IN RE: R.P. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] D.A. (Father) and M.A. (Mother) [collectively, Parents] have five children [collectively, the Children]. After the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) substantiated an allegation that Father was using methamphetamine while living in the home, the trial court determined the Children were Children in Need of Services (CHINS). Mother appeals, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the court's determination. Because we agree with Mother, we reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Parents have five children in their care: D.A. (born May 2025), M.A. (born April 2024), S.A. (born May 2023), K.A. (born June 2022), and R.P. (born September 2018). Four of them are Parents’ biological children while one, R.P., has a different father but was raised by Parents. In 2022, DCS initiated an informal adjustment (IA) with the family after K.A. was born with methamphetamine in his system. Parents were both using methamphetamine at the time and often engaged in domestic violence when under the influence. That IA was closed in 2023, but another was opened in 2024, again due to Parents’ substance use. In August 2024, Mother completed substance use treatment, and the second IA was closed in November.

[3] In late April 2025, while Parents lived with Father's parents (Grandparents), DCS contacted Mother, and she informed DCS that she believed Father was using methamphetamine. Ten days later, Father's positive drug screen confirmed his substance use. After DCS intervened and Father tested positive, Grandfather no longer allowed Father to live in the home. Because Father was no longer in the home, the Children were permitted to remain there in Mother's care. DCS helped the family institute a safety plan in which Father was not permitted to return home until he demonstrated sobriety. A few weeks later, DCS filed petitions alleging the Children were CHINS due to Father's substance use.

[4] Prior to the fact-finding hearing on DCS's petitions, Parents were referred to family preservation services and were required to participate in random drug screens. Mother also voluntarily started therapy and medication management. Father completed an eight-day substance abuse treatment program and had supervised visitation with the Children. DCS did not refer the Children to any services during that time.¹ On July 7, Father entered into a mediated agreed entry in which he admitted the Children were CHINS “because [he] need[ed] assistance maintaining a safe, stable home free from substance abuse ․” Appellee's Appendix Vol. 2 at 3. Mother did not participate in mediation and thus was not a party to Father's admission.

[5] At the fact-finding hearing, Mother, Father, and two DCS family case managers (FCMs) testified to the facts above. Mother claimed she had been unaware that Father was using methamphetamine until DCS got involved and he tested positive. Nonetheless, she said Father was never left home alone with the Children when he was under the influence of methamphetamine, and she claimed the Children were not harmed in any way by his drug use. She also testified that she had been, and continued to be, fully capable of caring for the Children, and she would continue to restrict Father's access to the Children until he had proven he could maintain his sobriety.

[6] Father testified that, for about two years, he hid his substance use by using at a friend's house, telling Mother he was “hanging out over there and fixing stuff[,]” and then returning home after about three days. Transcript at 43. He completed his treatment program approximately a week before the fact-finding hearing and admitted he had failed to call in on one occasion to see if he needed to come in for a drug screen. Nonetheless, he testified that he had been sober for approximately thirty days and maintained his sobriety by “[s]eeking treatment with outpatient services and ․ doing drug screens to get [his] Adderall.” Id. at 38. Like Mother, Father testified that he had never cared for the Children while using methamphetamine, further stating that he “would not be around the [C]hildren alone at all or anything if [he] was high on meth.” Id. at 39. He believed the Children did not need any services and that Mother could provide for them.

[7] FCM Wagner testified that, at the outset of the case, Mother informed her that “she was pretty sure that [F]ather was using methamphetamine and that it was a concern for her.” Id. at 45. And throughout the case, Mother and Grandmother consistently asked her “when [Father] would be able to return to the home ․” Id. at 49. Based on these questions and conversations, FCM Wagner believed that if DCS's involvement were to end, Mother and Grandmother would allow Father to return to the home. The family had told her that Father was erratic and paranoid when he used methamphetamine. They said his behavior caused “a lot of stress and confusion” because Father was “constantly going to the windows and checking[,] ․ telling people that the FBI was after him.” Id. at 61. She also testified that one time she observed Father under the influence—he was sweaty and fidgety and he had visible sores on his body. FCM Wagner never observed Father caring for the Children and agreed that Mother and Grandparents were sober caregivers at the time of the hearing. She testified that the Parents’ home (they still lived with Grandparents) was appropriate, and she didn't notice any obvious safety concerns for the Children. Like FCM Wagner, FCM Gooley testified that Mother had consistently asked about when Father could return home, and she believed Mother and Grandmother would allow Father to return if DCS's involvement ended.

[8] After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court entered an order with findings of fact and conclusions of law adjudicating the Children as CHINS. The court specifically concluded:

DCS ha[d] met its burden proving that the above-named [C]hildren [were] CHINS under IC 31-34-1-1.

․

․ [M]other [was] unwilling or unable to ensure the [C]hildren's safety ․ due to her failure to ensure the [C]hildren [were] not exposed to [F]ather's ongoing substance use, domestic violence, and instability. Mother [was] unwilling or unable to ensure the[ ] [C]hildren [were] not exposed to an unsafe caregiver. Mother needs services to obtain stable housing and employment and education to be able to discern her husband is using. She also needs services to maintain her sobriety. All of these services are tied to the parents’ ability to provide the [C]hildren with appropriate and safe care and supervision.

․ [Mother] does not believe that the family needs additional services and as such ha[s] shown that the coercive intervention of the Court is the only means by which they will participate in the aforementioned services necessary to develop the skills they and their [C]hildren need.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 34-35. After the dispositional hearing, the trial court entered an order dictating the services in which Mother was required to participate. It also accepted Father's agreed entry, which dictated Father's services. Mother now appeals ² the CHINS adjudication.³

Discussion and Decision

[9] Mother argues there was insufficient evidence to support the CHINS determination. CHINS adjudications are civil proceedings, and the State need only prove that a child is a CHINS under the juvenile code by a preponderance of the evidence. In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024); see Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. In our review for sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh that evidence or judge witness credibility. In re D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Rather, we “consider only that evidence supporting the trial court's decision and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” Id. And where a trial court sua sponte enters findings and conclusions, as it did here, “we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. (quoting In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied); see Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). We will affirm the CHINS determination unless it is clearly erroneous. N.E., 228 N.E.3d at 475.

[10] Here, the State alleged the Children were CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. Therefore, it had to prove the following regarding each of the minor Children:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent ․ to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent ․ is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent ․ to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

I.C. § 31-34-1-1.

[11] Mother specifically asserts that “the CHINS finding is not supported by substantial evidence and relies on speculative concerns of future harms rather than actual risk to the [C]hildren ․” Appellant's Br. at 7. She challenges the trial court's findings as well as its conclusions that the Children were seriously endangered and needed care, treatment, or rehabilitation that they were not receiving and were unlikely to receive without court intervention. See Appellant's App. Vol 2 at 33. We agree with Mother and find there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusions.⁴

[12] As noted by Mother, a CHINS determination must rest on more than speculative concerns for the future. In re A.R., 121 N.E.3d 598, 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “The purpose of the CHINS adjudication is to ‘protect [the] children, not punish parents[,]’ ” meaning the primary focus of the proceedings is the condition of the Children. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1255 (Ind. 2012) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2010)). At the fact-finding hearing, there was no evidence that the Children had been exposed to Father's drug use. Father's uncontradicted testimony was that he only used outside of the home and never cared for the Children while under the influence. There was no evidence that the Children were left without “necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision” by a sober caregiver, as there were three such caregivers in the home. I.C. § 31-34-1-1(1). In fulfilling this supervisory role, the family immediately removed Father from the home upon learning that he was using methamphetamine, and they adhered to their safety plan in not allowing him to return. While FCM Wagner expressed concern that Mother and Grandmother would allow Father to return if DCS is no longer involved, Father is nonetheless sober. And in light of FCM Wagner's further testimony that Grandfather is committed to keeping Father out of the home “for the safety for all of the [C]hildren” until he had proven his sobriety, such risk is seemingly minimized. Tr. at 59. Regardless, we find no indication in the record as to why Father's potential return to the home after thirty days of sobriety would seriously endanger the Children.

[13] FCM Wagner also testified that Father's behaviors, presumably exhibited while he was under the influence, caused “a lot of stress and confusion” in the home and those behaviors necessarily caused emotional trauma. Id. at 61. However, there was no evidence that the Children even witnessed these behaviors, let alone were seriously endangered by it. Without evidence linking Father's substance use and behavior to the serious endangerment of these Children, the trial court was left with merely “questions, inchoate concerns, and speculation[,]” which is not enough to support a finding that Children are seriously endangered. In re N.E., 198 N.E.3d 384, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Moreover, all parties acknowledged that Father was still not living in the home with Mother and the Children at the time of the hearing. It was because of this fact that the Children were permitted to remain in the home in the care of Mother and Grandparents. As Father's access to the Children remained restricted as of the date of the hearing, it seems there was minimal risk of his possible erratic or paranoid behavior causing the Children harm. “[A] cause for concern is not the touchstone of a CHINS determination, and an unspecified concern about what might happen in the future is insufficient in itself to carry the State's burden of proof.” In re L.N., 118 N.E.3d 43, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Here, although the evidence showed Father may at some point be permitted to return to the home, he had undisputedly been sober for over thirty days. As such, we agree with Mother that the State made no clear connection between his substance use and serious endangerment to the Children were he to return home. So, we conclude there was insufficient evidence that the Children were “seriously endangered” under the statute. I.C. § 31-34-1-1(1). Thus, the court's conclusion of such was clearly erroneous.

[14] As for coercive intervention, the record reflects that the Children's needs were being met. Thus, it is unclear to us exactly what circumstances necessitated the coercive intervention of the court. Notably, DCS did not refer the Children to any services.⁵ Indeed, FCM Wagner testified that she observed no real safety concerns in Parents’ home or with the Children's appearances, that Mother, Grandmother, and Grandfather were all sober caregivers, and that to her knowledge, the family's safety plan had been observed throughout the proceedings. FCM Gooley testified the same, stating there were no safety concerns with the Children in their home, and that “[a]ll their needs [were] met ․ [by] [t]heir mother and grandparents.” Tr. at 69. Furthermore, the record shows Parents had stable housing with and support from Grandparents, and there was no evidence presented that such support was in jeopardy at the time of the hearing or in the future. See In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 580 (Ind. 2017) (“When determining CHINS status under ․ the ‘coercive intervention’ element, courts ‘should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.’ ” (quoting S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290)).

[15] The State asserts the Children needed and were unlikely to be provided “sober supervision and protection from exposure to Father's ongoing drug use and domestic violence” without coercive intervention. Appellee's Br. at 18. This contention is not supported by the record. The Children had three sober caregivers in their home. And while Mother concedes to her history of substance use, she both testified at trial and noted on appeal that she had been sober for over a year at the time. See id. at 7. Furthermore, she voluntarily enrolled herself in therapy and medication management to help her maintain sobriety. Mother also fully participated in the one service DCS referred her to without a court order.⁶ As for Father, he successfully completed a voluntary drug treatment program, had maintained his sobriety for at least thirty days, and his post-treatment drug screens were all negative. And he testified that he would continue with treatment even if the Children were not adjudicated CHINS. These facts do not reveal a need for continued or coercive intervention. And although the State expressed concern about domestic violence, this concern stems from matters dating back to Parents’ 2022 IA case. See Appellee's Br. at 20. The only evidence of domestic violence presented in this case was Mother's admission that such had occurred in the past when she and Father used methamphetamine. There was no evidence that domestic violence had occurred between Parents during these proceedings or that it had occurred in front of or involved the Children.

[16] Given that Parents fully cooperated with DCS, adhered to their safety plan, pursued services on their own without a court order, and the Children had three sober caregivers meeting all of their needs, we find there was insufficient evidence to support the court's conclusion that the Children needed care, treatment, or rehabilitation that they were not receiving and were unlikely to receive without intervention. And thus, its conclusion was clearly erroneous. See In re E.K., 83 N.E.3d 1256, 1262-63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (coercive intervention of the court not necessary when parents have been cooperative with DCS's services prior to the adjudication), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[17] For the reasons above, we find there was insufficient evidence to support the CHINS determination. Therefore, the judgment is reversed, and we remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[18] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   After the fact-finding hearing, Mother enrolled three of the Children in the First Steps program on her own initiative.

2.   We find it important to note that Mother filed her appeal thirty-nine days after the trial court entered the dispositional order, which is nine days past the deadline imposed by Indiana Appellate Rule 9(A)(1) for filing a notice of appeal from a final judgment. Prior to filing her appeal, Mother sought permission from the trial court to file a belated notice of appeal, which the trial court granted. However, there is no mechanism authorizing a trial court to allow a party to file a belated notice of appeal after it has entered final judgment. Appellate Rule 14(B)(1)(a) authorizes trial courts to allow belated filing of interlocutory appeals if the appellant shows good cause. Post-Conviction Rule 2(1)(a) provides similarly but applies only to defendants “convicted after a trial or plea of guilty” who otherwise would have had the right to directly appeal their conviction or sentence. Neither of these rules apply under the present circumstances—Mother is neither a defendant appealing from a conviction, nor does she proceed by interlocutory appeal. Instead, she proceeds following a final judgment. See In re M.K., 964 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that CHINS dispositional orders are final appealable orders). Thus, Mother had no mechanism by which to seek permission to file a belated appeal from the trial court, and the trial court had no authority to grant it.Mother's notice of appeal was therefore untimely. Under Appellate Rule 9(A)(5), an appellant forfeits the right to appeal by filing an untimely notice of appeal. Nonetheless, the right to appeal may be restored, and we may still address the merits of an untimely appeal, when there are “extraordinarily compelling reasons” to do so. In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. 2014). Because our Appellate Rules provide us a mechanism to hear an otherwise forfeited appeal, there is no evidence that Mother was in any way at fault for the delay, and a CHINS determination implicates “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests” in a parent's right to “the care, custody, and control” of their child, we proceed to the merits of Mother's appeal. Id. at 972 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)); see App. R. 1 (stating the Court of Appeals may upon its own motion “permit deviation from these Rules”); see also Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 20 (Mother's motion to file belated appeal because appointed counsel's “notice of appointment was placed in counsel's mailbox at courthouse” which she did not check for months).

3.   Father does not participate in this appeal.

4.   Although Father signed an agreed entry admitting the Children were CHINS, the trial court did not accept his admission until after the dispositional hearing and did not rely on it in its fact-finding order adjudicating the Children as CHINS. It was therefore not a basis for the court's determination and cannot sustain the determination on appeal.

5.   DCS still did not request any services for the Children at the dispositional hearing. Rather, Mother chose to enroll a few of the Children in a service without DCS referral.

6.   And though this information was not available to the trial court when it adjudicated the Children as CHINS, we note that Mother continued to comply with services prior to the dispositional hearing, including participating in drug screens, all of which returned negative.

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.