IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of Pr.T. (Minor Child) and Z.S. (Mother) and Pa.T. (Father) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Pa.T. (“Father”) and Z.S. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal an order involuntarily terminating their parental rights over Pr.T. (“Child”) upon the petition of the Madison County Department of Child Services (“DCS”). The sole, restated issue on appeal is whether the trial court clearly erred when it terminated Parents’ parent-child relationships with Child. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born on September 18, 2023. Five days later, she was removed from Parents’ care on an emergency basis due to Parents’ “inability, refusal, or neglect ․ to provide [ ] Child with shelter, care, and/or supervision.” Appealed Order at 8. Two days later, DCS filed a petition to adjudicate Child as a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) based on allegations that Parents were homeless, lacked stable housing, and had a “history of substance use that deprived [ ] Child of a sober caregiver.” Id. The CHINS petition also noted that Mother had five other pending CHINS cases regarding other children. On September 26, the court held a combined detention and initial hearing, ordering Child to remain in foster care.

[3] On November 15, Parents each submitted a “Mediated Agreed Entry” in which they agreed that Child was a CHINS and that they needed “the coercive intervention of the court” to maintain safe, stable housing. Ex. v. 1 at 16, 20. Each parent also agreed to comply with specific services. Mother agreed to: complete a psychological assessment, including a substance use disorder assessment, and follow all recommendations; successfully complete a program of home-based case work and comply with all reasonable recommendations; complete a parenting assessment and follow all recommendations; and consistently engage in supervised parenting time with Child. Father agreed to: successfully complete fatherhood engagement and comply with all reasonable recommendations and consistently engage in supervised parenting time with Child. On November 17, the court accepted the agreements, adjudicated Child a CHINS, and issued a dispositional order in which it ordered Parents into services.

[4] On January 3, 2024, the trial court granted DCS's motion to suspend Mother's visitation with Child because Mother had repeatedly failed to contact the visitation providers to engage in supervised visitation. At a February 14 review hearing, the court found that neither Parent was complying with Child's case plan, cooperating with DCS, or engaging in court-ordered services. Father had been “unsuccessfully discharged from fatherhood engagement and supervised visitation” and had not visited Child since December 2023. Appealed Order at 9. Mother had also failed to engage in services and had not visited with Child “in over two months.” Id. On March 18 and April 22, the court held hearings on Mother's request to reinstate visitation, but Mother failed to appear at the latter hearing, and the trial court denied her motion.

[5] In the summer of 2024, Mother completed a psychological evaluation and was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and opioid use disorder. However, Mother “failed to engage in the recommended medication management, therapy, and home-based casework designed to assist Mother with stable housing, resources with which to parent [Child], and employment.” Id. at 8.

[6] In August 2024, Father was arrested and charged with domestic battery against Mother, and it was alleged that alcohol was involved in the incident. The trial court subsequently granted DCS's request to modify the dispositional decree by ordering the following additional services: prohibiting both Parents from consuming alcohol; ordering Father to complete a parenting assessment and follow all recommendations; prohibiting Father from engaging in domestic violence; ordering Father to complete a domestic violence assessment and follow all recommendations; and ordering Parents to abide by the terms of the no-contact order entered in Father's criminal case. The court imposed additional obligations upon Parents, including the requirement that they notify DCS “of any changes in address, household composition, employment[,] or telephone number within five (5) days of said change.” Ex. v. 1 at 29, 31.

[7] Following the December 3, 2024, permanency hearing, the trial court again found that neither Parent was complying with Child's case plan. Specifically, the court found that Mother had not engaged in home-based case management or the medication management and therapy recommended after her psychological evaluation. It further found that Father had not participated in fatherhood engagement as ordered or visited with Child except for one recent visit that he ended early. The court found Child was progressing well in the foster placement where she had lived since she was five days old. The court ordered a permanency plan of reunification and a concurrent plan of adoption.

[8] On December 9, DCS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Parents’ parental rights as to Child. On December 22, Mother was released from jail ¹ and began residing at her mother's boyfriend's residence in Alexandria; however, Mother failed to inform her family case manager (“FCM”) of the change of address. After DCS learned of the new address, one of the FCMs offered to see Mother's home, but Mother stated that there were “things going on at the home” and requested a virtual visit. Tr. at 121.

[9] The court held the termination of parental rights (“TPR”) fact-finding hearing in both Parents’ cases on January 27, February 25, May 20, and May 23, 2025. On August 20, the court issued an order terminating Parents’ rights. In addition to the facts stated above, the order included the following findings:

19. Mother failed to consistently keep DCS informed of where she was living, moving on more than one occasion without notice to her FCM, leaving the FCM to become aware of changes in address in open court.

20. At the time of trial, Mother acknowledged that she was then living at her mother's boyfriend's residence in Alexandria where Father had also on occasion resided and where Maternal Grandmother's paramour allows Mother and Father to reside “whenever they need a pillow[.]”

21. Mother briefly worked at a local bar/restaurant—The Curve—at the end of 2024 or early in 2025 but presents the Court with no pay stubs or other independent evidence of either the length of that employment or the wages earned as a result for the Court to determine whether [Mother] has sufficient resources to successfully provide housing and sustenance for both herself and for her daughter.

22. Mother's claims of current income from production of TikTok media is dubious and uncorroborated by other evidence; and even if accepted is unlikely to provide sufficient funding by which Mother could support herself and [Child].

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29. Mother's visits [with Child] have never been reinstated.

30. Throughout Mother's involvement in the CHINS case, providers refused to accept referrals for Mother's services due to her history of non-compliance.

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36. Father failed to comply with the Orders added by the modification on December 3, 2024, including completion of a parenting assessment, successful completion of all recommendations from the assessment, and completion of a domestic violence assessment.

37. Father failed to successfully complete the Fatherhood Engagement program, failed to consistently engage in supervised visitation, and has presented no evidence of completion of either the parenting assessment or the domestic violence assessment.

38. As of December of 2024, Father had not begun the Fatherhood Engagement program that on average requires four to six months to complete.

39. While Father testified that he is employed in Kokomo, he has provided neither to his [FCM] nor to this Court independent evidence to verify those assertions.

40. The apartment at which Father stays is not in his own name. Father testified that housing is provided by his job as an employee at an unspecified Marathon Gas Station in Kokomo and that he pays $450 in monthly rent.

41. The Court observed Father's notable reluctance during trial to forthrightly answer [DCS's] questions about the nature, location, and extent of his employment or the precise terms of his housing[ ] and therefore gives little weight to his testimony.

42. Father has not initiated weekly contact with DCS nor kept the agency informed of the address at which he resides.

43. DCS has, therefore, been unable to discern whether his housing is sufficiently stable and appropriate to serve as a place in which to parent [Child].

44. Father is not a U.S. citizen, having been in the country since 2021.

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46. Father reports his initial entry visa lapsed, although he claims, again without independent verification of these self-serving statements, that he now has a valid work visa.

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49. Regarding Father's time with [Child], according to testimony, Father had several visits with [Child], but the most recent was in December of 2024. According to the findings by the CHINS Court, Father had one visit prior to the December 3, 2024, hearing. This suggests that all or nearly all of his visitation during the pendency of the CHINS case occurred during the month of December, 2024.

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51. DCS's staffed recommendation is that TPR be granted as to both [Parents] so that [Child] can achieve permanency via adoption.

52. [The court appointed special advocate (“CASA”)]’s staffed recommendation also supports termination of [both Parents’] parental rights so [that Child] can achieve permanency via adoption.

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55. [Child's foster family,] [t]he Jordans[,] have a home with sufficient space to envelop [Child] into the family and where she is the only child.

56. The Jordans also have sufficient stable income to be able to afford to raise [Child] if an adoption court were to permit them to adopt her. Mrs. Jordan is employed as a dental hygienist and Mr. Jordan is a city employee.

57. [Child] exhibits a bond with the placement parents, crying and reaching for them when she would be taken from them to go to visits with the biological parents.

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61. Neither parent has progressed beyond supervised visits.

62. Father is not a U.S. citizen and may be at risk of having to return to his country or face deportation.

63. There is no point during the underlying CHINS case that [either Parent] made significant progress toward reunification.

64. Neither parent is now exercising visitation: Mother due to an order from the CHlNS court denying her such and Father due to moving out of county and lacking transportation, and the inability to find a provider that can transport for visits.

65. Father does not have transportation for himself․.

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68. There is not sufficient evidence Father has enough income to provide for himself and for [Child,] and he does not have a stable living arrangement in which he could parent her.

69. Neither is there credible evidence that Mother has either stable income to provide for herself and for [Child] or her own stable living arrangement, relying even at the time of trial on her mother's boyfriend providing her with shelter.

70. This Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child's best interest that [both Parents’] parental rights be terminated so that [Child] is free to reach permanency through adoption.

71. The Court further finds that [DCS] has a satisfactory plan for the child, that being adoption.

72. Finally, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence ․ there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by [either Parent].

Appealed Order at 3-6. Mother and Father now appeal that order.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[10] We begin our review by acknowledging that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Z.G. v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re C.G.), 954 N.E.2d 910, 923 (Ind. 2011). However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re K.S.), 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[11] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to allege and prove, among other things:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

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(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c), (d)(3)-(4) (2024).² DCS's “burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ ” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C.§ 31-37-14-2).

[12] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. E.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re E.M.), 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court's judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[13] Here, in terminating Parents’ parental rights, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court's judgment contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom that support them.” Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. v. LaPorte Cir. Ct. (In re T.S.), 906 N.E.2d 801, 804 (Ind. 2009). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 923. When, as here, the findings of fact are unchallenged, this Court accepts them as true. L.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re S.S.), 120 N.E.3d 605, 608 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Thus, if the unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm. Kitchell v. Franklin, 26 N.E.3d 1050, 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

Conditions that Resulted in Removal/Continued Placement

[14] Parents challenge the court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for Child's removal or continued placement outside the home will not be remedied. When we consider the likelihood of remediation of conditions, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. “First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). In the first step, we consider not only the initial reasons for removal, but also the reasons for continued placement outside the home. T.Q. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., (In re N.Q.), 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643.

[15] However, the court must also “evaluate the parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.” Moore v. Jasper Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 894 N.E.2d 218, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). The “trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, or social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” A.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re P.B.), 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. In evaluating the parent's habitual patterns of conduct, the court may disregard efforts made shortly before the termination hearing and weigh the history of the parent's prior conduct more heavily. R.C. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re K.T.K.), 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1234 (Ind. 2013). And DCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. Moore, 894 N.E.2d at 226.

[16] Here, the conditions that led to Child's removal were Mother's and Father's admitted inability to provide Child with shelter, care, or supervision without the coercive intervention of the court. Throughout the approximately one and one-half years of the CHINS and TPR cases, both Parents failed to keep DCS informed of where they were living, making it difficult, if not impossible, for DCS to determine whether either or both of them had obtained sufficiently safe, stable housing for themselves and Child. Although both Parents testified at the TPR hearing that they had appropriate housing, they had not provided DCS with an opportunity to visit their alleged homes to confirm they were appropriate for Child. And the trial court found Parents’ self-serving and uncorroborated statements regarding their alleged employment and housing to be “dubious” and, therefore, gave that testimony “little weight.” Appealed Order at 3, 4. Thus, the evidence most favorable to the judgment is that, at the time of the termination hearing, Parents had not remedied the reasons for Child's removal by obtaining safe, secure, and appropriate housing. Parents’ contentions to the contrary are merely requests that we reweigh the evidence and/or judge witness credibility, which we will not do. See, e.g., In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642.

[17] In addition, the uncontested findings establish that Child remained out of Parents’ care due to their failures to engage in and complete court-ordered services designed to assist them in parenting Child. Mother had failed to: engage in a psychological assessment that included a substance use disorder assessment and follow recommendations therefrom; successfully complete a program of home-based case work; complete a parenting assessment and follow recommendations therefrom; and consistently engage in parenting time.³ Father had failed to: successfully complete fatherhood engagement services; complete a parenting assessment and follow recommendations therefrom; complete a domestic violence assessment and follow recommendations therefrom; and consistently engage in parenting time. Thus, the trial court found that there was “no point during the underlying CHINS case that [Parents had] made significant progress toward reunification.” Appealed Order at 5.

[18] The evidence most favorable to the judgment supports the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that neither Parent is likely to remedy the reasons Child had been removed and remained out of their care since the beginning of the CHINS cases.

Best Interests of Child

[19] Mother also asserts that the court erred in concluding that termination of her parental rights is in Child's best interests.⁴ In making such a determination, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “A parent's historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.” Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. “Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. Such evidence, “in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” L.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.D.S.), 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[20] The evidence most favorable to the judgment shows that, throughout the CHINS and TPR proceedings and even at the time of the termination hearing, Mother was unable to provide adequate housing, stability, and supervision for Child. Mother had not seen Child since December 2023 due to her failure to maintain contact with visitation providers and appear in court on her request to reinstate visitation. Mother had failed to engage in and/or complete services designed to assist her in parenting Child, and she had provided no verification of her alleged employment. And Mother had failed to remain in contact with DCS and provide updates on her housing so that DCS could confirm that it was safe, stable, and appropriate for Child.

[21] Moreover, the FCMs and CASA testified that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests and that Child needs permanency which can be provided by her foster parents, who intend to adopt her. Given that testimony, in addition to evidence that Child needs permanency and stability that Mother cannot and/or will not provide and that the reasons for Child's removal and continued placement outside Mother's home will not likely be remedied, we conclude that the totality of the evidence supports the trial court's determination that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158-59.

Conclusion

[22] The trial court's uncontested findings of fact support its judgment terminating Parents’ parental rights. The trial court did not clearly err.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   It is not clear from the record why Mother had been in jail.

2.   We note the trial court made no findings regarding whether Parents posed a threat to Child's well-being, and that issue is not before us.

3.   Mother lost her supervised visitation rights by failing to keep in contact with visitation providers, and she failed to appear for a hearing on her request to reinstate visitation.

4.   Father does not challenge the court's conclusion that termination of his parental rights is in Child's best interests.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.