IN RE: A.L. and B.R. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] M.R. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's adjudication of her children, A.L. and B.R. (“Children”), as children in need of services (“CHINS”). Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion to dismiss the CHINS action because the fact-finding hearing was untimely. We conclude that Mother consented to a fact-finding date outside the sixty-day statutory deadline and, therefore, waived her challenge to the timeliness of the hearing. Accordingly, we affirm.

Issue

[2] Mother raises two issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred in denying Mother's motion to dismiss the CHINS action.

Facts

[3] Children were born to Mother and T.L. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”).¹ On March 28, 2025, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed petitions alleging that the Children were CHINS after receiving a report that the Children were being physically abused and neglected by Parents.

[4] On April 14, 2025, the trial court held the initial hearing. Parents appeared by counsel and denied DCS's allegations. At the hearing, Parents’ counsel requested that a fact-finding hearing date be set. When setting the date of the fact-finding hearing, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: Set this for a half-day trial. Do you want morning or afternoon of June 23?

[Parents’ Counsel]: I can do either, Your Honor.

[DCS's Counsel]: Either one's fine.

THE COURT: Okay. So, we'll set this for a fact-finding hearing June 23 at 9:30 a.m.

Tr. Vol. II pp. 12-13. None of the parties objected to the date of the fact-finding hearing.

[5] On May 29, 2025, Parents filed a motion to dismiss the CHINS petitions without prejudice because the fact-finding hearing was set outside the sixty-day statutory deadline under Indiana Code Section 31-34-11-1. The trial court reviewed Parents’ motion and set the matter to be addressed at the pretrial conference on June 12, 2025. After the conference, the trial court found that the June 23 date was “agreed upon by all parties present” and that the “parties had ample time to object to the setting of the Evidentiary Hearing on June 23, 2025 and at no time did so and agreed to the hearing date and time when given their trial acknowledgement on record.” Id. at 84. The trial court denied Parents’ motion to dismiss on June 17, 2025.

[6] On June 23, 2025, the fact-finding hearing was held. The trial court found that the Children were CHINS. The dispositional hearing was later held, and the dispositional order was entered. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[7] Mother challenges the denial of her motion to dismiss the CHINS action. “It is well established that a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.” Study v. State, 24 N.E.3d 947, 950 (Ind. 2015). “Discretion is a privilege afforded a trial court to act in accord with what is fair and equitable in each case.” McCullough v. Archbold Ladder Co., 605 N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ind. 1993). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's decision either clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or misinterprets the law.” Nardi v. King, 253 N.E.3d 1098, 1103 (Ind. 2025).

[8] Mother's argument requires that we interpret the statutes governing CHINS actions, specifically Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1. “Matters of statutory interpretation present pure questions of law and are thus reviewed de novo.” In re E.T., 152 N.E.3d 634, 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing In re M.S., 140 N.E.3d 279, 282 (Ind. 2020)), trans. denied. “In interpreting a statute, our goal is to determine and give effect to the intent of our legislature.” In re J.S., 130 N.E.3d 109, 111-12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing State v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 964 N.E.2d 206, 209 (Ind. 2012)).

[9] At the time of this action, Indiana Code Section 31-34-11-1 provided:²

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), unless the allegations of a petition have been admitted, the juvenile court shall complete a factfinding hearing not more than sixty (60) days after a petition alleging that a child is a child in need of services is filed in accordance with IC 31-34-9.

(b) The juvenile court may extend the time to complete a factfinding hearing, as described in subsection (a), for an additional sixty (60) days if all parties in the action consent to the additional time.

* * * * *

(d) If the factfinding hearing is not held within the time set forth in subsection (a) or (b), upon a motion with the court, the court shall dismiss the case without prejudice.

(emphasis added).

[10] The plain language of Indiana Code Section 31-34-11-1 establishes an initial sixty-day deadline for the fact-finding hearing. Subsection (b) provides that the trial court may extend that deadline “for an additional sixty (60) days if all parties in the action consent to the additional time.” Ind. Code § 31-34-11-1(b) (emphasis added). The Indiana Supreme Court has acknowledged the trial court's discretion to extend the original sixty-day deadline upon obtaining the parties’ consent, explaining that “the sixty-day deadline may be waived with the consent of both parties for any reason.” In re M.S., 140 N.E.3d 279, 283 (Ind. 2020). The proposed fact-finding hearing date that Mother challenges fell outside the original sixty-day deadline but was within the 120-day window.

[11] Mother argues that the trial court unilaterally determined the fact-finding hearing date and that the verbal confirmation of the attorneys’ schedule is not an “equivalent to obtaining consent.” Appellant's Br. p. 10. We disagree.

[12] This Court addressed a similar issue in In re L.S., where the father did not object and his counsel confirmed that the date proposed by the trial court, which was outside of the sixty-day deadline, would “work” for him. 82 N.E.3d 333, 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Similarly, here, the record shows that, when the trial court proposed June 23, 2025, both DCS's and Parents’ counsel responded that they were available that day and did not raise any objection.

[13] Additionally, in the nearly two months that followed, and before the sixty-day deadline passed, Mother did not raise any objection to the fact-finding hearing date. Instead, Parents waited until two days after the sixty-day deadline and then filed a motion to dismiss the CHINS action. It was not unreasonable for the trial court to construe Parents’ collective conduct—agreeing to the court's proposed date and failing to raise any objection during the relevant timeframe—as consent to the June 23 hearing date. See L.S., 82 N.E.3d at 339 (holding that the trial court did not violate Father's right to due process by scheduling the hearing outside the sixty-day statutory window because Father confirmed the date without raising any objection).

[14] Moreover, Mother expressly agreed to a fact-finding hearing date beyond the sixty-day deadline at the initial hearing and then waited until the deadline had passed to file her motion to dismiss; thus, she invited any error the trial court may have committed. A party “may not request a trial court to take an action and later claim on appeal that such action is erroneous.” Baugh v. State, 933 N.E.2d 1277, 1280 (Ind. 2010). Under the invited error doctrine, “a party may not take advantage of an error that she commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of her own neglect or misconduct.” Id. The invited error doctrine applies here to preclude Mother from obtaining dismissal of the CHINS action. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss. See In re M.S., 140 N.E.3d 279, 284-85 (Ind. 2020) (holding that a party may not move for a continuance that results in a fact-finding hearing occurring beyond the statutory deadline and then seek dismissal based on the expiration of that deadline).³

Conclusion

[15] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Parents’ motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we affirm.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father does not participate in this appeal.

2.   The statute was amended and became effective July 1, 2025.

3.   Mother relies on a recent decision from this Court, In re M.H., 244 N.E.3d 966 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), in support of her argument. Appellant's Br. p. 10. That case is factually distinguishable because, there, “Mother made multiple requests for a hearing date and objected to the juvenile court setting the factfinding hearing beyond the 60-day deadline.” Id. at 970. Here, Parents made no objection before the sixty-day deadline passed and instead waited two days after the deadline passed to file the motion, attempting to take advantage of a procedural error, if any, that they invited.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur