IN RE: C.W. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] T.W. (Mother) appeals the trial court's determination that her child is a Child in Need of Services (CHINS), alleging several findings are clearly erroneous and the evidence is insufficient to support the conclusions that Child was seriously endangered and Child's needs were unmet. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother is the biological mother of C.W. (Child), born in June 2025.¹ Mother has three older children, all of whom were removed from her care by the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) and adjudicated CHINS. Mother's oldest child was reunified with his father, and her parental rights for her second and third children were involuntarily terminated.

[3] After receiving a report alleging Child was born with marijuana in his system, DCS Family Case Manager (FCM) Mickayla Shurn went to the hospital to investigate. Mother told FCM Shurn she used fentanyl in November 2024 and marijuana throughout her pregnancy with Child.² However, Mother said she quit using marijuana one week before Child's birth because she wanted to breastfeed. Mother also told FCM Shurn that she had depression, but she knew how to “control it” and she would “seek any therapy or medication” if she needed it. Tr. Vol. II p. 25. But DCS had concerns for Mother's mental health because she “made a statement of wanting to be with her mom, and her mom is deceased.” Id. at 29.

[4] FCM Shurn also discussed Mother's prior cases with her. Mother explained that in her most recent CHINS case, she did not complete any “permanency” services like “homebased case[work] or ․ therapy[.]” Id. at 26. FCM Shurn specifically discussed substance-use services with Mother, but Mother said she “didn't want to do any services” because “DCS is a bully.” Id. Although Mother had experienced homelessness throughout her prior CHINS cases, she was residing in subsidized housing at the start of the instant case. FCM Shurn visited Mother's home early in her investigation and observed some supplies for Child, including a foldable crib, a bassinet and hygiene products, which Mother's sister provided. Mother indicated that “her sister would help her” with other still-needed items like diapers and bottles. Id. at 27.

[5] On June 18, the juvenile court authorized DCS to remove Child from Mother's care finding she “has been involved with DCS through a [CHINS] case since 2018 [and] has not successfully completed services to remedy” reasons for DCS involvement. App. Vol. II p. 38. At that time, the court also found Mother was not currently receiving treatment for her mental health needs and had a “significant history of substance abuse and untreated mental health issues that seriously hinder her ability to care for her children[.]” Id.

[6] On August 1, the court held a fact-finding hearing. Mother testified that she understood her previous CHINS cases to be caused by her mental health and marijuana-use issues. She indicated she was diagnosed with “[b]ipolar, depression, and anxiety” and said that she was attending “group counseling” for treatment. Tr. Vol. II p. 7. In those sessions, she “talk[s] about the grief” of losing her mother and children. Id. However, she was unable to state what type of counseling she was engaged in, and she had not provided any documentation of her attendance to DCS. As for her substance use, Mother admitted to marijuana use throughout her pregnancy and since Child's birth, with the last time she used being the day before the fact finding. She further indicated she used fentanyl for a few days in November 2024. She also refused a drug screen because she “had somewhere else to be.” Id. at 37.

[7] Mother further said she did not complete services in her prior CHINS cases because she “wasn't ready then.” Id. at 10. By the time of fact finding in the instant case, Mother had maintained her subsidized housing. She earned about $600 to $800 per month as a freelance hairstylist with which she said she purchased necessities for Child, including “a bassinet ․ a car seat ․ clothes, hygiene, diapers, wipes, bottles, [and] medicine.” Id. at 9. Mother testified she kept those items at her godmother's home because it was too emotional to see them while child was removed. The FCM assigned to Mother's case after Child's removal, FCM Grace Estes, later testified that Mother's home was appropriate with utilities and food for mother but did not contain items for Child.

[8] Mother's visitation facilitator, Ty Tanks, also testified. He generally observed Mother to be appropriate with and a “natural mother” to Child. Id. at 18. Although he had not observed Mother “under the influence[,]” Tanks said he would have concerns for Child in her care if she was using “illicit substances[.]” Id. at 20. He recommended Mother participate in parenting education to “make sure that she understands the infant's growth process[,]” and a mental health assessment or therapy to address “anxiety[.]” Id. at 17; 15.

[9] Child's guardian ad litem (GAL), Toni Thompson, provided testimony as well. GAL Thompson has known Mother since 2020 because she was also the GAL in Mother's prior CHINS cases. She explained that Mother's historical participation in services was “very sporadic[.]” Id. at 46. She further explained that Mother has not “resolved any concerns for ․ the safety of” Child in Mother's care. To recommend that Child be returned to Mother, GAL Thompson wanted to see Mother either participate in or provide documentation of her participation in mental health treatment and address her substance abuse. Although Mother asserted she had maintained the same housing for two years, GAL Thompson had ongoing concerns about Mother's stability because, from her prior case involvement, she did not believe Mother had maintained the same housing for the previous two years.

[10] On August 14, the juvenile court issued a written order adjudicating Child a CHINS. Mother appeals. Additional facts are provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Mother argues several of the court's findings are clearly erroneous because they are misleading or unsupported by the record. She also challenges the CHINS adjudication, alleging the findings are insufficient to support the conclusions that her actions seriously endangered Child and that Child's needs were unmet.

I. Standard of Review

[12] In reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, “we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility” but consider only the evidence supporting the trial court's judgment and the reasonable inferences therefrom. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017). Where, as here, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we consider “first, whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. at 578 (internal quotations omitted). We reverse only if the CHINS determination was clearly erroneous, which occurs if “the record facts do not support the findings” or the wrong legal standard is applied. Id. “We accept unchallenged findings as true.” Matter of W.H., 254 N.E.3d 549, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

[13] The trial court found Child to be a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which provides a child is a CHINS if that child is under eighteen and:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[14] DCS has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is a CHINS. Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3 (1997). In sum, a CHINS adjudication “requires three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied.

II. Challenged Findings

[15] Mother argues that Findings M, N, R, T, V, BB, DD, GG, II, JJ, KK, and RR are not supported by the record. Except for Findings T and BB, the State claims that mother's challenges are to the inferences drawn from the findings but not to the findings themselves. But Mother challenges the presence of evidence underlying some of the findings, so we address each in turn.

A. Findings M, N and DD

[16] Findings M, N and DD of the court's fact-finding order state:

M. Mother stated she goes to counseling at the Excel Center on Thursdays, but she does not know what type of counseling she receives, nor has she informed the DCS of this.

N. Mother is not credible in her testimony that she is attending therapy to address her mental health needs.

***

DD. [Visit Facilitator Ty Tanks] is skeptical of Mother's attendance in therapy on Thursdays.

App. Vol. II pp. 84-85.

[17] Mother alleges the evidence shows she knew that the type of counseling she attended was “group counseling[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 16. Mother insists that many people “would be unable to classify the exact psychological methodology” of their counseling, id.; but she does not dispute that when DCS asked her what “type” of counseling she attends, she responded, “I really don't know. I just know we talk about different things.” Tr. Vol. II p. 7. When DCS asked whether she informed any DCS caseworkers of her therapy attendance, Mother said, “No, I mean, I told the, I don't know what she's called when they first come out to the hospital, but I told her that I was going to the Excel center and that I was doing group therapy.” Id. But, Mother never indicated that she informed DCS what type of therapy she was attending. The record thus supports Finding M.

[18] Mother then challenges Finding DD, alleging she used the terms “ ‘group counseling’ and ‘group therapy’ interchangeably” but never “claimed to go to therapy on Thursdays.” Appellant's Br. pp. 16; 17. Yet, at trial, Mother asked Tanks if he was aware of whether she went to “therapy” every Thursday, and Tanks testified, “I don't think [Mother] goes to therapy every Thursday.” Tr. Vol. II p. 19. Mother's technical distinction between therapy and counseling, despite her own interchangeable use of the terms, does not negate that Finding DD is supported by Tanks’ testimony.

[19] Mother claims any errors in Findings M and DD “undercut” the court's conclusion in Finding N that Mother was not credible about her therapy. Appellant's Br. p. 17. But it is within the court's factfinding discretion to determine Mother's credibility, and we will not judge witness credibility. D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577-78.

B. Finding R

[20] Finding R states, “Mother is not credible in her assertion that she can maintain her sobriety as she has not demonstrated any period of sobriety.” App. Vol. II p. 84. Mother claims this is erroneous because she “never asserted she would maintain sobriety and freely admitted she continued to use marijuana.” Appellant's Br. p. 17. But Mother testified that she was willing to agree “not to use marijuana around [Child,]” “not to use marijuana in the home[,]” and that Child would have “a sober caregiver at all times[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 64. It was reasonable for the court to infer that Mother was thus asserting she could maintain sobriety around Child, which supports Finding R. And as above, it was within the court's discretion to determine whether Mother's testimony was credible. Finding R is not clearly erroneous.

C. Finding T

[21] Finding T states, “Mother was unable to initially state what her trigger for substance use is; however, later stated her fentanyl use in November 2024 was due to grief caused by her mother's passing. Mother stated her mother passed away in 2022.” App. Vol. II p. 84. Mother challenges this finding for two reasons: first, she testified that her mother passed away in 2023; second, she explicitly testified that there was no trigger for her November 2024 fentanyl use. Although this error does not affect the import of Finding T, the court's finding that Mother's mother passed away in 2022 is incorrect; Mother testified that it was in 2023. See Tr. Vol. II p. 70.

[22] However, the portion of Finding T indicating Mother stated her fentanyl use was due to grief caused by her mother's passing is erroneous. FCM Shurn testified that mother “told [her] that she had used Fentanyl back in November when her mom had passed.” Id. at 25. This alleged temporal connection is the only reference made between Mother's fentanyl use and her mother's death. Indeed, Mother testified there “wasn't a trigger that caused [her] to” use fentanyl as “[i]t was just something [she] tried[.]” Id. at 12. When DCS specifically asked Mother if her mother's death was the trigger for her fentanyl use, Mother said, “No․ The trigger was just you guys. That was around the same time that it was the anniversary of my son being adopted out.” Id. at 70. Although the evidence shows Mother did not initially identify a trigger for her fentanyl use, no evidence supports the finding that her use was triggered by her mother's passing. This latter portion of Finding T is clearly erroneous.

D. Finding V

[23] Finding V states, “FCM Estes observed Mother's home but did not observe items in the home for [Child].” App. Vol. II p. 85. Mother argues this finding is misleading because FCM Shurn previously observed items for Child in her home, but Mother said she removed the items to alleviate emotional suffering. Nevertheless, Mother does not contest that FCM Estes did not observe the items, and the record supports the same. FCM Estes also testified that she had neither a reason to doubt nor to believe that Mother still had the items. It was within the court's discretion to determine what weight to assign each person's testimony. This finding is not clearly erroneous.

E. Finding BB

[24] Finding BB states, “Mother has told DCS FCM and Visit Facilitator Ty Tanks (VF) that she needs basic items for herself such as food, clothing, and feminine hygiene products. She was upset and crying when she conveyed these needs to Mr. Tanks outside of their regularly scheduled visitation sessions.” Id. Mother correctly notes that she was only crying when requesting items from FCM Estes, not when requesting items from Tanks. But that inconsistency does not affect the substance of Finding BB—that is, Mother had needs for herself for which she requested assistance, and she was upset when conveying those needs—all of which is supported by the evidence.

F. Finding GG

[25] Finding GG states, “VF [Ty Tanks] recommends parenting education for Mother to ensure necessary skills exist for her to appropriately care for [Child].” Id. Mother claims this is erroneous because Tanks testified that parenting education “is just something that our agency offers ․ so I always recommend it” and that “there's not something specific about” Mother that says she needs the education. Tr. Vol. II p. 18. That notwithstanding, Finding GG is clearly supported by Tanks’ testimony that he recommended the parenting education “to make sure that [Mother] understands the infant's growth process and stuff like that.” Id. at 17. This finding is not erroneous.

G. Finding II

[26] Finding II states, “Mother has refused drug screens offered by the DCS FCM. When last offered a drug screen, Mother informed the DCS FCM it would be positive.” App. Vol. II p. 86. Mother contends this is erroneous because she was unable to screen once due to a conflict, which she insists is different than a refusal. Her technical distinction is unpersuasive. Mother's reasoning aside, FCM Estes testified that Mother did not take a drug screen when requested. Finding II is not clearly erroneous.

H. Finding JJ

[27] Finding JJ states, “During the assessment in the above-captioned cause, Mother made statements that she wished she was with her deceased mother and did not want to be here anymore.” App. Vol. II p. 86. Mother attempts to recharacterize the statements but does not contest that she said “she wanted to be with her own mother” while she was at the hospital when Child was removed. Appellant's Br. p. 19. She asserts DCS presented “no evidence that Mother made a habit of saying this or wish[ing] death on herself” and that she never said she “did not want to be here anymore.” Id. However, FCM Shurn testified that she was concerned for Mother's mental health based on Mother's statement that she “want[ed] to be with her mom, and her mom is deceased.” Tr. Vol. II p. 29. And GAL Thompson testified that she was concerned for Mother's mental health in part because of “incidences where mom herself has spoken about not wanting to be here[.]” Id. at 52. Despite Mother's concerns about how Finding JJ may be construed, the finding is supported by the record.

I. Finding KK

[28] Finding KK states, “Mother informed the assessment FCM [Shurn] she would not do services in [Child's] case.” App. Vol. II p. 86. Mother challenges this finding because she later told the permanency FCM, FCM Estes, that she was open to some services. But Mother does not contest what she told FCM Shurn. Finding KK is supported by FCM Shurn's testimony that Mother said “[s]he didn't want to do any services [and s]he told me she wasn't going to do any services.” Tr. Vol. II p. 26. This finding is not clearly erroneous.

J. Finding RR

[29] Mother challenges the portion of Finding RR that states, “Mother's family supports have not been consistent, nor did they offer to care for [Child] while the case is open. Mother has also stated a family support upon whom she relied for transportation today [to the fact-finding hearing] uses illicit substances in her vehicle.” App. Vol. II p. 86-87. Regarding Mother's family supports, FCM Shurn testified Mother's sister brought some items to help Mother with Child; but she also testified that Mother “kept calling people” to take placement of Child and “they didn't really seem to be giving her a call back to the placement for [Child].” Tr. Vol. II pp. 26-27. Mother's testimony that her sister could help with childcare if Mother later got a job does not render this finding unsupported by the evidence. And when DCS questioned Mother about the odor of marijuana coming from her, Mother testified her cousin that brought her to court smoked. Finding RR is not clearly erroneous.

K. Conclusion on Findings

[30] In sum, the only challenged finding that is clearly erroneous is the portion of Finding T that states, “[Mother's] fentanyl use in November 2024 was due to grief caused by her mother's passing.” App. Vol. II p. 84. The remainder of the challenged findings are not erroneous and are taken as true along with the unchallenged findings. W.H., 254 N.E.3d at 554.

III. Seriously Endangered

[31] Mother asserts the court's conclusion that Child was seriously endangered, particularly by her substance use and untreated mental health issues, is erroneous. Mother acknowledges her testimony that she has “bipolar disorder, anxiety and depression” but asserts that her “participation in group counseling ․ sufficiently addresses those issues.” Appellant's Br. p. 21. She reiterates testimony of other witnesses and, in effect, requests that we reweigh their testimony, which we cannot do. D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577-78. Still, Mother asserts a CHINS adjudication may not be based solely on past conditions or solely on her marijuana use and argues she “is now doing what it takes to preserve her relationship with Child[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 22.

[32] Here, the findings support the judgment. Among other things, the court found: Mother was not credible in her testimony about attending therapy; Mother continues to use marijuana and last used the day before her factfinding hearing; Mother used fentanyl in November 2024; Mother had Section 8 housing at the time of the hearing, but had periods of homelessness since 2020; and FCM Estes did not observe items for Child in Mother's home. The court also found:

Z. Mother currently has unutilized referrals for therapy and substance use services through the Volunteers of America (VOA). Mother went to the VOA but left the same day. Mother does not acknowledge that her use of substances requires treatment.

AA. Mother believes she manages her depression and anxiety well on her own without services.

***

II. Mother has refused drug screens offered by the DCS FCM. When last offered a drug screen, Mother informed the DCS FCM it would be positive.

JJ. During the assessment in the above-captioned cause, Mother made statements that she wished she was with her deceased mother and did not want to be here anymore.

***

PP. Mother informed the assessment FCM she continued to use marijuana until approximately one week before she gave birth to [Child].

App. Vol. II pp. 85-86. Regarding Mother's historical involvement with DCS, the court further found: Mother had prior CHINS cases and two involuntary terminations of parental rights; Mother rarely participated in services in her prior CHINS cases and completed no services to achieve reunification; and Mother did not participate in prior services because she was not ready to.

[33] Although a CHINS adjudication may not be based solely on prior conditions, a court can consider issues that have not been corrected and existed at the time the case was filed. See e.g., In re R.S., 987 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). These findings demonstrate that Mother has historically failed to participate in services to address her housing stability, mental health, and substance use issues. But the findings also demonstrate these conditions continued at the time of fact finding, and Mother had taken no action to remedy them.

[34] Although she temporarily quit using marijuana one week before Child's birth, she had resumed using it after Child's removal and admitted she last used the day before the fact finding. She also refused at least one drug screen when requested but admitted that a screen would be positive for marijuana. Mother asserted she was attending weekly counseling, but the record reveals no documentation thereof, and she has not utilized referrals for therapy and substance-use services. She also made comments during the instant case about wanting to be with her mother, who was deceased, which reinforced GAL Thompson's and the DCS's concerns for her mental health. And although Mother had housing at the time of the hearing, she did not have the items necessary to care for Child when FCM Estes visited her home. Even though Mother said the items were at her godmother's house, FCM Estes testified that she had neither a reason to doubt nor to believe that Mother still had the items kept at another person's house.

[35] As we have said before, DCS need not wait until a child is physically or emotionally harmed to intervene. K.B. v. Ind. Dept. of Child Servs., 24 N.E.3d 997, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). And this is not a case where Mother's marijuana use was the only endangering condition present without more. Cf. Ad.M. v. Ind. Dep't. of Child Servs., 103 N.E.3d 709, 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). The totality of Mother's habitual patterns of conduct coupled with her ongoing substance use and mental health needs sufficiently established that Child was seriously endangered by Mother's actions and inactions. See S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287.

IV. Unmet Needs

[36] Mother also asserts the DCS did not prove Child's needs were unmet. She recites evidence that she had housing, income as a freelance hairdresser, food in the home, and that she previously had supplies for Child in her home. But this is insufficient for us to determine that the court's conclusion was erroneous.

[37] Regardless of what she had previously, Mother did not have adequate supplies in her home for Child when FCM Estes visited. Mother said she planned to apply for “SSI” or seek additional employment so that she could further provide for Child, but she had not done so prior to the fact finding. Tr. Vol. II p. 12. The court found Mother's assertions that she could provide Child with shelter or supervision free from substance abuse were not credible given Mother's admission to ongoing marijuana use and refusal of drug screens. The court also found Mother had unutilized referrals for mental health treatment and she historically refused mental health services. And Mother told FCM Shurn she would not accept services through Child's case.

[38] The purpose of services for parents is to benefit the child by attempting to remedy a parent's neglect, refusal, or inability to meet the needs of the child. See Ind. Code § 31-34-20-3 (2022) (“If the juvenile court determines that a parent ․ should participate in a program of care, treatment or rehabilitation for the child, the court may order the parent” to participate in certain services. (emphasis added)). Mother's historic and current refusal to participate in substance use and mental health services together with her inconsistent supplies for Child demonstrated that the Child's needs were unmet.

[39] For all the foregoing reasons, the evidence sufficiently supports the CHINS adjudication. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The appealed order reflects that R.V. is Child's legal father; he does not participate in this appeal.

2.   DCS believed Child was born positive for marijuana and alleged the same in its petition alleging Child was a CHINS. However, DCS did not admit any evidence at fact finding to prove Child was born positive for marijuana, and Mother's admission to marijuana use during her pregnancy is insufficient to establish the same. The trial court did not adjudicate Child a CHINS as a drug-exposed infant.

Scheele, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.