James Patrick, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A jury found James Patrick guilty of multiple drug-related offenses, and Patrick admitted to being a habitual offender. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of fifty years. On appeal, Patrick argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence found on his person during a traffic stop, that the prosecutor committed misconduct, and that his sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the afternoon of April 21, 2024, Floyd County Sheriff's Department Lieutenant Noah Pollert was monitoring traffic in his marked police vehicle from an emergency turnaround on Interstate 64. He saw a silver Jeep SUV with an expired license plate that was registered to a Toyota passenger car. Lieutenant Pollert pulled onto the interstate to conduct a traffic stop and determined that the Jeep was traveling seventy miles per hour in a fifty-five-miles-per-hour zone. He activated his emergency lights, and the Jeep “started to drop speed and abruptly moved to the emergency shoulder but continued on.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 84. According to Lieutenant Pollert, this behavior, called “slow rolling[,]” may indicate that “individuals inside [the vehicle] are hiding contraband, possibly planning an escape route via vehicle or by foot.” Id. The lieutenant “suspect[ed] that there was some form of criminal activity occurring within” the Jeep, and he requested backup. Id. at 85.

[3] Eventually, the Jeep stopped, and Lieutenant Pollert got out of his vehicle. As he approached the Jeep, he “could see some movement around the car.” Id. He walked up to the front passenger's window. David Jones was in the driver's seat, and Patrick was in the front passenger's seat. Lieutenant Pollert introduced himself and “was immediately met by the overwhelming odor of marijuana emitting from inside of the vehicle.” Id. at 86. The lieutenant “explained the stop” to Jones, who “appeared extremely nervous.” Id. Jones stated that the Jeep belonged to his girlfriend and that he had retrieved it from an impound lot in Louisville. “Upon hearing that, [the lieutenant] became even more suspicious because tow lots won't release vehicles unless it's to the registered owner. They also won't release unregistered, false, and fictitious license plates.” Id. Lieutenant Pollert determined that Jones “wasn't even a valid driver[,]” and Patrick “said he didn't have his driver's license or his ID on him.” Id. at 87.

[4] Lieutenant Pollert noticed that Patrick was “not acknowledging [his] presence, which was strange[,]” that he was breathing heavily, and that “there was this brown bag sitting at his feet.” Id. at 87. A backup officer arrived, and Lieutenant Pollert asked him to remove Jones from the Jeep. The lieutenant then asked Patrick to exit the vehicle. He manually “secured [Patrick's] hands behind his back” and “started a pat down on his person.” Id. at 89. Patrick was wearing a pair of pants “that were sagging, had big, open pockets.” Id. The lieutenant felt “multiple objects” in Patrick's “front right pant[s] pocket[.]” Id. He saw “a glass vial inside of the pocket” that contained “multicolored pills” that he “immediately recognized ․ to be ecstasy.” Id. 89-90. The lieutenant removed the pills from Patrick's pocket and handcuffed him.

[5] Lieutenant Pollert then conducted “a full search of ․ Patrick's person.” Id. at 91. From the same pocket, the lieutenant removed a plastic bag containing a powder consisting of what was later determined to be heroin and fentanyl and “two stacks of U.S. currency[.]” Id. at 92. Lieutenant Pollert asked the backup officer to read Jones and Patrick their Miranda rights and then searched the Jeep. He found “a plastic bag wedged between the passenger seat and the center console” that contained “a white, crystal-like substance that was very consistent with methamphetamine.” Id. at 93. Lieutenant Pollert opened the brown bag that had been sitting at Patrick's feet and “observed a large, gallon-sized plastic bag that contained” what was later determined to be 301.14 grams of methamphetamine. Id. at 95. Also inside the bag were a “meth pipe,” a “marijuana smoking pipe[,]” and a “hand-rolled cigarette” with a charred end ¹ “that contained a green plant-like substance inside of it that produced the odor consistent with marijuana.” Id. at 96. He found another marijuana smoking pipe in the Jeep's center console. On the driver's side floorboard, the backup officer found a “plastic bag that contained a green, plant-like material that produced the odor of marijuana and resembled marijuana[.]” Id. at 94.

[6] Lieutenant Pollert then “reconfirmed” that Jones and Patrick “understood their Miranda rights[.]” Id. at 100. The backup officer transported Jones to jail, and the lieutenant transported Patrick. Patrick “plead[ed] to speak” with the lieutenant, who asked him how he and Jones had acquired the methamphetamine. Id. Patrick replied that they had purchased it in Louisville and “that they were returning back to their home in Vincennes, where they would then sell the methamphetamine.” Id. 101. Upon Patrick's arrival at the jail, corrections officers found on his person a “small plastic bag” with “the remnants of a green, plant-like substance consistent with marijuana.” Id. at 99.

[7] Ultimately, the State charged Patrick with dealing in methamphetamine, as a Level 2 felony, possession of methamphetamine, as a Level 3 felony, possession of a narcotic drug (fentanyl), as a Level 6 felony, possession of marijuana, as a Class B misdemeanor, and two counts of possession of paraphernalia (the methamphetamine and marijuana pipes), as a Class C misdemeanor. The State also alleged that Patrick was a habitual offender. Patrick filed a motion to suppress “one or more articles” that had been seized without a warrant in alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 49. The trial court held a hearing, at which Lieutenant Pollert testified, and denied Patrick's motion.

[8] A three-day jury trial was held in May 2025. At the outset, Patrick asked the court to “show [a] continuing objection to the initial traffic stop as being without probable cause to pull the car over and the search of [his] pocket, where an object was found and manipulated[,]” based on the arguments raised in his motion to suppress and at the suppression hearing. Tr. Vol. 3 at 43. The court granted Patrick's request. The jury found Patrick guilty as charged, and Patrick admitted to being a habitual offender. The trial court entered judgment of conviction on all counts except the possession of methamphetamine count and imposed an aggregate sentence of fifty years executed. Patrick now appeals his convictions and his sentence.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Admission of Evidence

[9] On appeal, Patrick does not challenge the constitutionality of the traffic stop. Instead, he challenges only the constitutionality of Lieutenant Pollert's warrantless search of his person and the admission of the fruits of that search, i.e., the fentanyl, at trial.² “The trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence.” K.K. v. State, 40 N.E.3d 488, 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). “We will reverse a trial court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence only when the trial court abused its discretion.” Id. “An abuse of discretion involves a decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Id. “But when an appellant's challenge to such a ruling is predicated on an argument that impugns the constitutionality of the search or seizure of the evidence, it raises a question of law, and we consider that question de novo.” Id. at 490-91 (quoting Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40-41 (Ind. 2014)).

[10] “We cannot reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and must consider conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling.” Johnson v. State, 992 N.E.2d 955, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “[W]hen reviewing the constitutionality of a search or seizure, we must also examine ‘any uncontested evidence favorable to the appellant.’ ” Id. (quoting Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 434 (Ind. 1993)). “We will affirm the trial court's evidentiary ruling on any basis supported by the record.” Carr v. State, 106 N.E.3d 546, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.

Fourth Amendment

[11] Patrick first contends that Lieutenant Pollert's warrantless patdown search violated his protections under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states,

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

“The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens possess in their persons, homes, and belongings.” State v. Parrott, 69 N.E.3d 535, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. “In general, the Fourth Amendment prohibits searches and seizures conducted without a warrant that is supported by probable cause.” Id. (quoting Mullen v. State, 55 N.E.3d 822, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “As a deterrent mechanism, evidence obtained without a warrant is not admissible in a prosecution unless the search or seizure falls into one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Mullen, 55 N.E.3d at 827.

[12] On appeal, the State argues that Lieutenant Pollert's warrantless search of Patrick was a valid search incident to arrest.³ A search incident to lawful arrest is an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. K.K., 40 N.E.3d at 491. “An arrest is lawful if it is supported by probable cause.” Id. “Probable cause adequate to support a warrantless arrest exists when, at the time of the arrest, the officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the suspect committed a criminal act.” Griffith v. State, 788 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ind. 2003).

[13] “The level of proof necessary to establish probable cause is less than that necessary to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Probable cause, in fact, requires only a fair probability of criminal activity, not a prima facie showing.” Jellison v. State, 656 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted). “The amount of evidence necessary to meet the probable cause requirement is determined on a case-by-case basis.” White v. State, 24 N.E.3d 535, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. “It is grounded in notions of common sense, not mathematical precision[ ].” Id. “As such, the probable cause standard is a ‘practical, nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’ ” Id. (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003)). “The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371.

[14] “[A]s long as probable cause exists to make an arrest, the fact that a suspect was not formally placed under arrest at the time of the search incident thereto will not invalidate the search.” Moffitt v. State, 817 N.E.2d 239, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. “A police officer's subjective belief as to whether he has probable cause to arrest a defendant has no legal effect. Instead, the police officer's actual knowledge of objective facts and circumstances is determinative.” VanPelt v. State, 760 N.E.2d 218, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citation omitted), trans. denied. “The ultimate determination of probable cause is reviewed de novo.” Bell v. State, 13 N.E.3d 543, 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[15] Here, the Jeep in which Patrick was riding had an expired plate that was registered to another vehicle and was traveling fifteen miles per hour over the speed limit. When Lieutenant Pollert activated his emergency lights, the Jeep did not stop right away, but rather started “slow rolling.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 84. This suggested to the lieutenant that the Jeep's occupants were “hiding contraband, possibly planning an escape route via vehicle or by foot.” Id. Lieutenant Pollert also “could see some movement around the car.” Id. at 85. When the lieutenant approached the Jeep, he detected the “overwhelming odor” of an illegal substance—marijuana—emanating from the vehicle.⁴ Jones, the driver, “appeared extremely nervous” and gave Lieutenant Pollert a “suspicious” narrative about retrieving the Jeep from an impound lot for his girlfriend; impound lots “won't release vehicles unless it's to the registered owner[,]” and they “won't release unregistered, false, and fictitious license plates.” Id. at 86. The lieutenant determined that Jones “wasn't even a valid driver.” Id. at 87. Initially, Patrick did not acknowledge the lieutenant's presence, “which was strange[,]” and he was breathing heavily. Id. Patrick “said he didn't have his driver's license or his ID on him.” Id. And “there was this brown bag sitting at his feet.” Id.

[16] Based on the totality of the foregoing circumstances, we agree with the State that Lieutenant Pollert had probable cause to believe that Jones and Patrick had stolen the Jeep and possessed marijuana, which they had an opportunity to conceal during their “slow rolling” stop. See, e.g., Sebastian v. State, 726 N.E.2d 827, 831 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“Here, the police officers stopped Sebastian's vehicle because he was driving erratically. When the officers approached the vehicle, they smelled the distinctive odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the passenger compartment. These facts and circumstances would have warranted a man of reasonable caution to believe that Sebastian had committed a criminal act and provided probable cause for his arrest.”), trans. denied. Therefore, the warrantless search of Patrick's person was a valid search incident to arrest under the Fourth Amendment.

Article 1, Section 11

[17] Patrick further contends that the search violated his protections under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, which states,

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

Although the text of this provision is nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment, “Indiana courts interpret and apply it ‘independently from federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.’ ” Ocampo v. State, 268 N.E.3d 823, 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Lundquist v. State, 179 N.E.3d 1051, 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). “ ‘Instead of focusing on the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy, we focus on the actions of the police officer,’ and employ a totality-of-the-circumstances test to evaluate the reasonableness of the officer's actions.” Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 17 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Trimble v. State, 842 N.E.2d 798, 803 (Ind. 2006)). “Reasonableness is assessed by balancing: ‘1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.’ ” Id. at 17-18 (quoting Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005)).⁵

[18] As explained above, Lieutenant Pollert's degree of suspicion that criminal activity had occurred was high. The search was not especially intrusive: the lieutenant manually secured Patrick's hands behind his back and patted the outside of his right front pants pocket, where he “could feel multiple objects[,]” Id. at 89, one of which was a bag containing fentanyl. Patrick offers no specific argument regarding the extent of law enforcement needs in this situation. Given Lieutenant Pollert's suspicions regarding the provenance of the Jeep and the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle, we conclude that the law enforcement needs to investigate criminal activity were strong. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the patdown search was not unreasonable. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the fruits of the search under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

Issue Two: Prosecutorial Misconduct

[19] In his opening statement, the prosecutor summarized the evidence that was expected to be presented at trial and stated, “[T]hat's the case, folks, in a nutshell. Now, you're going to hear from the State's witnesses. You're going to find that they're trustworthy and reliable.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 62. Defense counsel stated, “Objection, Your Honor. That's improper vouching. The jury will decide whether they're trustworthy.” Id. The trial court asked counsel to approach and asked defense counsel, “Do you have any rule to cite for improper vouching, or case law?” Id. at 63. Defense counsel replied, “Well, we've got the Attorney Rules and Ethics that say we're not allowed to vouch for (indiscernible).” Id. The court overruled the objection.

[20] On appeal, Patrick argues that the prosecutor's comment constituted misconduct that warrants reversal. Recently, our Supreme Court stated,

When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct properly raised in the trial court, we determine (1) whether misconduct occurred, and if so, (2) whether the misconduct, under all the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he or she would not have been subjected otherwise. Whether a prosecutor's argument constitutes misconduct is measured by reference to case law and the Rules of Professional Conduct. The gravity of peril is measured by the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury's decision rather than the degree of impropriety of the conduct. To preserve the misconduct claim for appeal, the defendant must object at the time the alleged misconduct occurs.

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1077 (Ind. 2025) (citation modified).⁶

[21] In Gaby v. State, we stated, “It is inappropriate for a prosecutor to make an argument which takes the form of personally vouching for a witness.” 949 N.E.2d 870, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We then quoted Indiana Professional Rule 3.4(e), which provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer shall not․ in trial ․ state a personal opinion as to ․ the credibility of a witness[.]” Finally, we stated, “A prosecutor may comment on the credibility of the witnesses only if the assertions are based on reasons which arise from the evidence.” Gaby, 949 N.E.2d at 881.

[22] Here, the prosecutor stated his personal opinion as to the credibility of the State's witnesses that would be testifying at trial. See Tr. Vol. 3 at 62 (“You're going to find that they're trustworthy and reliable.”). And because no evidence had been presented, the prosecutor had no basis for commenting on their credibility. Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutor's comment was misconduct.

[23] Patrick argues that he was placed in a position of grave peril by the misconduct because of the risk “that the jury placed inordinate weight on the exhibits and Officer Pollert's testimony.” Appellant's Br. at 19. But Patrick does not suggest that the exhibits are anything other than what they appear to be or that Lieutenant Pollert's testimony was fabricated in any way. The evidence of Patrick's guilt was overwhelming, and thus the probable persuasive effect of the prosecutor's improper comment at the beginning of a three-day trial was negligible. Therefore, we affirm Patrick's convictions.

Issue Three: Appropriateness of Sentence

[24] Finally, Patrick asks us to reduce his fifty-year sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that this Court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Our “role under Rule 7(B) is to ‘leaven the outliers,’ and we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 613 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)).

[25] Indiana's flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor a sentence appropriate to the circumstances presented, and “the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. “[A]ppellate review should focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Id. at 1225. The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). It is Patrick's burden to establish that his sentence has met the inappropriateness standard of review. Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1092.

[26] In determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence “is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1081 (Ind. 2006). Because the trial court ran the Level 6 felony and misdemeanor sentences concurrent with the sentence for the Level 2 felony, we concern ourselves only with the most serious offense. The sentencing range for a Level 2 felony is between ten and thirty years, with an advisory sentence of seventeen and one-half years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4.5. The trial court imposed an executed thirty-year sentence on Patrick's Level 2 felony conviction. If a person is found to be a habitual offender, the court shall sentence him to an additional fixed term that is between eight years and twenty years if the person is convicted of a Level 2 felony. I.C. § 35-50-2-8(i)(1). This additional term is nonsuspendible. Id. Patrick admitted to being a habitual offender, and the trial court imposed an additional term of twenty years, for an aggregate sentence of fifty years executed.

[27] On appeal, Patrick does not address the nature of his offenses, which could be viewed as a concession that he is not entitled to a sentence reduction based on that prong of Appellate Rule 7(B).⁷ Our Supreme Court has explained that, “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2024).

[28] As for the second prong of Appellate Rule 7(B), “[o]ur analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse.” Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Patrick, who was born in 1988 and never attended high school, has an extensive criminal history in both Georgia and Indiana dating back to 2005, including convictions for possession of illegal substances, robbery, theft, obstructing/resisting law enforcement, and intimidation. He currently has two pending cases in Knox County involving charges for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, among other offenses. We observe that even a minor criminal history reflects poorly on a defendant's character and shows that he was not deterred by previous contacts with the criminal justice system from committing the current offenses. Harris v. State, 163 N.E.3d 938, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

[29] As indicated in his presentence investigation report, Patrick reported that he started consuming alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine at an early age, started using methamphetamine at age twenty, abused ecstasy in his twenties, and “has never attended substance abuse treatment.” Appellant's App. Vol. 5 at 76. Patrick characterizes his lack of treatment as “shocking[.]” Appellant's Br. at 20. We agree with the State that if Patrick “has not attended substance-abuse treatment, it is simply because he did not want to.” Appellee's Br. at 33.⁸ Patrick further reported that he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. He argues that his “PTSD and ADHD diagnoses are particularly significant because one can infer that drug addiction is part-in-parcel [sic] with his mental illness.” Appellant's Br. at 21.⁹ But Patrick has failed to establish any nexus between these factors and the commission of the instant offenses. And at the sentencing hearing, Patrick expressed no remorse for his crimes, telling the court, “I'm not no troublemaker in your city[,]” and, “I didn't do nothing wrong, period.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 10, 12.

[30] More generally, Patrick has failed to point to any substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character, and we conclude that he has failed to carry his burden to establish that his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). Therefore, we affirm it.

[31] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Ex. Vol. at 20, 33 (photos of cigarette).

2.   Patrick also asks us to “reverse the law allowing a vehicle search based on the odor of marijuana alone[.]” Appellant's Br. at 15 (typography altered). But Patrick did not challenge the search of the Jeep at trial, so he has waived this issue for appeal. Doyle v. State, 223 N.E.3d 1113, 1121 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

3.   The State also argues, as it did below, that the search was a valid patdown search for weapons under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the United States Supreme Court stated that “where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot[,]” “there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.” Id. at 30, 27. “The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Id. “[I]n determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Id.Regarding his warrantless search of Patrick, Lieutenant Pollert testified at the suppression hearing in pertinent part as follows:I do the same thing every single time. It's a creature of habit. It's just preventative.․ It's Southern Indiana. [E]verybody carries guns[.]․ So again, all of the totality of everything, while speaking with [Jones], the slow roll, me standing directly next to Mr. Patrick, he's not looking on me, he's been heavy breathing, won't make eye contact with me, odor of marijuana, so I believed criminal activity was being engaged. I smelled marijuana. Drugs and guns generally go hand in hand with each other when we're dealing with criminal investigations.Tr. Vol. 2 at 127-28. This testimony establishes that Lieutenant Pollert pats down suspects as a matter of routine, not necessarily based on “specific reasonable inferences” that they are armed and dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. We can confidently state that drugs and guns do not always “go hand in hand with each other” (as demonstrated here and in thousands of other cases); that not everybody in southern Indiana carries guns; and that, regardless of whether they carry guns, Hoosiers in that part of the state are entitled to equal protection from government overreach under the Fourth Amendment and Terry. Once again, we “caution police officers against routinely searching people stopped for traffic violations; it is not inevitable that there will always be a valid basis for doing so.” K.K., 40 N.E.3d at 495 n.8 (quoting Edmond v. State, 951 N.E.2d 585, 592 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)).

4.   Lieutenant Pollert did not specify whether the odor was burnt or raw marijuana. Given that raw marijuana, a hand-rolled cigarette with a charred end that smelled of marijuana, and two marijuana pipes (one of which appeared to have charred residue in the bowl) were found in the Jeep, a reasonable inference could be drawn that “the odor of burnt or raw marijuana, or both, was present.” K.K., 40 N.E.3d at 494 n.7.

5.   We note that Patrick merely cited Article 1, Section 11 in his motion to suppress and never mentioned any of the Litchfield factors at the suppression hearing or at trial.

6.   The State asserts that because Patrick did not request a new trial or an admonishment, his “objection preserved nothing for review[.]” Appellee's Br. at 29-30. This is no longer good law. See Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1082 (“[M]oving forward, where a defendant timely objects to alleged misconduct by the prosecutor and the trial court overrules the objection, nothing further is required to preserve the issue for appeal.”).

7.   The State points out that Patrick possessed over 300 grams of methamphetamine, which is thirty times the amount required to commit Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine. I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1(e). Patrick admitted to Lieutenant Pollert that he purchased the drug in Louisville and was going to sell it in his hometown of Vincennes.

8.   Patrick complains that “rehabilitation is entirely missing from the trial court's sentencing logic.” Appellant's Br. at 21. On the contrary, the trial court noted that when a convicted person “arrive[s] at the Department of Correction[ ] ․ they will make a determination whether [he] is in need of treatment of any kind of medical or mental health treatment, or substance use, and that sort.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 17.

9.   At the sentencing hearing, the trial court told Patrick, “I think I'm compelled under the law to give you some [mitigating] weight to [your] post-traumatic stress disorder.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 16. The State argues that the trial court was not compelled to do so, given its acknowledgment that the “diagnosis had no ‘tie-in to, necessarily’ Patrick's crimes[.]” Appellee's Br. at 33 n.8 (quoting Tr. Vol. 4 at 16). We agree with the State.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.