IN OPCO LLC LLC v. Charlson David DePrez, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Charlson David DePrez worked across multiple healthcare facilities in Indiana under a written employment agreement that established his salary and provided for reimbursement of work-related travel. After his employer later reduced his pay and declined to reimburse his mileage expenses, DePrez sued his employer to recover both. Following a small claims bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for DePrez in the amount of $10,000. The employer appeals, challenging the trial court's denial of the employer's motion to continue, reliance on the written employment agreement, and award of damages. In response, DePrez seeks appellate attorney fees based on his allegation that his employer pursued this appeal in bad faith. We affirm and deny DePrez's request for appellate attorney fees.

Facts

[2] On June 30, 2023, DePrez and Shelbyville IN OPCO, LLC entered into a written employment agreement providing that DePrez's “annual base salary will be $177,580.00.” App. Vol. III, p. 39. The agreement further specified that DePrez “will receive a vehicle allowance of $5,240.00 per year” and, in addition, “will be reimbursed for mileage at the rate established by the Internal Revenue Service” (IRS). Id. Shelbyville IN OPCO, LLC later identified DePrez's employment position as “Administrator/Oversight Administrator at Restore Health[, LLC].” App. Vol. II, p. 64.

[3] DePrez began working for Shelbyville IN OPCO, LLC and Restore Health, LLC (collectively, Employer) on July 1, 2023. Employer initially paid DePrez according to the written agreement before unilaterally reducing his compensation. From mid-August 2023 through June 30, 2024—his last day on Employer's payroll—DePrez was paid at a reduced salary that resulted in a total of $1,610 less in wages than required by the written agreement.

[4] DePrez's position required him to travel regularly among Employer's facilities in Indiana. He tracked his work-related travel and calculated mileage reimbursement at IRS rates, consistent with the agreement, but Employer failed to pay the mileage that DePrez claimed he was owed. Employer also failed to pay the $1,610 in back wages claimed by DePrez.

[5] DePrez then left his employment and filed this action in May 2025 in the small claims court, seeking the unpaid salary and mileage reimbursements under the employment agreement. He also sought damages for Employer's tardy notice of his rights to continue his Employer-provided insurance under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA).

[6] The bench trial was initially scheduled for June 3, 2025, but was continued twice at Employer's request: first to August 11, 2025, and then to October 6, 2025. On October 3, 2025—the Friday before the rescheduled trial—Employer filed a third motion to continue, asserting that Employer was unavailable “due to the observance of the Jewish Holidays.” Id. at 57. The motion did not identify any specific witness of Employer who would be unavailable and did not reveal the testimony that any such witness was expected to offer. The trial court denied the motion.

[7] At the trial on October 6, DePrez represented himself, and Employer's counsel appeared on its behalf. DePrez's evidence consisted of his testimony and summary documents showing that he was owed $1,610 in unpaid salary, plus a statutory penalty of $3,220, bringing his total claim for unpaid wages to $4,830. DePrez also presented evidence that Employer owed him $6,670.57 in unreimbursed mileage for more than 10,000 miles of business-related travel. Employer did not object to admission of this evidence. Presenting documentary evidence but no witnesses, Employer instead asserted only that: (1) the written agreement was not the parties’ actual agreement due to a drafting error; and (2) the federal courts, not any Indiana state court, had jurisdiction over the COBRA matter.

[8] Employer moved to dismiss DePrez's COBRA-related claims. The trial court granted that motion, agreeing it lacked jurisdiction over that part of DePrez's claim. As to DePrez's wage and mileage claims, the court ruled:

I'm gonna award $10,000.00 to the Plaintiff for mileage and for salary depreciation. I believe that the contract was agreed to and signed. I'm goin’ off the four corners. I believe he's entitled to mileage, and I agree he is entitled to his, his salary as agreed upon. Unilateral reduction by it is not sufficient. I do believe any ERISA claims are proper for federal court. I do not have jurisdiction over those. So ․ [t]o the extent that you are seeking mileage and wage reimbursement, Court awards $10,000.00 plus court costs.

Tr. Vol. II, p. 27.¹

[9] Employer appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Employer raises three claims on appeal. First, Employer contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying Employer's third motion to continue. Second, Employer asserts that the court erroneously determined DePrez's unpaid wages based on the written employment agreement, rather than on Employer's internal correspondence that Employer introduced. Third, Employer asserts the $10,000 award is unsupported by the evidence and contrary to law.

[11] “We generally review small claims judgments for clear error, giving considerable deference to the small claims court and its assessment of witness credibility.” Picadilly Mgmt. v. Abney, 215 N.E.3d 1078, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). In doing so, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Hetty Inc. v. Weems, 237 N.E.3d 701, 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[12] We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, given Employer's prior continuances and failure to properly document the need for another. We also conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the written employment agreement controlled this dispute. Finally, the $10,000 damages award is supported by DePrez's evidence showing that Employer owed him $6,670.57 in unpaid mileage and $4,830 in unpaid wages and penalties.

I. Denial of Motion to Continue

[13] Employer contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motion for a third continuance, filed on the last business day before trial. Employer argues that its witnesses, who lived in New Jersey, had to choose between appearing at trial and observing Sukkot, a Jewish religious holiday that began at sunset on October 6, 2025.

[14] The ability to seek continuances in small claims courts is limited. A continuance may be granted for just cause, but “[e]xcept in unusual circumstances[,] no party shall be allowed more than one (1) continuance in any case[.]” Ind. Small Claims Rule 9(a). Even when a continuance is granted by a small claims court, the continuance “shall be for as short a period as possible[.]” Id.

[15] “The decision to grant or deny a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Hoagland Fam. Ltd. P'ship v. Town of Clear Lake, 257 N.E.3d 830, 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). We will reverse the court's decision only for an abuse of that discretion, which occurs when the trial court denies the continuance motion for which good cause is established and the movant is prejudiced by that ruling. Id.

[16] “When a trial court denies a party's motion for a continuance, there is a strong presumption that the trial court properly exercised its discretion.” Matter of N.K., 249 N.E.3d 607, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). We may find no abuse of discretion “when the record reveals, among other things, ‘dilatory tactics on the part of the movant designed to delay coming to trial.’ ” Hoagland, 257 N.E.3d at 840 (quoting J.P. v. G.M., 14 N.E.3d 786, 790 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)).

[17] In this case, the bench trial was originally scheduled for June 3, 2025. At Employer's request, the trial court continued the matter to August 11, 2025, and then again to October 6, 2025. Because Small Claims Rule 9(a) limits each party to no more than one continuance absent unusual circumstances, and Employer had already received two, Employer was not entitled to another continuance under Small Claims Rule 9(a) absent a showing of “unusual circumstances.” Id.

[18] Though the October trial date was set in late July, Employer failed to object to that setting or raise any religious-observance conflict until October 3—the last business day before trial. In its brief motion for continuance, Employer asserted:

3. Defendants are unavailable to attend trial due to the observance of the Jewish Holidays ․

4. Defendants ha[ve] indicated that they are available on October 27, 2025 and October 28, 2025, if the Court's calendar would allow for the trial to be reset on either of those dates ․

6. Additionally, Plaintiff has stated that he will be supplementing some of his prior discovery responses with additional exhibits.

App. Vol. II, pp. 57-58.

[19] The motion failed to identify any specific witness who would be unable to appear, describe what testimony would be offered, or explain the delay in filing the motion for continuance. Moreover, the trial record contains no further reference to supplementation of discovery responses.

[20] At the trial on October 6, Employer did not renew the motion for continuance or object to the trial proceeding. Employer's counsel merely noted, in response to the court's question, that there were no “employees” present because “[t]hey reside in New York ․ and they were in observance of the Jewish holidays.” Tr. Vol. II, pp. 5-6. Although Employer now raises a constitutionally-based claim that Employer was entitled to the continuance for religious reasons, Employer has waived this claim by raising it for the first time on appeal. See Carmichael v. Separators, 148 N.E.3d 1048, 1058 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“It is well settled that ‘[i]ssues not raised at the trial court are waived on appeal.’ ”) (quoting Cavens v. Zaberdac, 849 N.E.2d 526, 533 (Ind. 2006)).

[21] Waiver notwithstanding, Employer's claim fails for other reasons. Employer has failed to show “unusual circumstances” justifying the third continuance, as well as prejudice resulting from the motion's denial. S.C.R. 9(a). Employer essentially claims the religious observance was the unusual circumstance that justified the continuance and that the absence of its unnamed witnesses caused substantial prejudice, given that Employer was unable to offer testimony central to its defense.

[22] But Employer's arguments on “unusual circumstances” and prejudice are quite general. Employer has never provided the names or positions of the witnesses who could not appear due to their religious observation. Nor has Employer ever alleged that all potential witnesses who could provide the evidence pertinent to Employer's defense were observing the same religious holiday. See Multivest Props. v. Hughes, 671 N.E.2d 199, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (“We do not, however, hold that a small claims court is required to grant a continuance upon the bare assertion that a party is unable to attend” due to being out of state).

[23] In denying the motion, the trial court noted that Employer had only asked for a continuance three calendar days before the hearing—that is, on the Friday before the Monday trial—even though the cited religious “holiday's been on the books for a couple thousand years, probably.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 5. Although Employer's counsel presented no witnesses, he contested DePrez's claim, presenting both documentary evidence and argument on Employer's behalf.

[24] We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in declining to grant Employer's third request for a continuance, given the restrictive language of Small Claims Rule 9(a), the timing and unspecific nature of Employer's request, and the lack of a particularized showing of prejudice to Employer. See Matter of N.K., 249 N.E.3d at 616 (finding denial of motion for continuance did not constitute an abuse of discretion when the movant had filed multiple motions to continue during the case to obtain counsel and was permitted to introduce evidence and examine witnesses pro se at the hearing); Multivest Props., 671 N.E.2d at 201-02 (finding no abuse of discretion in the denial of a continuance due to “the paucity of information” provided in the motion—filed on the final business day before a trial date that had been set 11 months earlier—when the motion failed to specify why another “principal” of the defendant company could not have appeared in place of the allegedly unavailable witness).

II. Enforcement of the Written Employment Agreement

[25] Employer next argues that the trial court erred by relying on the written employment agreement to determine DePrez's award. Employer contends that the agreement contained a drafting error and that the trial court should have relied instead on internal email correspondence reflecting the parties’ true intent.

[26] The construction of a written contract is a pure question of law. Turner v. KLS Services, LLC, 254 N.E.3d 1082, 1088 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “Where terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, we will apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms and enforce the contract according to its terms.” John M. Abbott, LLC v. Lake City Bank, 14 N.E.3d 53, 56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “The terms of a contract are not considered ambiguous because the parties dispute the proper interpretation of the terms.” Ecorp, Inc. v. Rooksby, 746 N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

[27] Under “the four corners rule,” which applies when the language of a contract is unambiguous, “the parties’ intent is to be determined by reviewing the language contained within the ‘four corners’ of the document.” Id. When “the four corners rule” applies, “ ‘parol or extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to expand, vary, or explain the instrument unless there has been a showing of fraud, mistake, ambiguity, illegality, duress or undue influence.’ ” Id. (quoting Adams v. Reinaker, 808 N.E.2d 192, 196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)).

[28] Employer relies on Ecorp, Inc. v. Rooksby, 746 N.E.2d 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), in arguing that the trial court should have relied on extrinsic evidence to determine DePrez's proper compensation. In Ecorp, the employment contract expressly conditioned payment of accrued compensation on the occurrence of a future corporate event, and the dispute concerned whether that contractual condition had been satisfied. Id. at 131-33. Because the timing of payment turned on an undefined triggering event, extrinsic evidence was relevant to determine whether the condition precedent had occurred. Here, by contrast, DePrez's compensation was not contingent on a future event. Moreover, the written agreement between DePrez and Employer contained no undefined terms whose clarity depended on extrinsic evidence. Employer's reliance on Ecorp is unavailing.

[29] Here, the evidence established that DePrez and Employer executed a written employment agreement on June 30, 2023. The agreement expressly provided that DePrez's annual base salary would be $177,580, that he would receive a vehicle allowance of $5,240 per year, and that he would be reimbursed for mileage at the rate established by the IRS. Employer initially paid the wages required by the written agreement. However, in August 2023, Employer unilaterally reduced DePrez's wages and paid him at a lower level for the remainder of the term of the agreement, resulting in his receipt of $1,610 less in wages than the agreement provided. Moreover, Employer did not pay DePrez the mileage specified in the agreement.

[30] At trial, Employer did not argue that the language in the written agreement was ambiguous. Instead, Employer asserted that the agreement reflected a drafting error. In support of that defense, Employer offered extrinsic evidence in the form of internal email correspondence to show that Employer intended different compensation terms than those set forth in the written agreement that DePrez produced. On appeal, however, Employer seems to argue that the written agreement is ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence is necessary to understand it.

[31] The small claims court admitted Employer's extrinsic evidence, considered it, and rejected it in favor of the terms of the written agreement and DePrez's testimony. The court specifically ruled that Employer could not unilaterally change the terms of the written contract executed with DePrez. Implicit in that ruling is a finding that Employer had not proven that the agreement was ambiguous or the result of a mutual mistake between Employer and DePrez that would justify reliance on extrinsic evidence of intent. We agree that the written agreement is unambiguous and binding. Thus, Ecorp does not further Employer's argument.

[32] We conclude that the trial court did not err in relying on the written employment agreement in awarding DePrez's back wages and mileage.

III. Damages Award

[33] Employer's final claim is that the trial court erred in awarding $10,000 in damages to DePrez. First, Employer challenges DePrez's reliance on summary exhibits rather than underlying documentation. Second, Employer maintains the court allegedly “capped” damages at the jurisdictional maximum without sufficient proof.

[34] “[W]e may affirm a general judgment on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” Ford v. Slate, 209 N.E.3d 1, 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). “When the specific issue for review relates to the award of damages, the award should not be reversed if it falls within the scope of the evidence presented to the trial court.” Id.

[35] Small claims actions are designed to provide a simple, informal, and inexpensive means for resolving disputes. See S.C.R. 8(A). For that reason, small claims courts are not required to apply strict evidentiary rules in calculating damages. See id. Consistent with that informal framework, the trial court may receive and rely on evidence in rendering judgment that may be inadmissible in other proceedings. See, e.g., Matusky v. Sheffield Square Apts., 654 N.E.2d 740, 741-42 (Ind. 1995) (finding hearsay that would be inadequate to support judgment in administrative proceedings and plenary actions was sufficient to support small claims judgment); Fortner v. Fam. Valley Applewood Apts., 898 N.E.2d 393, 398-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming small claims judgment based largely on hearsay evidence).

[36] Here, DePrez testified regarding unpaid salary and unreimbursed mileage and introduced summary exhibits quantifying those amounts. The trial court admitted the summaries without objection and discussed the figures on the record, noting that the unpaid wages plus the applicable statutory penalty ² totaled $4,830 and the unreimbursed mileage totaled $6,670, for a combined amount exceeding $10,000. The court then awarded DePrez $10,000—the jurisdictional limit for damages in small claims courts. See Ind. Code § 33-29-2-4.

[37] Employer's argument—that the trial court should have required more formal or detailed proof—asks for a level of evidentiary precision not required in small claims proceedings. See S.C.R. 8(A). In addition, Employer essentially seeks to reweigh the evidence that the trial court was entitled to credit. See Hetty, Inc., 237 N.E.3d at 704. We decline to do so.³

[38] Employer also suggests that some of the mileage awarded by the trial court reflects personal commuting expense rather than work-related travel and therefore was not reimbursable under either state or federal law. Employer further argues that the statutory penalties the trial court imposed on the unpaid wages portion of the judgment did not apply because DePrez failed to show Employer acted in bad faith. But Employer never presented these arguments to the trial court. Instead, Employer focused on whether the written employment agreement accurately stated the parties’ compensation terms. Employer therefore has waived these claims first raised on appeal. See Carmichael, 148 N.E.3d at 1058.

[39] Finally, Employer contends the court should not have entered the judgment against Restore Health Indiana, LLC because it was not a party to the written employment agreement. There are two problems with this argument.

[40] First, in pleadings filed with the trial court, Employer acknowledged an employment relationship between Restore Health Indiana, LLC and DePrez when it identified DePrez as the former “Administrator/Oversight Administrator at Restore Health[, LLC].” App. Vol. II, p. 64. Employer, which consisted of both defendants—Shelbyville IN OPCO, LLC and Restore Health Indiana, LLC—was represented by the same counsel at trial. Throughout the proceedings, Employer never attempted to distance Restore Health Indiana, LLC from Shelbyville IN OPCO, LLC. In fact, Employer's arguments implied that both entities had the same interests in this litigation except as to the dismissed COBRA claim. Employer contended that COBRA did not apply to Restore Health Indiana, LLC because, unlike Shelbyville IN OPCO, LLC, Restore lacked the minimum number of employees to trigger COBRA application.

[41] Second, Employer has waived the propriety of a judgment against Restore Health Indiana, LLC by failing to raise that issue in the trial court. See Carmichael, 148 N.E.3d at 1058. Employer's challenge to the damages award therefore fails.

IV. Appellate Attorney Fees

[42] DePrez requests appellate attorney fees under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E), arguing that Employer brought this appeal in bad faith. That rule permits this Court, at its discretion, to “assess damages [including attorney fees] if an appeal ․ is frivolous or in bad faith.” App. R. 66 (E). We award damages under Appellate Rule 66(E) only in “instances when an appeal is permeated with meritlessness, bad faith, frivolity, harassment, vexatiousness, or purpose of delay.” Gallo v. Sunshine Car Care, LLC, 185 N.E.3d 392, 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Wagler v. W. Boggs Sewer Dist., Inc., 29 N.E.3d 170, 174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)). We use “extreme restraint” when exercising this authority due to its potential chilling effect on the exercise of litigants’ rights to appeal. Id.

[43] Although Employer has not prevailed on appeal, we cannot say that the appeal is permeated with meritlessness, bad faith, frivolity, harassment, vexatiousness, or purpose of delay. We therefore decline to award appellate attorney fees under Appellate Rule 66(E).

Conclusion

[44] Concluding Employer's claims either are waived or unpersuasive, we affirm the trial court's judgment. We also decline DePrez's request for appellate attorney fees.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The jurisdictional damages limit for small claims courts is $10,000. See Ind. Code § 33-29-2-4 (limiting the small claims docket to civil actions in which “the amount sought or value of the property sought to be recovered is not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000)”). Therefore, the trial court lacked authority to enter a judgment for the full amount of unpaid wages (including the statutory penalty) and the mileage that DePrez sought to recover.

2.   The trial court appears to have imposed the penalty based on Indiana Code § 22-2-5-2, which provides:Every such person, firm, corporation, limited liability company, or association who shall fail to make payment of wages to any such employee as provided in [Indiana Code § 22-2-5-1] shall be liable to the employee for the amount of unpaid wages, and the amount may be recovered in any court having jurisdiction of a suit to recover the amount due to the employee ․ In addition, if the court in any such suit determines that the person, firm, corporation, limited liability company, or association that failed to pay the employee ․ was not acting in good faith, the court shall order, as liquidated damages for the failure to pay wages, that the employee be paid an amount equal to two (2) times the amount of wages due the employee.

3.   Employer also appears to argue that no statutory penalty applied to the unpaid mileage, which according to DePrez's evidence, amounted to $6,670.57. This argument is unavailing because the only statutory penalty that DePrez sought at trial applied solely to the unpaid wages of $1,610—not the unpaid mileage. Nothing in the trial court's comments during the hearing or in its ruling suggests that the court applied any statutory penalty to the unpaid mileage.

Weissmann, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.