Gary W. Carpenter, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Gary Carpenter led law enforcement officers on a high-speed chase, which lasted more than 13 minutes and only ended when Carpenter's motorcycle became inoperable. Carpenter was charged with and pled guilty to resisting law enforcement with a vehicle and reckless driving. The trial court sentenced Carpenter to 910 days of incarceration. Carpenter now appeals, raising one issue for our review: Whether Carpenter's sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In December 2024, Carpenter was on pretrial release for drug charges filed in Ripley County, Indiana. On December 27, in Dearborn County, Lieutenant Joshua Bauer of the Lawrenceburg Police Department observed Carpenter driving his motorcycle on U.S. 50 without a “license plate light and/or any taillights in the rear of the vehicle.” Tr. Vol. II at 20. When Lieutenant Bauer “initiated a traffic stop” on Carpenter's motorcycle, Carpenter “began to fle[e].” Id. Lieutenant Bauer pursued Carpenter, and the chase lasted approximately 13 minutes before culminating in Carpenter's arrest. During the chase, Carpenter traveled “approximately 80 miles an hour at some points,” and he drove “into oncoming traffic,” id., and through a marked construction zone. Carpenter only stopped fleeing when his motorcycle “became inoperable.” Id.

[4] Carpenter was charged with and pled guilty to one count each of resisting law enforcement with a vehicle as a Level 6 felony and reckless driving as a Class C misdemeanor. Under the terms of Carpenter's plea agreement, his sentence was left to the trial court's discretion. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and set the matter for a sentencing hearing. Prior to sentencing, the State filed a motion to revoke Carpenter's bond, alleging that in June and September 2025, he committed new criminal offenses, which resulted in charges in two new criminal causes. After the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Carpenter to serve 910 days executed at the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Carpenter's Sentence Is Not Inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B)

[5] Carpenter argues his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B) and should be revised. The Indiana Constitution authorizes us to independently review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision. Russell v, State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 855–56 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020)). That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits us to revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we] find[ ] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1092 (Ind. 2025) (quoting McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020)).

[6] Our Supreme Court has explained our role under Appellate Rule 7(B) as follows:

“[O]ur constitutional authority to review and revise sentences boils down to our collective sense of what is appropriate,” Cramer [v. State], 240 N.E.3d [693,] 698 [(Ind. 2024)] (quoting Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 165 (Ind. 2017)), an act that, importantly, is reserved for “exceptional” cases, id. (citing Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 231, 241 (Ind. 2015)). Determining a sentence's appropriateness thus “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” McCain, 148 N.E.3d at 985.

Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1092.

[7] Additionally, the defendant bears the burden of proving that “his or her sentence has met the inappropriateness standard of review.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1092 (quoting Cramer, 240 N.E.3d at 698). And because sentencing “ ‘is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference,’ a trial court's sentencing decision will generally prevail ‘unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense ․ and the defendant's character.’ ” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).

[8] A trial judge may impose any sentence within the statutory range without regard to the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). When considering the nature of the offense, we start with the advisory sentence. Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 4 (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494). Here, Carpenter was convicted of and sentenced on one Level 6 felony and one Class C misdemeanor. “A person who commits a Level 6 felony ․ shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six (6) months and two and one-half (2 1/212) years, with the advisory sentence being one (1) year.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b) (emphasis added). On his one Level 6 felony conviction, the trial court sentenced Carpenter to 910 days executed at the DOC. “A person who commits a Class C misdemeanor shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than sixty (60) days.” Id. § 35-50-3-4. On his one Class C misdemeanor conviction, the trial court sentenced Carpenter to 60 days executed at the DOC. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently, resulting in a total sentence of 910 days executed at the DOC.

[9] Where, as here, the trial court deviated from the advisory sentence, one factor we consider is “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)), as amended (May 26, 2023). We also consider whether the offense was “accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1093 (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122).

[10] As set forth in more detail above, Carpenter led law enforcement officers on a high-speed chase that was dangerous to law enforcement and the motoring public. Carpenter only stopped fleeing when his motorcycle became inoperable. As the State points out, “[a] person could commit resisting law enforcement without putting others in danger,” Appellee's Br. at 8, so by speeding through a construction zone and into oncoming traffic, Carpenter went beyond what was needed for a resisting law enforcement conviction. Carpenter's acts showed a complete lack of restraint and regard for other motorists. See Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1093.

[11] In considering the character of the offender, “we engage in a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities,” T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211 (citing Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on other grounds on reh'g), including whether the defendant has “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character,” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1093 (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122).

[12] Carpenter's presentence investigation report reveals five prior felony and three prior misdemeanor convictions. Outside of those prior convictions, the instant offense was committed while Carpenter had charges pending in another cause, and the trial court revoked Carpenter's bond in the instant offense prior to sentencing because he was charged in two new criminal causes. Carpenter also reported using methamphetamine while this underlying cause was pending. Carpenter exhibited no remorse for committing the instant offense; rather, when asked about it, he reported that when Lieutenant Bauer “turned on his lights,” he “kept going because he wanted to get his bike home so he didn't have to pay to get it out of impound.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 67.

[13] We acknowledge that Carpenter has provided care for his mother and that he may have had a difficult childhood. However, we cannot ignore that Carpenter has failed to appreciate the dangerousness of his actions and rejected multiple opportunities to reform. Cf. Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Wright v. State, 168 N.E.3d 244, 269 (Ind. 2021)) (“[E]vidence of a difficult childhood is entitled to little, if any, mitigating weight.”). Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that Carpenter has produced compelling evidence demonstrating that the nature of his offenses or his character renders his sentence inappropriate. See Lane, 232 N.E.3d 119; Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 855–56. Carpenter's sentence is not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). We therefore affirm the trial court.

[14] Affirmed.

Felix, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.