Matthew McKee, Appellant-Petitioner v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Matthew McKee appeals the trial court's denial of his petition to be removed from Indiana's sex offender registry. McKee raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the court abused its discretion when it denied his petition. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 25, 2018, while residing in Missouri, McKee was found to be in possession of videos that depicted sexual acts involving children. As a result, the State of Missouri charged McKee with four counts of possession of child pornography, as Class B felonies.

[3] Thereafter, McKee and the State of Missouri entered into a plea agreement. The State of Missouri amended the first two counts of the charging information to state that McKee committed promoting obscenity in the first degree, as Level E felonies, when he “wholesale possessed or distributed obscene material” consisting “of a pornographic video of a prepubescent girl engaging in lascivious exhibition of her genitals” and a “pornographic video of a prepubescent girl and prepubescent boy engaging in deviate sexual intercourse” by disseminating the videos through a file-sharing system and that, “at the time of its dissemination, the defendant knew of its content and character.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 80-81. McKee pleaded guilty to those two amended counts, and the State of Missouri dismissed the remaining two counts. The Missouri court accepted McKee's plea and sentenced him to five years, all suspended to probation. At some point, McKee moved to Indiana and transferred his probation. His probation officer informed McKee that he needed to register as a sex offender, which McKee did.

[4] On May 21, 2024, McKee filed a petition to be removed from the sex offender registry. McKee alleged that his offense of promoting obscenity in Missouri was wrongfully determined to be substantially similar to Indiana's child exploitation statute, which requires registration as a sex offender, and that it is more similar to the dissemination of matter harmful to minors statute, which does not require registration. The State argued that the proper analysis was not to compare the statutes but to compare the underlying conduct and that McKee's conduct was similar to child exploitation.

[5] On July 25, 2025, the court held a hearing on McKee's petition. During the hearing, McKee testified that he estimated that the individuals depicted in the material were “[a]nywhere from 6 to 12” years of age. Tr. at 23. Following the hearing, the trial court denied McKee's petition. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] McKee appeals the trial court's denial of his petition to be removed from the sex offender registry. “We review the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion.” Cundiff v. State, 66 N.E.3d 956, 958 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and inferences supporting the petition for relief.” Id.

[7] Our Supreme Court has recently outlined:

Under the law today, a person must “register”—i.e., “report in person” to local law enforcement—if that person is a “sex or violent offender” who (1) “resides in” the state, (2) works or intends to work in the state, or (3) attends school or plans to attend school in the state. I.C. § 11-8-8-4; I.C. § 11-8-8-7(a). A “sex or violent offender” refers to a person convicted of one of several enumerated Indiana offenses (including various sexual crimes) or a “substantially similar offense committed in another jurisdiction.” I.C. § 11-8-8-5(a); I.C. § 1-1-2-4(b)(3). See also I.C. § 11-8-8-4.5(a) (setting forth an analogous definition for a “sex offender”).

Peters v. Quakenbush, 260 N.E.3d 919, 923 (Ind. 2025).

[8] On appeal, McKee contends that the court abused its discretion when it denied his request to be removed from the registry because he does “not have an out-of-state conviction that triggers the obligation to register in Indiana.” Appellant's Br. at 5. There is no dispute that McKee pleaded guilty to two counts of promoting obscenity in the first degree, which is defined as follows:

1. A person commits the offense of promoting obscenity in the first degree if, knowing of its content and character, such person:

(1) Wholesale promotes or possesses with the purpose to wholesale promote any obscene material; or

(2) Wholesale promotes for minors or possesses with the purpose to wholesale promote for minors any material pornographic for minors; or

(3) Promotes, wholesale promotes or possesses with the purpose to wholesale promote for minors material that is pornographic for minors via computer, internet or computer network if the person made the matter available to a specific individual known by the defendant to be a minor.

2. The offense of promoting obscenity in the first degree is a class E felony.

3. As used in this section, “wholesale promote” means to manufacture, issue, sell, provide, mail, deliver, transfer, transmute, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, or to offer to agree to do the same for purposes of resale or redistribution.

Mo. Ann. Stat. § 573.020.

[9] McKee contends that that statute is more closely analogous to Indiana's statute prohibiting the dissemination of matter or conducting performance harmful to minors, a conviction for which does not trigger a registration requirement. See Ind. Code § 11-8-8-5 (listing the crimes for a which a conviction makes someone a sex or violent offender). That statute reads, in relevant part, that a person who knowingly or intentionally disseminates matter to minors, displays harmful material in an area to which minors have access, or sells matter that is harmful to minors near a school or church or engages in or conducts a performance before minors or in an area where minors have access commits a Level 6 felony. I.C. § 35-49-3-3(a). As related to that statute, a matter or performance is harmful to minors if it “describes or represents, in any form, nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse”; “appeals to the prurient interests in sex of minors”; “is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole”; and “lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.” I.C. § 35-49-2-2.

[10] On their face, the statute under which McKee was convicted and our dissemination of matter harmful to minors statute appear to be similar, as they both criminalize possessing obscene material. However, we are not limited to comparing only the plain language of the statutes. Rather, we consider whether McKee committed an offense in Missouri that is a “substantially similar offense” to an offense in Indiana that requires registration. Peters, 260 N.E.3d at 923. And in doing so, we may consider the facts of the underlying offense. See Spencer v. State, 153 N.E.3d 289, 296-97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (considering the defendant's underlying conduct in Florida to determine whether he was required to register in Indiana).

[11] Here, the amended information to which McKee pleaded guilty provided that he “wholesale possessed or distributed obscene material” that consisted of a pornographic video of a “prepubescent girl engaging in lascivious exhibition of her genitals” and a pornographic video of a “prepubescent girl and prepubescent boy engaging in deviate sexual intercourse” by disseminating the video through a file sharing system while knowing of its contents. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 80-81.

[12] We agree with the trial court and the State that that offense is more similar to our child exploitation statute, which provides:

(b) A person who:

(1) knowingly or intentionally manages, produces, sponsors, presents, exhibits, photographs, films, videotapes, or creates a digitized image of any performance or incident that includes sexual conduct by a child under eighteen (18) years of age;

(2) knowingly or intentionally disseminates, exhibits to another person, offers to disseminate or exhibit to another person, or sends or brings into Indiana for dissemination or exhibition matter that depicts or describes sexual conduct by a child under eighteen (18) years of age;

(3) knowingly or intentionally makes available to another person a computer, knowing that the computer's fixed drive or peripheral device contains matter that depicts or describes sexual conduct by a child less than eighteen (18) years of age;

(4) with the intent to satisfy or arouse the sexual desires of any person:

(A) knowingly or intentionally:

(i) manages;

(ii) produces;

(iii) sponsors;

(iv) presents;

(v) exhibits;

(vi) photographs;

(vii) films;

(viii) videotapes; or

(ix) creates a digitized image of;

any performance or incident that includes the uncovered genitals of a child less than eighteen (18) years of age or the exhibition of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple by a child less than eighteen (18) years of age;

(B) knowingly or intentionally:

(i) disseminates to another person;

(ii) exhibits to another person;

(iii) offers to disseminate or exhibit to another person; or

(iv) sends or brings into Indiana for dissemination or exhibition;

matter that depicts the uncovered genitals of a child less than eighteen (18) years of age or the exhibition of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple by a child less than eighteen (18) years of age; or

(C) makes available to another person a computer, knowing that the computer's fixed drive or peripheral device contains matter that depicts the uncovered genitals of a child less than eighteen (18) years of age or the exhibition of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple by a child less than eighteen (18) years of age;

commits child exploitation, a Level 5 felony.

I.C. § 35-42-4-4(b) (2018).¹

[13] Again, McKee pleaded guilty to possessing pornographic videos that depicted a prepubescent girl exhibiting her genitals and a pornographic video of prepubescent boy and girl engaged in deviate sexual intercourse and to disseminating those videos through a file sharing system while knowing of their contents. Further, during the hearing on his motion, McKee admitted that the children in the videos were twelve years of age or younger. Stated differently, McKee knowingly disseminated or exhibited material that depicted or described sexual conduct by a child less than eighteen years old. That is precisely the conduct prohibited by the child exploitation statute, whereas the dissemination statute criminalizes providing harmful material to minors, regardless of whether minors are depicted in the material.

[14] McKee seems to acknowledge that the trial court can look to the underlying facts, but he claims that the court may do so only in situations where the defendant was actually convicted of the conduct in another state. See Appellant's Br. at 12. And, here, he contends that the court wrongly relied on the allegations of the probable cause affidavit, which supported the charges for which he did not plead guilty. However, the charging information that outlined the charges to which McKee pleaded guilty and McKee's admissions at the hearing on his motion, both of which demonstrate that McKee possessed or distributed material that depicted sexual situations with young children, contained sufficient facts for the court to determine that conduct underlying his convictions was substantially similar to the conduct prohibited by the child exploitation statute.

[15] Still, McKee contends that, because he would have been able to receive an exemption in Missouri that would remove all registration requirements had he remained there, he should not be required to register in Indiana. However, as our Supreme Court noted, a person is required to register in Indiana if he is convicted of one of several enumerated offenses, including child exploitation, or a substantially similar offense. See Peters, 260 N.E.3d at 923; see also I.C. § 11-8-8-5(a)(4) (listing a conviction for child exploitation as a crime that makes a person a sex or violent offender). There is no limitation that a person is required to register in Indiana only if required to register in the state of conviction. Such a limitation would undermine the intent of the sex offender registry, which is to prevent Indiana from “becoming a safe haven for offenders[.]” Peters, 260 N.E.3d at 923.

[16] Here, because McKee was convicted of an offense substantially similar to child exploitation, he is required to register as a sex offender in Indiana regardless of Missouri's requirements.

Conclusion

[17] Because the conduct underlying McKee's Missouri offenses is substantially similar to the conduct contemplated by Indiana's child exploitation statute, McKee is required to register as a sex offender in Indiana. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied McKee's petition to be removed from the registry. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Indiana General Assembly has since amended that statute, but we refer to the version that was in effect when McKee committed the offenses in Missouri.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.