IN RE: the Paternity of Avery Maddison Bailey (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Joseph Paul Bailey (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order enforcing a settlement agreement between him and Rachel Beth Koomler (“Mother”). We affirm.

Issues

[2] Father raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as the following two issues:

1. Whether the court clearly erred when it determined that there was a valid settlement agreement.

2. Whether the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to correct error.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother and Father have one child together: Avery. Avery is now a young adult who attends Florida Southern College. On May 16, 2024, Mother filed a petition for postsecondary educational expenses in which she asked the court to order her and Father to contribute to the cost of Avery's college.

[4] After Mother filed her petition, the parties, through counsel, engaged in negotiations related to several topics, including Avery's post-secondary expenses. On November 20, 2024, Father's attorney, Michael McEntee, emailed Mother's attorney, Maria Mirande, a proposal that Father would “contribute 50% of actual parental expenses up to $15,500 per year to be paid directly to the school by payment plan.” Ex. at 4. The proposal also included terms related to child support, a pending contempt motion, attorney's fees, tax exemptions, and medical expenses.

[5] On November 21, Mirande responded to McEntee's email and stated that Mother “agrees to your proposal with a few caveats/clarifications.” Id. at 7. Mirande then made comments on McEntee's email in red. In particular, she proposed that the parties alternate paying for each semester of Avery's school. Mirande also made a few comments related to some of the other issues.

[6] That same day, McEntee responded: “Maria, per our telephone conversation this afternoon, we accept your acceptance of our last offer as clarified by your redlining of the thread next below.” Id. at 11. Mirande then prepared a joint stipulation, which Mother signed. Mirande sent the stipulation to McEntee, who forwarded it to Father. Father never signed the stipulation, and he did not make any payments toward Avery's college expenses.

[7] On January 6, 2025, Mother filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. In that motion, Mother alleged that “[t]here is no doubt that the parties entered into a binding settlement agreement on November 21, 2024[,]” that required Father to pay fifty percent of Avery's postsecondary expenses. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 52. And Mother alleged that Father had failed to make any payments. Id. at 51.

[8] The court held a fact-finding hearing on Mother's motion on July 23. During the hearing, Father argued that he had not entered into a binding agreement with Mother because McEntee did not have the authority to accept Mother's proposal.

[9] McEntee testified that he had Father's “authority to send” the November 21 email. Tr. at 15. Father acknowledged that he had authorized McEntee to send the first email on November 20 but that he did not “agree” to Mother's edits. Id. at 33. He then testified that he had a phone call with McEntee where McEntee said he thought Mother's proposal was “a good deal” and that Father responded: “Okay, again, at the end of the day I will do what you think is best, let me take a look at it.” Id. at 37.

[10] Following the fact-finding hearing, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon, including the following:

24. The Court finds that the various emails exchanged between Mr. McEntee and Ms. Mirande on November 20, 2024 and November 21, 2024 constituted an enforceable settlement agreement and all the material terms of the agreement were contained within the emails.

25. The Court finds that Mr. McEntee had authority to send the Offer on November 20, 2024 and the Confirmation on November 21, 2024. It is clear that the [Father's] refusal to adhere to the settlement agreement is not due to Mr. McEntee lacking authority, rather a case of “cold feet.”

* * *

27. Finally, the Court finds that the email communications between the parties’ counsel are written and signed and, therefore, satisfy the statute of frauds. The Court rejects [Father's] attempt to avoid a settlement on a technicality as this is not the intent or purpose of the statu[t]e of frauds.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 23. Accordingly, the court ordered the parties to “abide by the terms of the November 21, 2024 settlement agreement” and ordered Father to pay fifty percent of Avery's post-secondary expenses per year, in an amount not to exceed $15,500. Id.

[11] Thereafter, Father filed a motion to correct error and alleged that he had “newly discovered material evidence which could not have been discovered at trial.” Id. at 90. Father contended that McEntee “did not have express authority or authorization to accept the agreement” on Father's behalf. Id. at 91. As such, he asserted that there was no “valid and binding agreement.” Id. at 92. In addition, he claimed that the agreement violated the statute of frauds because only his attorney signed the agreement; but he did not. In support of his motion, Father attached an affidavit of McEntee in which McEntee stated that “[a]t no time during my representation did [Father] provide me with express authorization, either orally or in writing, to accept or finalize the proposed settlement agreement on his behalf.” Id. at 102. The trial court denied Father's motion to correct error. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Settlement Agreement

[12] Father appeals the court's order enforcing the settlement agreement. Following the hearing, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. As this Court has stated:

When reviewing a ruling where the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. Goodwine v. Goodwine, 819 N.E.2d 824, 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “In deference to the trial court's proximity to the issues, we disturb the judgment only where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment.” Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, and consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court's judgment. Id.

Young v. Adams, 830 N.E.2d 138, 141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). As such, Father must establish that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous, which occurs when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. See id. “We do not defer to conclusions of law, however, and evaluate them de novo.” Id.

[13] On appeal, Father contends that the court erred when it enforced the settlement agreement because there was no valid agreement between him and Mother. “Settlement agreements are governed by the same general principles of contract law as other agreements.” MH Equity Managing Member, LLC v. Sands, 938 N.E.2d 750, 757 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. The existence of a contract is a question of law. Id. The basic requirements are offer, acceptance, consideration, and a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties. See id. Here, Father specifically contends that there was no valid settlement agreement because his attorney did not have the authority to accept Mother's proposal.

[14] It is well settled that, in order to bind the client, “the attorney must have either express, implied, or apparent authority, or must act according to the attorney's inherent agency power.” Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1301 (Ind. 1998). Further, “the retention of an attorney to pursue a claim does not, without more, give the attorney the implied authority to settle or compromise the claim.” Id. at 1302. However,

[a]uthority can be express or implied and may be conferred by words or other conduct, including acquiescence. Implied authority can arise from words used, from customs, or from the relations of the parties. The agent is authorized if the agent is reasonable in drawing an inference from the principal's actions that the principal intended to confer authority. It is well settled that an attorney, by virtue of the representation, becomes a powerful agent with a great deal of authority. Retention confers on an attorney the general implied authority to do on behalf of the client all acts in or out of court necessary or incidental to the prosecution or management of the suit or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the attorney was retained.

Id. (citation modified).

[15] Father maintains that McEntee “did not attain authority from [him] prior to agreeing to the final terms of the Settlement Agreement proposed by [Mother] in the November 21, 2024 counteroffer.” Appellant's Br. at 13. Rather, Father argues that he “reviewed [Mother's] counteroffer, determined he needed clarification and guidance from McEntee, expressed such concerns via text message, and never expressed assent to the counteroffer.” Id. at 14.

[16] But McEntee testified at the fact-finding hearing that he had Father's “authority to send the email” accepting Mother's proposal on November 21. Tr. at 15. That evidence alone demonstrates that McEntee believed he had the authority to accept the agreement.

[17] Still, Father contends that McEntee's belief was not reasonable based on the emails and text messages that Father had sent to McEntee, which he claims establish that he “had questions and concerns about the newest counter proposal[.]” Appellant's Br. at 16. The specific email to which Father refers was sent by him to McEntee on November 20, the day before Mother sent her proposal. Nothing about that email could express any concern about Mother's proposal since Father had not yet seen it.

[18] After receiving Mother's proposal, Father sent McEntee a text message in which he asked for McEntee's thoughts regarding the requirement that he pay his portion of Avery's tuition in one payment. See Ex. at 28. While that text may demonstrate that Father had a question for McEntee, that is not dispositive of whether McEntee had the authority to accept the agreement on Father's behalf. Rather, Father acknowledged at the hearing that, after he received a copy of Mother's proposal, he spoke with McEntee over the phone and asked McEntee for his thoughts. McEntee told Father that he believed it was a “good deal.” Tr. at 37. Father then replied: “Okay, again at the end of the day I will do what you think is best, let me take a look at it.” Id. Stated differently, while Father indicated in a text that he had a question, he subsequently spoke with McEntee, who told Father that the proposal was good, and Father said he would do what McEntee thought was best. Based on that conversation, it was reasonable for McEntee to infer that he had the authority to accept Mother's proposal.

[19] Still, Father contends that McEntee knew that he lacked the authority to agree to Mother's terms because McEntee testified that, “[a]t some point” between November 21 and December 31, 2024, Father indicated that “he did not agree to the settlement agreement.” Id. at 16. However, any remarks Father made subsequent to McEntee's acceptance of the proposal have no bearing on whether McEntee had the authority to accept the agreement at the time he did. McEntee had a reasonable belief that he had the authority to accept Mother's proposal, and the court did not err when it concluded as such.¹

Issue Two: Motion to Correct Error

[20] While Father does not make a separate argument regarding the court's denial of his motion to correct error, he makes references in his brief to the fact that the court abused its discretion when it denied that motion. “Generally, a trial court's ruling on a motion to correct error is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Poiry v. City of New Haven, 113 N.E.3d 1236, 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Id.

[21] Father filed his motion to correct error based on “newly discovered material evidence,” in the form of McEntee's affidavit in which McEntee affirmed that Father had not provided him with “express authorization, either orally or in writing, to accept or finalize the proposed settlement agreement.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 90, 102. To prevail on a motion to correct error based on newly discovered evidence, Father was required to demonstrate

that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced at trial with reasonable diligence; that the evidence is material, relevant, and not merely cumulative or impeaching; that the evidence is not incompetent; that he exercised due diligence to discover the evidence in time for the final hearing; that the evidence is worthy of credit; and, that the evidence raises the strong presumption that a different result would have been reached upon retrial.

Matzat v. Matzat, 854 N.E.2d 918, 920 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

[22] Here, Father failed to demonstrate that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced prior to the fact-finding hearing and that the evidence was not merely impeaching. Indeed, the substance of McEntee's affidavit was that he did not have express authorization to enter into the agreement on November 21, 2024. That evidence could have been discovered and produced at the July 23, 2025, fact-finding hearing. In addition, it is apparent that the sole purpose of the affidavit was to impeach McEntee by contradicting his testimony that he had the authority to send the email.² As such, the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Father's motion to correct error.

Conclusion

[23] McEntee reasonably believed that he had the authority to accept Mother's proposal. As such, the court did not err when it concluded that the settlement agreement was valid and entered its order enforcing the agreement. In addition, because the evidence Father used to support his motion to correct error was discoverable prior to the fact-finding hearing and merely impeaching, the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Father's motion to correct error. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father also contends that the court erred when it concluded that the settlement agreement complied with the statute of frauds and that several of the court's findings are unsupported by the evidence. But those arguments are based only on Father's contention that McEntee lacked the authority to accept Mother's proposal. For the reasons already discussed, we reject Father's arguments on those issues as well.

2.   We note that McEntee testified generally that he had the authority to send the email, while the affidavit states only that he lacked express authority. There is nothing in the affidavit to indicate that McEntee believed he lacked implied authority.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.