D.A., Appellant-Respondent, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] D.A. appeals from the juvenile court's true finding that he committed Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm. He challenges the admission of a gun found in his possession, alleging that the officer lacked probable cause for his arrest, which led to the gun's discovery. Concluding that the officer had probable cause, the seizure of the gun was lawful under both the federal and state constitutions, and, therefore, the evidence was admissible, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 18, 2025, Indianapolis’ Riverside Park hosted one in a series of community events held every Sunday during the summer called “Sunday Fun Day.” Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 8, 13. Undercover officers with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, including Officer Nicholas Snow, were on duty that day watching for criminal activity. Multiple people had been shot in the park in the lead-up to this particular Sunday Fun Day event. And officers had received numerous complaints from community members about open air narcotics dealing and use in the park during the events.

[3] The temperature on that day was warm, in the 70's. And the daylight hours included 7:00 p.m. at that time of year. At around 7:00 p.m. that day, Officer Snow observed a group of juveniles that included fifteen-year old D.A. and fifteen-year-old C.J. It was “immediately apparent” to the officer that the two were juveniles because they looked “very young,” and their “facial features” looked like juveniles. Id. at 9-10, 14. All of the juveniles in the group were wearing heavy clothing, which seemed abnormal to Officer Snow given the warm temperatures. For example, D.A. was wearing a thick, black jacket, and C.J. was wearing a gray hoodie. C.J. was also wearing a “full-face covering mask,” which Officer Snow knew from his training and experience to be a practice used to prevent identification. Id. at 9-10.

[4] Officer Snow also observed a “large bulge” in the front waistband areas of both D.A.’s and C.J.’s pants. Id. at 9. Although Snow could not see a gun, he could see the outline of a gun inside the waistband area. He knew through his training and experience that people who were not allowed to possess firearms usually carried them in their waistbands rather than in a holster. He also knew that people who carry guns in their waistband often perform “security checks” by reaching down to feel the gun, and, if necessary, to adjust it, to make sure it was still there and still secure. Id. at 10. Officer Snow observed D.A. and C.J. engaging in frequent security checks of the bulge areas of their waistbands.

[5] He continued to observe the group of juveniles as they walked over to another group. The members of that group appeared to him to be juveniles as well. Officer Snow saw the juveniles removing the tobacco from the inside of a cigar and replacing it with something from a baggie. He knew from his training and experience that marijuana was often inserted in the center of cigars to create a blunt. Next, he observed the juveniles passing the cigar around, and each taking a hit from it, which is also indicative of marijuana use. He was standing approximately twenty-five to thirty feet away from the group when he smelled the odor of burnt marijuana in the area, a scent he recognized from his training and experience, and numerous narcotics investigations.

[6] The officer then followed the group using an observation drone as the juveniles walked further into the park. D.A. and C.J. separated from the group and began walking toward Riverside High School. The two stopped and sat on a park bench before walking toward 30th Street. Once they were some distance from the public in the park, Officer Snow decided to stop them because he believed they were armed. A group of five to seven officers surrounded the two, ordered them to the ground at gunpoint, and handcuffed them. Police found an AR rifle-caliber pistol in D.A.’s front waistband, loaded with a magazine of live ammunition. Officers found a fully functional Polymer 80 Glock replica handgun in C.J.’s front waistband. That weapon was loaded with live 9mm ammunition. After confirming that both were juveniles, the officers formally arrested D.A and C.J.

[7] The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that D.A. committed Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm. During the fact-finding hearing, D.A. objected and moved to suppress the gun on the ground that he was subjected to an unconstitutional search and seizure unsupported by probable cause. The court found there was probable cause and denied the suppression motion and objection. The juvenile court entered a true finding after the disposition hearing and placed D.A. on formal probation.

Discussion and Decision

[8] D.A. appeals, contending that the trial court erred in admitting the firearm found in his possession. He argues that the seizure of the gun was the product of the State's warrantless and unlawful search of him without probable cause for his arrest and minimal suspicion that he was committing a crime.

[9] Here, the court denied D.A.’s motion to suppress and admitted the evidence during the fact-finding hearing. Our standard of review following the admission of evidence after the denial of a motion to suppress is well settled.

When ruling on the admission of evidence at trial following denial of a motion to suppress, a trial court must consider the foundational evidence presented at trial. It also considers evidence from the suppression hearing that is favorable to the defendant only to the extent it is uncontradicted at trial. A trial court is in the best position to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility, and we review its rulings on admissibility for an abuse of discretion and reverse only if a ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights. However, the ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of law that we review de novo.

Casillas v. State, 190 N.E.3d 1005, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Gerth v. State, 51 N.E.3d 368, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)), trans. denied. With that standard in mind, we analyze D.A.’s constitutional claims.

I. Fourth Amendment Analysis

[10] For this constitutional claim, D.A. contends that “the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support a probable cause finding that (a) [Detective] Snow knew D.A. was a juvenile prior to taking D.A. to custody, and (b) that D.A. possessed a firearm.” Appellant's Br. p. 14.

[11] If we begin with the premise that D.A. was subject to an arrest when he was surrounded by officers, ordered to the ground at gunpoint, and placed in handcuffs, the question is whether the arrest was supported by probable cause and, therefore, was lawful. Probable cause is a “ ‘practical, nontechnical conception’ that deals with the ‘factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’ ” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)). “Probable cause ‘is not a high bar[.]’ ” Hodges v. State, 125 N.E.3d 578, 581-82 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014)). The amount of evidence necessary to establish probable cause involves “ ‘facts and circumstances ․ such as to warrant a man of (reasonable) prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed’ and, of course, that the person to be arrested was the offender.” U.S. v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431 n.4 (1976) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925)). “Whatever evidence may be necessary to establish probable cause in a given case, however, it is clear that it never need rise to the level required to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Watson, 423 U.S. at 431 n.4.

[12] Probable cause does not require proof by a preponderance of the evidence. “Finely-tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence ․ have no place” in the probable cause analysis. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235. Probable cause requires only the probability, not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity. Id. The possibility of a post hoc innocent explanation for the observed conduct does not defeat probable cause; “innocent activity will often supply a basis for showing probable cause.” Hodges, 125 N.E.3d at 582-83.

[13] In assessing probable cause, courts must look at the facts in their totality rather than taking a “divide and conquer” approach by assessing the significance of each relevant fact in isolation. McGrath v. State, 95 N.E.3d 522, 529 (Ind. 2018). Additionally, these facts must be considered in the context of the officer's training and experience. Id. “[S]tate and federal courts have ‘long recognized the police officer's investigatory insight in evaluating probable cause.’ ” Id. n.5. (quoting Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1995, 2026-27 (2017) (citing cases)). “This court is deferential to police officer training and experience, and we certainly recognize that a trained officer can properly act on a suspicion that would elude an untrained eye.” Denton v. State, 805 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.

[14] D.A. relies on L.A.F. v. State, 698 N.E.2d 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) to support his position. However, that case is distinguishable from the present case. In L.A.F., a panel of this court reversed a juvenile adjudication for insufficient evidence that officers had probable cause to believe L.A.F. was underage, and therefore violating curfew, at the time he was frisked and a gun was recovered. Id. at 356 n.2. The inference drawn from the reversal is that there was no testimony in the record that the officers believed L.A.F. was a juvenile based on his physical appearance.

[15] The officer testified that it was immediately apparent to him that D.A. and his group were juveniles because they looked very young and their facial features made it apparent to him that they were juveniles. Here, Officer Snow had probable cause to believe that D.A. was a juvenile in possession of a firearm, which constituted probable cause to believe he was committing a crime in the officer's presence. See Ind. Code § 35-47-10-5 (2024) (dangerous possession of a firearm by a child).

[16] Additionally, Indiana appellate courts have found that when age is an element of an offense, which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it can be proven through circumstantial evidence. See Staton v. State, 853 N.E.2d 470, 473-74 (Ind. 2006) (“circumstantial testimonial evidence can be sufficient to prove age”). And age as an element of an offense may be proven by opinion testimony. See Chrisp v. State, 372 N.E.2d 1180, 1181 (Ind. 1978) (“The opinion of a witness as to the age of the accused, based on personal observation, is sufficient evidence of age, if believed by the jury, to support the conviction.”). Thus, it follows that opinion testimony of the age of the alleged delinquent child based on a witness’ personal observation can constitute probable cause.

[17] Furthermore, the objective facts support the reasonableness of Officer Snow's belief that D.A. and C.J. were juveniles. D.A. had just turned fifteen years old one month prior to the incident. And C.J. was also fifteen years old. Therefore, they were not juveniles on the brink of turning eighteen years old. And the juvenile court had the opportunity to observe D.A. and C.J. in court and could assess whether their appearance made it reasonable for the officers to conclude they were juveniles.

[18] Next, we consider D.A.’s challenge to the adequacy of Officer Snow's belief that he was in possession of a firearm. D.A. suggested that the large bulge the officer identified could have been a flashlight or some other item innocently possessed. And on appeal, D.A. offers two cases in support of his challenge; however, we find those cases to be distinguishable.

[19] In Stalling v. State, 713 N.E.2d 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), a panel of this Court reversed the denial of a motion to suppress evidence after an officer saw Stalling place something near the belt buckle of his waistband. The officer testified to nothing more than that one act. We concluded that absent any further movements consistent with securing the object in his pants, the officer in Stalling's case lacked probable cause. Id. at 924-25. Here, however, Officer Snow testified that he saw a large bulge near D.A.’s waistband. Further, he observed D.A. make numerous security checks of the object in his waistband, which in the officer's training and experience is indicative of concealing a weapon in his pants.

[20] In Richardson v. State, 927 N.E.2d 379 (Ind. 2010), a police officer observed a seatbelt violation and conducted a routine traffic stop of Richardson, who was an adult. The officer observed a large bulge in his pocket. Richardson admitted it was his handgun. The officer's additional inquiry into the handgun and licensing for it, along with the subsequent pat down which led to the discovery of cocaine in his pants, was found by our Supreme Court to be unconstitutional because, under the Seat Belt Act, no further inspection, search, or detention, is allowed solely because of a violation of the Act. Id. at 382. Here, there was no statutory constraint to the search and there was no constitutional protection for a juvenile, such as D.A., possessing a firearm.

[21] Additionally, as pointed out by the State, Officer Snow's observation of D.A. in possession of marijuana was its own independent ground for probable cause to arrest him/detain him. He testified that he saw D.A. and the group of juveniles removing tobacco from a cigar and replacing it with a substance from a baggie they possessed. In his training and experience, the officer knew that these actions were common practice when making marijuana blunts. And he recognized the odor of burnt marijuana, from his training and experience through conducting “thousands of narcotics investigations involving marijuana.” Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 11-12. If an officer has the requisite background and qualification through training and experience to detect the odor of an illicit substance, then that, standing alone, can provide probable cause. See Bunnell v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1231, 1237-38 (Ind. 2021) (“an officer who affirms that they detect the odor of raw marijuana based on their training and experience may establish probable cause without providing further details on their qualifications to recognize this odor.”). Here, the officer expanded on his assertion of recognition through training and experience by noting that he had been involved in “thousands of narcotics investigations involving marijuana.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 11.

[22] We conclude that the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress and properly admitted the evidence at the fact-finding hearing. D.A.’s Fourth Amendment challenge does not prevail.

II. Indiana Constitutional Analysis

[23] For this constitutional claim, D.A. argues that the officers had a “minimal degree of suspicion [that] D.A. was committing a crime, the degree of intrusion was excessive, and law enforcement needs were de minimus.” Appellant's Br. pp. 10-11.

[24] Although the language of Article I, Section 11 of Indiana's constitution tracks that of the Fourth Amendment, “Indiana has explicitly rejected the expectation of privacy as a test of the reasonableness of a search or seizure.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). “The legality of a governmental search under the Indiana constitution turns on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of the circumstances.” Id. And because “ ‘Indiana citizens have been concerned not only with personal privacy but also with safety, security, and protection from crime’ ․ some intrusions upon privacy are tolerated, so long as they are reasonably aimed toward those concerns.” Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 940 (Ind. 2006) (quoting State v. Gerschoffer, 763 N.E.2d 960, 966 (Ind. 2002)). Therefore, the “reasonableness of a search or seizure [turns] on a balance of: 1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361.

[25] Applying this test to the current case, we come to the following conclusions. First, the degree of suspicion in this case was high. Officer Snow had probable cause to believe D.A. was in possession of a firearm and in possession of marijuana based on his personal observations of D.A. and the group of juveniles and his training and experience. Next, the extent of law enforcement needs was great. D.A. and his friend were juveniles carrying firearms and smoking controlled substances at a community event marketed to bring families and children together. There had been multiple, recent shootings in the park in the days leading up to the event and there was community concern about open air use of drugs at these events. “Protecting the public from gun violence is a legitimate and paramount concern of law enforcement, and the State is legitimately concerned with deterring gun violence and possession of firearms by unlicensed individuals.” Grayson v. State, 52 N.E.3d 24, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.

[26] And, as for the third consideration, the degree of intrusion was significant because D.A. was arrested. However, that factor is outweighed by the other two factors discussed above. Additionally, D.A. has not pinpointed any aspect of the execution of his arrest that was unreasonable. The officers had probable cause to believe that D.A. and C.J. were armed. That fact, plus Officer Snow's observation that D.A. was using marijuana, heightened the need to quickly intervene by surrounding the suspects with numerous officers, ordering the juveniles to the ground at gunpoint, and handcuffing them prior to any further investigation. There is no evidence in the record that the officers used excessive physical force against D.A. once he was detained/arrested or that there was any violation of policies and procedures for arresting individuals believed to be armed.

[27] We conclude that the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress and properly admitted the evidence at the fact-finding hearing. D.A.’s state constitutional challenge does not prevail.

Conclusion

[28] The officers had probable cause to believe that D.A. illegally possessed a firearm at a community event where families were present. The trial court did not violate federal or state constitutional protections by admitting the firearm evidence in the fact-finding hearing. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's evidentiary ruling and adjudication.

[29] Affirmed.

Crone, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Felix, J., concur.