Randy D. Nelson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Pursuant to a plea agreement, Randy Nelson pled guilty to sexual misconduct with a minor and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The agreement left Nelson's sentence to the discretion of the trial court, which sentenced Nelson to ten years of incarceration with two of those years suspended to probation. Nelson now appeals and raises one issue for our review: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Nelson.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On May 16, 2021, when Nelson was 41 years old, he provided alcohol to two minor girls in Marion, Indiana, and then sexually abused one of them by penetrating her vagina with a sex toy. Nelson's girlfriend Debra Gillespie participated in this incident, and one of the victims was her daughter. The State charged Nelson in Cause 27D02-2105-F3-000017 (the “May Cause”) with rape as a Level 3 felony, sexual misconduct with a minor as a Level 4 felony, two counts of neglect of a dependent as Level 6 felonies, and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor as Class A misdemeanors. The State also charged Gillespie in connection with this incident, as well as for several others; Gillespie pled guilty to certain charges; and the trial court sentenced her to ten years of incarceration with two of those years suspended to probation.¹

[4] While investigating the May Cause, law enforcement learned of another incident that allegedly occurred in February 2021.² ,  ³ Consequently, the State charged Nelson in Cause 27C01-2106-F3-000021 (the “February Cause”) with two counts of rape as Level 3 felonies, attempted rape as a Level 3 felony, two counts of sexual battery as Level 6 felonies, and one count of furnishing alcohol to a minor as a Class B misdemeanor.

[5] In March 2025, pursuant to a plea agreement, Nelson pled guilty in the May Cause to sexual misconduct with a minor and both counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor; in exchange, the State dismissed the remaining charges in the May Cause and dismissed all charges in the February Cause. Nelson's sentence was left to the trial court's discretion.

[6] Nelson's presentence investigation report (the “PSI”) showed that he had only one prior conviction, which was for reckless driving as a Class B misdemeanor. Nelson has three children and is court-ordered to pay child support that was likely “$20,000 to $30,000 in arrears” due to his pre-trial incarceration in the May Cause. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 48. Additionally, Nelson blamed Gillespie for his offenses, claiming she “asked” him to “insert[ ] a sex object into” one of the victims. Id. at 47. Nelson also claimed he “was under the influence of alcohol” at the time, having “consume[d] 2 to 4 beers.” Id. Nelson did acknowledge that “[t]here are no circumstances that justif[y]” his offenses. Id. The PSI included a sentencing recommendation of 10 years of incarceration with 4 years and 263 days thereof suspended to probation.

[7] At the sentencing hearing, both parties presented only argument. Nelson argued that his prior conviction “can't carry much weight,” he pled guilty, “he will respond affirmatively to probation,” he has dependents to whom he owes a financial obligation, he had been steadily and gainfully employed prior to his pre-trial incarceration, the circumstances were not likely to recur, and he was not in a position of control over the victims. Tr. Vol. II at 5.

[8] Regarding aggravating and mitigating factors, the trial court stated as follows:

․ I will accept as mitigating factors, certainly his plea of guilty, that there's no criminal history, ․ that's significant, although certainly a condition of the plea is a dismissal of another cause number. [T]hat he may respond affirmatively to probation. The circumstances are not likely to reoccur. [T]hat's a mild mitigator [H]ardship on dependents ․ through incarceration, as well. I think a significant aggravator is the defendant's position of care and trust with the victim, ․ and I think however you characterize it, he certainly was in that position, ․ and I find that to be a significant aggravator.

Tr. Vol. II at 5–6. The trial court considered Gillespie's sentence and determined “similar sentences are appropriate.” Id. at 6. The trial court sentenced Nelson to a total of ten years of incarceration with two of those years suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Sentencing Nelson

[9] Nelson contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him.⁴ We review a trial court's sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.’ ” Id. (quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490). “A court does not abuse its discretion if the record supports its reasons for imposing a sentence and those reasons are proper as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490–91).

[10] First, Nelson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by determining the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances. A trial court “is not obligated to credit or weigh the defendant's evidence of mitigating circumstances the same way the defendant does.” Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 847–48 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 952 (Ind. 1994)). To that end, a trial court's failure to accord greater weight to mitigating factors “is not available for appellate review.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493–94. Accordingly, Nelson's reweighing argument fails.

[11] Second, Nelson contends the trial court abused its discretion by not adhering to the recommended sentence in the PSI. “A trial court is not obliged to follow the recommendation set out in a presentence report.” Murphy v. State, 555 N.E.2d 127, 132 (Ind. 1990) (citing Jenkins v. State, 492 N.E.2d 666, 669 (Ind. 1986)). Nelson's reliance on the PSI recommendation is therefore unpersuasive.

[12] Third, Nelson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by determining he should receive a sentence similar to Gillespie's. Generally, it is within a trial court's discretion to determine whether a defendant should receive a sentence similar to his co-defendant. See Owen, 210 N.E.3d at 269 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490); cf. Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 658–59 (Ind. 2014) (considering co-defendant's revised sentence in revising defendant's sentence); Knight v. State, 930 N.E.2d 20, 22–23 (Ind. 2010) (same). Nelson does not contend that his sentence is unsupported by the record, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court based Nelson's sentence on only Gillespie's sentence.

[13] Based on the foregoing, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Nelson. We therefore affirm the trial court's sentencing decision.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   For the May 16, 2021, incident, Gillespie was charged under Cause 27C01-2105-F3-000016. Gillespie was charged for the other incidents under Causes 27C01-2106-F3-000020 and 27C01-2106-F5-000080. To the extent necessary and pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 27 and Indiana Evidence Rule 201, we have taken judicial notice of the Clerk's Record in these causes. See Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1156 (Ind. 2016) (taking judicial notice under Evidence Rule 201 of documents that were part of the Record on Appeal as defined in Appellate Rule 27).

2.   Nelson's Appendix contains only a few documents from the May Cause and none from the February Cause. We remind Nelson that pursuant to Appellate Rule 50(B)(1)(a), the appellant's Appendix in a criminal case such as this must include the entire Clerk's Record, not just a selection of materials therefrom. See Ind. Appellate Rule 2(E) (“The Clerk's Record is the Record maintained by the clerk of the trial court ․ and shall consist of the Chronological Case Summary (CCS) and all papers, pleadings, documents, orders, judgments, and other materials filed in the trial court ․ or listed in the CCS.” (emphases added)). Pursuant to Appellate Rule 27 and Evidence Rule 201, we have taken judicial notice of the Clerk's Record in the February Cause and the remainder of the Clerk's Record in the May Cause. See Horton, 51 N.E.3d at 1156.

3.   In Nelson's presentence investigation report, this incident is described as occurring in December 2018. Both the charging information and probable cause affidavit for the February Cause state the offense occurred in February 2021. It is unclear what led to this discrepancy.

4.   In the Conclusion of his brief, Nelson “asks this court to reduce his sentence to time served, with the balance suspended to probation.” Appellant's Br. at 15. This request appears to be based on Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits us to revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision,” we conclude “that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender,” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1092 (Ind. 2025) (quoting McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020)). Nelson does not raise Appellate Rule 7(B) anywhere else in his brief, so to the extent he intended to bring such a challenge, he has waived it for our review. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a); Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)).

Felix, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.