James W. Baker Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] James Baker was charged in relevant part with three counts of theft and one count of resisting law enforcement. He pled guilty to one count each of theft and resisting law enforcement. The trial court accepted Baker's guilty pleas; however, the abstract of judgment incorrectly identified the theft charge. Baker filed a verified motion to vacate conviction and sentence and discharge defendant due to that scrivener's error. After the trial court denied the motion but amended the abstract, Baker then filed a motion to correct errors, which the trial court also denied. Baker now appeals, raising two issues for our review, which we restate as the following single issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to correct errors.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In September 2024, Baker reached a plea agreement disposing of 11 total charges stemming from two separate causes: Cause 06C01-2308-F6-1633 (the “Theft Cause”) and Cause 06D02-2308-F6-1548 (the “Resisting Cause”). As to the Theft Cause, Baker pled guilty to Count II, theft as a Level 6 felony; as to the Resisting Cause, Baker pled guilty to resisting law enforcement as a Level 6 felony. In exchange for Baker's guilty plea to those two counts, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining nine counts in the Theft and Resisting Causes as well as all counts in two other causes. The plea agreement provided that Baker waived his right to appeal both his convictions and sentence.

[4] On October 1, the trial court conducted a guilty plea hearing at which Baker appeared pro se. During the hearing, the trial court confirmed multiple times the two specific counts to which Baker was pleading guilty and ensured that Baker understood the agreement. At the end of the hearing, the trial court granted Baker's “motion to enter a plea of guilty under [the Theft Cause] to Count II Theft, a Level 6 Felony and under [the Resisting Cause] to Count I, Resisting Law Enforcement, a Level 6 Felony.” Tr. Vol. II at 26. The trial court took the guilty plea and plea agreement under advisement and set the matter for sentencing.

[5] At the sentencing hearing, the trial court accepted Baker's pleas of guilty. The trial court sentenced Baker to consecutive sentences of 910 days under each of the Resisting and Theft Causes. The trial court's sentencing order referenced the October 1 plea hearing, noted convictions of “Theft – Level 6 Felony” and “Resisting Law Enforcement – Level 6 Felony,” and it expressly accepted Baker's plea and the plea agreement. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 39. The abstract of judgment issued in the Theft Cause noted the correct sentence but listed an incorrect disposition as to the specific counts (the “November Abstract”):

PART1 The Defendant was charged with the following crimes under the above-referenced cause: COUNT CRIME STATUTORY CITATION DISPOSITION I35-43-4-2(a)/F6: Theft Def. has a prior conviction for either theft or 35-43-4-2(a) Plea By Agreement conversion. II35-43-4-2(a)/F6: Theft where value of property is between $750 & 35-3-4-2(a) Dismissed $50k. III 35-43-4-2(a)/MA: Theft 35-43-4-2(a) Conviction Merged IV 35-43-4-2.7(d)/MB: Unauthorized Entry of a Motor Vehicle 35-43-4-2.7(d) Dismissed

Id. at 42.

[6] In July 2025, Baker filed a motion to vacate his convictions and sentences in the Theft and Resisting Causes (the “Motion to Vacate”). Baker asserted that because the plea agreement covered Count II of the Theft Cause and the trial court referenced Count II in the plea hearing, the trial court impermissibly convicted him of Count I and violated the terms of the plea agreement by merging Count III with Count I. Also according to the Motion to Vacate, because the trial court did not enter a conviction on Count II, it no longer had jurisdiction to sentence Baker under the Theft Cause. The trial court summarily denied the Motion to Vacate and simultaneously issued an amended abstract of judgment (the “Amended Abstract”). The Amended Abstract conformed to the plea agreement and the trial court's statements during the plea hearing:

PART 1 The Defendant was charged with the following crimes under the above-referenced cause: COUNT CRIME STATUTORY CITATION DISPOSITION I 35-43-4-2(a)/F6: Theft Def. has a prior conviction for either theft or 35-43-4-2(a) Dismissed conversion. II 35-43-4-2(a)/F6: Theft where value of property is between $750 & 35-43-4-2(a) Plea By Agreement $50k. III 35-43-4-2(a)/MA: Theft 35-43-4-2(a) Dismissed IV 35-43-4-2.7(d)/MB: Unauthorized Entry of a Motor Vehicle 35-43-4-2.7(d) Dismissed

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 68. In response, Baker filed a motion to correct errors (“the Motion to Correct Errors”), arguing the trial court lacked authority to convict him of Count II because it dismissed that count in the November Abstract. The trial court denied the Motion to Correct Errors, concluding that “there is no basis in law or fact supporting [Baker's] motion.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 110. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying the Motion to Correct Errors

[7] Baker contends the trial court erred by denying the Motion to Correct Errors because his conviction and sentence under the Theft Cause are void. Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6) permits a party to make a motion for relief from a void judgment. Generally, however, a collateral attack on a conviction or sentence must be pursued through a petition for post-conviction relief. See Pirant v. State, 119 N.E.3d 178, 181 (Ind. Ct. App 2019) (examining Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(b) and concluding collateral challenges to a conviction must be made through post-conviction proceedings).

[8] Here, Baker specifically challenges the Amended Abstract, claiming the trial court lacked authority to enter a conviction on Count II because the trial court dismissed that count in the November Abstract; thus, his conviction thereunder is void, entitling him to discharge. This is a collateral attack on his conviction that should have been made via a petition for post-conviction relief—not via a Trial Rule 60(B) motion. See Pirant, 119 N.E.3d at 181.

[9] Even if we consider the merits of Baker's claim that the trial court erred by denying the Motion to Correct Errors, that claim fails. Our review of such a claim is for an abuse of discretion. Pirant, 119 N.E.3d at 180 (citing State v. Willis, 773 N.E.2d 808, 811 (Ind. 2002)). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.’ ” Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)).

[10] Here, Baker argues that the trial court erred by denying the Motion to Correct Errors because (a) it entered a conviction and sentence for Count I of the Theft Cause but he pled guilty to only Count II, and (b) the Amended Abstract reflected conviction and sentence upon Count II, which had been dismissed. Baker cites to the Chronological Case Summary (the “CCS”), the November Abstract, and the Amended Abstract in support of his claim. Neither the November nor Amended Abstracts are judgments of conviction; they are mere forms issued for convenience to the Indiana Department of Correction. McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 588 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 794 (Ind. 2004)). When there is a “discrepancy between a sentencing order and an abstract of judgment ․ the sentencing statement rather than the abstract of judgment controls.” Id. In this case, the trial court entered a sentencing order which listed the date of the plea hearing, the two offenses to which Baker pled guilty, expressly “accept[ed Baker's] plea of guilty and the Plea Agreement,” and entered judgments of conviction for those two offenses. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 39. Thus, despite Baker's claims to the contrary, Count II in the Theft Cause was never dismissed. There was no error in the sentencing order, and that judgment is not void.

[11] Because the sentencing order controls, see McElroy, 865 N.E.2d at 588, any error in the November or Amended Abstracts is not a basis for appeal. Trial courts are permitted to correct “clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts to the record.” Ind. Trial Rule 60(A). Here, the trial court's erroneous notations on the November Abstract were clerical mistakes, which the trial corrected in the Amended Abstract. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Motion to Correct Errors, having already cured the alleged defects in the November Abstract. Regardless, at all relevant times, despite the erroneous notations on the November Abstract, the trial court's judgment conformed to the plea agreement, so there is no error. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[12] Affirmed.

Felix, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.