Justin C. Gasaway, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Justin C. Gasaway was convicted of murder and Level 6 felony battery resulting in moderate bodily injury and sentenced to a total of 70 years. He now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in the admission and exclusion of evidence, that the evidence is insufficient to support his murder conviction, and that there are errors in the sentencing documents. We affirm the murder conviction but remand for correction of the sentencing documents.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2019, Gasaway lived with his mother, Gail Gasaway, at her home in Terre Haute. Gail, who is an amputee and is bedridden, hired Alexa Campbell as an in-home caretaker, and Campbell and Gasaway began dating. At the end of 2019, Brian Nicholls, who'd previously worked with Gasaway, was staying at Gail's house. Before then, Nicholls was homeless. While living at a homeless shelter, Nicholls had met and become friends with Bryan Owen, who also happened to be a distant cousin of Gasaway's father.

[3] On the night of January 1, 2020, Owen went to Gail's house to see Nicholls and was “very, very drunk.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 198. He and Nicholls talked on the front porch, and he was slurring his words. When Gasaway saw Owen, he was “ticked” and “didn't want him there.” Id. at 203. Owen said he was tired, laid down on the porch, and passed out. Gasaway kicked Owen in the head and in the side, but Owen didn't respond. Gasaway told Nicholls, who was still on the porch, to go inside with Gail and “said he would take care of it.” Id.

[4] Gasaway had to work that night and was getting a ride from his coworker, Anthony Lee. While on his way to pick up Gasaway, Lee called him to tell him to be ready. Gasaway was “very irritated” and said that “this f-in bum better get off his porch or [Lee was] going to see some real shit.” Id. at 162. Lee hung up but called Gasaway back a few minutes later when he was almost at the house, and Gasaway said, “[D]ude, I think this guy's dead.” Id. at 164. Gasaway went inside and told Gail that he and Nicholls had tried to wake Owen up, but Owen didn't have a pulse. Gail called 911 and reported that a man had been sleeping on her porch, but then her son and a friend “took his pulse and he's cold and they said that he, they got no pulse and they think he's dead.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 12.

[5] When Lee arrived at Gasaway's house, “there was a gentlem[a]n that was obviously deceased on his porch.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 164. Lee checked Owen's pulse but couldn't feel one, so he called 911 from the porch. The operator instructed Lee to perform CPR, which he did. First responders arrived, found Owen in cardiac arrest, and took over CPR. A “bystander” (presumably Gasaway) told first responders that “they found [Owen] unconscious on the porch,” “and then twenty (20) minutes later, they found [him] in cardiac arrest.” Id. at 227, 229.

[6] Paramedics took Owen to the hospital. They continued CPR in the ambulance but never got a heartbeat. The paramedics also noticed “significant trauma” to Owen's body, including facial swelling and distension of his abdomen. Id. at 232. At the hospital, emergency-room personnel discovered that Owen had a stab wound in the upper left part of his back. Owen was pronounced dead shortly thereafter. Later that same night, after learning that Owen had been stabbed, detectives went to Gail's house. They interviewed Gail, and she signed a consent to search. Detective Kenny Murphy noticed a cardboard box with a knife sticking out of it. He asked Gail how long the knife had been there and where it came from, and she said Gasaway had put the knife in the box that night. Both the knife and the box had blood on them. Detective Murphy took the box with the knife still in it to the crime lab. The crime-scene technician collected numerous other knives from the house.

[7] Forensic pathologist Dr. Roland Kohr performed the autopsy and determined that the cause of Owen's death was the stab wound, which was three to four inches deep. The weapon perforated the posterior chest wall between the first and second ribs, penetrated the apex of the left upper lobe of the lung, and caused a hemothorax and hemorrhage adjacent to the external jugular. The stab wound was “a couple of inches” from Owen's heart but didn't reach the heart. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 240. Based on the appearance of the wound, Dr. Kohr concluded that Owen was stabbed with a double-edged blade. Of the knives recovered from Gail's house, the knife that was stuck into the cardboard box was the only one with a double-edged blade, so Dr. Kohr ruled out the rest of the knives as the murder weapon. The double-edged knife and the box were later tested at the Indiana State Police Laboratory. Testing revealed Owen's blood was on the box and the blade of the knife and Gasaway's DNA was on the knife handle.

[8] The State charged Gasaway with murder and Level 6 felony battery resulting in moderate bodily injury and alleged that he is a habitual offender.¹ After Gasaway was arrested and charged, Campbell, who was still working as Gail's caretaker, “wanted to prove [Gasaway] innocent,” so she “start[ed] to look into things.” Id. at 77, 78. Campbell “talked to several people,” including Gail, about what happened the night Owen died. Id. at 78. Gail told Campbell that, on the night of the murder, she saw Gasaway with a knife in his hand and saw him stick the knife in the cardboard box.

[9] At trial, though, Gail testified that she didn't remember making such statements to Campbell. Gail also said she didn't recall telling detectives she'd seen Gasaway stick the knife in the box that night. She acknowledged that the knife was Gasaway's and that he'd stuck it in the box, but she said she “thought it was in there for a long time.” Id. at 22. During Campbell's testimony, the State asked, “[W]hen you talked to Gail, did you talk to her about whether or not she saw the defendant carrying around a knife that night?” Id. at 79. Gasaway objected on hearsay grounds. The State responded that it was “not offering for the truth of the matter asserted” but “for impeachment purposes on Gail's testimony.” Id. The trial court allowed the State's question “in a very limited context” and noted that “it will only go to the credibility of [Gail].” Id. at 80. Campbell testified that Gail told her that she saw Gasaway with a knife in his hand on the night of the murder and that she saw him stick the knife in the box that night. The court instructed the jury that it could consider this testimony only “for credibility as to Gail Gasaway and how much weight, if any, ․ to give her testimony,” not “for the truth of the matter asserted.” Id. at 95-96.

[10] During direct examination of Detective Murphy, he began testifying about what Gail told him on the night of the murder when he asked her how long the knife had been in the box. Gasaway again made a hearsay objection. The State asked the court to instruct the jury to consider Detective Murphy's answer not for the truth of the matter asserted but to impeach Gail's trial testimony and to explain the course of the investigation. The court overruled Gasaway's objection and gave the limiting instruction. Detective Murphy testified that, on the night of the murder, Gail told him that Gasaway had put the knife in the box that night.

[11] Dr. Kohr testified that the type of stab wound Owen sustained “is survivable with prompt medical attention.” Id. at 242. He estimated that such an injury would be fatal after 30 minutes or more without proper trauma treatment. On cross-examination, Gasaway asked Dr. Kohr what concerns he had about the medical treatment Owen received. The State objected on relevancy grounds. Gasaway asserted that Owen's medical treatment was relevant to “the knowing and intentional” element of murder and to whether “the[re] were intervening circumstances that contributed to the death.” Tr. Vol. 4 p. 55. The State responded that, under Indiana case law, what kind of medical care a victim receives is irrelevant when the defendant's actions are the reason the victim needed medical care. The State also noted that the only cause of death was the stab wound, and Dr. Kohr didn't indicate that Owen's medical treatment was part of the cause of death. The court sustained the State's objection. In an offer of proof outside the jury's presence, Dr. Kohr said that if Owen's stab wound had been discovered before he got to the hospital, his treatment by the paramedics and when he first arrived in the emergency room might've been different. Dr. Kohr explained what the course of treatment would've been and opined that this “would have increased [Owen's] chances” of survival, although he noted that there's “no way of saying” whether “it [would] have definitely saved him.” Id. at 59.

[12] The jury found Gasaway guilty as charged, and Gasaway admitted to being a habitual offender. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total sentence of 70 years, with 60 years executed and 10 years suspended, as follows: (1) 60 years for murder with 6 years suspended, enhanced by 10 years for being a habitual offender, with 4 of those 10 years suspended, and (2) 2 years for Level 6 felony battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, all suspended and concurrent to the sentence for murder. But the written sentencing order and abstract of judgment list the 2-year sentence for battery as consecutive to the murder sentence instead of concurrent, and they don't designate that those 2 years are to be suspended. See Appellant's App. Vol. 3 pp. 70, 72. Additionally, the sentencing order includes the habitual-offender enhancement as an enhancement to the battery sentence instead of the murder sentence, and the abstract lists the habitual-offender enhancement as a separate conviction with its own sentence. See id.

[13] Gasaway now appeals.²

Discussion and Decision

I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission or exclusion of evidence

[14] Gasaway first argues that the trial court erred in excluding certain testimony and in admitting other testimony. Generally, trial courts have broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we review only for an abuse of that discretion. Chambless v. State, 119 N.E.3d 182, 188 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

A. Testimony about Owen's medical treatment

[15] Gasaway contends that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Kohr's testimony that if Owen's stab wound had been discovered sooner, his treatment may have been different, which would have increased his chances of survival. The trial court sustained the State's relevancy objection to this testimony. “Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.” Ind. Evidence Rule 402. Indiana Evidence Rule 401 provides that evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”

[16] To analyze relevancy here, we ask whether Dr. Kohr's testimony about Owen's medical treatment had any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the testimony. To convict Gasaway of murder, the State had to prove that he knowingly or intentionally killed Owen. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1); Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 28. “[I]t [i]s not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant's acts were the sole cause of the decedent's death.” Watson v. State, 658 N.E.2d 579, 580 (Ind. 1995). Rather, the State needed only prove that Gasaway's acts “contributed, whether mediately or immediately,” to Owen's death. Id. Gasaway argues that Dr. Kohr's testimony about Owen's medical treatment is relevant to causation and to whether the killing was knowing or intentional.

[17] Gasaway relies on Singh v. State, 203 N.E.3d 1116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). There, Singh missed a turn off a highway and reversed his semi-truck in the left lane of traffic. Another driver slammed into Singh's truck and died on impact, and Singh was charged with reckless homicide. At trial, the court excluded on relevancy grounds evidence that the victim had been reading and composing Snapchat messages in the minutes leading up to the crash and a line of questioning from the defense about whether distracted driving could've caused the crash. We reversed Singh's reckless-homicide conviction, holding that the excluded evidence was relevant and should've been admitted for the jury to “determine whether Singh's conduct was a proximate cause of [the victim's] death, whether he unjustifiably disregarded a risk of death, and ultimately whether Singh is guilty of reckless homicide.” Id. at 1123.

[18] We find Singh distinguishable for several reasons. First, while the jury there had to determine whether Singh's conduct was a proximate cause of the victim's death, there was no question here that Gasaway stabbing Owen caused Owen's death. The autopsy report lists one cause of death: “Stab wound to the chest.” Ex. 139. And Dr. Kohr was unequivocal in his testimony that the stab wound caused Owen's death. Gasaway claims that “[t]he failure to more quickly perform a full medical exam of Owen was an intervening circumstance.” Appellant's Br. p. 19. We disagree. “An intervening cause is an independent force that breaks the causal connection between the actions of the defendant and the injury.” Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 928 (Ind. 1999).³ Dr. Kohr testified that his review of Owen's emergency-room records didn't change his conclusions on the cause or manner of death, see Tr. Vol. 4 p. 79, so Owen's medical treatment didn't break the causal connection between Gasaway's conduct and Owen's injuries. We reject Gasaway's argument that Dr. Kohr's excluded testimony was relevant to causation.

[19] Additionally, while the excluded evidence in Singh related to events leading up to the fatal crash, Dr. Kohr's excluded testimony concerned only what happened after Gasaway stabbed Owen. Whether a person engaged in conduct knowingly or intentionally turns on the person's state of mind while engaging in the conduct, not on what happened after the conduct. “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). And “[a] person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Id. at (a). The quality of the medical care Owen received after Gasaway stabbed him doesn't make it any more or less probable that, at the time Gasaway stabbed Owen in the back, Gasaway either was aware of a high probability that he was killing Owen or had a conscious objective to do so.

[20] Finally, in Singh, we concluded that “without the introduction of the Snapchat evidence or the evidence about distracted driving, the jury did not have the full picture of this tragic situation.” 203 N.E.3d at 1123. Gasaway claims that if the jury had heard Dr. Kohr's testimony about the deficiencies in Owen's medical treatment, “the jury would have had a fuller picture of the circumstances contributing to Owen's death.” Appellant's Br. p. 18. But the jury already had the full picture here. The State elicited testimony from Dr. Kohr that the type of stab wound Owen sustained “is survivable with prompt medical attention” and that his injuries would be fatal after 30 minutes or more without proper trauma treatment. The jury also heard testimony that Owen's stab wound wasn't discovered until he was at the hospital. Thus, even without the excluded testimony, the jury was aware that Owen's injuries were potentially survivable if he'd received prompt medical treatment for his stab wound.

[21] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Kohr's testimony about Owen's medical treatment.

B. Gail's prior inconsistent statements

[22] Gasaway also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Campbell and Detective Murphy to testify about what Gail told them she saw the night Owen was killed. Gasaway claims this testimony is inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is a statement, not made by the declarant while testifying at trial, “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Evid. R. 801(c). But when a prior inconsistent statement is used to impeach a witness, the statement is not hearsay because it is not being used to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Martin v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1213, 1217 (Ind. 2000).

[23] “Extrinsic evidence of a witness's prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and an adverse party is given an opportunity to examine the witness about it[.]” Evid. R. 613(b). Here, Gail testified at trial that she didn't remember telling Campbell that she saw Gasaway with a knife on the night of the murder or that she saw Gasaway stick the knife in the box that night. Gail testified that she didn't know “[w]hy [Campbell would] say [Gail] said that,” and when the State asked if Campbell “just ma[d]e all of this up,” Gail said, “I couldn't see why she would.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 24. Gail also testified that she didn't recall telling detectives she'd seen Gasaway stick the knife into the cardboard box the night of the murder. And when the State asked Gail, “Would you have said that to the detectives?” Gail said, “I thought [the knife] was in there for a long time, I'm not sure though.” Id. at 22.

[24] To impeach this testimony by Gail, the State elicited (1) testimony from Campbell that Gail told her that she'd seen Gasaway with a knife in his hand that night and that she'd seen him stick the knife in the box that night and (2) testimony from Detective Murphy that, on the night of the murder, Gail told him Gasaway had put the knife in the box that night. Both times, the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider the testimony about Gail's prior statements only as to Gail's credibility and what weight to give her trial testimony, not for the truth of the matter asserted.⁴ Because the State offered Gail's prior inconsistent statements to impeach her credibility as a witness, not for their truth, the statements are not hearsay.

[25] Despite the trial court's limiting instructions, Gasaway contends that “[t]here was a strong likelihood the jury would consider [Campbell's and Detective Murphy's] testimony on what Gail Gasaway told [them] for its truth.” Appellant's Br. pp. 22, 23. But “[w]hen limiting instructions are given that certain evidence be considered for only a particular purpose, the law will presume that the jury will follow the court's admonitions.” Hernandez v. State, 785 N.E.2d 294, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. We give no weight to Gasaway's suggestion that the jury disregarded the court's clear instructions. The trial court did not err in admitting Gail's prior inconsistent statements.

II. The evidence is sufficient to support Gasaway's murder conviction

[26] Gasaway next argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for murder. When reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). We consider only the evidence supporting the verdict and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it. Id. We will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[27] For purposes of his sufficiency argument, Gasaway doesn't dispute that he stabbed Owen, which killed him. Rather, he claims that the State failed to prove he killed Owen knowingly or intentionally. But “[a] knowing or intentional killing may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.” Carr v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1153, 1154 (Ind. 2001). Our appellate courts have held that “a stabbing near the heart allows an inference of [a] knowing or intentional killing.” McEwen v. State, 695 N.E.2d 79, 90 (Ind. 1998); see, e.g., Eichelberger v. State, 773 N.E.2d 264, 266 (Ind. 2002) (where defendant stabbed victim in chest with knife and pierced his lung and heart, concluding there was sufficient evidence to find a knowing killing and rejecting defendant's argument that there was insufficient evidence to prove he was aware of a high probability that he was killing the victim); Pointer v. State, 585 N.E.2d 33, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (finding sufficient evidence of intent to kill where defendant “stabbed [the victim] in the chest, near his heart, to a depth of several inches”). Here, Gasaway stabbed Owen with a double-edged knife in his upper left back, about three or four inches deep and within “a couple of inches” of Owen's heart. Because Gasaway used the knife in a manner likely to cause death, the jury could infer that he knowingly or intentionally killed Owen.

[28] Gasaway tries to liken his case to Nunn v. State, 601 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. 1992), but the facts there are entirely distinguishable. In Nunn, the Supreme Court found insufficient evidence of an intent to kill where the defendant struck the victim once with his hands and the victim died of a severed vertebral artery, which is an unusual injury. Here, Gasaway didn't strike Owen with his hands; he stabbed him with a double-edged knife. And nothing in the record suggests that the injuries Owen sustained were at all unusual as a result of a stab wound. The evidence is sufficient to support Gasaway's murder conviction.

III. We remand for the trial court to correct the errors in the sentencing order and abstract of judgment

[29] Finally, Gasaway highlights that there are discrepancies in the trial court's oral and written sentencing statements. The State acknowledges these discrepancies and concedes that remand for correction of errors is appropriate.

[30] When oral and written sentencing statements conflict, we examine them together to discern the intent of the sentencing court. McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ind. 2007). Both parties acknowledge that, based on the trial court's remarks at the sentencing hearing, its “ultimate goal in sentencing” was a total term of 70 years: 60 years in the Department of Correction followed by 10 years of probation. Tr. Vol. 4 p. 218. To accomplish this, the court imposed the following sentence at the hearing: (1) 60 years for murder with 6 years suspended, enhanced by 10 years for being a habitual offender, with 4 of those 10 years suspended, and (2) 2 years for Level 6 felony battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, all suspended and concurrent to the sentence for murder. But the written sentencing order and abstract of judgment don't reflect this sentence—as written, they reflect a total term of 72 years rather than the intended 70. The sentencing documents list the 2-year sentence for battery as consecutive to the murder sentence instead of concurrent, they don't designate that those 2 years are to be suspended, and they don't include the habitual-offender enhancement as an enhancement to the murder sentence (the sentencing order lists it as an enhancement to the battery sentence and the abstract lists it as a separate conviction with its own sentence). See I.C. § 35-50-2-8(j) (“Habitual offender is a status that results in an enhanced sentence. It is not a separate crime and does not result in a consecutive sentence. The court shall attach the habitual offender enhancement to the felony conviction with the highest sentence imposed ․”).

[31] There is another error in the sentencing documents that neither party points out: the trial court suspended a portion of Gasaway's habitual-offender enhancement. Indiana's habitual-offender statute provides, in relevant part, “An additional term imposed under this subsection is nonsuspendible.” Id. at (i). The trial court was not permitted to suspend 4 of the 10 years of Gasaway's habitual-offender enhancement. However, the same outcome can be achieved by imposing a 10-year-habitual-offender enhancement (to be fully executed as required by statute) but suspending 10 of the 60 years of the sentence for the underlying murder conviction. See Howard v. State, 873 N.E.2d 685, 690-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that although the portion of a sentence imposed under the habitual-offender statute cannot be suspended, a trial court may suspend part of the sentence for the underlying conviction (as long as the sentence complies with the applicable sentencing statutes)).

[32] As for the remaining discrepancies, when faced with a conflict in oral and written sentencing statements, we may remand the case for correction of clerical errors if the sentencing court's intent is unambiguous. See Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh'g denied; Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 445 n.8 (Ind. 1999) (where written sentencing order was consistent with abstract of judgment but at odds with unambiguous oral pronouncement at sentencing hearing, concluding that abstract of judgment and sentencing order contained clerical errors and remanding for correction of errors). The parties agree that the trial court's intent was to impose a total sentence of 70 years with 10 years suspended. Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to correct the written sentencing order and abstract of judgment to reflect this intent as follows: (1) a total term of 70 years for murder—a 60-year sentence enhanced by 10 years for being a habitual offender—with 10 years suspended and (2) 2 years for Level 6 felony battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, all suspended and concurrent to the sentence for murder.

[33] Affirmed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State also charged Gasaway with Level 6 felony altering the scene of a death but dismissed that charge before trial.

2.   We held oral argument on March 3, 2026, at Griffith High School. We thank the school's administration, staff, and students for their hospitality, as well as counsel for their helpful advocacy.

3.   The trial court here relied on Wooley in sustaining the State's relevancy objection to Dr. Kohr's testimony. See Tr. Vol. 4 p. 67. Gasaway argues that this reliance was error because Wooley was a sufficiency-of-the-evidence case where the jury heard evidence about the victim's medical care, while the issue here is whether the excluded testimony is relevant evidence that the jury should have heard. But because we find that the evidence was properly excluded on several grounds, the trial court's reliance on Wooley does not warrant reversal. See Gauvin v. State, 878 N.E.2d 515, 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“[W]e will not reverse the trial court's decision to admit evidence if that decision is sustainable on any ground.”), trans. denied.

4.   The trial court allowed Detective Murphy's testimony about what Gail told him not only to impeach Gail's credibility but also to explain the course of the police investigation. See Tr. Vol. 3 p. 124. Gasaway argues that this, too, was an abuse of discretion. But because the trial court properly admitted the testimony as impeachment evidence, we need not consider whether the court erred in admitting it to explain the course of the investigation. See Gauvin, 878 N.E.2d at 520.

Vaidik, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Scheele, J., concur.