Desiree L. Jennings, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Desiree Jennings was convicted of resisting law enforcement and sentenced to probation for six months. Jennings appeals and raises one issue, which we restate as follows: Whether the trial court erred in sentencing Jennings.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On January 17, 2024, Jennings contacted Evansville Police Department Officers Zachary Turpin and Steven King regarding a “custody dispute” involving Jennings's child (“Child”). Am. Tr. Vol. II at 5.¹ Child's father had “primary custody” of Child, and Child's stepmother had been attempting to pick up Child since 7:00 p.m. on the father's behalf. Id. Jennings “would not release” Child, and the stepmother had been “waiting for quite some time.” Id.

[4] At approximately 8:30 p.m., the officers arrived at Jennings's home, and Jennings gave them permission to enter. The officers determined that Child should have been released to the stepmother at 7:00 p.m. and it was “now after that time.” Am. Tr. Vol. II at 6. Jennings, however, would not allow Child to go with the stepmother.

[5] The officers attempted to place Jennings under arrest for interference with custody. Jennings walked away from the officers, called 911, and “pulled away ․ multiple times” when the officers attempted to place her hands behind her back. Am. Tr. Vol. II at 7. At this point, Jennings released Child to the stepmother. Jennings then instructed her other children in the home to also call 911, which resulted in “five separate [Evansville Police Department] cars in route” to the home. Id. at 8.

[6] The State charged Jennings with resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor and disorderly conduct as a Class B misdemeanor. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Jennings guilty of the former and not guilty of the latter. The trial court sentenced Jennings to 180 days, all suspended with credit for one day. This appeal ensued.²

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Err in Sentencing Jennings

[7] In her Statement of Issues, Jennings frames her argument as whether her sentence is “manifestly unreasonable and not supported by the record of the proceedings.” Appellant's Br. at 4. In her Argument section, Jennings argues that her sentence is “unreasonable under Appellate Rule 7(B)” and that the “trial court did not delineate the reasons for his decision to impose[ ] the sentence.” Appellant's Br. at 12. Jennings appears to conflate two distinct arguments: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Jennings, and (2) whether her sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B).

[8] Beginning with the abuse of discretion argument, we note that “Indiana trial courts are required to enter sentencing statements whenever imposing sentence for a felony offense.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007) (emphasis added). Jennings was sentenced for a Class A misdemeanor. Trial courts are not required “to issue a sentencing statement with ․ misdemeanor conviction[s].” Stephenson v. State, 53 N.E.3d 557, 561 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Morris v. State, 985 N.E.2d 364, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds on reh'g, 985 N.E.2d 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)). The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion.

[9] Next, to the extent Jennings argues that her sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B), we cannot address this argument due to Jennings's significant noncompliance with Appellate Rule 46. Although we have a well-established preference for deciding cases on their merits rather than on procedural grounds like waiver, Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Roberts v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 897 N.E.2d 458, 469 (Ind. 2008)), if a party's failure to comply with the Appellate Rules is “sufficiently substantial to impede our consideration of the issue raised,” we will not address the merits of that issue, id. (quoting Guardiola v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (Ind. 1978)). Moreover, a party's arguments must be supported by cogent reasoning. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). “We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on [her] behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’ ” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)).

[10] First, Jennings fails to provide the applicable standard of review for an inappropriate sentencing claim as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(b); she includes only the standard of review for abuse of sentencing discretion claims. Moreover, Jennings fails to present a cogent argument as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Appellate Rule 7(B) permits this court to revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we] find[ ] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1092 (Ind. 2025) (quoting McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020)). Jennings never discusses the nature of her offense or her character. These errors substantially impede our review of Jennings's inappropriate sentence claim. Consequently, Jennings has waived this argument on appeal, and we will not exercise our discretion to address the merits thereof. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Appellate Rule 28 and Appendix A to the Appellate Rules require a court reporter to consecutively number the volumes of the Transcript, with the first volume containing only the Table of Contents. Ind. Appellate Rule 28(A); id. App. A(11)–(13); see also id. Form # App. R. 28-1. Here, the court reporter submitted two Tables of Contents, each within a separate set of volumes. We use “Am. Tr. Vol. II” to refer to the amended transcript of the trial, and we use “Tr. Vol. II” to refer to the transcript of the sentencing hearing.

2.   Jennings's Statement of Facts section does not comply with our Appellate Rules. Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)(a) requires the Statement of Facts section to “be supported by page references to the Record on Appeal or Appendix in accordance with Rule 22(C).” Jennings's Statement of Facts section, however, includes not a single citation to the record. The section is merely copied and pasted from the probable cause affidavit. We remind counsel that the purpose of our appellate rules—especially Appellate Rule 46 governing the content of briefs—“is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)).

Felix, Judge.

Mathias, J., concurs. May, J., concurs in result without opinion.