickly drove them from the scene.

[13] Helton was stopped and arrested in Bloomington about five hours later and transported to the Lawrence County Sheriff's Department. Before his detention, Helton made over forty phone calls, but none was to police, fire, or emergency medical services. Helton had also changed vehicles in Bloomington and traveled to several locations.

[14] Upon being interviewed at the sheriff's department that night, Helton initially denied being at Grubb's property. He eventually claimed self-defense after learning from investigators that there was surveillance video of the shooting. Helton noted the prior text exchanges and that upon arriving at the garage he felt like Crane had set him up. Helton explained that he (Helton) “freaked out” after there was a gun reference and he saw Grubb grab for something on the shelf. Exhibits Vol. I at 56 (Exhibit 20 at 1:11:08). Though Helton acknowledged never seeing a gun at the scene, he said that he had heard from others that Grubb had guns. Helton explained to investigators, “I wasn't going to give [Grubb] time to turn around and shoot me․. I was high. I was paranoid.” Id. (Exhibit 20 at 1:29:28, 1:30:23). Helton also noted that he had been shot multiple times before and suffered from related trauma. Helton stated, “I really thought he had a gun and would shoot me.” Id. (Exhibit 20 at 1:35:38).

[15] Meanwhile, Grubb had been pronounced dead upon arrival at the hospital, and Crane had been taken by helicopter to a hospital in Louisville. Crane was in a coma for the first week, remained hospitalized for over a month, required multiple surgeries, had to have a large portion of his intestines removed, and suffered permanent injuries.

[16] On May 20, 2024, the State charged Helton with murder (Count I), attempted murder (Count II), unlawful carrying a handgun (Count III), criminal recklessness (Count IV), and two counts of pointing a firearm (Counts V and VI). The State also alleged that Helton was a habitual offender. On March 6, 2025, at the conclusion of a five-day jury trial, the jury found him guilty as charged of all six counts. Helton then admitted his habitual offender status in exchange for the dismissal of Count III.

[17] At sentencing on May 20, 2025, the trial court merged Counts IV and V into Count I and merged Count VI into Count II. The trial court then sentenced Helton on Count I to 63 years plus a 20-year habitual offender enhancement and on Count II to 37 years. The terms were ordered to be served consecutively for an aggregate sentence of 120 years.

[18] Helton appeals both his convictions and sentence. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Discussion & Decision

1. The State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Helton's claim of self-defense.

[19] Helton's initial argument on appeal is that no reasonable person could find that the State negated Helton's self-defense claims beyond a reasonable doubt. Helton notes his mistaken belief that he had been given permission by Crane to come to the property and that the two had made amends through their text conversations. Further, Helton argues that he was “immediately confronted with hostility” when he arrived on the morning of the shooting, which caused him to feel that he had been set up by Crane and resulted in him making “a split-second decision” out of fear for his own safety as Grubb reached for something on the garage shelf. Appellant's Brief at 14.

[20] When a defendant challenges the State's sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense, our standard of review is no different than any other sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. Turner v. State, 253 N.E.3d 526, 533 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility and will look only to the evidence most favorable to the judgment. Id. We will reverse only if no reasonable person could say that the self-defense claim was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[21] Self-defense is a legal justification for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, and it operates as a complete bar to conviction. Id. at 534. Once a defendant invokes self-defense, the State has the burden to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one element of the justification. Id. The elements of self-defense in a deadly-force case such as this include: (1) the defendant was in a place where he had a right to be; (2) he did not provoke, instigate, or willingly participate in the violence; and (3) he had a reasonable fear of serious bodily injury necessitating the use of defensive force. See Carroll v. State, 744 N.E.2d 432, 433 (Ind. 2001) (citing Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2). While the parties address each element on appeal, we need only address the third element – whether Helton's fear of serious bodily harm was reasonable under the circumstances.

[22] “[W]hen people make split-second decisions about how to defend themselves in what they perceive to be a dangerous situation, they sometimes make mistakes that become apparent only with the benefit of that hindsight.” Turner, 253 N.E.3d at 535. In Turner, the Supreme Court explained the nuances of hindsight: “How we use hindsight to determine whether self-defense justifies force depends on whether hindsight reveals a mistake or confirms the necessity of using force.” Id. That is, a defendant's use of force based on what turns out to be a mistaken belief about the need for force is “only justified if the mistake was a reasonable mistake under the circumstances.” Id. But as a matter of first impression, the Court held that where a defendant's subjective belief later turns out to be accurate, the defendant's use of force is justified regardless of the reasonableness of that belief at the time the decision to use force was made.³ Id. at 534. “In other words, using force for protection based on a belief that is both unreasonable and turns out to be wrong isn't justified, but acting on a belief that is unreasonable, yet right, is justified.” Id.

[23] Here, even if Helton subjectively believed that deadly force was necessary because Grubb was about to shoot him, hindsight shows that was not the case. Grubb was not reaching for a gun, and no one other than Helton was armed. Thus, the question becomes whether Helton's mistaken belief was objectively reasonable under the circumstances known to him at the time of the shooting. Id. at 535-36 (observing that although the inquiry into reasonableness is strictly objective, the trier of fact must consider the circumstances from the standpoint of the defendant at the time of the offense).

[24] There is ample evidence to support the jury's determination that Helton's fear of being shot was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances known to him at the time. The entire encounter lasted about thirty seconds, and the facts favorable to the conviction show that Grubb, Crane, and Allgood never provoked a confrontation with or made any threats toward Helton. On the contrary, Grubb stood at the entrance to the garage eating a cupcake while talking with Helton. Both Crane and Allgood had walked away to allow Helton and Grubb to talk about the four-wheeler, and then Grubb turned and walked a couple steps to his right and reached for something on a shelf. Helton, who was high on methamphetamine, paranoid, and armed with a concealed handgun, decided, in a split second, to shoot Grubb twice and then Crane. He did not wait for Grubb to turn back around before shooting Grubb, and he never saw Grubb or Crane with a gun. He just shot. This was not objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

[25] Further, Helton's actions of fleeing to another county, failing to call for medical assistance for the victims, taking active steps to avoid detection, and lying to police about being at Grubb's property that day – that is, until he learned that there was surveillance video placing him there – were all inconsistent with the actions of a person who believed himself to have acted in self-defense. See Orozco v. State, 146 N.E.3d 1038, 1041-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that defendant's conduct of fleeing the state and disposing of evidence rather than calling for medical assistance or contacting police is probative evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have concluded that the murder was not committed in self-defense), trans. denied.

[26] In sum, the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Helton's claim of self-defense. Accordingly, we affirm his convictions for murder and attempted murder.

2. Helton's 120-year aggregate sentence is not inappropriate.

[27] Helton seeks our independent review of the appropriateness of his sentence under Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B), which allows us to revise a sentence if “after due consideration of the trial court's decision” we find that “the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Id.; see also Hoak v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1209, 1209 (Ind. 2019) (“Even when a trial court imposes a sentence within its discretion, the Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of this sentencing decision.”).

[28] Our principal task in this regard is “ ‘to attempt to leaven the outliers,’ not to achieve a ‘correct’ result in every case.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1248 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). “Whether a sentence should be deemed inappropriate ‘turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.’ ” McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224). “And we generally defer to the sentence imposed unless a defendant presents ‘compelling evidence’ portraying the nature of the offense and their character in a positive light.” Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1248 (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)). Thus, Helton bears the responsibility of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. See Robinson v. State, 91 N.E.3d 574, 577 (Ind. 2018).

[29] The sentencing range for murder is between 45 and 65 years, with an advisory sentence of 55 years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3. The sentencing range for a Level 1 felony conviction is between 20 and 40 years, with an advisory sentence of 30 years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(b). In addition, the habitual offender enhancement for a person convicted of murder or a Level 1 felony is an additional fixed term between 8 and 20 years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i). Thus, Helton faced a maximum sentence of 125 years. The trial court sentenced him to 120 years – 63 years for the murder of Grubb enhanced by 20 years for being a habitual offender and a consecutive term of 37 years for the attempted murder of Crane. Helton asks that we revise his aggregate sentence to 53 years, the minimum sentence available to him.

[30] We turn first to the nature of Helton's offenses. Helton argues that there is no evidence that the murder and attempted murder were “part of some premeditated, planned, callous and horrific killing.” Appellant's Brief at 30. Rather, he suggests that this was “a tragedy arising from a unique series of events” in which, based on the text exchanges that he mistakenly believed were with Crane, Helton went to the property this second time thinking he was on good terms with Crane. Id.

[31] While it does appear that Helton thought things had been smoothed over a bit since the earlier encounter, he still showed up this second time armed and without verification that he could come over that morning. His car was positioned in such a way that they could drive away quickly. And contrary to his assertions on appeal, the men in the garage did not confront Helton with “aggression and anger” nor was Grubb's movement toward the shelf in the garage “abrupt.” Id. at 31. Grubb simply walked over to the shelf and Helton, paranoid and high on methamphetamine, thought Grubb might be grabbing a gun, so he shot before Grubb even had a chance to turn back around. In quick succession and without hesitation, Helton shot two unarmed men multiple times and then fled the scene. Moreover, Crane suffered life-threatening and permanent injuries. This was a senseless act of violence that was not accompanied by any restraint and was certainly deserving of an aggravated sentence.

[32] Helton's character is even more aggravating, completely lacking in “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character” that might compel sentencing revision. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. He was thirty-six years old when he committed these offenses and had already amassed five misdemeanors and seven felony convictions, served stints in the DOC,⁴ and violated probation and pretrial release several times. Most notably, Helton had prior felony convictions for possession of methamphetamine (2011 and 2013), criminal recklessness (2014 and 2019; both involving a deadly weapon),⁵ felon carrying a handgun (2022), and resisting law enforcement (2022). And he was on pretrial release on charges of Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine and Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement when he committed the instant offenses. This history shows that the present offenses were a continuation of a long pattern of dangerous and violent conduct committed by Helton.

[33] Throughout his escalating criminal history, Helton has received suspended sentences, community supervision, and time in the DOC with purposeful incarceration, yet he has still failed at rehabilitation and conforming his behavior to the law. He details his difficult childhood, early drug use, and past trauma, but we do not find these circumstances compelling given his age and multiple chances to reform.

[34] Finally, while Helton expressed remorse for his actions, the trial court did not find his remorse to be sincere, and we will not second-guess that determination. See Corralez v. State, 815 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“The trial court, which has the ability to directly observe the defendant and listen to the tenor of his or her voice, is in the best position to determine whether the remorse is genuine.”).

[35] Nothing about the nature of the offenses or Helton's character compels revision of his sentence. Moreover, we find Helton's requested revision to the minimum aggregate sentence of fifty-three years to be shocking and wholly inappropriate under the circumstances.

[36] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In fact, the four-wheeler never belonged to Helton.

2.   There is video footage of the interaction from a surveillance camera positioned at a distance outside of the garage. There is no audio.

3.   Helton seemingly misunderstands the holding in Turner, as he suggests that hindsight can be used to determine whether a defendant's use of force was reasonable. The Turner Court did not use hindsight to determine reasonableness but rather to determine necessity. The Court noted: “So, for example, if Turner had been mistaken, and Briscoe hadn't been preparing to shoot him, we would have to affirm because there is evidence to support (even if it does not compel) the trial court's conclusion that Turner's fear that the approaching car posed an imminent threat was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 536.

4.   The presentence investigation report indicates that Helton had a history of disciplinary action during his prior incarcerations, “with violations for Battery[;] Unauthorized Use of Mail, Telephones, Visits; Fighting; Disruptive, Unruly, Rowdy Conduct; Attempting to Commit Any Class C Offense; Refusing to Obey an Order; and Disfigurement.” Appendix Vol. 2 at 88.

5.   The 2019 conviction involved Helton shooting a firearm into a building in 2017. Helton was charged with both attempted murder and criminal recklessness and pled guilty to criminal recklessness to avoid the attempted murder charge. In August 2019, he was sentenced to six years in the DOC. Shortly after his release in 2022, Helton committed new offenses.

Altice, Judge.

May, J. and Foley, J., concur.