State of Indiana, Appellant-Respondent v. Christopher Jewell, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Christopher Jewell filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief in which he claimed that he was entitled to additional educational credit time. The post-conviction court (“PC Court”) granted Jewell's petition on grounds that the calculation of Jewell's educational credit time by the Department of Correction (“DOC”) pursuant to the case plan credit time (“CPCT”) program constituted a violation of the ex post facto clause of the Indiana Constitution. The State appeals and claims that the PC Court erred by concluding that the DOC's calculation of Jewell's educational credit time violates the ex post facto clause. We agree with the State and, accordingly, reverse.

Issue

[2] The State presents one issue: whether the PC Court erred by concluding that the limitation of Jewell's educational credit time pursuant to the CPCT program violates the ex post facto clause of the Indiana Constitution.

Facts

A. Underlying convictions and sentence.

[3] Based upon actions that occurred from 2004 to 2007, Jewell was convicted in January 2010 of two counts of sexual misconduct with a minor, Class B felonies; one count of child molesting, a Class C felony; one count of sexual misconduct with a minor, a Class C felony; and two counts of child seduction, Class D felonies. The trial court sentenced Jewell to an aggregate term of forty years in the DOC. Jewell's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. See Jewell v. State, 938 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. granted, opinion vacated, Jewell v. State, 957 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. 2011).

B. Prior unsuccessful post-conviction petitions.

[4] Jewell filed a petition for post-conviction relief in September 2012. The PC Court denied this petition. Jewell filed a notice of appeal, but this Court dismissed that appeal with prejudice after Jewell failed to file an appellant's brief. Jewell then filed several requests for authorization to file successive petitions for post-conviction relief, which this Court denied. See Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(12) (requiring authorization from the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court to file successive petitions for post-conviction relief).

C. Educational credit time.

[5] Prior to October 2021, Jewell completed a vocational program while in DOC custody, for which he was awarded 180 days of credit time.¹ Effective January 1, 2022, our General Assembly changed the manner in which offenders could earn educational credit time by implementing the CPCT program. Bradford v. State, 211 N.E.3d 36, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. The CPCT program allows for periodic reviews of an offender's progress and provides the DOC with the opportunity to take a more holistic approach to awarding credit time. Id.

[6] The DOC offered offenders such as Jewell, who were incarcerated prior to the implementation of the CPCT program, the opportunity to opt into the program. On October 7, 2021, Jewell voluntarily opted into the CPCT program by signing a form indicating that he agreed to earn educational credit time via an individualized case management plan. This form stated that offenders sentenced for an offense committed prior to July 1, 2014, such as Jewell, “may be eligible for a maximum amount of educational credit time of the lesser of four (4) years, or one-third (1/313) of the person's total applicable credit time.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 86. On December 18, 2022, after opting into the CPCT program, Jewell earned an associate degree through Oakland City University.

[7] After Jewell earned his associate degree, the DOC conducted three CPCT periodic reviews in which Jewell's associate degree was factored into the assessment. At each of these periodic reviews, Jewell was awarded 305 days of credit toward his sentence, for a total of 915 days of educational credit time under the CPCT program. The DOC calculated that, as of January 1, 2022—the start date of the CPCT program—Jewell had 2,746 days remaining until his earliest possible release date. Thus, under the DOC's interpretation, Jewell could earn a maximum of one-third of that time under the CPCT program, or 915 days. This 915 days, plus the 180 days Jewell had already earned, amounted to 1,095 days of total educational credit time.

D. Current post-conviction proceedings.

[8] Jewell disagreed with the DOC's award and insisted that he was entitled to the 915 days he had been awarded under the CPCT program plus an additional one year of credit time for completion of his associate degree. Accordingly, Jewell sought authorization from this Court to file another successive petition for post-conviction relief. We granted Jewell's request, and Jewell filed another successive petition for post-conviction relief on October 4, 2024. In his petition, Jewell argued that he was statutorily entitled to one year of educational credit time for completing his associate degree in addition to the 915 days he had earned in the CPCT program.

[9] The State filed an answer to Jewell's petition, and on November 26, 2024, filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that Jewell was not entitled to any additional educational credit time beyond the 915 days already awarded under the CPCT program. The PC Court held a hearing on Jewell's petition on February 27, 2025. The PC Court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon granting Jewell's post-conviction petition on March 13, 2025. The PC Court determined that, by limiting the educational credit time Jewell could earn under the CPCT program to 915 days, rather than allowing him to earn up to a total of four years, the DOC's actions constituted an ex post facto violation under the Indiana Constitution.² The PC Court ordered: “The DOC shall award the educational credit time it deems appropriate to [Jewell], under the terms of the CPCT program, utilizing four years as the maximum amount of educational credit [Jewell] is eligible for.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 16. The State now appeals.³

Discussion and Decision

A. Post-Conviction Standard of Review

[10] “ ‘Post-conviction proceedings are not super-appeals and provide only a narrow remedy for subsequent collateral challenges.’ ” State v. Oney, 993 N.E.2d 157, 161 (Ind. 2013) (quoting State v. Cooper, 935 N.E.2d 146, 148 (Ind. 2010)). Where, as here, the State appeals a judgment granting post-conviction relief, we review under the standard set forth in Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), which provides that, in cases tried by the court without a jury, “the court on appeal shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses.” See id. (citing T.R. 52(A)). We do not reweigh the evidence presented at the post-conviction proceedings, and we examine only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the PC Court's determination. Kelly v. State, 257 N.E.3d 782, 792 (Ind. 2025), reh'g denied, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 2026 WL 79878 (Jan. 12, 2026). We review pure legal questions de novo. Id.

B. History of Educational Credit Time.

[11] As we explained in Bradford, 211 N.E.3d 36, “[e]ducational credit was initially offered to incarcerated individuals in the DOC in 1993.” Id. at 39 (citing I.C. § 35-50-6-3.3 (1993)). The educational credit time statutes at that time “provided for completion of academic programs only, including a high school diploma or general equivalency degree, or an associate or bachelor's degree.⁴ Id.

[12] In 2020, the educational credit time statute was amended so that “educational credit could be awarded to offenders by completing ‘an individualized case management plan approved by the [DOC].’ ” Id. (citing I.C. § 35-50-6-3.3(b)(3)(E). An “individualized case management plan” was defined to mean “a plan designed to address an individual's personal risk of recidivism, and may include”:

(A) addiction recovery treatment;

(B) mental health treatment;

(C) vocational education programming;

(D) adult basic education, a high school or high school equivalency diploma, a college diploma, and any other academic educational goal; or

(E) any other programming or activity that encourages productive pursuits while a person is incarcerated and that may reduce the person's likelihood to recidivate after the person's release from incarceration.

Ind. Code § 35-50-6-0.5(6). This new CPCT program “specifically considers the offender's case plan, job performance, and how the offender is performing in a given program.” Bradford, 211 N.E.3d at 39 (internal quotation omitted).

[13] Credit time is defined as “the sum of the person's accrued time, good time credit, and educational credit.” I.C. § 35-50-6-0.5(3). “And pursuant to I.C. § 35-50-6-3.3(i) (effective through June 30, 2014), if a criminal offense was committed prior to July 1, 2014, the maximum amount of educational credit that an offender could earn was the lesser of: “(1) four ․ years, or (2) one-third ․ of the person's total applicable credit time.” Bradford, 211 N.E.3d at 40.

[14] The maximum educational credit time was shortened, effective July 1, 2014 to “the lesser of (1) two years; or (2) one-third (1/313) of the person's total applicable credit time.” I.C. § 35-50-6-3.3(i) (2014). In an apparent effort to avoid ex post facto issues, the DOC applies the prior maximum of the lesser of four years or one-third of the total applicable credit time to prisoners, such as Jewell, who were incarcerated prior to the 2014 amendment of the statute. Thus, as we noted in Bradford, “[t]he DOC incorporated the above parameters on credit time into its policies as follows”:

The maximum amount of credit time an offender may earn under this provision is the lesser of:

(1) For offenses committed prior to July 1, 2014:

a. Four (4) years; or,

b. One-third (1/313) of the offender's total applicable credit time.

(2) For offenses committed on July 1, 2014 or after:

a. Two (2) years; or,

b. One-third (1/313) of the offender's total applicable credit time.

211 N.E.3d at 40 (emphasis in original); see also Adult Classification, Credit Time, pp. VII-17-18, available at: https://www.in.gov/idoc/files/policy-and-procedure/policies/01-04-101/7-Credit-Time-1-1-2023.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J9Y-WZTD] (last visited Feb. 13, 2026) (providing for the same).

[15] “[Inmates] who arrive at a DOC facility after January 1, 2022, are automatically placed in CPCT. On the other hand, offenders who were in DOC custody before that date ․ could opt into the CPCT program.” Bradford, 211 N.E.3d at 40.

The educational credit that is available under the CPCT program is “[a]n amount determined by the [DOC] under a policy adopted by the [DOC] concerning the individualized case management plan, not to exceed the maximum amount described in subsection (j).” I.C. § 35-50-6-3.3(d)(9) (emphases added). [Indiana Code Section] § 35-50-6-3.3 does not set forth a minimum amount of credit time that may be earned; nor is there a guarantee of educational credit for meeting case plan goals or for completing a program. Additionally, if an offender completes a traditional program, it is considered at the CPCT review. The completed program does not result in a separate, identifiable award of credit.

Id. at 39-40.

[16] Importantly, under either the pre-CPCT system or the CPCT program, incarcerated individuals have no constitutional right to receive credit time. Budd v. State, 935 N.E.2d 746, 753 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); see also Bradford, 211 N.E.3d at 39 (“educational credit time for those incarcerated in the DOC is not an entitlement or a guarantee”). Instead, the DOC has discretion to award credit time to offenders. Id. (citing Fuller v. Meloy, 848 N.E.2d 1172, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the DOC had discretion to award petitioners only three months of credit for completing vocational program even though statutory maximum for such program was six months)).

C. The DOC's determination of Jewell's educational credit time did not constitute an ex post facto violation.

[17] The PC Court found that the DOC's determination of Jewell's credit time under the CPCT program constituted an ex post facto violation. We disagree. Article 1, Section 24 of the Indiana Constitution provides: “No ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed.” This clause “forbids laws that impose punishment for an act that was not otherwise punishable when it was committed.” State v. Kirby, 120 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Lemmon v. Harris, 949 N.E.2d 803, 809 (Ind. 2011)). Under Article 1, Section 24, the State is “forbidden from enacting ‘any law which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.’ ” Bradford, 211 N.E.3d at 42 (quoting Ramon v. State, 888 N.E.2d 244, 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)). “The purpose of the ex post facto clause is to give effect to the fundamental principle that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties.” Id. (citing Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 377 (Ind. 2009)).

[18] For there to be an ex post facto violation, “the action in question must apply to events occurring before its enactment and must disadvantage the prisoner.” Id. (emphasis added, citation omitted). “An ex post facto law applies retroactively to disadvantage an offender's substantial rights.” Hawkins v. State, 973 N.E.2d 619, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Budd v. State, 935 N.E.2d 746, 752 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), clarified on reh'g, 937 N.E.2d 867). “We determine whether a particular statute is an ex post facto law by examining whether the change increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable or alters the definition of criminal conduct.” Id.

1. The change in the method of calculating Jewell's credit time is not an ex post facto violation.

[19] The trial court determined that the DOC's calculation of Jewell's credit time under the CPCT program by using the time remaining on his sentence constituted an ex post facto violation. But this is incorrect as a matter of law.

[20] We rejected a similar argument in Hawkins, 973 N.E.2d 619. There, a statutory amendment resulted in the end of the educational program in which the offender was participating, resulting in the lost opportunity for earning educational credit time. The offender argued that this was an improper ex post facto violation. We rejected this argument, noting that “although Hawkins may have lost an opportunity to obtain educational credit time, the amendment did not increase his twenty-year sentence or alter the definition of his criminal conduct.” Id. at 622. Thus, his ex post facto claim failed. Id.; see also Budd, 935 N.E.2d at 753 (holding that an amendment to the educational credit time statute did not constitute an ex post facto law because the offender's sentence was not increased).

[21] The same is true here. The amendment to the educational credit time statute, and Jewell's voluntary entry into the CPCT program, did not increase Jewell's forty-year sentence, nor did it alter the definition of his criminal conduct. As in Hawkins, Jewell's ex post facto claim fails for this reason alone.

2. Jewell was not disadvantaged by his participation in the CPCT program.

[22] We also disagree with the PC Court's determination that Jewell was “penalized” or disadvantaged by his participation in the CPCT program because the maximum educational credit time he could earn was reduced and that this resulted in an ex post facto violation. The relevant question is not whether Jewell's theoretical maximum educational credit time has been reduced; even Jewell does not claim that he has earned the maximum. The question is whether he has been disadvantaged by his participation in the CPCT program. He clearly has not—he cannot because he voluntarily entered the program. To the contrary, Jewell significantly benefited by participating in the CPCT program.

[23] As discussed above, Jewell earned 180 days of educational credit for the completion of a vocational program under the pre-CPCT system.⁵ The DOC also awarded him 915 days under the CPCT program, which included consideration of his associate degree. The DOC calculated Jewell's total educational credit time as 180 days plus 915 days, for a total of 1,095 days.

[24] In contrast, had Jewell not opted into the CPCT program, he would still have earned the 180 days for his completion of the vocational program, but he could only have earned up to 365 days for the completion of his associate degree, see Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-3.3(d)(3), for a total of 545 days. Thus, instead of being penalized for participating in the CPCT program, Jewell has instead earned an additional 550 days toward his sentence.

[25] What Jewell wants is to get consideration for his associate degree under the CPCT program, plus get an additional one year of credit for the same degree under the pre-CPCT system. But once Jewell opted into the CPCT program, he was no longer eligible to earn time under the pre-CPCT system. This was clearly spelled out in the form which Jewell signed on October 7, 2021, opting into the CPCT program. This form states: “I will not earn credit time upon completion of my current program, but at the first CPCT review.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 86. And this is to Jewell's benefit, as he has earned substantially more educational credit under the CPCT program than he would have under the prior system.

[26] Jewell seems to think that he is entitled to one year of credit time under the pre-CPCT system for earning his associate degree. But the educational credit time statute clearly states that an inmate can earn “not more than one (1) year for completing an associate degree.” I.C. § 35-50-6-3.3(d)(3) (emphasis added); see also Fuller, 848 N.E.2d at 1174 (holding that the DOC has discretion to award less than the statutory maximum for educational achievements).

[27] Although Subsection (b) of the credit time statute provides that an inmate may earn credit time under the CPCT program “in addition to” any credit under Subsection (a), which is the traditional pre-CPCT system, this simply means that Jewell can keep the credit time he earned prior to his enrollment in the CPCT program. Moreover, the statute uses the discretionary term “may,” not the mandatory term “shall.” See I.C. § 35-50-6-3.3(b); Alden v. State, 983 N.E.2d 186, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that a statute's use of “may” ordinarily implies a permissive condition and a grant of discretion). And again, if Subsection (a) still applied to Jewell, he could get no more than 365 days of educational credit for his associate degree, see I.C. § 35-50-6-3.3(d)(3), instead of the 915 days he earned under the CPCT program.

[28] The PC Court found our opinion in Bradford, 211 N.E.3d 36, to be distinguishable, but we find it to be directly on point. In Bradford, the defendant, like Jewell, opted into the CPCT program, and the DOC awarded her 119 days of educational credit. Bradford filed a habeas corpus action alleging that she was entitled to additional credit time, and the trial court rejected this claim. On appeal, Bradford again argued she was entitled to additional credit. We rejected this claim and noted that Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-3.3 “does not set forth a minimum amount of credit time that may be earned; nor is there a guarantee of educational credit for meeting case plan goals or for completing a program.” Bradford, 211 N.E.3d at 40. Bradford received more educational credit under the CPCT program than she would have under the pre-CPCT system—119 days instead of ninety days. Id. at 42. We, therefore, rejected her ex post facto claim: “[T]he implementation of CPCT did not change the definition of Bradford's crime or alter her ․ revocation sentence․ Bradford's ability to seek release from prison was enhanced—not reduced.” Id. Because Bradford did not do anything to earn more than the 119 days she was awarded, there was no ex post facto violation. Id.

[29] The same is true here. As in Bradford, Jewell's participation in the CPCT program did not change the definition of his crimes or alter his sentence and instead gave him more educational credit toward his sentence than he would have earned under the pre-CPCT system. See id. at 40. We, therefore, conclude that the DOC's calculation of Jewell's credit time under the CPCT program did not constitute an ex post facto violation.

Conclusion

[30] The changes to the educational credit time statute did not alter Jewell's sentence or the definition of his crime. In addition, Jewell's participation in the CPCT program significantly benefited him by allowing him to earn an additional 550 days of credit than he could have earned under the pre-CPCT system. This does not establish an ex post facto violation, and the PC Court erred in concluding otherwise. Accordingly, we reverse the PC Court's judgment.

[31] Reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.3(d)(5) (2004 through 2014) (providing that a prisoner could earn not more than six months of credit for the completion of a technical education program approved by the DOC).

2.   Jewell did not present an ex post facto claim in his original post-conviction petition, and he first made an ex post facto argument at the post-conviction hearing. On appeal, the State does not argue that Jewell waived his ex post facto claim. Accordingly, we address the issue on the merits.

3.   The State filed what it styled a motion to reconsider on April 11, 2025. Because this motion was filed after the entry of a final judgment, it was, as a matter of law, a motion to correct error. People for Cmty., Inc. v. City of Ft. Wayne Neighborhood Code Compliance, 198 N.E.3d 19, 23 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). The PC Court denied this motion on April 14, 2025. The State then filed its Notice of Appeal on May 14, 2025. Jewell subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the State's appeal, which this Court denied.

4.   The educational credit time statute was later amended to require that the incarcerated individual had “demonstrated a pattern consistent with rehabilitation.” I.C. § 35-50-6-3.3(a)(2) (1995).

5.   Jewell could have earned more than the 180 days of educational credit he earned prior to his enrollment in the CPCT program, but he did not. The fact that he did not earn more days prior to his entry into the CPCT program does not mean that the DOC deprived him of any available credit time.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.