Rahim Michael Sadik, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Rahim Sadik pleaded guilty to operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death, a Level 4 felony. The plea agreement left sentencing to the trial court's discretion, and the court sentenced Sadik to eight years, with five years to be served in the Department of Correction (“DOC”) and three years to be served on community corrections. Sadik appeals and claims: (1) he did not waive his right to appeal his sentence; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by considering an improper aggravating factor at sentencing; and (3) his sentence is inappropriate. We conclude that Sadik did waive his right to appeal his sentence and, accordingly, dismiss this appeal.

Issue

[2] Sadik presents three issues, one of which we find to be dispositive: whether Sadik waived his right to appeal his sentence in his plea agreement.

Facts

[3] On May 18, 2023, Sadik drank several alcoholic drinks and then drove to work. On his way to work, Sadik rear-ended a motorcycle. The force of the impact threw the motorcyclist into the grass, where he died. Sadik did not stop after the accident, even though his airbags deployed and his vehicle was severely damaged. Sadik soon encountered a law enforcement officer on the road and stopped to inform the officer that he thought he might have struck something. When the officer went to the scene of the crash, the motorcyclist was already dead, and parts of Sadik's car were still in the roadway. Law enforcement transported Sadik to the hospital for a blood draw, and Sadik admitted that he had been drinking. Tests of Sadik's blood indicated that he had an alcohol concentration equivalent (“ACE”) of .118.

[4] On September 14, 2023, the State charged Sadik with Count I: operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing death, a Level 4 felony; and Count II: operating a vehicle with an ACE of .08 or greater causing death, a Level 4 felony. Sadik entered into a plea agreement on July 10, 2024. Pursuant to this agreement, Sadik agreed to plead guilty to Count I, and the State agreed to dismiss Count II. The agreement stated: “The Parties are otherwise free to argue.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21. The agreement also contained the following provision:

I understand that I have a right to appeal my sentence if there is an open plea. An open plea is an agreement which leaves my sentence to the Judge's discretion. I hereby waive my right to appeal my sentence under Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73 (Ind. 2008), so long as the Judge sentences me within the terms of my plea agreement.

Id. at 21-22. At the guilty plea hearing, the trial court asked Sadik: “You're also waiving your right to appeal your conviction and appeal your sentence so long as I sentence you within the terms of this plea, which in this case would be legally for a Level 4 felony. Do you understand that?” Sadik responded, “I do.” Tr. Vol. II p. 15.

[5] At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found as mitigating that Sadik had no criminal history and that he had pleaded guilty. The trial court did not find any facts as aggravating, but noted the serious nature of the offense and that it involved the death of another person. The trial court sentenced Sadik to a total of eight years, with five years to be served in the DOC and three years to be served on community corrections. Sadik now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Sadik claims that he did not waive his right to appeal his sentence. We disagree. Plea agreements are contracts, and contract law principles generally apply to such agreements. Anderson v. State, 269 N.E.3d 817, 824 (Ind. 2025). “Like any contract, we ‘begin with its plain language.’ ” Id. (quoting Berry v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1243, 1247 (Ind. 2014)). Any ambiguity in the plea agreement is construed against the State, which drafted the agreement. Id. (citing Davis v. State, 217 N.E.3d 1229, 1233 (Ind. 2023)). We review questions of contract interpretation de novo. Id. (citing Lake Imaging, LLC v. Franciscan All., Inc., 182 N.E.3d 203, 206 (Ind. 2022)).

[7] It is also well settled that “a defendant may waive the right to appellate review of his sentence as part of a written plea agreement.” Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 75 (Ind. 2008). Such waivers “should be given effect if ‘the record clearly demonstrates that it was made knowingly and voluntarily.’ ” Morris v. State, 985 N.E.2d 364, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Creech, 887 N.E.2d at 75), aff'd in relevant part on reh'g, 2 N.E.3d 7.¹

[8] Here, the waiver provision of the plea agreement provided:

I understand that I have a right to appeal my sentence if there is an open plea. An open plea is an agreement which leaves my sentence to the Judge's discretion. I hereby waive my right to appeal my sentence under Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73 (Ind. 2008), so long as the Judge sentences me within the terms of my plea agreement.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 21-22. Sadik claims that this provision preserves his right to appeal his sentence because he did enter into an open plea, i.e., one in which sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court. We agree that the plea agreement is an “open plea,” but we cannot ignore the last sentence of the waiver provision.

[9] The waiver provision starts by stating what the law is: that Sadik had the right to appeal his sentence if he entered into an open plea. See Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230, 233 (Ind. 2004) (holding that a defendant who pleads guilty to an “open” plea may challenge the propriety of the sentence on direct appeal); Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Ind. 1996) (holding that if a plea agreement leaves sentencing to the trial court's discretion, then the defendant may challenge the trial court's sentencing discretion on direct appeal).²

[10] But immediately after explaining that Sadik had the right to appeal his sentence if he entered into an open plea, the plea agreement then clearly and unambiguously states: “I hereby waive my right to appeal my sentence under Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73 (Ind. 2008), so long as the Judge sentences me within the terms of my plea agreement.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 22. This provision is almost identical to the waiver provision upheld in Creech itself. In that case, the waiver provision stated:

I understand that I have a right to appeal my sentence if there is an open plea. An open plea is an agreement which leaves my sentence to the Judge's discretion. I hereby waive my right to appeal my sentence so long as the Judge sentences me within the terms of my plea agreement.

Creech, 887 N.E.2d at 74. Our Supreme Court held that this “express language” was enforceable. Id. at 76.

[11] The plea agreement in Bowling v. State, 960 N.E.2d 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied, also contained a similar provision. There, the plea agreement provided:

You understand that you have a right to appeal your sentence if there is an open plea. An open plea is an agreement which leaves your sentence to the Judge's discretion. By pleading guilty you have agreed to waive your right to appeal your sentence so long as the Judge sentences you within the terms of your plea agreement.

Id. at 839 (emphasis in original). We held that this provision “sufficiently informs a defendant that although she has a right to appeal an open sentence, she is agreeing to waive that right as part of her plea agreement.” Id. at 843; see also Galvan v. State, 877 N.E.2d 213, 215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that defendant “expressly waived” her right to appeal her sentence in plea agreement using language identical to that used in Sadik's plea agreement). Following Creech, as we must, and Bowling, we conclude that this is a valid waiver of Sadik's right to appeal his sentence.

[12] Sadik, nevertheless, claims that this waiver provision is ambiguous.³ We disagree. There is nothing ambiguous about this waiver. It expressly states that, although Sadik would have the right to appeal from an open plea, he “hereby waive[s]” his right to appeal his sentence so long as the trial court sentenced him within the terms of the agreement. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 22.

[13] We also note that the trial court here specifically informed Sadik that he was “waiving [his] right to appeal [his] conviction and appeal [his] sentence so long as I sentence you within the terms of this plea ․” Tr. Vol. II p. 8. And Sadik indicated that he understood this. This is unlike in Creech, where the trial court mistakenly informed the defendant that he still had the right to appeal his sentence despite the express language of the plea agreement. Our Supreme Court held that the waiver was enforceable despite this misadvisement because the trial court's erroneous statement came at the end of the sentencing hearing, well after the plea had been signed by the parties and accepted by the trial court. 887 N.E.2d at 76. The situation here is the same as in Bowling, where the trial court “did not provide [the defendant] with incorrect information.” 960 N.E.2d at 842. Like in Bowling, Sadik's claim is weaker than the defendant's claim in Creech.

[14] Sadik's plea agreement clearly and unambiguously provides that Sadik waived his right to appeal his sentence so long as the trial court sentenced him within the terms of the agreement, and the plea agreement left the sentencing to the discretion of the trial court. Sadik's sentence is not outside the statutory range for a Level 4 felony, see Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5 (setting forth sentencing range of two to twelve years for a Level 4 felony), nor was it otherwise illegal.⁴ See Crider v. State, 984 N.E.2d 618, 625 (Ind. 2013) (holding that the provision of a plea agreement providing that defendant waived his right to appeal his sentence did not prohibit defendant from challenging an illegal sentence where the plea agreement did not expressly agree to illegal sentence). Sadik, therefore, cannot appeal the sentence imposed by the trial court.

[15] Still, Sadik argues that, if he waived his right to appeal his sentence, then he gained nothing by way of the plea agreement. But the State dismissed one of the counts pending against Sadik.⁵ And defendants often enter into open pleas in the hope that the trial court will be more lenient in sentencing. See Lindsey v. State, 71 N.E.3d 428, 431 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (noting that trial counsel advised defendant to enter into an open plea in the hope that this would result in a lower sentence).⁶

Conclusion

[16] Sadik's plea agreement contains a clear and unambiguous waiver of his right to appeal his sentence. The trial court also advised Sadik that he was waiving his right to appeal his sentence, and Sadik indicated that he understood this. Because Sadik waived his right to appeal his sentence, we dismiss this appeal. See Davis, 217 N.E.3d at 1236 (dismissing appeal after concluding that plea agreement signed by defendant unambiguously waived right to appeal sentence).

[17] Dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Creech was itself quoting United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 1999).

2.   This is true even if the plea agreement includes a sentencing cap or range. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1079-80 (Ind. 2006). If, however, a defendant agrees to a particular sentence as part of the plea agreement, then the defendant may not challenge the appropriateness of the sentence on appeal. Sholes v. State, 878 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 2008).

3.   Sadik also claims that the ambiguity of the agreement is evidenced by the dispute between the parties regarding its meaning. But he acknowledges that, as with any contract, the terms of a plea agreement are not ambiguous simply because the parties disagree as to how to interpret the terms. Conn v. State, 206 N.E.3d 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

4.   Our Supreme Court has explained that, in this context, a sentence is “illegal” only if it is not within the statutory range or is unconstitutional. Anderson v. State, 269 N.E.3d 817, 822 (Ind. 2025).

5.   We express no opinion on whether Sadik could be convicted of both operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death and operating a vehicle with an ACE of .08 or greater causing death under the double jeopardy analysis set forth in Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020).

6.   To the extent that Sadik claims that he did not knowingly or voluntarily waive his right to appeal, such a claim must be presented in a petition for post-conviction relief, not on direct appeal. See Davis v. State, 217 N.E.3d 1229, 1233-34 (Ind. 2023) (holding that a defendant's claim that his plea was not voluntary because the trial court misled him by incorrectly stating that defendant could appeal his sentence, contrary to the express language of the plea agreement, must be presented in a claim of post-conviction relief).

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.