IN RE: P.R. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] T.R. (“Mother”) and A.R. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the determination that their child, P.R. (“Child”), was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). Parents present the following consolidated and restated issues:

I. Whether sufficient evidence supported the CHINS adjudication; and

II. Whether the trial court erred in requiring Parents to reimburse DCS for certain expenses related to Child.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Child was born to Parents in November 2022. As of early 2025, Child lived with Parents in Shelby County. The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) was familiar with Mother because, due to her methamphetamine-related criminal cases, substance abuse, and noncompliance with court-ordered services, Mother's parental rights were terminated in 2021 as to two older children (who were not Father's biological children). DCS was also aware that the police had responded to Parents’ home on reports of domestic violence.

[4] On March 29, 2025, the police stopped Parents’ vehicle and called DCS. Family case manager Madelyn Davis (“FCM Davis”) went to the scene and spoke with Parents. She also spoke with Parents’ neighbor, who had helped by watching Child while the police were present. The neighbor took two pictures of Child and gave them to FCM Davis. The pictures captured Child wearing filthy clothing with dirt caked on her arms, legs, and face. In one picture, Child's hair was pulled back to reveal a large bruise on her forehead. Parents agreed to follow DCS to its office to complete a safety plan. DCS also spoke with Child's maternal grandmother (“Grandmother”), who confirmed that Child's bruise came from tripping on loose carpet, not from physical abuse.

[5] Mother went into the DCS office, but Father initially remained in the vehicle. When Father came inside to sign the safety plan, he exhibited slurred speech and had difficulty following the conversation, which led DCS to suspect that Father was intoxicated. Mother agreed to a drug screen and the results came back on April 10, 2025, with Mother testing positive for methamphetamine. Concerned that Child lacked a sober caregiver, DCS tried to get in touch with Parents through unannounced visits to the home, but no one came to the door.

[6] On May 1, 2025, DCS requested emergency detention of Child. The trial court granted the request on May 5, 2025. DCS then filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. DCS alleged that Child was two years old and “depends on a caregiver for necessary supervision and care 24 hours per day.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 p. 27. DCS further alleged that it “attempted to provide services without filing a CHINS case”; however, due to Father's “relapse using drugs,” Mother's “current [m]ethamphetamine use,” and “the history of neglecting children and drug abuse,” Child “will not receive necessary supervision and care without the intervention of the court.” Id. DCS added that it was “requesting a Child Support Order to be entered for [Mother] and [Father] in an amount to be determined at [the] [d]ispositional [h]earing.” Id. at 28. The trial court held the initial/detention hearing on May 6, 2025. Meanwhile, Child was removed and placed with Grandmother. A fact-finding hearing was scheduled, and Parents were each appointed counsel. Around this time, a permanency family case manager, Beth Bean (“FCM Bean”), was assigned to the case and took over for FCM Davis. Mother denied using illegal substances and claimed that sexual intercourse with Father caused her to test positive for methamphetamine. Father later informed DCS that he had relapsed and used methamphetamine the day before Child's removal.

[7] After DCS filed the CHINS petition, Parents agreed to participate in random drug screening, where DCS planned to test Father once or twice per week and test Mother once per week. At this time, Parents each had prescriptions for suboxone to help with their sobriety. Father participated in drug screens on May 15, May 20, May 21, May 22, May 27, and June 5, 2025. All samples tested positive for THC, and the sample from May 27 also tested positive for methamphetamine. Mother admitted to ongoing THC use, reporting that she purchased THC gummies and vapes from a convenience store. During random screening, there was no evidence Mother tested positive for methamphetamine.

[8] On May 21, 2025, FCM Bean held a child and family team meeting, where there was a discussion about different services DCS could provide the family. Parents agreed to keep participating in drug screening and undergo substance abuse assessments. Father also agreed to participate in a batterer's intervention program while Mother agreed to participate in a program for victims of domestic violence. At a subsequent meeting, Father said that he did not agree to the services and “was being made to do those things.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 103.

[9] The fact-finding hearing was held on June 30, 2025, where there was testimony from Parents, Grandmother, FCM Davis, FCM Bean, and a DCS supervisor. Grandmother provided background on the dynamic between Parents, noting that she had observed Parents together for five years and had “seen them both in their good times and in their bad times.” Id. at 44. Grandmother had witnessed Parents’ struggles with addiction over the years. She had also witnessed volatility in Parents’ relationship related to an “inability to know how to control the emotion and just talk things out or walk away.” Id. Grandmother thought that some of Parents’ issues stemmed from grief. She noted that Mother experienced the death of a child shortly after childbirth, and a different witness testified that Father's son was killed by a dog. Grandmother said Father needed help with his “unbelievable ․ mental health needs,” and she suspected that Mother had untreated mental health needs as well. Id. at 43. Grandmother had been supervising visits, which were going well, and she ultimately felt that “with services, with help, [Parents] can make it.” Id. at 44.

[10] At the hearing, Mother maintained that she had not used methamphetamine and that the positive drug test resulted from sexual intercourse with Father. She agreed that Father needed mental health services and explained that, at some point in childhood, Father was diagnosed as schizosymptomatic. She added: “They gave him that diagnosis because you can't legally be diagnosed with schizophrenia until 18 to 21 years old. But he had all the symptoms. All of them. Everyone one of ’em, every one of those boxes were checked.” Id. at 74. When Grandmother was asked if Father had been “trying now for a couple of years to get a psych eval to try to get some help,” she said: “Absolutely.” Id. at 43. Father said he had struggled with drug addiction for approximately seven years and was currently in a suboxone program. He was also taking prescribed medication for ADHD. Father was in the process of applying for disability due to his mental health issues. When asked what type of issues prevented him from working, Father responded: “My anger.” Id. at 61. Father got upset when testifying in response to DCS questioning, at one point stating to counsel:

It's a bunch of bull crap. I've been in and out of this system my whole life. You know? And you know I, I'm, I'm gonna have a problem answerin’ your questions, that's why you asked me instead of the person (indiscernible). You know what I'm sayin’? That she can answer the questions for me. You know it was gonna make me upset. You knew what you were doin’, ’cause that's what your job is.

Id. at 63. Father then suggested that DCS direct questions to Mother instead of him.

[11] Mother was employed at Pizza Hut and participating in management training. She was candid about her own struggles with mental health. Mother listed her mental health diagnoses as follows: “A.D.H.D., A.D.D., O.D.D., ․ anxiety, bipolar depression II, schizophrenia, and dissociative identity disorder, [which] also used to be known as multiple personality disorder, but they changed the name of it some years ago.” Id. at 86. The trial court asked: “And you said you're unmedicated for all those conditions?” Id. Mother responded: “Yeah.” Id. Mother later said she was also diagnosed with PTSD. Mother used THC gummies at night, claiming the THC “helps with almost every single one of those things.” Id. Mother added: “I don't need anything else. Besides my medicine. But. Still working on that.” Id. at 87. Mother had been medicated in the past and “just didn't like how [she] felt” on the medication. Id. at 86.

[12] FCM Bean said that DCS had “just gotten [referrals] in” for Parents’ substance abuse assessments. Id. at 105. FCM Bean knew that Parents were scheduled for substance abuse assessments the weekend prior to the fact-finding hearing, however, she was unsure whether Parents completed them. She noted that DCS was “just starting” with respect to services, adding that Parents’ agreement with DCS had not extended to psychological evaluations. Id. Independent of DCS services, Father's primary care physician referred him for a psychological evaluation, which Father had not completed. Mother claimed she was helping Father schedule the evaluation, and after the hearing, they planned to visit the provider's office to bring Father's insurance card and schedule an appointment.

[13] Mother indicated that she completed a substance abuse assessment, however, DCS had not received the results of the assessment. Mother's version of the assessment was as follows: “My drug assessment lady just told me that I'm a wonderful person. I met with her on Friday, and [ ] she has no fear of me using.” Id. at 93. Mother added that the service provider “said she'd like to stay on for other reasons, like [Mother's] grief and stuff like that,” with the provider noting that “with what she can do[,] [Mother's] insurance will also help cover [sic], and she's there for all of it.” Id. Mother also said that Parents’ suboxone clinic was going to provide them services, stating: “[T]hey're getting the couples counseling, marriage counseling started, they're getting ou[r] family counseling started. They're just waiting on [Child] to come home so that we can start our family counseling with her in there with the same doctors that have seen us ․” Id.

[14] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS. It later entered a written order containing special findings. Among those findings was that Parents “hav[e] unaddressed mental health needs” resulting in their “inability to provide [Child] with necessary care and supervision.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 p. 46. The court added that “[o]n the day DCS began investigation into this CHINS case[,] [Child] was found in a condition of chronic neglect.” Id. Referring to the photographs, the trial court stated: “[Child's] skin [was] deeply caked with grime and her clothing [was] not just stained from usual play from a child her age, but she ha[d] clearly been left unwashed for days.” Id. The trial court further found that Child was removed “when it was discovered that [P]arents were both using [m]ethamphetamine,” id., which was “inconsistent with providing any child with necessary care and supervision, but even more so for a two-year-old,” who “needs a sober caregiver to supply all necessities of life every minute of the day[,] including supervision,” id. at 47. The trial court found that Parents had “failed through [their] inability to provide [Child] with necessary supervision and care[,] including adequate hygiene necessary to maintain[ ] [Child's] health and prevent[ ] disease, especially through cleanliness.” Id. The court further found that Parents’ “actions or inactions have seriously endangered [Child],” Child's “needs are unmet, and those needs are unlikely to be met without the coercive intervention of the [c]ourt.” Id.

[15] Ahead of the dispositional hearing, DCS submitted a predispositional report wherein one recommendation was that Mother and Father each “reimburse [DCS] expenses for services to benefit [Child] in the amount of $20.00 per week beginning 7/28/2025 or as otherwise established by court order.” Id. at 56. At the hearing, the trial court asked DCS “to summarize the recommendations [it] ha[s] regarding [Child] and each of the [P]arents for dispositional purposes.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 125. DCS outlined the recommendations, including the provisions regarding financial reimbursement. Later, Mother's counsel and Father's counsel told the court they were “on board” with the recommendations. Id. at 132, 133. The court subsequently adopted the recommendations and entered a dispositional order on July 31, 2025. In a separate order entered that day, the trial court determined that DCS was “paying ongoing expenses for [Child] including [a] $300.00 monthly stipend paid to relative placement each month [Child] is in placement.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 p. 70. The court ordered that Mother and Father each “pay a portion of said services and ․ pay the sum of $20.00 per week beginning August 1, 2025.” Id. Parents now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[16] Parents challenge the CHINS adjudication and claim the trial court erred in ordering them to reimburse DCS. We address each issue in turn.

I. CHINS Adjudication

[17] Parents challenge certain findings in the written CHINS adjudication and claim there was insufficient evidence proving Child was a CHINS. DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS. Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3; In re Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 2019). Where, as here, the trial court entered sua sponte findings in a CHINS case, the findings control only the issues they cover, with a general judgment standard controlling any “issues ․ not covered by such findings.” Ind. Trial Rule 52(D); In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014) (noting that “no statute expressly requires formal findings in a CHINS fact-finding order”). Where a general judgment standard applies, we affirm if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. E.g., Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997).

[18] Under Trial Rule 52(A), we “shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” A finding is clearly erroneous only if the record contains no facts to support the finding, either directly or by inference. Yanoff, 688 N.E.2d at 1262. “A judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. We ultimately look to whether the evidence supports the findings and the findings support the judgment. Id. In doing so, “[w]e neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment.” Staresnick v. Staresnick, 830 N.E.2d 127, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. We will affirm unless our review leaves us “with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Yanoff, 688 N.E.2d at 1262. Moreover, to the extent findings are unchallenged on appeal, we may “simply determine whether the unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the judgment.” In re A.M., 121 N.E.3d 556, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[19] Here, the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which provides as follows:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[20] In this case, the trial court found that Child was a CHINS due to, among other things, Parents’ “unaddressed mental health needs” resulting in their “inability to provide [Child] with necessary care and supervision.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 p. 46. The court referred to photographs showing Child in a “condition of chronic neglect” when DCS began its investigation; Child's skin was “deeply caked with grime and her clothing [was] not just stained from usual play from a child her age, but she ha[d] clearly been left unwashed for days.” Id. The trial court found that Parents “were both using [m]ethamphetamine” when Child was removed, id., which was “inconsistent with providing any child with necessary care and supervision, but even more so for a two-year-old,” id. at 47. The court further found that Parents “failed through [their] inability to provide [Child] with necessary supervision and care[,] including adequate hygiene necessary to maintain[ ] [Child's] health and prevent[ ] disease, especially through cleanliness.” Id. It also found that Parents’ “actions or inactions have seriously endangered [Child],” Child's “needs are unmet, and those needs are unlikely to be met without the coercive intervention of the [c]ourt.” Id.

A. Financial Means

[21] Parents direct us to the portion of the CHINS statute related to financial means, which requires proof that a parent neglected to supply necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision either “(A) when the parent ․ [was] financially able to do so” or “(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent ․ to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so ․” I.C. § 31-34-1-1(1). Parents claim the trial court found them unable to care for Child because they needed treatment for mental health issues and substance abuse, but DCS failed to establish that they could afford, or failed to seek, suitable treatment to address these conditions. As a result, Parents assert that there was insufficient evidence under this portion of the CHINS statute. DCS responds that Mother's testimony indicated that Parents had access to health insurance, noting that Mother said she planned to bring Father's insurance card to a mental health provider. However, Parents argue that this type of evidence instead indicated that Parents “were seeking means and were participating in treatment.” Appellant's Br. p. 10.

[22] Here, the trial court did not enter a finding addressing the financial means portion of the CHINS statute. We, therefore, apply a general judgment standard of review, affirming where there is evidence supporting the judgment. See generally T.R. 52(D); In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287; Yanoff, 688 N.E.2d at 1262. On appeal, Parents focus on their unremedied mental health issues and use of illegal substances. We note, however, that the trial court found Parents neglected Child by failing to satisfy her basic hygienic needs. Indeed, the court found that Child's skin was “deeply caked with grime” and her clothing was filthy, indicating that she had “clearly been left unwashed for days.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 p. 46. Regardless of root causes for Parents’ neglectful conduct—here, a combination of mental health issues, emotional volatility, and substance abuse—the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment indicate that Parents neglected to bathe or provide basic hygiene for Child. Parents are not claiming they lacked financial resources to bathe Child or that they were unsuccessful in seeking out reasonable means to care for Child's basic hygiene. Even if they were claiming as much, the evidence indicates that Mother was purchasing THC products from a convenience store, which supports a reasonable inference that Parents could afford to bathe Child to maintain her hygiene.

[23] As to Child's hygiene, Parents argue that the trial court mischaracterized Child's condition in photographs taken by Parents’ neighbor on the day law enforcement facilitated a meeting with DCS. Parents argue that “[t]he photographs of [Child] showed she was very dirty but cannot support a finding of ‘chronic neglect’ without more.” Appellant's Br. p. 12 (quoting Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 p. 46). Indeed, Parents argue that “[a]lthough [Child] was admittedly very dirty, she looked like a normal, healthy child in the photographs.” Id. We must reject these invitations to reweigh the evidence presented to the trial court, which supported its determination that Child was found in a state of neglect indicative of ongoing inattention to her hygiene.

[24] For the foregoing reasons, we identify sufficient evidence that Parents neglected to support Child's basic hygienic needs when Parents were “financially able to do so” or due to their “failure, refusal, or inability ․ to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so ․” I.C. § 31-34-1-1(1)(A), (B).¹

B. Seriously Endangered

[25] Next, Parents claim there was insufficient evidence that Child was seriously endangered. Parents focus their argument on whether Child was seriously endangered as a result of their unaddressed mental health needs or illegal drug use. Appellant's Br. pp. 12–17. Again, however, putting aside contributing causes, as we have explained, DCS presented evidence indicative of Parents’ ongoing inattention to Child's hygiene. The court noted that Child “is a two-year-old child and depends on her parents for attending to her personal care and hygiene.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 p. 46. Moreover, it specifically found that Parents “failed through [their] inability to provide [Child] with necessary supervision and care[,] including adequate hygiene necessary to maintain[ ] [Child's] health and prevent[ ] disease, especially through cleanliness.” Id. at 47.

[26] Parents argue that “[n]o evidence was presented that [Child] had been ill, unhealthy, or had not had vaccinations and appropriate medical care.” Appellant's Br. p. 13. They ultimately claim “DCS failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [Child] was actually and seriously endangered because she was very dirty on two occasions but appeared healthy and well-nourished.” Id. However, we must defer to the trial court's reasonable interpretations of the evidence presented. Here, there were pictures of Child while in Parents’ care, which the trial court considered and determined showed Child in a filthy condition—where she had “clearly been left unwashed for days.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 p. 46. This was a reasonable interpretation of the evidence, which ultimately supported the trial court's determination that Child's physical condition was “seriously impaired or seriously endangered” as a result of Parents’ neglect. I.C. § 31-34-1-1(1). We, therefore, conclude that there was sufficient evidence as to this portion of the CHINS statute.²

C. Coercive Intervention

[27] Parents argue that DCS failed to prove Child “needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation” that she was not receiving and “is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.” I.C. § 31-34-1-1(2).

[28] We begin by observing that “[t]he purpose of a CHINS inquiry is to determine whether a child's circumstances require services that are unlikely to be provided without the intervention of the court, and thus, the focus of a CHINS adjudication is on the condition of the child alone, not on the culpability of one or both parents.” In re N.C., 72 N.E.3d 519, 524 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). But “[n]ot every endangered child is a child in need of services, permitting the State's parens patriae intrusion into the ordinarily private sphere of the family.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. Thus, proof that a child's needs are unlikely to be met without court intervention is “perhaps [the] most critical[ ]” requirement of the CHINS statute in that it “guards against unwarranted [s]tate interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families ‘where parents lack the ability to provide for their children,’ not merely where they ‘encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.’ ” Id. (quoting Lake Cnty. Div. of Fam. & Child. Servs. v. Charlton, 631 N.E.2d 526, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)). “[W]hen determining whether a child is a CHINS under section 31-34-1-1, and particularly when determining whether the coercive intervention of the court is necessary, the [trial] court ‘should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.’ ” In re N.C., 72 N.E.3d at 524 (quoting S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290).

[29] Parents argue that, while the CHINS matter was pending, they took positive steps toward maintaining their sobriety and addressing mental health matters. Parents also focus on evidence that Mother was employed, and they were appropriate in supervised visits with Child. Although there was evidence that Parents were working toward root issues, the trial court nonetheless had a reasonable basis for concern about Parents’ long-term ability to meet Child's needs. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine within a few months of the fact-finding hearing but denied using the illegal substance. Moreover, after agreeing to random drug screens, Father tested positive for methamphetamine. Both Mother and Father suffered from serious mental health conditions that they had not yet fully addressed, with Mother testifying that she declined to take prescribed medication and essentially self-medicated with THC products.

[30] There was also evidence of volatility in Parents’ relationship. Parents agreed to participate in services related to domestic violence. However, Father later denied that he agreed to do so, and Mother testified at the fact-finding hearing that she had “a very big problem with the batterer's intervention and ․ the domestic violence classes that [they] had to do,” claiming she only agreed to participate in the services because she “want[s] [Child] home more than [she] want[s] life itself.” Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 112–13. Moreover, when the trial court asked FCM Bean whether she “continue[d] to believe that Mother and Father are both in need of, at a minimum, th[e] agreed upon services,” she responded: “I do believe that. Yes.” Id. at 105. FCM Bean explained that referrals were in place and services for Parents had “started,” but things were really “just starting.” Id.

[31] In light of the evidence of historical issues affecting Parents’ ability to care for Child and limited progress toward addressing root issues at the time of the fact-finding hearing, there was sufficient evidence that Child was unlikely to receive necessary care from Parents without the coercive intervention of the court.

D. Reimbursement Order

[32] We turn to the trial court's order that Mother and Father each reimburse DCS $20.00 per week for expenses related to Child's care. Parents do not dispute that a trial court may order reimbursement in a CHINS case. Cf. I.C. § 31-40-1-3.8(c) (authorizing reimbursement orders in CHINS cases). Rather, Parents challenge the evidentiary support for the reimbursement order, claiming the order is “clearly erroneous and must be reversed.” Appellant's Br. p. 20. They argue that “[t]he undisputed evidence ․ is that Father is not able to work due to his mental health issues.” Id. Parents also argue that “although Mother was employed at Pizza Hut, no evidence was offered regarding her income or the family expenses.” Id. DCS responds that, at the dispositional hearing, Parents told the judge they agreed with recommendations in the predispositional report, which included that Parents “shall reimburse [DCS] expenses for services to benefit [Child] in the amount of $20.00 per week beginning 7/28/2025 or as otherwise established by court order.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 p. 56. DCS argues that, based on Parents’ statements to the trial court, they are precluded from now claiming the court erred in ordering reimbursement. We agree.

[33] At the outset of the dispositional hearing, the trial court asked DCS “to summarize the recommendations [it] ha[s] regarding [Child] and each of the Parents for dispositional purposes.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 125. DCS then outlined the recommendations, among them, that “[i]n regards to [Mother], [DCS] [was] recommending ․ reimbursement for costs of services ․ and placement in the amount of $20.00 per week.” Id. DCS later stated that “[i]n regards to [Father],” DCS was also recommending “reimbursement of costs for services and placement in the amount of $20.00 per week.” Id. After Mother testified, the trial court asked Mother's counsel whether he had “anything else” and counsel stated: “Judge, we are on board with the recommendations as they are at this [sic], workin’ on stuff, and seem to be moving in the right direction.” Id. at 132. The trial court then asked Father's counsel if he had “anything [he] want[ed] to present[.]” Id. Counsel told the trial court that Father was “on board with the recommendations in the dispositional report,” id. at 133. The trial court then adopted the recommendations in the report and entered a separate order requiring weekly reimbursement, as outlined in the report.

[34] Because Parents informed the trial court that they were on board with the recommendations in the predispositional report, which included specific requirements that they each reimburse DCS at a rate of $20.00 per week, they are precluded from now asserting that the order lacked evidentiary support. Cf. In re M.W., 130 N.E.3d 114, 116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (concluding that a parent was precluded from claiming that insufficient evidence supported a CHINS adjudication when, at a hearing, the parent agreed the child needed services).

Conclusion

[35] Sufficient evidence supported the determination that Child is a CHINS. Moreover, Parents are precluded from challenging the reimbursement order.

[36] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Having resolved the issue on this basis, we do not further address arguments related to financial means.

2.   Having identified sufficient evidence, we do not address additional arguments as to serious endangerment.

Foley, Judge.

May, J. and Altice, J., concur.