Jaqwaneice Daniels, Appellant-Petitioner v. III (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In this paternity action, the trial court granted Norman Richmond III's (Father's) petition to modify custody after Jaqwaneice Daniels (Mother) failed to appear at the modification hearing. Mother then submitted three post-modification filings: an “objection” to the modification order, a Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief, and a motion to correct error. The court struck Mother's objection and denied her motions, and Mother now appeals. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and Mother are the parents of two teenage boys, Nor.R. and Noa.R. [collectively, the Children]. These proceedings began in November 2010 when the State filed a petition to establish paternity and child support. A few days later, the trial court set that petition for a hearing and ordered the “Sheriff to serve summons on [the] parties.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 15. A child support order was entered in March 2011. Then, after a series of support modification and contempt proceedings spanning several years, Mother was formally awarded primary physical custody of the Children in May 2014, with Father ordered to have parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.

[3] From 2014 through 2025, the parties continued to litigate numerous contempt citations, show cause motions, and a petition for joint custody filed by Father in September 2017.¹ Until 2023, the trial court mailed orders and notices to Mother at various addresses she had provided to the court. But at a hearing on August 22 of that year, Mother completed an “Open Court Appearance Form,” on which she listed an email address. Id. at 8. After that date, all orders and notices from the court were sent to the email address Mother had provided. At no point did Mother object to that manner of service, and she in fact appeared at a hearing in June 2024 where she again listed her email address on an appearance form.

[4] On July 15, 2025, Father filed a pro se petition to modify custody. In it, he alleged that Nor.R. (then aged fifteen) and Noa.R. (then thirteen) had been in the care of Mother and her relatives from 2012 to 2019. Father claimed that in 2019, he moved with the Children “to Indianapolis with the intention to have them live in a safer environment” but then Mother “sent them back to Gary” in 2020. Id. at 16. Father had since “moved back to Gary ․ and restarted his life and employment there solely to be present for [the] [C]hildren.” Id. at 16-17. Though he suffered “job loss and financial hardship” after being injured at work in April 2023, Father alleged he “ha[d] maintained his role as a dedicated and committed father.” Id. at 17. Finally, Father asserted that he “believe[d] that it [was] in the best interest of the [C]hildren to be in his custody full-time due to his consistent involvement and stability, and [ability] to provide a safe, structured, and loving home.” Id.

[5] The trial court set Father's motion for a hearing on September 3 and ordered Father “to provide proof that the petition was served by certified mail and bring the green card to the next hearing.” Id. at 20. At the end of the scheduling order, the clerk certified that he sent notice of the hearing to Mother's email address. Still, Mother did not appear. At the start of the hearing, the court found that notice of the hearing had been sent to Mother's email address and ruled “[s]he had proper notice.” Transcript at 4. The court did not ask Father for proof that he had served her with the petition and no evidence was presented as to whether Father complied with the court's directive to serve Mother with that filing.

[6] The court proceeded with the hearing in Mother's absence, and Father testified that the Children had been living with Mother's grandmother “on and off since 2012.” Id. at 5. He explained that he and Mother had both moved to Indianapolis in 2019 but lived separately. They initially brought the Children with them, but Mother unilaterally sent them back to Gary to live with their great-grandmother. Since then, Father and Mother had been “unable to communicate” and Mother rarely allowed Father to see the Children. Id. at 7. After answering a few questions from the court about his current housing and employment, Father read the following written statement into the record:

I am here today to request custody of my two sons ․ My main concern is their well-being, stability, and safety. The [C]hildren's mother has shown a pattern of financial and personal instability. I have documented evidence of multiple evictions and vehicle repossessions which have directly affected the [C]hildren's living conditions and stability.2 In addition to financial issues, she has repeatedly spoken negatively about me to my [C]hildren, telling them things that are untrue to turn them against me․ This behavior has caused confusion and emotional harm to my children. I also have messages from a mutual party showing that she has posted me on social media in a way to downplay my character in front of my family and peers. This not only hurts me but also affects the [C]hildren by placing them in the middle of conflict.

Furthermore, she has told my oldest son troubling statements, including she wanted to set me up to be harmed. These comments are not in the best interest of our [C]hildren and create an unsafe emotional environment. She has entered multiple relationships in recent years, two of which resulted in three additional children. I am not saying this to judge her but to show that her focus has been divided and, unstable, while I've been consistent in my role as a father.

I respect that she may need time to heal and work on herself, but in the meantime, my sons deserve a stable home, consistent care, and a safe environment. I am ready and committed to providing that.

․

Your Honor, my request is simple: [t]hat the custody be granted to me so that [the Children] can have stability, safety[,] and a chance to grow up in a positive environment. I am not trying to cut their mother out of their lives, but I believe the [C]hildren's best interests would be served under my care.

Id. at 10-11.

[7] At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled from the bench that it was in the Children's best interest for Father to have primary physical and sole legal custody. The court lamented that “unfortunately Mother ha[d] not been able to establish her wishes ․ because she did not appear.” Id. at 14. After the hearing, the court issued a written order consistent with that ruling, in which it found and ordered, in part,

[T]here [was] adequate service on [Mother].

․

․ [I]t is in the best interest [sic] to award Father physical and sole legal custody of the Children. The factors the Court considered are the age and sex of the Children (13 and 15, both males), the wishes of Father (Father wants custody and Mother failed to appear to present her position on the issues), the interaction and interrelationship of the Children with the parents, siblings[,] and anyone else who may significantly affect the Children's best interest (the parents are unable to communicate effectively regarding the Children, and Mother keeps the Children from Father), and the mental and physical health of the Children (who are impacted by residing with Mother or Maternal Grandmother, which is not conducive to a stable living environment).

Mother shall have parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 40-41.

[8] The day after the hearing, Mother filed a pro se “objection/response ․ to the ruling on September 3 ․” Id. at 43. In it, Mother asserted that she had been “unaware of the time court started ․ because [Father] never served [her] any papers ․” Id. at 44. She claimed she first became aware that Father had petitioned to modify custody on Saturday, August 30, when she saw a text message Father had sent to Noa.R. on July 15. In that message—a copy of which was attached to Mother's objection—Father told Noa.R., “I got some papers to give yo mama.” Id. at 53 [sic throughout]. Mother then called the court's staff late in the morning on Wednesday, September 3, to ask when the hearing was, and she was advised it had already commenced and concluded earlier that day. Mother further claimed, among other things, that “everything [Father] ha[d] stated was a lie,” she “ha[d] not been evicted from [her] home,” and the Children lived with her, not “with [Mother's] grandmother ․” Id. at 43-44. She then expressed her desire “for this ruling to be reversed” and explained,

I do not see it in my son[s’] best int[e]rest to be in [Father's] custody, as he does not work, he lives at his parent[s’] home with his other brothers and their children. When the boys do visit[,] they sleep on the couch/pallets. I or my grandmother ha[ve] to provide [the Children] food when they are in their father[’]s care because he states he has no money to feed them. He has chosen to not help me with them ․

Id. at 44. Attached to Mother's motion was her current apartment lease, most recent pay stub, vehicle registration, and screenshots of the July 15 text exchange between Father and Noa.R. Shortly after receiving Mother's motion, the court issued an order striking it “for failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id. at 61.

[9] The next week, on September 9, 2025, an attorney filed an appearance for Mother. Then, on the 22nd, Mother's counsel filed a motion seeking relief from the custody modification order “pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(3) and/or 60(B)(8).” Id. at 66. Mother alleged that “had she received proper notice [of the September 3 hearing], she would have appeared because there is no more important concern tha[n] the health, safety[,] and future of her children.” Id. at 65. Additionally, Mother asserted “Father made multiple misrepresentations to the court that perhaps represent[ed] an outright fraud, but certainly misconduct of an adverse party.” Id. at 66. Finally, according to Mother, she “ha[d] a meritorious defense to the unwarranted, unsubstantiated, and misleading claims of ․ Father that may indeed approach a fraud upon the court.” Id. On September 23, the court summarily denied Mother's Rule 60(B) Motion.

[10] On October 3, Mother's counsel filed a motion to correct error alleging, in part,

[I]t was fundamentally unfair for a proceeding of such importance be heard [sic] and conducted without the presence of the custodial parent, who obviously has pertinent information on the issue before the court.

․ Mother has had these [C]hildren in her custody for their entire lives and they know very little about ․ Father.

․ [W]hen the court denied ․ Mother's Trial Rule 60(B) motion, it committed reversible error because ․ Mother had a legal and moral right to be heard before her children were unceremoniously taken from her.

Id. at 70. The court summarily denied Mother's motion to correct error in an order issued on the same day it was filed. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[11] We begin by noting that Father did not file a brief in support of the trial court's decisions. In such a case, “we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on [his] behalf.” Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006)). Accordingly, “we will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error,” meaning error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. (quoting Trinity Homes, 848 N.E.2d at 1068).

[12] Mother presents four arguments on appeal which can be distilled into three. First, she contends the trial court erred when it struck her pro se objection to the custody modification order because it should have “consider[ed] [it] as a motion to correct error.” Appellant's Brief at 13. Second, Mother claims her Trial Rule 60(B) motion should have been granted because the custody modification order was “void for lack of personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 17. Third, Mother challenges the denial of her motion to correct error, reiterating the court did not have personal jurisdiction “due to Father's failure to properly serve Mother with notice of the hearing ․” Id. at 19. We address these points in turn.³

1. Mother's Post-Modification “Objection”

[13] Mother first argues the court should have treated her “objection to the September 3, 2025, order as a motion to correct error.” Id. at 13. She cites two cases to support her claim that “motions challenging court orders should be treated as motions to correct error regardless of how they are labeled.” Id. at 15. First, Mother cites a non-citable memorandum decision for the proposition “that ‘it would elevate form over substance to treat a motion to clarify as something other than a motion to correct error’ ․” Id. at 13 (quoting Stanisic v. Massa, No. 79A02–1507–DR–970, at *4 (Ind. Ct. App. May 20, 2016) (mem.)). But “[m]emorandum decisions issued before January 1, 2023 are not binding precedent and must not be cited, except to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.” Salmon v. Tafelski, 235 N.E.3d 867, 873 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D)(2)). Thus, we do not consider Stanisic in our analysis.

[14] The other, Hubbard v. Hubbard, 690 N.E.2d 1219 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), is not dispositive. There, this Court found a trial court erred in granting a mother's request to vacate an order modifying child custody and support before giving the father notice and an opportunity to respond. Id. at 1221. Though the mother stylized her motion as a motion to reconsider, the panel reasoned that motions to reconsider cannot be filed after final judgment, so the mother's request “should have been treated as a motion to correct error” and ruled on in accordance with “the procedural requirements of Trial Rule 59 ․” Id. The upshot of Hubbard was that the court erred in granting what was effectively a motion to correct error without providing the father an opportunity to respond as required by Trial Rule 59(E). But here, the court did not violate that rule; since it did not grant Mother's request to set aside the September 3 order, no relief was provided in violation of Father's right to lodge an objection. Thus, Hubbard does not require reversal in this case.

[15] In any event, even if the trial court did err in striking Mother's objection rather than treating it as a motion to correct error, that error was harmless because Mother's counsel later filed another motion to correct error, so Mother was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the September 3 order. See Higgason v. State, 210 N.E.3d 868, 886 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“Harmless error, by definition, is ‘an error that does not affect the substantial rights of a party.’ ” (quoting Lander v. State, 762 N.E.2d 1208, 1213 (Ind. 2002)), trans. denied; see also Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A) (“No error ․ in any ․ order ․ is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.”). Mother has therefore failed to demonstrate prima facie error in the court's decision to strike her objection.

2. Trial Rule 60(B)

[16] Next, Mother contends the trial court failed “to properly consider [her] Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief ․” Appellant's Br. at 16. Trial Rule 60(B) permits a court to grant equitable relief from a judgment under certain circumstances enumerated by its subsections. In re Paternity of P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d 737, 740-41 (Ind. 2010). Mother requested relief under Rule 60(B)(3) and (8), which provide that a judgment may be set aside because of “(3) fraud ․, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party ․ [or] (8) any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).” Yet on appeal, Mother argues the court should have granted relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(6), which permits a court to set aside a void judgment. She claims the September 3 order was issued “without proper service of process” and was therefore “void for want of personal jurisdiction.” Appellant's Br. at 16. But Mother did not invoke Rule 60(B)(6) in her motion, and while she claimed she did not have notice of the hearing, she did not argue the judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction. She has therefore waived that claim for our review.⁴ See In re Paternity of T.M.Y., 725 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“[A] claim of lack of personal jurisdiction may of course be waived or, [to put it another way], is susceptible to ‘cure’ or ‘waiver.’ ”) (second alteration in original), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

[17] Waiver notwithstanding, a party may not seek relief under Rule 60(B) on grounds which could be raised in a motion to correct error or on direct appeal:

“[A] motion under T.R. 60 may not serve as a substitute for a direct appeal.” Magnuson v. Blickenstaff, 508 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); see also In re Paternity of P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ind. 2010). “Trial Rule 60(B) motions address only the procedural, equitable grounds justifying relief from the legal finality of a final judgment, not the legal merits of the judgment.” P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d at 740 (quoting Mid-West Fed. Sav. Bank v. Epperson, 579 N.E.2d 124, 129 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)[, reh'g denied]).

Thus, “Trial Rule 60(B) is meant to afford relief from circumstances which could not have been discovered during the period a motion to correct error could have been filed.” Bello v. Bello, 102 N.E.3d 891, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “Any issue which was raised by, or could have been raised by, [a] timely motion to correct error and [a] timely direct appeal may not be [the] subject of motion for relief from judgment.” Cullison v. Medley, 619 N.E.2d 937, 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), [reh'g denied,] trans. denied.

Eminger v. State, 204 N.E.3d 926, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (internal brackets omitted), reh'g denied.

[18] It goes without saying that when a party seeks relief from an order before the deadline to file a motion to correct error has passed, the grounds asserted for relief could “have been discovered during the period a motion to correct error could have been filed ․” Bello, 102 N.E.3d at 894. Thus, a necessary corollary to the rule expressed in Eminger is that a party may not seek relief under Trial Rule 60(B) when she still has time to file a motion to correct error or a direct appeal. Yet, here, Mother filed her Rule 60(B) motion on September 22, 2025—just nineteen days after the September 3 modification order and eleven days before her October 3 deadline to file a motion to correct error or notice of appeal. See T.R. 59(C) (“The motion to correct error ․ must be filed not later than thirty ․ days after the entry of a final judgment ․”); App. R. 9(A)(1) (“A party initiates an appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal ․ within thirty ․ days after the entry of a Final Judgment ․”). Mother's attempt to invoke Trial Rule 60(B) was therefore procedurally improper.

[19] Because relief was not available to Mother under Trial Rule 60(B), she is wrong that “[t]he trial court's failure to conduct a hearing on [her] ․ motion before denying it constitute[d] an abuse of discretion.” Appellant's Br. at 22. As this Court has explained, “[h]earings are required under Indiana Trial Rule 60(D), except where the motion lacks ‘pertinent’ evidence to support it.” Holland v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 171 N.E.3d 684, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Integrated Home Techs., Inc. v. Draper, 724 N.E.2d 641, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)) (emphasis added), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Thus, a court may deny a Rule 60(B) motion without a hearing if holding one would be futile, meaning “there is no evidence which could be pertinent to the allegations of the motion because such allegations, even if true, would not warrant the relief sought.” Darling v. Martin, 827 N.E.2d 1199, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Schaller, 299 N.E.2d 625, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973)), reh'g denied. As noted above, Rule 60(B) was the wrong procedural mechanism for Mother to challenge the custody modification order, so a hearing would have been futile. The trial court did not err in denying Mother's Rule 60(B) motion without a hearing.

[20] Furthermore, to the extent the court erred in handling Mother's Rule 60(B) motion, that error was harmless for the same reasons discussed in Section 1. Though the court denied Mother's Rule 60(B) motion, she was not precluded from later seeking relief from the September 3 order through her motion to correct error. Thus, Mother has not shown prima facie error in the court's denial of relief under Rule 60(B).

3. Motion to Correct Error

[21] Finally, Mother argues the trial court erred in denying her motion to correct error because the “custody modification order is void for lack of personal jurisdiction due to Father's failure to properly serve Mother with notice of the hearing ․” Appellant's Br. at 19. The denial of a motion to correct error is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, which “occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Coronado v. Coronado, 243 N.E.3d 1121, 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Watson, 70 N.E.3d 380, 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)). When, as here, a motion to correct error involves questions of law, we review those questions de novo. Id.; LinkAmerica Corp. v. Cox, 857 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Ind. 2006) (“As with other questions of law, a determination of the existence of personal jurisdiction is entitled to de novo review by the appellate courts.”).

[22] Mother is correct that a judgment is void if it is rendered without personal jurisdiction and “[a] motion to correct error[ ] is a permissible vehicle to obtain relief from a void judgment.” Harris v. Harris, 922 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). But like her Trial Rule 60(B) motion, Mother's motion to correct error made a general allegation that she had not been notified of the hearing but did not specifically challenge the court's personal jurisdiction. Thus, for the same reasons outlined in Section 2, Mother has waived any such challenge on appeal.

[23] Waiver notwithstanding, Mother is incorrect that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over her “due to Father's failure to properly serve Mother with notice of the hearing as specifically ordered by the court.” Appellant's Br. at 16. To begin with, nothing in the record suggests Father was ordered to serve Mother with notice of the September 3 hearing. The scheduling order for that hearing instructed Father to “provide proof that the petition was served by certified mail and bring the green card to the hearing,” and the record is silent as to whether Father complied with that directive.⁵ Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 20 (emphasis added). As for notice of the hearing itself, the scheduling order indicated the clerk had sent notice to Mother via email.

[24] Regardless, even if we were to assume Father failed to serve the petition on Mother, that would not have deprived the court of personal jurisdiction. A court acquires personal jurisdiction over a person when she has been served with adequate service of process. Anderson v. Wayne Post 64, Am. Legion Corp., 4 N.E.3d 1200, 1206 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Here, the court acquired personal jurisdiction over Mother in November 2010 after it directed the Sheriff to serve her with a summons, which is a proper method of process service under Trial Rules 4 and 4.12(A).⁶ Various contempt and modification proceedings have been pending nearly continuously since, and Mother was not entitled to service of process for each new filing and order issued throughout the life of this case. Instead, she was entitled to service in the manner provided by Trial Rule 5(B). As a prior panel of this Court described:

Regarding service of process, Trial Rule 4(A) provides that “[t]he court acquires jurisdiction over a party or person who ․ is served with summons or enters an appearance ․”

Meanwhile, Trial Rule 5 pertains to the service of orders, pleadings, written motions, briefs, documents relating to discovery, and other written notices.

Lindsey v. De Groot Dairy LLC, 867 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (alteration in original), trans. denied.

[25] Trial Rule 5(B)(3) authorizes a clerk to “transmit notice of rulings, orders, or judgments required by Trial Rule 72(D) by electronic means ․ to unrepresented parties who have supplied the Court with an e-mail address for service.” Since Mother provided the court with her email address in August 2023, the clerk properly served her with subsequent orders via email—including the scheduling order for the September 3 hearing. Indeed, as the court remarked at the start of the hearing, “We sent notice to [Mother's] e-mail address. She had proper notice.” Tr. at 4. Mother has therefore failed to make a prima facie showing that she was not notified of the modification hearing. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of Mother's motion to correct error.

Conclusion

[26] For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The disposition of most of those filings is not clear from the materials transmitted to us on appeal, as Mother's appendix does not contain any documents pre-dating the present custody dispute. We've ascertained much of the history of this case by reviewing the limited information available on the Chronological Case Summary. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 3-15.

2.   Despite Father's claim that he possessed those documents and brought them to the hearing, no exhibits were offered or admitted at the hearing.

3.   Mother raised two additional contentions in her statement of the issues and summary of the argument, specifically: (1) the trial court failed “to consider the wishes of the parties’ fifteen-year-old child” when it modified custody and (2) she “is entitled to appellate attorney fees and costs under Indiana Code § 31-15-10-1 and/or Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E) due to Father's procedural misconduct.” Appellant's Br. at 11. Mother did not, however, address these issues in the argument section of her brief or otherwise develop a cogent argument supporting them, so they have been waived, and we do not address them. See Woodson v. Randall, ___ N.E.3d ___, 2026 WL 201925, at *7 n.13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (finding an issue waived and declining to address it when a party raised it in her summary of the argument but, among other things, “did not expand upon [it] in her [a]rgument”); see also Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (“The argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning.”).

4.   In any event, we hold that the trial court did have personal jurisdiction over Mother for the reasons discussed below in Section 3.

5.   Indeed, despite ordering Father to bring proof of service of the petition to the September 3 hearing, the trial court proceeded with the hearing without confirming whether Father complied with that order.

6.   Mother makes no claim that she was not served with that summons.

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.