D.P., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] D.P. appeals his juvenile adjudication for committing Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm. He argues that the firearm was found on his person in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights and that the trial court therefore erred by admitting it into evidence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In April 2025, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Patrick Scott was assigned to a task force that conducted proactive patrols in designated high-crime areas. On April 3, Officer Scott was patrolling the area near High School and Moeller Roads due to “an increase in activity, shots fired incident and illegal handgun activity that [their] analyst identified.” Tr. p. 7. Officer Scott was driving his marked patrol car south on High School Road when he observed D.P., who was 13 years old, and another individual walking north. Officer Scott could tell that D.P. was “definitely under eighteen.” Id. at 8. Upon seeing Officer Scott, D.P. was “scared and nervous.” Id. D.P. also performed a “security check,” which Officer Scott knew from his training and experience is when people who “carry firearms” “subconsciously” “touch[ ] the handgun on their person, most commonly ․ in the front of their waistband.” Id. Officer Scott turned his patrol car around and began driving north. When Officer Scott observed D.P. and the other individual cross High School Road “without using a crosswalk,” he decided to stop them. Id. at 9. Officer Scott performed a pat down on D.P.’s waistband and found a handgun. D.P. was arrested.

[3] The State alleged that D.P. was a delinquent child for committing Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm. See Ind. Code § 35-47-10-5(a). At the fact-finding hearing, when Officer Scott started to testify about finding the handgun on D.P. during the pat down, defense counsel objected on grounds that the stop and pat down violated D.P.’s rights under the United States and Indiana Constitutions. The court paused the fact-finding hearing to hold a suppression hearing. During that hearing, Officer Scott testified that he drove by D.P. two times: the first time, D.P. did a “security check,” and the second time, he “still had one hand in his waistband.” Tr. p. 13; see also id. at 17 (testifying that he saw D.P. “reach into his waistband”). Officer Scott acknowledged that before patting D.P. down, he never saw a gun. The court denied the motion to suppress, and the fact-finding hearing resumed. When the State moved to admit the gun into evidence, defense counsel objected on the same grounds argued during the suppression hearing. The court overruled the objection and admitted the gun into evidence. See id. at 29. The trial court found that D.P. was a delinquent child for committing dangerous possession of a firearm and placed him on probation.

[4] D.P. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] D.P. contends that the trial court erred in admitting the handgun found on his person in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017). However, when a challenge to the admissibility of evidence is based on the constitutionality of a search or seizure, our review is de novo. Id.

I. The Fourth Amendment was not violated

[6] The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Combs v. State, 168 N.E.3d 985, 991 (Ind. 2021). A warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable, and the State must prove that one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. Id. One such exception is derived from Terry v. Ohio, which permits a brief investigatory stop “where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot[.]” 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). “When determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop, we consider whether the totality of the circumstances presented a particularized and objective basis for the officer's belief that the subject was engaged in criminal activity.” Jacobs v. State, 76 N.E.3d 846, 850 (Ind. 2017) (quotation omitted). “[I]n order to pass constitutional muster, reasonable suspicion must be comprised of more than an officer's general ‘hunches’ or unparticularized suspicions.” Id. (quotation omitted).

[7] “After making a Terry stop, an officer may, if he has reasonable fear that a suspect is armed and dangerous, frisk the outer clothing of that suspect to try to find weapons.” Johnson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1199, 1205 (Ind. 2020). “The purpose of this protective search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.” Id. (quotation omitted). “The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.

[8] Here, D.P., a juvenile, was walking in a high-gun-crime area and became “scared and nervous” when he saw Officer Scott. D.P. performed a “security check” on his waistband, which Officer Scott knew from his training and experience that people carrying handguns often do, and reached into his waistband. Under Indiana law, juveniles generally cannot possess firearms. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Scott had reasonable suspicion to stop D.P. and pat him down based on D.P.’s suspected illegal possession of a firearm. Therefore, the stop and pat down didn't violate the Fourth Amendment.

II. Article 1, Section 11 was not violated

[9] Article 1, Section 11 provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated ․” Although Article 1, Section 11 is worded similarly to the Fourth Amendment, we interpret it independently and “ask whether the State has shown that a particular search or seizure was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.” Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 191 (Ind. 2021). In doing so, we employ the framework provided in Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005). Id. Although there may be other relevant considerations, we evaluate the reasonableness of a law-enforcement officer's search or seizure by balancing three factors: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361.

[10] Applying the Litchfield factors here, Officer Scott had a high degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that D.P. was illegally possessing a firearm due to his age. As explained above, D.P. was walking in a high-gun-crime area, became “scared and nervous” when he saw Officer Scott, and performed a “security check” on his waistband and reached into his waistband. The degree of intrusion was not particularly high, as Officer Scott just patted down D.P.’s waistband. Finally, law enforcement has a compelling need to stop juveniles from illegally possessing firearms. The stop and pat down didn't violate Article 1, Section 11. Accordingly, the trial court didn't err by admitting the gun into evidence.

[11] Affirmed.

Vaidik, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Scheele, J., concur.