Melody Fairlite Sebastian, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Melody Fairlite Sebastian appeals following her conviction for burglary, as a Level 5 felony, and theft, as a Class A misdemeanor. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Issues

[2] Sebastian raises four issues for our review:

1. Whether the court abused its discretion when it ordered her to pay a special death benefit fee.

2. Whether the court abused its discretion when it ordered her bond to be used to pay for court costs without holding an indigency hearing.

3. Whether the court abused its discretion when it ordered her to pay restitution.

4. Whether the court abused its discretion when it sentenced her.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In the late evening or early morning of July 6 into July 7, 2024, Sebastian and Justin May entered a farmhouse owned by Gary Thrasher and his wife. To gain access to the house, May removed a plywood covering from a door. Once inside, Sebastian and May took various objects and placed them in bags.

[4] Thrasher and his wife live in Tennessee, but they use their farmhouse in Indiana to store personal items. Even though the house is vacant, it still has electricity, and Thrasher has a security system installed. At approximately 12:00 a.m. on July 7, 2024, Thrasher received an alert from his security system. Thrasher opened the app and saw that there were two people inside his house. Thrasher called the Sheriff's Department.

[5] A deputy with the Sullivan County Sheriff's Department and an officer with the Sullivan City Police Department responded to the dispatch. Once there, they observed a truck that was registered to Sebastian. They also noticed that a door had been covered with plywood but that the “screws that were anchoring the plywood against the building had either been taken all the way out or had been backed out.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 222. Officers then found Sebastian and May hiding in the nearby brush. Officers searched them and found the items they had taken from Thrasher's home. Officers arrested Sebastian and May, and the court set Sebastian's bond at $28,000. Sebastian posted a 10% cash bond of $2,800.

[6] The State charged Sebastian with burglary, as a Level 5 felony, and theft, as a Class A misdemeanor. Following a jury trial, the jury found Sebastian guilty as charged, and the court entered judgment of conviction accordingly. At the sentencing hearing, a victim advocate with the prosecutor's office testified that Thrasher had asked for restitution in the amount of $3,029. In support of that claim, the State presented as evidence a handwritten document from Thrasher that listed items that Thrasher believed had been taken and their values. See Ex. Vol. 4 at 23-24. The victim advocate further testified that Thrasher was waiting on an appraisal for his door to be fixed but that he was asking for approximately $1,000. Sebastian testified at the hearing that she is not employed but is applying for disability based on a “severe mental illness.” Tr. Vol 3 at 116.

[7] Sebastian then presented argument regarding mitigating factors. In particular, she argued that the crime did not result in serious harm and that the property appeared to be abandoned. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court identified as aggravators Sebastian's criminal history and her lack of remorse, and the court did not identify any mitigators. Accordingly, the court sentenced Sebastian to an aggregate sentence of four years, with three years executed and one year on probation. The court then ordered $1,504 in restitution, “which represents the door and plywood to fix that[,]” and ordered May and Sebastian to split that cost equally, leaving Sebastian responsible for $527.00. Id. at 134. The court additionally imposed a five-dollar special death benefit fee. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 188. And the court ordered Sebastian's fines, costs, and fees to be paid with her bond. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Special Death Benefit Fee

[8] Sebastian first contends that the court abused its discretion when it imposed a five-dollar special death benefit fee. Specifically, she contends that Indiana Code Section 33-37-4-1, which governs the costs and fees that can be assessed against a defendant, does not include a special death benefit fee. However, in her reply brief, Sebastian acknowledges that there is a different statute, Indiana Code Section 35-33-8-3.2(d), that “permit[s]” the court clerk to collect that fee and that, if the fee was imposed under that statute, “then [she] concedes that fee imposition was proper.” Reply Br. at 4. Sebastian makes no argument that the fee was not imposed pursuant to that statute. As such, we affirm the imposition of that fee.

Issue Two: Bond

[9] Sebastian next contends that the court abused its discretion when it ordered that her cash bond be applied to court fines, costs, and fees without first conducting an indigency hearing. We review a trial court's assessment of costs and fees for abuse of discretion. Spells v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767, 771 (Ind. 2024). “This standard allows reversal only when a decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Id. The State “acknowledges that the trial court was required to hold an indigency hearing before ordering Sebastian to pay court costs and fees.” Appellee's Br. at 10. We agree. Here, the court did not hold a hearing to determine whether Sebastian was indigent or whether she had the ability to pay the fines, costs, and fees. See Howard v. State, 236 N.E.3d 736, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (holding that the court erred when assessing fees without properly determining whether the defendant was indigent, even when a cash bail had been posted). We therefore reverse the court's order that Sebastian pay the fines, costs, and fees and remand with instructions for the court to hold an indigency hearing.

Issue Three: Restitution

[10] Sebastian also contends that the court abused its discretion when it ordered her to pay restitution. “We review a trial court's order of restitution for an abuse of discretion and will affirm the order if sufficient evidence exists to support the decision.” Morgan v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1091, 1094 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). The amount of actual loss is a factual matter to be determined upon the presentation of evidence. Id.

[11] Sebastian asserts that there was no evidence to show the cost of any damage. The State acknowledges that the “only evidence of the cost was testimony from the victim advocate” that Thrasher “was waiting on [an] appraisal for the door” and that he had requested $1,054. Appellee's Br. at 11. As such, the State agrees that the evidence is insufficient to support the restitution order. We do as well. Indeed, the State presented no evidence regarding any damage to the door or the cost of repairing it. Thrasher simply asked for $1,054.00 without any evidence to support that request. As such, the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed that amount as restitution.

[12] Still, while the parties agree that the restitution order must be reversed, they disagree as to the appropriate remedy. The State argues that we should remand for a new restitution hearing at which it can present actual evidence to support the restitution amount. Sebastian contends that “remand is not appropriate.” Reply Br. at 6. We agree with Sebastian.

[13] This Court has stated that “a restitution order must reflect a loss sustained by the victim as a direct and immediate result of the defendant's criminal acts.” Morgan, 49 N.E.3d at 1094 (quotation marks omitted). The State admits that “[t]here was no evidence presented either at trial or at sentencing that the front door had been damaged by Sebastian and May when they broke into the building” and “there was not sufficient evidence presented to establish that the loss was a direct and immediate result of the defendant's criminal act[.]” Appellee's Br. at 11-12. Because there was no evidence that Sebastian's criminal act caused any loss to Thrasher, there is no amount of restitution to be determined. Therefore, remand is not necessary. We reverse the portion of the trial court's order requiring Sebastian to pay restitution.

Issue Four: Sentencing

[14] Finally, Sebastian contends that the court abused its discretion when it sentenced her. Sentencing decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted), trans. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does any of the following:

(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”

Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind.), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)).

[15] The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is one year to six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). And a person convicted of a Class A misdemeanor shall be imprisoned for a term of not more than one year. I.C. § 35-50-3-2. Here, the court identified two aggravators— Sebastian's criminal history and her lack of remorse—and did not identify any mitigators. Accordingly, the court sentenced her to four years, with three years executed and one suspended to probation, on the Level 5 felony charge and to a concurrent term of one year on the misdemeanor conviction.

[16] On this issue, Sebastian first contends that the court abused its discretion when it declined to find her “various mental health diagnoses, including post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”)” to be a mitigating factor. Appellant's Br. at 19. However, Sebastian did not raise her mental health diagnoses as a mitigating factor to the trial court. While she briefly mentioned that she has “severe mental illnesses,” it was in response to a question about why she was applying for disability benefits. Tr. Vol. 3 at 116. Sebastian did not explain to the court what those mental illnesses are or how they are mitigating. Then, when it came time for Sebastian to present her sentencing argument at the end of the hearing, the only mitigators she put forth were that “this crime did not result in serious harm” and that she thought the property was “abandoned[.]” Id. at 130. She did not argue that her mental illness should be considered a mitigator. As such, she has waived that argument for appeal. See Simms v. State, 791 N.E.2d 225, 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that, if a defendant fails to advance a mitigating circumstance at sentencing, “this court will presume that the circumstance is not significant and the defendant is precluded from advancing it as a mitigating circumstance for the first time on appeal.”).

[17] Still, Sebastian contends that the court abused its discretion when it identified her lack of remorse as an aggravator. However, we need not decide whether the court erred in this regard. It is well settled that, where the trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing a defendant, we need not remand for resentencing if we can “say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. Here, in addition to the challenged aggravator, the court also identified as aggravating Sebastian's criminal history, which includes one prior felony conviction and two prior misdemeanor convictions. Sebastian does not challenge that aggravator. And it is well settled that “a single aggravating factor is sufficient to warrant an enhanced sentence.” Guzman v. State, 985 N.E.2d 1125, 1133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[18] The court sentenced Sebastian to a slightly enhanced sentence of four years, with one year suspended to probation. Based on the unchallenged aggravator and lack of mitigators, we can say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence even without consideration of the challenged aggravator. We therefore affirm Sebastian's sentence.

Conclusion

[19] Sebastian has conceded that the court properly imposed the special death benefit fee. And the court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Sebastian. As such, we affirm the imposition of the fee and Sebastian's sentence. However, the court abused its discretion when it imposed fines, costs, and fees without determining Sebastian's ability to pay, and we remand with instructions for the court to hold an indigency hearing. And the court abused its discretion when it ordered Sebastian to pay restitution, so we reverse that portion of the order.

[20] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.