Danny J. Clark, Appellant-Petitioner v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Danny J. Clark appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following his convictions for murder, Level 4 felony arson, Level 6 felony abuse of a corpse, Level 6 felony residential entry, Level 6 felony auto theft, and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The underlying facts of this case are as follows:

Clark's nine-year relationship with Darlene Schultz ended in May 2018. That same month, Schultz obtained a no-contact order against Clark. In August, Clark went to Schultz's house to talk to her. Schultz was not home, so Clark broke into her home to wait for her. Unbeknownst to Clark, Schultz was out of the state visiting family. One afternoon, after Clark had been inhabiting Schultz's house for a few days, Schultz's current boyfriend, William Toosley, entered the house to do some work for Schultz. He was surprised to find Clark there. Clark forced Toosley onto the floor and then hit him in the head with a baseball bat at least five times, fracturing his skull in several places. The force of the impact drove the fractured skull pieces into Toosley's brain, killing him. Clark then set fire to the house and fled in Schultz's vehicle. Firefighters later found Toosley's charred body in the home.

Clark fled to Louisiana, where he was apprehended․

Clark v. State, No. 22A-CR-1423, 2023 WL 5664091, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2023) (mem.), trans. denied.

[3] After Clark was taken into custody, Indiana police officers went to Louisiana to interview him. Clark told police that he was asleep on Schultz's couch when Toosley entered the house, which “startled” him. Trial Tr. Vol. 5 p. 44. He admitted that he pointed a shotgun at Toosley and forced him to the ground. Then, “a scuffle ․ occurred” and Clark “struck [Toosley] in the back of the head,” but “he just wanted to knock him out.” Id. Clark said that Toosley was still moving, so he struck him again, and “then he knew that he had killed him” because Toosley stopped moving. Id. Clark also admitted to setting Schultz's house on fire and fleeing in her car.

[4] Dr. Thomas Sozio, a forensic pathologist, performed an autopsy. He determined that the fractures in Toosley's skull resulted from “a significant amount of force by a high-velocity heavy object hitting that particular area.” Id. at 100. Dr. Sozio “could tell there were multiple blows, not just one,” and “[t]hey all could be fatal.” Id. at 104. Due to the extent of the damage, Dr. Sozio sent Toosley's skull to Dr. Krista Latham, a forensic anthropologist, for reconstruction. Dr. Latham determined that there was one area of impact on the back-left side of the skull and “at least four impacts” on the right. Id. at 209. The impact on the left caused a “depressed fracture,” meaning the skull had “been pushed in” when the impact occurred. Id. at 208, 209. On the right side, the wounds “penetrated completely through the bones of the skull,” presumably “[i]nto the brain.” Id. at 210.

[5] The State charged Clark with murder, Level 4 felony arson, Level 6 felony abuse of a corpse, Level 6 felony residential entry, Level 6 felony auto theft, and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. The defense theory at trial was that although Clark struck Toosley's head multiple times, he acted under sudden heat—he “was under great stress at the time,” and “there was virtually no time for him to think ․ about what he was going to do next.” Trial Tr. Vol. 3 p. 92. After the parties rested, defense counsel requested a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder. The State objected, but the trial court agreed to give the instruction. During closing argument, defense counsel argued that Clark didn't intend to kill Toosley and, alternatively, “[I]f you do believe that he had an intent to kill[, find] that he was doing so under sudden heat.” Trial Tr. Vol. 6 p. 45.

[6] The jury found Clark guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to a total of 70 years. On direct appeal, we affirmed Clark's convictions, finding no error in the admission of evidence and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain his murder conviction. Clark, 2023 WL 5664091, at *6. Our Supreme Court denied transfer.

[7] In August 2024, Clark, pro se, petitioned for post-conviction relief, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on reckless homicide as a lesser-included offense of murder.¹ The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing in March 2025. Clark questioned his trial counsel about their discussions regarding whether to request jury instructions on lesser-included offenses of murder, including reckless homicide. Counsel said he'd told Clark that the “fact scenario really does not fit for a reckless homicide kind of situation”—Clark had broken into Schultz's house, was waiting for her to return when Toosley arrived, and struck Toosley in the head five times “with sufficient strength of violence to fracture his skull each and every time that [he] hit him.” P-C Tr. p. 12. Counsel recalled explaining to Clark before trial that it would've been “very difficult for [him] as an attorney” to argue that Clark acted recklessly “without it also being knowingly.” Id. Clark presented no other evidence at the hearing.

[8] After the hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, concluding that Clark failed to prove that his trial counsel was ineffective.

[9] Clark, still pro se, now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Clark contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition. A defendant who petitions for post-conviction relief bears the burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Hollowell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 263, 268-69 (Ind. 2014). A petitioner appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief must show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Id. at 269. “Although we do not defer to the post-conviction court's legal conclusions, a post-conviction court's findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation omitted).

I. There is no error in the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law

[11] Clark first argues that the post-conviction court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law in ruling on his petition.² Indiana's post-conviction rules require the court to “make specific findings of fact, and conclusions of law on all issues presented.” Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). “These findings must communicate the basis upon which the petition is granted or denied, and must be sufficient for review on appeal.” Rose v. State, 120 N.E.3d 262, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. Even if a post-conviction court's findings are deficient, remand is not necessary where the underlying facts are not in dispute and the issues are sufficiently presented for our review. Grigsby v. State, 503 N.E.2d 394, 397 (Ind. 1987) (“Although the order of the judge at the post-conviction hearing was general in nature and lacked specificity, we do not find that a remand for more specific findings is warranted since the facts underlying appellant's claims are not disputed and the issues are sufficiently presented for review.”).

[12] The facts underlying Clark's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim are undisputed. In rejecting this claim, the post-conviction court made the following findings:

3. The Court finds [defense counsel's] testimony is credible and [defense counsel's] representation of Mr. Clark was well above even a reasonable standard for representation.

4. The Court further finds Mr. Clark present[ed] no evidence at all to show any probability that but for those claimed errors, the result would have been different.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 8. These findings convey the post-conviction court's basis for denying Clark's petition and sufficiently present the issue for our review. See King v. State, 499 N.E.2d 213, 214 (Ind. 1986) (“While it is true that the trial court's findings were quite brief, it is plain enough that the decision was based on the conclusion that appellant had not provided sufficient evidence to carry his burden of proof.”), reh'g denied. The post-conviction court made adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law in compliance with Post-Conviction Rule 1(6).

II. The post-conviction court did not err in concluding that Clark failed to prove his trial counsel was ineffective

[13] Clark also argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that his trial counsel was not ineffective. When evaluating a defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, we apply the well-known, two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 282 (Ind. 2022), reh'g denied. The defendant must prove: (1) counsel's performance was deficient based on prevailing professional norms and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, meaning there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 282-83.

[14] Clark contends that because his trial counsel “argued from the outset of the trial that Clark ․ did not intend to kill [Toosley], it was clearly deficient performance for counsel not to request the lesser included offense of reckless homicide.” Appellant's Br. p. 18. But “failure to submit an instruction is not deficient performance if the court would have refused the instruction anyway.” Rouster v. State, 705 N.E.2d 999, 1009 (Ind. 1999), reh'g denied. In determining whether to instruct the jury on a lesser offense that is either inherently or factually included in the crime charged, the trial court considers whether a serious evidentiary dispute exists such that the jury could conclude that the lesser offense was committed but not the greater. McDowell v. State, 102 N.E.3d 924, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.

[15] Reckless homicide is an inherently included offense of murder, as the only element distinguishing the two is the mens rea. Evans v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1072, 1082 (Ind. 2000). That is, a person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being commits murder, I.C. § 35-42-1-1, while a person who recklessly kills another human being commits reckless homicide, I.C. § 35-42-1-5. “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). And “[a] person engages in conduct ‘recklessly’ if he engages in the conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.” Id. at (c).

[16] There is no serious evidentiary dispute as to whether Clark killed Toosley knowingly or intentionally as opposed to merely recklessly. As Clark's trial counsel testified at the post-conviction hearing, the “fact scenario really does not fit for a reckless homicide kind of situation,” and it would've been “very difficult for [him] as an attorney” to argue that Clark acted recklessly “without it also being knowingly.” Clark forced Toosley to the ground at gunpoint and then struck him in the head with a baseball bat multiple times, fracturing his skull.³ Dr. Latham, the forensic anthropologist who reconstructed Toosley's skull, determined that there were at least five areas of impact. There was a “depressed fracture” on the left, meaning the skull had “been pushed in” when it was struck. On the right side, the wounds “penetrated completely through the bones of the skull,” presumably “[i]nto the brain.” Dr. Sozio, the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy, concluded that the fractures in Toosley's skull resulted from “a significant amount of force by a high-velocity heavy object” and that any one of the blows could have been fatal. Given the nature of Toosley's injuries and the amount of force needed to inflict them, even if Clark's trial counsel had requested a reckless-homicide instruction, the trial court would not have given it. See McDowell, 102 N.E.3d at 933 (“[T]he victim was so savagely beaten that there was no serious evidentiary dispute that McDowell acted recklessly without also acting knowingly. Thus, the trial court would properly have rejected such an instruction had one been requested ․”). Counsel's failure to request a reckless-homicide instruction did not amount to deficient performance.

[17] For the same reasons, Clark cannot show prejudice because there is no reasonable probability that, had his trial counsel tendered a reckless-homicide instruction, the jury would have found Clark guilty of reckless homicide instead of murder. See Warner v. State, 577 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that Warner was not prejudiced by trial counsel's decision not to tender instructions on lesser-included offenses where facts supported conviction for greater offense). Given the facts described above, no reasonable person could have found that Clark killed Toosley only recklessly as opposed to knowingly or intentionally. See McDowell, 102 N.E.3d at 932 (“[E]ven if the reckless homicide instruction had been given, there is no reasonable possibility that the jury would have concluded that McDowell only recklessly, as opposed to knowingly, killed [the victim], given the extent of her injuries.”).

[18] Clark has failed to show that his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a jury instruction on reckless homicide. The post-conviction court therefore did not err in denying Clark relief.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Clark's petition for post-conviction relief included several other claims, but Clark does not raise these issues on appeal.

2.   While this appeal was pending, Clark filed a “Motion to Temporarily Stay Proceedings and Remand for Issuance of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.” Case No. 25A-PC-827 (June 18, 2025 docket entry). We denied the motion.

3.   Clark claims “there was no evidence introduced at trial that a baseball bat was actually used in the attack in order reasonably infer same [sic].” Appellant's Br. p. 7. This is incorrect—evidence was presented that, in 2020, Clark admitted to hitting Toosley with a baseball bat, see Tr. Vol. 5 pp. 242-43, and that a baseball bat was missing from Schultz's house after the fire, see Tr. Vol. 3 p. 148, Tr. Vol. 5 pp. 5-9, 15-16.

Vaidik, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.