Daniel Michaels, Appellant-Petitioner v. Kristen Rae Michaels, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Daniel Michaels (“Husband”) appeals the Morgan Superior Court's dissolution decree ending his marriage to Kristen Rae Michaels (“Wife”). Husband presents three issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as two issues:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it divided the marital estate.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Husband to pay some of Wife's attorney fees.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Shortly after Husband and Wife started dating in June 2024, Wife moved into Husband's house. In August, Wife sold her house, and Wife paid the mortgage payment on Husband's house. Shortly after they married in September, Wife learned that Husband was “almost four months behind on the mortgage.” Tr. p. 24. Husband later admitted to Wife that he had been too “ashamed” to tell her about the missed payments before the wedding. Ex. p. 66.

[4] Because of a bad credit score, Husband was unable to secure financing to catch up on the mortgage payments. Accordingly, Wife got a loan “in [her] name” for $18,000 from One Main Financial (“One Main loan”). Tr. p. 24. Wife also opened an Apple credit card account (“Apple card”) in her name, and Husband used that credit card to buy things he needed to start a new plumbing business.

[5] In May 2025, Husband filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage. At the final hearing, Wife submitted her Exhibit A, which set out the parties’ assets and liabilities and proffered a fifty-fifty division of the marital estate. Exhibit A listed Husband's assets as: the marital residence, valued at $536,300 with a mortgage of $533,303; a “Promaster” van worth $13,000; and a Nissan Altima worth $3,500. Exhibit A listed Wife's assets as: a Hyundai Tucson worth $926; a GMC Acadia worth $4,480; and a checking account with a balance of $3,934.47. Wife proposed that Husband would assume the One Main loan and the Apple card debt, totaling $26,315.41, and she would assume the remaining marital debt, totaling $33,255.32. Thus, Exhibit A proffered that Wife's net share of the marital estate would be negative $23,914.77, and Husband's net share of the marital estate would be negative $6,818.77. Exhibit A included an equalization payment from Husband to Wife to achieve a fifty-fifty division.

[6] Husband, pro se, did not object to Wife's Exhibit A other than to allege that it erroneously excluded $15,000 of his credit card debt. Notably, Husband did not object to the inclusion of Wife's student loan debt in the marital estate, which she had incurred prior to the marriage.

[7] Wife's Exhibit A shows that the marital estate has a total value of negative $30,733.54 and, again, proffered a fifty-fifty split of the net estate. In the decree, however, the trial court did not adopt an equal division of the marital estate. Instead, the court awarded the marital residence and its mortgage to Husband; ordered each party to keep his/her own personal property; and ordered each party to be responsible for any debt in his/her name, with the following exceptions:

a. That Husband be responsible for the One Main Financial Debt and the Apple Credit Card. The court finds husband[’]s arguments and requests as to the division of this debt to be unpersuasive given the evidence as to the creation and use of the funds during the marriage. The court finds him being responsible for this debt to be fair and equitable as to the division of this debt and the other assets. Husband shall be responsible for the payments associated with the debts immediately, and shall refinance the debts, and otherwise remove them from Wife's [n]ame within sixty (180) [sic] days.

b. That Husband shall reimburse Wife $1,056.56 for monies that she spent on the One Main Financial Debt while this matter was pending and another $575 for monies that Wife spent on the Apple Card payments on a preliminary basis.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 7. Accordingly, Wife assumed the debts in her own name, which totaled $33,255.32, and Husband was obligated to pay the balances on the One Main loan and the Apple Card debt which totaled $26,315.41. Balanced against the parties’ assets, Wife's net share of the marital estate was negative $23,914.77, and Husband's net share was negative $6,818.77.

[8] The trial court further concluded that Wife had rejected an equalization payment from Husband.¹ Accordingly, the trial court divided the marital estate unequally. The trial court also ordered Husband to pay $2,000 of Wife's attorney's fees. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Division of Marital Estate

[9] Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined which assets and liabilities should be included in the marital estate and when it did not “deviate[ ] from an equal division” in light of the short duration of his marriage to Wife. Appellant's Br. at 15. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. Therefore, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: first, we consider whether the evidence supports the findings; and, second, we consider whether the findings of fact support the judgment. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 103 N.E.3d 690, 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. We will set aside findings only if they are clearly erroneous, which occurs if the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference. Id. To determine that a trial court's findings or conclusions are clearly erroneous, this court's review of the evidence must leave it with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Campbell v. Campbell, 993 N.E.2d 205, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[10] Our review of family law matters is conducted with a preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges. Anselm v. Anselm, 146 N.E.3d 1042, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

Appellate deference to the determinations of our trial court judges, especially in domestic relations matters, is warranted because of their unique, direct interactions with the parties face-to-face, often over an extended period of time. Thus enabled to assess credibility and character through both factual testimony and intuitive discernment, our trial judges are in a superior position to ascertain information and apply common sense․

Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011). “It is not enough on appeal that the evidence might support some other conclusion; rather, the evidence must positively require the result sought by the appellant.” Hamilton, 103 N.E.3d at 694. “Accordingly, we will not substitute our own judgment if any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court's judgment.” Id.

[11] As our Supreme Court has explained,

[t]he division of marital property in Indiana involves a two-step process. First, the trial court must identify the property to include in the marital estate. O'Connell v. O'Connell, 889 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). This consists of both assets and liabilities, Miller v. Miller, 763 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), and encompasses “all marital property,” whether acquired by a spouse before the marriage or during the marriage or procured by the parties jointly, Eads[ v. Eads], 114 N.E.3d [868,] 873[ (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)].

Once the court identifies the marital estate, it must then distribute the property in a “just and reasonable” manner. O'Connell, 889 N.E.2d at 10-11 (citing I.C. § 31-15-7-5). Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5 (the Division-of-Property Statute) calls for a presumptive equal division between the parties. A party, however, may rebut this presumption with “relevant evidence” showing “that an equal division would not be just and reasonable.” This evidence may include

• each spouse's contribution to the property's acquisition, regardless of whether the contribution produced any income;

• the extent to which a spouse acquired property, either before the marriage or through inheritance or gift;

• each spouse's economic circumstances at the time of divorce;

• the parties’ conduct during the marriage, as it related to the disposal or dissipation of assets; and

• the parties’ respective earnings or earning ability.

I.C. §§ 31-15-7-5(1)-(5).

This statutory list is nonexclusive, see I.C. § 31-15-7-5, and no single factor controls the division of property, McBride v. McBride, 427 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). The trial court may, for example, consider the length of the parties’ marriage in dividing the marital pot. Webb v. Schleutker, 891 N.E.2d 1144, 1154 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). A short-lived marriage may rebut the presumption favoring equal division, especially if one party brought substantially more property into the marriage. Houchens v. Boschert, 758 N.E.2d 585, 591 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 226-27 (Ind. 2022).

[12] Husband first contends that the trial court should have divided the marital estate unequally in light of the short duration of the marriage. But Husband's argument turns on his miscalculation of the court's division of the marital estate. Rather than implementing the fifty-fifty split shown on Wife's Exhibit A, the court did not order Husband to make an equalization payment to Wife, and the result was an unequal division of the negative value of the marital estate. Specifically, the court allocated seventy-eight percent of the negative net balance to Wife and only twenty-two percent to Husband. Accordingly, Husband's contention on this issue is entirely without merit.

[13] Husband makes several other arguments that are based on his fundamental misunderstanding of the court's division of marital assets and debts in the decree. For instance, Husband asserts that “[t]he [marital] residence should be set over completely to Husband and the student loan debt set over to Wife solely.” Appellant's Br. at 15. That is exactly what the trial court did. The only debt in Wife's name that the trial court assigned to Husband was the One Main loan and the Apple Card debt, and Wife presented evidence that those debts were incurred by Husband. Indeed, Wife presented evidence that the bulk of the One Main loan was used to pay Husband's overdue mortgage payments he had incurred before the marriage and that Husband used the Apple Card for purchases related to his plumbing business. We will not reweigh this evidence on appeal.

[14] Husband's remaining arguments on appeal pertain to the inclusion or exclusion of certain assets and debts in Wife's Exhibit A. But Husband made no objection to that exhibit other than to argue that he had $15,000 in credit card debt that was not included in the exhibit. Husband's objection stated as follows:

[THE COURT:] ․ Just to draw your attention to exhibit A, since we're still on your case, do you agree at least that this is the list of assets and vehicles and accounts and debts, is there any missing?

[Husband]: My credit cards are not on here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And how much is it?

[Husband]: Roughly $15,000.

THE COURT: Anything else you want to tell me, sir?

[Husband]: No Your Honor.

Tr. p. 21. On appeal, Husband merely argues that the trial court should have included this debt in the marital estate because “Wife did not dispute” the debt. Appellant's Br. at 13. But Husband did not present any evidence to the trial court that this alleged credit card debt was incurred prior to the marriage, during the marriage, or since the dissolution petition was filed. Without any evidence that the alleged debt is a marital debt, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded it from the marital estate.

[15] In any event, as the trial court pointed out in the decree, even considering the $15,000 in credit card debt, Husband would still owe Wife an equalization payment, which Wife has rejected. In other words, any error in the exclusion of the $15,000 in Husband's credit card debt from the marital balance sheet is harmless.²

[16] It is well settled that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal. See Husainy v. Granite Mgmt., LLC, 132 N.E.3d 486, 500 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Husband's sole objection to Exhibit A was the exclusion of the $15,000 in credit card debt, and he cannot now complain that the trial court abused its discretion when it included or excluded other items in/from the marital estate. Husband has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion when it divided the marital estate.

Issue Two: Attorney's Fees

[17] Husband also contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay $2,000 of Wife's attorney's fees. The trial court's decision concerning an award of attorney's fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Minser v. DeKalb Cnty. Plan Comm'n, 170 N.E.3d 1093, 1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's decision either clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or misinterprets the law.” Id.

[18] Typically, under the American Rule, both parties pay their own fees. Id. “In the absence of statutory authority or an agreement between the parties to the contrary—or an equitable exception—a prevailing party has no right to recover attorney fees from the opposition.” Id. (citation omitted).

[19] Indiana Code section 31-15-10-1(a) provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he court periodically may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding” stemming from a dissolution of marriage, including “attorney's fees.”

“In determining whether to award attorney's fees in a dissolution proceeding, trial courts should consider the parties’ resources, their economic condition, their ability to engage in gainful employment and earn income, and other factors bearing on the reasonableness of the award. A party's misconduct that directly results in additional litigation expenses may also be considered. Consideration of these factors promotes the legislative purpose behind the award of attorney's fees, which is to ensure that a party who would not otherwise be able to afford an attorney is able to retain representation. When one party is in a superior position to pay fees over the other party, an award is proper.”

Haggarty v. Haggarty, 176 N.E.3d 234, 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Eads v. Eads, 114 N.E.3d 868, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)).

[20] Here, again, the trial court awarded Wife $2,000 in attorney's fees. Husband maintains that he and Wife have approximately the same income. And he argues that the evidence shows that he cannot afford to pay any of Wife's attorney's fees in light of his concurrent obligation to assume more than $20,000 in marital debt.

[21] But Wife argues that the attorney's fee award is reasonable in light of Husband's dishonesty with her about his finances prior to the marriage. And Wife emphasizes Husband's testimony that he currently earns between $5,000 and $6,000 per month in addition to his $1,800 in monthly disability benefits. Wife, on the other hand, only earns $3,400 per month. Given the parties’ disparate incomes, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Husband to pay $2,000 of Wife's attorney's fees.

[22] For all these reasons, we affirm the trial court's division of the marital estate and attorney's fee award.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Wife's Exhibit A showed that Husband would pay her an equalization payment of $8,548 to achieve an equal division of the marital estate.

2.   The inclusion of this debt would still result in an unequal division of the marital estate in Husband's favor.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.