IN RE: the Adoption of Li.P. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] M.P. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order granting K.J.’s (“Stepfather's”) petitions to adopt Father's three minor children. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Father raises the following two issues for our review:

1. Whether Stepfather's petitions were barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

2. Whether the trial court erred when it found that his consent to the adoptions was not required.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Father and S.J. (“Mother”) were married, and they have three children together: Lo.P, born June 3, 2008; Li.P., born January 10, 2011; and La.P., born June 28, 2012 (collectively, “the Children”). At some point, Mother and Father dissolved their marriage. In April 2021, Father was arrested and charged with several offenses. Mother married Stepfather on August 28.

[4] On May 13, 2022, Stepfather filed petitions to adopt the Children. That court held a hearing on the motions on December 2. At that time, Father was still in custody but had not yet been convicted of a crime. On December 5, the trial court issued an order denying Stepfather's petitions.¹ Thereafter, in August 2023, Father pleaded guilty to robbery, as a Level 2 felony, and admitted to being a habitual offender. The court sentenced him to thirty years in the Department of Correction.

[5] On May 13, 2024, Stepfather again filed petitions to adopt the Children. Stepfather asserted that Father's consent was not required because Father was currently incarcerated and has “had no contact or meaningful communication or visitation” with the Children, that Father was “unfit[,]” and that Father had “abandoned” the Children. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 29.² Mother consented to the adoptions, but Father did not.

[6] On November 15, Father filed a motion to dismiss Stepfather's petitions on the ground that they were barred under the doctrine of res judicata. In particular, Father alleged that there was a previous court order denying the original petitions and that Stepfather would present no new evidence in support of his new petitions. During a hearing on Father's motion, Mother confirmed that any “evidence presented during the hearing” on the new adoption petitions “would be about events that occurred after” the 2022 order denying the original petitions. Tr. Vol. 2 at 12. The court denied Father's motion to dismiss.

[7] The court then held a hearing to determine whether Father's consent was required and whether the adoptions were in the best interests of the Children. During that hearing, Mother testified that Father had made “no attempts to have contact” with the Children since December 2022. Id. at 16. She also testified that Father knows where she currently lives and has her phone number. And she testified that she never prevented Father's family from contacting her. Mother additionally asserted that Father had been convicted of a crime, which “has had a negative impact on the [C]hildren and the experiences they have had.” Id. at 18.

[8] Following that hearing, the court concluded that “[n]o evidence was presented to suggest that Father has made efforts to contact the [C]hildren in the last two and [one-]half years” without justifiable cause. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 113. Accordingly, the court determined that Father's consent to the adoptions was not required. The court then found that the adoptions were in the best interests of the Children and granted Stepfather's petitions. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Res Judicata

[9] Father first contends that Stepfather's petitions were “barred” by the doctrine of res judicata. Appellant's Br. at 11. The principle of res judicata is divided into two branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Freels v. Koches, 94 N.E.3d 339, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). In his brief, Father contends that the petitions are barred by claim preclusion.

[10] Before a court can find that claim preclusion applies to bar a subsequent action, four essential elements must be met: (1) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the former judgment must have been rendered on the merits; (3) the matter now at issue was or might have been determined in the former suit; and (4) the controversy adjudicated in the former suit must have been between the parties to the present action or their privies. Ramey v. Ping, 190 N.E.3d 392, 410 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.

[11] Here, there is no dispute that the former judgment denying Stepfather's petitions was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, that it was rendered on the merits, and that it was between the same parties to the present actions. The only dispute is whether the matter now at issue was or might have been determined in the former suit.

[12] We first note that Father did not provide a copy of the original adoption petitions, a copy of the transcript of the hearing on those petitions, or a copy of the order denying those petitions. As a result, we are unaware of what evidence was presented at that hearing. In any event, Stepfather based his new petitions on the fact that, in 2023, Father was convicted of a serious felony and sentenced to thirty years in the Department of Correction. In addition, Stepfather alleged that Father had not communicated with the Children since December 2022. All of those are facts that could not have been determined in the former suit. As such, claim preclusion does not apply, and the court did not err when it denied Father's motion to dismiss.

Issue Two: Consent

[13] Father next contends that the court erred when it determined that his consent to the adoptions were not required. As our Supreme Court recently stated:

We generally show “considerable deference” to the trial court's decision in family law matters “because we recognize that the trial judge is in the best position to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, get a feel for the family dynamics, and get a sense of the parents and their relationship with their children.” E.B.F. v. D.F., 93 N.E.3d 759, 762 (Ind. 2018) [(citation modified)]. So, “when reviewing an adoption case, we presume that the trial court's decision is correct, and the appellant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption.” Id. And we will not disturb that decision “unless the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the trial judge reached an opposite conclusion.” In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014). “We will not reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses.” E.B.F., 93 N.E.3d at 762 (citation omitted). “Rather, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision.” Id. (citation omitted).

J.P. v. V.B. (In re Adoption of I.B.), 163 N.E.3d 270, 274 (Ind. 2021).

[14] Indiana law generally requires natural parents to consent to adoptions. Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1. However, as relevant here, a natural parent's consent to an adoption is not required if the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence that, for a period of at least one year, the parent fails without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with the children when able to do so. I.C. § 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(A).

[15] Father does not dispute that he had no contact with the Children for more than one year. However, he maintains that he was unable to do so because he did not have the Children's address or Mother's phone number and because Mother had prevented contact between the Children and his mother. But Mother testified that Father “know[s] where [she] currently live[s]” because her address was on paperwork he was “served” and that he “know[s] her phone number” because he had contacted her “previous times[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 22-23. Further, Mother testified that she never blocked contact with Father's mother. Father's contentions are merely a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.

[16] The evidence most favorable to the judgment demonstrates that Father has not communicated at all, let alone significantly, with the Children since at least December 2022. As such, the trial court did not err when it found that Father's consent to the adoption was not necessary.

Conclusion

[17] Stepfather's petitions were not barred by res judicata. And the court did not err when it found that that Father's consent to the adoptions was not necessary. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father has not provided a copy of Stepfather's 2022 petitions or the order denying those petitions in his record on appeal.

2.   Stepfather filed a separate petition to adopt each child, but each petition contains identical language.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.