Robert S. Watson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Robert S. Watson appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to Level 3 and Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and to being a habitual offender. He raises three issues that we consolidate as: Did the trial court err when it denied Watson's motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] On February 14, 2023, the State charged Watson in cause number 74C01-2302-F6-38 (F6-38) with Level 6 felony strangulation and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. On February 23, 2023, the State charged Watson in cause number 74C01-2302-F6-43 (F6-43) with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and alleged that he was a habitual offender. On September 19, 2023, the State charged Watson in cause number 74C01-2302-F2-276 (F2-276) with two counts of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine and one count of Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine. On January 16, 2025, the State filed a notice of intention to seek a habitual offender enhancement in F2-276.

[4] On January 29, 2025, Watson appeared in person and with counsel, Joshua Mastison, for a hearing – originally scheduled as a suppression hearing that was converted to a change of plea hearing. Watson and the State submitted a combined plea agreement (the Agreement) for the three cases. Watson agreed to plead guilty in F6-43 to Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and the habitual offender enhancement and to Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine in F2-276. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the charges in F6-38 and the two charges of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine in F2-276. The State also withdrew its notice to seek a habitual offender enhancement in F2-276. The Agreement provided for concurrent sentences in F6-43 and F2-276. Watson signed the Agreement, which provided that Watson understood its terms and was making the plea knowingly and voluntarily and that his attorney had discussed it with him.

[5] At the hearing, Watson admitted that he possessed methamphetamine in F6-43 and in F2-276, and he admitted to prior felonies supporting the F6-43 habitual enhancement. Watson verbally acknowledged, among other things, that he signed the Agreement, had reviewed it with his attorney, understood the constitutional rights he was waiving, and was satisfied with his counsel. The trial court found that Watson's guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily made, accepted the factual basis, entered judgments of conviction on the admitted charges, and took the Agreement under advisement. The February 2025 jury trial setting was removed from the court's calendar.

[6] Prior to sentencing, and while represented by counsel, Watson filed on March 25, 2025, a flurry of pro se motions, including a Motion to Replace Counsel and a Motion to Withdraw Plea. On April 3 and 8, 2025, he filed additional pro se motions, including another Motion to Withdraw Plea and Motion for Removal of Counsel due to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. In his unverified motion ¹ to withdraw his guilty plea, Watson claimed that he did not understand the terms and consequences of the Agreement, his counsel was ineffective for not explaining the plea and not providing him access to evidence, and his plea was not voluntary and thus unconstitutional.

[7] At the April 8, 2025 sentencing hearing, the trial court began by addressing the now-pending pro se motions and asked for the parties’ positions on Watson's motion to set aside the guilty plea. The State objected to withdrawal of the plea, asserting, first, that Watson's motion was unverified and procedurally improper. The State also argued that it would suffer prejudice by the withdrawal of Watson's guilty plea because, after Watson pled guilty, the State finalized a plea agreement with a co-defendant in F2-276, but if there had been no plea with Watson, then the State would have negotiated with the co-defendant for him to provide truthful testimony against Watson. The State also asserted resulting prejudice because the cases had been set for trial numerous times but were continued due to Watson's several changes of counsel, and permitting withdrawal of his plea would result in yet another delay.

[8] Watson stated that he had emailed Attorney Mastison a number of times, asking him to file “many motions,” but that Attorney Mastison did not do so, never shared documents or discovery with him, and did not discuss the case with him at all. Id. at 25. He told the court that none of the several attorneys appointed to represent him had shown him even “one piece of paperwork” on any of his cases. Id. He maintained that he wanted to go to trial but not with Attorney Mastison as he “doesn't even know anything about my case.” Id. at 44. Watson explained that his friend, later identified as Meghan Browning, helped him draft and type all the pro se motions and that she filed them because “obviously” Attorney Mastison would not. Id. at 26.

[9] Attorney Mastison advised the trial court that he was unaware of Watson's recent pro se filings until the court's staff contacted him about it, and that when he thereafter contacted Watson to discuss the matter, Watson told him that he wanted to proceed on his own. Attorney Mastison explained to the court that he had no part in the drafting of those motions. Attorney Mastison stated that he met with Watson numerous times and had spoken with him several times by phone to discuss Watson's options.

[10] During the hearing, Browning interjected comments – some audible – to Watson and to the trial court, including a reference to a co-defendant's culpability and expressing intent to file a tort claim on Watson's behalf. The court admonished Browning for being disruptive.

[11] Ultimately, the trial court denied Watson's request to withdraw his guilty plea, finding that the motion was not verified and thus not in proper form, that Watson failed to show manifest injustice, and that the State would be prejudiced by withdrawal of the plea. The court noted that, given that Watson had “top notch” attorneys with high-level felony experience, the court was skeptical of Watson's claim that none of them communicated with him about his case or reviewed the evidence. Id. at 32.

[12] The trial court denied Watson's motion and accepted the Agreement, imposing an aggregate sentence of fifteen years. Watson now appeals.

Discussion & Decision

[13] After entry of a guilty plea but before sentencing, the trial court “shall” allow the withdrawal of the plea if the defendant provides that the withdrawal is “necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b). Absent that showing, a trial court “may allow” the defendant to withdraw a guilty plea “for any fair and just reason unless the state has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea.” Id. That is, the motion to withdraw the plea must be denied if withdrawal of the plea would result in substantial prejudice to the State. McGraw v. State, 938 N.E.2d 1218, 1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. The motion is required to be “in writing and verified.” I.C. § 35-35-1-4(b). The defendant has the burden of establishing his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 35-35-1-4(e).

[14] We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing for an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 35-35-1-4(b); Asher v. State, 128 N.E.3d 526, 530 (Ind. Ct. App 2019). A trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea “arrives in this [c]ourt with a presumption in favor of the ruling.” Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ind. 2001). A defendant attempting to overturn a trial court's decision “faces a high hurdle.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. We will not disturb the court's ruling where it was based on conflicting evidence. McGraw, 938 N.E.2d at 1220.

[15] As a threshold matter, we observe that Watson's motion was unverified as required by I.C. § 35-35-1-4(b). Because the motion was procedurally defective, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying it. See Kinman v. State, 152 N.E.3d 1060 (Ind. 2020) (affirming the court of appeals’ determination that, because defendant's oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea was procedurally defective, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying it). Here, after recognizing the lack of verification as one basis for denial of Watson's motion, the court determined that, regardless of that procedural failure, Watson had failed to establish grounds for relief. We agree.

[16] Watson argues that because of Browning's “de facto intervention” and her “unauthorized practice of law” – which he asserts “unfairly prejudiced” him and the court should not have permitted – the trial court was required to allow him to withdraw his plea “to prevent manifest injustice from ineffective assistance of counsel.” Appellant's Brief at 5, 6. We are unpersuaded. First, Watson did not claim in the trial court that his counsel was ineffective due to Browning's interference, and it is well settled that we “look with disfavor upon issues that are raised by a party for the first time on appeal[.]” Craig v. State, 883 N.E.2d 218, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Second, Watson requested, encouraged, and participated in Browning's involvement in his case, and thus his current claim that her “relentless interference” resulted in manifest injustice is not well taken. Appellant's Brief at 23.

[17] Third, to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Watson was required to show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Brightman, 758 N.E.2d at 46. Watson has shown neither. Attorney Mastison reported that he did not file, or have anything to do with, any of the pro se motions that Watson and Browning drafted. Indeed, Watson acknowledged that he filed the motions, with the assistance of Browning, because Attorney Mastison would not. Thus, contrary to Watson's claim that Attorney Mastison's legal representation was “significantly disrupted” by Browning, the record does not show that counsel's performance was rendered deficient – or even affected – by Browning's involvement. Appellant’s Brief at 11.

[18] Moreover, while Watson asserted below that Attorney Mastison did not keep him apprised and did not know anything about his case, Attorney Mastison informed the trial court that he met with Watson numerous times and spoke with him by phone several times as well. It was the trial court's prerogative to determine who to believe on this matter. Here, the trial court expressed its skepticism about Watson's claim that not one of his several attorneys, including Attorney Mastison, kept him informed about his case. Watson has not established that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that, as a result, he suffered manifest injustice. Accordingly, the trial court was not statutorily required to grant Watson's request to withdraw his guilty plea.

[19] As to whether the trial court, in its discretion should have allowed him to do so, our courts have observed that “[i]n determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we examine the statements made by the defendant at his guilty plea hearing to decide whether his plea was offered ‘freely and knowingly.’ ” Akins v. State, 245 N.E.3d 179, 183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Brightman, 758 N.E.2d at 44).

[20] Watson pled guilty under a written plea agreement with a list of his rights and an acknowledgement he waived certain rights by pleading guilty. At the change of plea hearing, the trial court asked Watson a series of questions about the voluntariness of his plea. And the court asked him if he had discussed the Agreement with his attorney and if he was satisfied with his representation. Watson answered in the affirmative to both. Our review of the record reveals that Watson entered into the Agreement freely and knowingly. The trial court was well within its discretion in determining that no fair and just reason supported withdrawal of Watson's guilty plea.

[21] Finally, the trial court found, and we agree, that the State showed it would be prejudiced by withdrawal of Watson's guilty plea. Relying on Watson's guilty plea, the State negotiated a plea agreement with a co-defendant such that the opportunity to negotiate with that co-defendant to provide truthful testimony for the State against Watson is now foreclosed. Additionally, due to Watson's several changes of counsel, the case already has been delayed over two years. We will not disturb a trial court's ruling denying a defendant's request where the State would be substantially prejudiced. See McGraw, 938 N.E.2d at 1220 (recognizing that trial court must deny motion to withdraw guilty plea if the withdrawal would result in substantial prejudice to the State).

[22] In sum, Watson has failed to overcome the “high hurdle” of establishing error in the denial of his motion. See Akins, 245 N.E.3d at 183. We therefore affirm the trial court's denial of Watson's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

[23] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Watson filed separate motions to withdraw plea in F6-43 and F2-276, but they are identical other than having different cause numbers. Because he entered into one combined Agreement, we will refer to a singular motion to withdraw plea.

Altice, Judge.

May, J. and Foley, J., concur.