Bethany Cingel, Appellant-Petitioner v. Gregory Ferreri, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Bethany Cingel (“Mother”), pro se, appeals the trial court's order denying her request to hold Gregory Ferreri (“Father”) in civil contempt of the parties’ dissolution decree. She purports to raise seven issues on appeal, but we conclude that she has waived all her claims by failing to comply with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On March 18, 2025, Mother, pro se, filed her “Amended Verified Information in Contempt and Motion to Enforce Final Decree of Dissolution” in which she alleged that Father had violated the December 27, 2024, Final Decree of Dissolution by failing to provide her with “midweek visitation” and “telephone contact” with the parties’ children. Appellee's App.¹ at 20-21. On May 5, the trial court conducted a hearing on Mother's contempt petition. Mother represented herself at the hearing and Father appeared with counsel. On June 27, the trial court issued its order denying Mother's petition. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Mother, pro se, appeals the trial court's denial of her petition to hold Father in contempt of the parties’ dissolution decree. Trial courts have “considerable discretion” in making contempt determinations. Matter of Paternity of B.Y., 159 N.E.3d 575, 577 (Ind. 2020). We review such rulings for an abuse of discretion, id., “with a preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters[,]” In re Guardianship of A.E.R., 184 N.E.3d 629, 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[5] However, here, Mother has waived her claims on appeal by failing to comply with our Rules of Appellate Procedure.

It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.

Lowrance v. State, 64 N.E.3d 935, 938 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citation modified), trans. denied.

[6] Appellate Rules 49-51 contain the rules regarding appendices. Generally, an appellant should file an appendix that includes copies of “those parts of the Record on Appeal that are necessary for the Court to decide the issues presented.” App. R. 50(A)(1); see also App. R. 22(C) (“Any record material cited in an appellate brief must be reproduced in an Appendix or the Transcript or exhibits.”). While the failure to include any item in an Appendix shall not, alone, waive any issue or argument, see App. R. 49(B), “[a]ppellants who fail to include the materials necessary for our review risk waiver of the affected issues or dismissal of the appeal.” Cavallo v. Allied Physicians of Michiana, LLC, 42 N.E.3d 995, 999 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (emphasis added); see also Rausch v. Reinhold, 716 N.E.2d 993, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (“It is the appellant's duty to present an adequate record on appeal, and when the appellant fails to do so, he is deemed to have waived any alleged error based upon the missing material.”), trans. denied.

[7] Here, Mother provided no appendix at all. And, while Father provided an appendix, it did not include all documents necessary for our review—most notably, it does not include a copy of the December 27, 2024, dissolution decree of which Mother contends Father is in contempt. That document is necessary for our review; that is, we cannot determine whether the trial court erred when it denied Mother's contempt petition if we do not have a copy of the order that was the basis of that petition.

[8] Were that the only deficiency, we would attempt to access the missing order through our Odyssey case management system—which gives us access to the documents filed in the trial court—and then proceed to resolve the appeal on the merits. However, Mother's appellate brief is also so deficient that it, too, substantially impedes our appellate review.

[9] Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)(a) requires that an appellant's brief contain a statement of facts which must “be supported by page references to the Record on Appeal or Appendix.” When a party refers to facts without citation to the record in support, “we need not consider those facts.” Reed v. City of Evansville, 956 N.E.2d 684, 688 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Similarly, Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) requires that “[e]ach contention [in the argument section] be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal.” When an appellant provides no citation to legal authority supporting her contentions, those contentions are waived. E.g., Shields v. Town of Perrysville, 136 N.E.3d 309, 312 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Thus, under our Appellate Rules, “[i]t is not sufficient for the argument section that an appellant simply recites facts and makes conclusory statements without analysis or authoritative support.” Kishpaugh v. Odegard, 17 N.E.3d 363, 373 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). This rule “prevents the court from becoming an advocate when it is forced to search the entire record for evidence in support of [a party's] broad statements.” Lane Alan Schrader Tr. v. Gilbert, 974 N.E.2d 516, 521 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Keller v. State, 549 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ind. 1990)).

[10] Here, Mother's one-paragraph “Statement of Case[² ] and Facts” does not contain a single citation to any record material. For example, she asserts that the parties’ dissolution decree “entitles Mother to midweek parenting time and reasonable communication consistent with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.” Appellant's Br. at 4. However, Mother provides no citation to the record to support her contention as to what the dissolution decree requires; therefore, we do not consider that alleged fact on appeal. See Reed, 956 N.E.2d at 688 n.1.

[11] Mother's argument section of her brief is similarly deficient. Again, she provides no citation to the record for any of the alleged “facts” referenced in her argument section. As already noted, Mother not only failed to provide a citation to the dissolution decree that Father allegedly violated, she did not provide a copy of the dissolution decree in the appellate record at all. Therefore, her claim that the trial court “failed to enforce the decree,” Appellant's Br. at 8, is waived. See Rausch, 716 N.E.2d at 1002.

[12] In addition, Mother's argument section provides few citations to legal authority, and most of the legal authority she does cite does not support her claims. For example, Mother cites only two cases in her “due process” claim and neither supports that claim.³ Mother's claim that the trial court erred by failing to follow the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines is not supported by any citation to any such guideline.⁴ Mother's claim that the trial court erred by failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions thereon is also not supported by any legal authority.⁵ And, finally, Mother fails to provide any legal support for her claim that the trial court's “[c]onduct [c]reated an [a]ppearnace of [b]ias.” Appellant's Br. at 12.⁶ Because Mother provides no citation to legal authority supporting her contentions, those contentions are waived. See e.g., Shields, 136 N.E.3d at 312 n.2.

Conclusion

[13] Mother's failure to provide copies of documentation necessary to her appeal and failure to provide relevant and accurate citations to the record and supporting legal authorities is so complete that it substantially impedes our appellate review. Therefore, Mother has waived such review.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that Mother did not file an appendix on appeal.

2.   We also note that Appellate Rule 46(A)(5) requires a statement of the case—including page references to the appellate record—that is separate from the statement of facts.

3.   Mother cites In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. 2014), for the proposition that “[a] fundamental requirement of due process is the ability to present evidence and to meaningfully examine witnesses.” Appellant's Br. at 6. However, O.R. says no such thing; to the extent it addresses due process at all, it is only within the context of parents’ substantive due process rights to raise their children. 16 N.E.3d at 972. The other case Mother cites relates only to the Indiana constitutional right to due process of law in the context of a prisoner's right to file a civil lawsuit. See Zimmerman v. Hanks, 766 N.E.2d 752, 757 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Thus, one of the only two cases Mother cites refers to the federal due process right, and the other case refers to the state right to due process of law. It is unclear under which constitution Mother brings her claim, as she has cited neither constitution.

4.   Mother's one and only specific guideline citation refers to a procedural requirement, not any substantive requirement that she alleges Father violated and the court erroneously ignored. See Appellant's Br. at 10.

5.   The only authority Mother cites—D.B. v. M.B.V., 913 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)—relates to findings and conclusions made pursuant to Trial Rule 52(A), where either the parties or the court on its own motion request findings. Here, there is no claim that findings were requested under Trial Rule 52.

6.   Mother cites only L.G. v. S.L., 88 N.E.3d 1069 (Ind. 2018). However, far from supporting Mother's claim of an “appearance” of bias, L.G. provides that the law presumes that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced unless a party can prove “personal prejudice[,]” which Mother has not even attempted to do. 88 N.E.3d at 1073.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.