Brandon Williams, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Brandon Williams stabbed his pregnant girlfriend Wydreka Williams more than 40 times in the head with a screwdriver and was strangling her when law enforcement officers kicked in the front door of their apartment. After this court affirmed his attempted murder conviction, Williams filed a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCR court denied Williams's petition. Williams now appeals and presents three issues for our review, which we revise and restate as the following single issue: Whether the PCR court clearly erred when it denied Williams's PCR petition.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2023, a jury found Williams guilty of attempted murder as a Level 1 felony, aggravated battery as a Level 3 felony, two counts of domestic battery as Level 5 felonies, and strangulation as a Level 5 felony. Williams v. State, 233 N.E.3d 986, No. 23A-CR-2050, slip op at ¶ 12 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2024) (mem.). Due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial court only entered a conviction on the attempted murder count. Id. The trial court sentenced Williams to 38 years of incarceration. Id. We have previously set out the facts underlying Williams's conviction:

In July 2022, Williams and his girlfriend, Wydreka Williams, were living in an apartment in Fort Wayne. Wydreka was six months pregnant at that time.

On the afternoon of July 31, 2022, Williams arrived home, and Wydreka was on the phone with her cousin, Felisha. Williams knocked the phone out of Wydreka's hands. Felisha called 911 because Williams was drunk and belligerent and because she heard screaming in the background. The dispatcher called Felisha back to confirm Wydreka's address while Felisha was still on the line with Wydreka. Felisha said that Wydreka was screaming and gasping.

Id. at ¶¶ 3–4 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A downstairs neighbor also called 911. Id. at ¶ 4.

Officer Christopher McBride and Officer Collin Bundy of the Fort Wayne Police Department arrived at the apartment quickly and knocked on the door. They heard a woman screaming for help and then heard a woman either gasping for air or groaning or moaning. The officers kicked the door in and found Wydreka on the ground yelling for help. Williams appeared to be on top of Wydreka strangling her. Williams had blood all over his arms and his hands. Williams's t-shirt was covered in blood, and Williams removed the t-shirt and tossed it on the floor. Officer McBride saw that the sectional couch was completely covered in blood, the carpet and rug were bloody, and blood was splattered on the wall․

Wydreka was in obvious distress, crying, and asking the officers to help her. She told the officers that Williams attempted to choke her to death and that Williams stabbed her more than 40 times in the head with a screwdriver. Wydreka told the officers that she was going to die and said, Tell my family I love them․ Williams, who was handcuffed and in custody, stated, No one can help her, man. Nobody can help her, and She is toxic as f***.

Officer Scott Wilson arrived on the scene to assist and removed Williams from the apartment. While Williams was handcuffed in the police car, he told Officer Scott Wilson, I made a decision. Everybody got [sic] a breaking point․ I was trapped. Williams also told Officer Wilson, I made a decision and it is what it is.

While Officer Bundy was assisting Wydreka, she lost consciousness and was no longer responding verbally or to a sternum rub․ During the ambulance ride, Wydreka was going in and out of consciousness, and her condition started to decline. Wydreka's blood pressure was dropping, and she stopped responding appropriately.

* * *

On August 3, 2022, Detective Mark Wentz spoke to Wydreka at the hospital. Wydreka had scratches and puncture marks all over her face, a bloodshot eye, and a raspy voice․

A bloody screwdriver was recovered from the scene. The analysis of the screwdriver revealed that Williams's fingerprints and Wydreka's DNA were on the screwdriver.

Id. at ¶¶ 5–11 (third and fourth alterations in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). On direct appeal, this court affirmed Williams's conviction. Williams, No. 23A-CR-2050, slip op at ¶ 18.

[4] On July 19, 2024, Williams filed a PCR petition pro se, which he later amended. Williams alleged in relevant part that he received ineffective assistance of his trial counsel (“Trial Counsel”). In particular, Williams alleged Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) object to testimony “relaying statements of the alleged victim ․ on grounds of lack of relevance,” PCR Appellee's App. Vol. II at 15; (2) object on foundation grounds to the testimony of four witnesses identifying the victim; (3) timely object to the admission of two 911 calls; (4) object on foundation grounds to the admission bodycam footage, photos, and DNA results; (5) move for a directed verdict as to the aggravated battery count; and (6) move for a directed verdict as to the victim's identity.

[5] After Williams submitted his case by affidavit, the PCR court denied Williams's petition. This appeal ensued.¹ Additional facts are set forth below.

Discussion and Decision

The PCR Court Did Not Clearly Err in Denying Williams's PCR Petition

[6] Williams contends that the PCR court erred when it denied his PCR petition.² “Post-conviction actions are civil proceedings, meaning the petitioner (the prior criminal defendant) must prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1279 (Ind. 2019) (citing Ind. PostConviction Rule 1(5) (effective Jan. 1, 2015, to Dec. 31, 2019); Wilkes v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 2013)). When a petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, he “appeals from a negative judgment, so he must show that ‘the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the postconviction court.’ ” Kelly v. State, 257 N.E.3d 782, 792 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 282 (Ind. 2022)). That is, the petitioner must demonstrate “clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Bobadilla, 117 N.E.3d at 1279 (quoting Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 682 (Ind. 2017)). “We do not reweigh the evidence presented at the post-conviction proceedings, and we examine only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the post-conviction court's determination.” Kelly, 257 N.E.3d at 792 (quoting Conley, 183 N.E.3d at 282). We review pure legal questions de novo. Id. (citing State v. Stidham, 157 N.E.3d 1185, 1190 (Ind. 2020)).

[7] Williams contends the PCR court clearly erred when it concluded that Williams did not establish that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. To evaluate a petitioner's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, “we apply the well-established, two-part Strickland test.”³ Bobadilla, 117 N.E.3d at 1280 (citing Humphrey, 73 N.E.3d at 682). Under that test, the defendant must prove: (1) “counsel rendered deficient performance, meaning counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as gauged by prevailing professional norms”; and (2) “counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant,” that is, there exists a reasonable probability that “but for counsel's errors the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing Ward v. State, 969 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind. 2012)); see also Middleton v. State, 72 N.E.3d 891, 891 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 694 (1984)). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Middleton, 72 N.E.3d at 891–92 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) (collecting cases). Failure to satisfy either of the two prongs will cause the claim to fail. French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002).

[8] “There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics and these decisions are entitled to deferential review.” Weisheit v. State, 109 N.E.3d 978, 983 (Ind. 2018) (internal citations omitted) (citing Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 746–47 (Ind. 2002)). Moreover, “isolated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective.” Id. at 984 (citing Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 747).

[9] Williams alleges Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to (a) object to victim-identity testimony from four witnesses, and (b) failing to move for directed verdicts. We address each argument in turn.

a. Failure to Object

[10] Williams challenges Trial Counsel's failure to object to testimony from four witnesses about Wydreka's identity as the victim in this case. When a petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object at trial, the petitioner “must prove that the trial court would have sustained the objection” to show prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland test. Passwater v. State, 989 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Ind. 2013) (citing Lowery v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1031, 1042 (Ind. 1994)).

[11] Specifically, Williams claims the State failed to lay a proper foundation to allow the witnesses to testify that Wydreka was the victim or “establish that any of the witnesses possessed personal knowledge of the subject matter.” PCR Appellee's App. Vol. II at 16. In his affidavit in support of his PCR petition, Williams claimed that because Officer McBride, EMT Zaire Anderson, Firefighter John McMahon, and Detective Rickey Parrish each said, “I think,” or “if I remember correctly” they were not “testifying to a matter that they had firsthand knowledge of.” Id. at 28. This, Williams claims, demonstrated the State's failure to “lay a proper foundation for the admission of any of these witnesses as to the identity of the alleged victim.” Id.

[12] Even if we accepted this proposition as true—and we do not—Officer McBride did not qualify his testimony regarding the victim's identity. Indiana Evidence Rule 602 limits testimony to matters of which a witness has personal knowledge. When asked for the name of the pregnant female “laying on the floor” with stab wounds—in other words, the victim—Officer McBride testified unequivocally that “[h]er name was Wydreka Williams.” DA Tr. Vol. II at 149. At trial, Officer McBride testified that he was dispatched to 5453 Clinton Street for a domestic disturbance that was reported via 911 calls. He further testified that when he responded to that address, he observed “a black female” who was “on her back yelling for help” and “a male black who appeared to be coming off” of her. DA Tr. Vol. II at 147. Officer McBride identified the black male as Williams and the victim as Wydreka. Clearly, Officer McBride had personal knowledge of the incident to which he responded and the parties involved therein.⁴ Trial Counsel's failure to object to the specified victim-identity testimony does not show that Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance on this basis.

b. Failure to Move for Directed Verdicts

[13] Williams maintains that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to move for directed verdicts. In a criminal prosecution, Indiana Trial Rule 50 (effective Jan. 1, 2001, to Feb. 1, 2026), permits a defendant to move for a directed verdict at the close of the States's case if “all or some of the issues in a case tried before a jury ․ are not supported by sufficient evidence.” Generally, the “failure of trial counsel to move for a directed verdict does not create sufficient prejudice to result in a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Lee v. State, 91 N.E.3d 979, 989 n. 22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Siglar v. State, 541 N.E.2d 944, 948 (Ind. 1989)).

[14] Williams specifically contends that Trial Counsel should have moved for a directed verdict (i) on all counts because the State failed to prove “the alleged victim's identity,” PCR Appellant's Br. at 14, and (ii) on the aggravated battery count because the State failed to prove that “aggravated battery [was the] means used to commit attempted murder,” id. at 16. We address each contention in turn.

i. Wydreka's Identity

[15] In order to convict Williams of attempted murder, the State was required to prove that Williams intentionally “engage[d] in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward” killing Wydreka. See I.C. §§ 35-42-1-1(1), 35-41-5-1(a). Accordingly, the State was required to prove the victim's identity. Id. Williams maintains that “the State relie[d] solely upon the testimony of its four (4) witnesses in identifying” Wydreka, PCR Appellant's Br. at 12, and that the State failed to lay a proper foundation for their victim-identification testimony because each witness qualified their identification answers with “I think,” id. at 14. Therefore, according to Williams, the State failed to prove its case as to Wydreka's identity, and Trial Counsel should have moved for a directed verdict.

[16] On this issue, the PCR court concluded that Williams suffered no prejudice. We agree. As we explained above, Officer McBride did not qualify his answer and Williams's contention that “the State relie[d] solely upon the testimony of four (4) witnesses in identifying the alleged victim” is factually incorrect and unsupported by the record. PCR Appellant's Br. at 12. To the contrary, there was ample evidence of Wydreka's identity from multiple sources establishing that (1) Williams knocked Wydreka's phone out of her hand without ending her call with her cousin; (2) Wydreka's cousin called 911 and provided Wydreka's name and address; (3) law enforcement officers arrived at that address; (4) once there, they observed Williams's hands literally covered in blood and Wydreka in obvious distress on the floor; (5) Wydreka told officers she was stabbed over 40 times with a screwdriver; and (6) a screwdriver was recovered from the scene with Wydreka's blood and Williams's fingerprint. That is sufficient evidence of victim identity such that a directed verdict would not have been successful, so Trial Counsel was not ineffective by not moving for a directed verdict as to the victim's identity.

ii. Aggravated Battery

[17] Finally, Williams argues Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to “challenge the sufficiency of the State's evidence of aggravated battery as a means used to commit attempted murder with an Ind. Trial Rule 50 motion[, which] allowed a conviction despite a lack of sufficient evidence.” Appellant's Br. at 16. As an initial matter, we note that the trial court only entered a conviction and sentenced Williams on the attempted murder count—it vacated the aggravated battery conviction, so Williams's contention that the result of the proceeding would have been different had Trial Counsel moved for a directed verdict is unsupportable. Nevertheless, Williams asserts without citation to authority that the aggravated battery conviction “has present penal consequences because it is included in the attempted murder conviction.” Appellant's Br. at 16. Given that Williams was sentenced only on the attempted murder conviction, we fail to see any penal consequences stemming from the aggravated battery count, and Williams has not directed us to any. There is no prejudice as Williams has failed to show “a reasonable probability” that the result of the proceeding would have been different if Trial Counsel had moved for a directed verdict because even a successful motion would have led to the same result—vacatur of the aggravated battery conviction. See Middleton, 72 N.E.3d at 891–92.

[18] Based on the foregoing, the PCR court did not clearly err by denying Williams's PCR petition. We affirm the PCR court on all issues raised.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The PCR court took judicial notice of the Record in Williams v. State, 233 N.E.3d 986, No. 23A-CR-2050 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2014) (mem.). Williams did not file a motion to transfer the Record in Williams, No. 23A-CR-2050, into the instant appeal, so to the extent necessary and pursuant to Appellate Rule 27 and Indiana Evidence Rule 201, we have taken judicial notice of the Clerk's Record in Williams's direct appeal. See Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1156 (Ind. 2016) (taking judicial notice under Evidence Rule 201 of documents that were part of the Record on Appeal as defined in Appellate Rule 27). Citations to the PCR record are denoted by “PCR,” and citations to Williams's direct appeal record are denoted by “DA.”

2.   Williams, appealing pro se, did not renew his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims as to items (1), (3), and (4) on appeal; nor did he renew his claims regarding appellate counsel. Trial Counsel did not represent Williams on appeal. Because Williams did not provide any argument in his Appellant's Brief regarding these alleged errors, he has waived them for our review. Likewise, in his reply brief, Williams argues for the first time that the 911 calls were admitted without proper foundation. Because Williams did not raise this argument until his reply brief, he has waived it for our review. See Newcomb v. State, 194 N.E.3d 131, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Snow v. State, 137 N.E.3d 965, 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied, cert. denied), trans. denied.

3.   Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

4.   We do not need to address the other three witnesses’ testimonies because a single witness can establish victim identity. Cf. Chambless v. State, 119 N.E.3d 182, 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012)) (“A conviction can be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness”).

Felix, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.