Dede R. Bisel, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Dede Bisel was detained inside her home after Lieutenant Tony Lennartz of the Jay County Sheriff's Office made a warrantless entry. She was taken to jail while Lt. Lennartz obtained a search warrant based on his pre-entry “knock and talk” investigation. Upon execution of that warrant, Lt. Lennartz discovered methamphetamine and marijuana. Bisel was charged with multiple offenses.

[2] Bisel filed two motions to suppress, alleging violations of her federal and state constitutional rights; both were denied. In this interlocutory appeal, Bisel asserts error in the denial of her motions to suppress. Although we find Lt. Lennartz's warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment, his prior knock and talk attempts were constitutional. And because the evidence discovered pursuant to Lt. Lennartz's search warrant was not fruit of the poisonous tree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 1

[3] In the days before March 13, 2023, the Jay County Sheriff's Office (JCSO) received several complaints about possible drug activity at Dede Bisel's home in Salamonia. With this information, JCSO Lieutenant Tony Lennartz surveilled Bisel's residence. Over a couple hours, he observed several vehicles visiting the home and staying for a short time before leaving. Based on his experience, Lt. Lennartz believed this activity was consistent with distribution of drugs from the residence. Lt. Lennartz knocked on the door, but there was no response.²

[4] On March 13, Lt. Lennartz returned and spoke with one of Bisel's neighbors, who reported there was traffic in and out of Bisel's home at all hours, especially in the evenings. The neighbor pointed at the house and said, “[J]ust like right now there's a vehicle pulling up[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 9. Lt. Lennartz saw two people, later identified as Michelle Jackson and Christopher Adams, exit the vehicle and enter Bisel's residence through the back door.

[5] Lt. Lennartz approached the home and knocked on the back door. Jackson answered, and marijuana odor and smoke came “billowin’ out into [Lt. Lennartz's] face.” Id. at 12. Lt. Lennartz made up a name to ask Jackson if “Angie” was there. Id. at 13. Jackson said there was no Angie there, and Lt. Lennartz returned to his vehicle.³ He then called JSCO Deputy Brad Wendel to “watch the residence while [he] went and got a search warrant.” Id. at 14.

[6] While at his vehicle, Jackson and Adams exited Bisel's house. Lt. Lennartz approached and asked if Bisel was inside; they responded that she was. Lt. Lennartz determined Jackson and Adams were “kinda part of [his] investigation[,]” and instructed the pair to return to the back door with him. Id. at 14. Jackson knocked and Bisel answered. When Jackson started to enter, Bisel “got extremely agitated and tried to slam the door[.]” Id. Later, at the suppression hearing, Lt. Lennartz said that when Bisel “attempted to go back towards the living room area[,]” he became concerned that she may “possibly” lock the door and destroy evidence. Id. at 15. After he entered the residence, Bisel was “very hostile” and pushed and kicked Lt. Lennartz. Id. About that time, Deputy Wendel arrived. While Lt. Lennartz applied for a search warrant, Bisel was taken to the Jay County Security Center and Jackson and Adams remained detained in Bisel's home.

[7] In his probable cause affidavit in support of the search warrant, Lt. Lennartz recited that he knew of Bisel from her prior drug-related arrests; he had received several tips regarding suspicious activity at Bisel's home and corroborated suspicious traffic through his own observations; and he detected a strong odor of burning marijuana emanating from inside Bisel's home during a knock and talk. He also said:

I went to the door and knocked twice with no answer both times and this being about an hour apart. I observed a car pull into the driveway and a man and woman exited the car and went inside the home using the back door. I pulled into the driveway and went to the door and knocked. A female answered the door and I asked her if Angie was there. She stated, “No Angie here”. I could smell a very strong odor of burnt marijuana coming from the interior of this home. I am trained in the odor and detection of burnt and unburnt marijuana. I went to my Police vehicle and called Deputy Brad Wendel to come and assist me with locating the origins of the odor of marijuana. Just then the two persons that I observed enter the home came out. I asked them to go back into the home as they were part of this investigation. They went back to the door and [Bisel] opened the door and we went inside all together. I had to push the male subject inside the door at one point as they were trying to run away from me.

I explained to [Bisel] why I was in her home due to the multiple complaints I had of suspicious activity in her home as well as the odor of marijuana inside of it. She became belligerent and told me to leave and pushed me back. I informed her that I was there legally and was going to apply for a search warrant to search her home. [Bisel] was very mad and kicked me in the leg.

App. Vol. II p. 27.

[8] The search warrant was granted. Lt. Lennartz returned to execute the warrant within an hour. Police located, among other things, thirty-four grams of methamphetamine, fifty-four grams of marijuana, plastic bags, scales, smoking devices, and other paraphernalia.⁴ The next day, the State charged Bisel with Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 5 felony battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official, Level 6 felony battery by bodily waste, Level 6 felony maintaining a common nuisance, Level 6 felony possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.

[9] On December 21, 2023, the court held a hearing on Bisel's first motion to suppress, wherein she argued Lt. Lennartz violated the state and federal constitutions by repeatedly attempting to knock on her door and by entering her home without a warrant. Through cross-examination, Bisel's attorney attempted to clarify the timing of each of Lt. Lennartz's attempted knock and talks. Ultimately, Lt. Lennartz testified he went to Bisel's residence and knocked on the door two times, and on “the second time someone answered the door.” Tr. Vol. II p. 19. Regarding his entry, Lt. Lennartz said he entered behind Jackson and Adams and that Jackson was “halfway in the door when [Bisel] tried to slam it on us[.]” Id. at 21. Bisel's attorney then asked, “And then after that there was this agitation, hostility and people were detained?” to which Lt. Lennartz responded, “That's correct.” Id.

[10] On December 22, the trial court denied Bisel's motion to suppress, finding Lt. Lennartz “reasonably feared” Bisel would destroy evidence if he did not enter her home without a warrant. App. Vol. II p. 18. The court also found “[t]here was no search or seizure in the home until said warrant (based on the strong odor of marijuana) was issued.” Id. at 17. In March 2025, Bisel filed a renewed motion to suppress, reasserting her constitutional arguments, which was summarily denied. This interlocutory appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Bisel argues the trial court erred in denying her motions to suppress because Lt. Lennartz's multiple knock and talk attempts and warrantless entry into her home violated the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.⁵ Our standard of reviewing a denied motion to suppress is well settled:

“When a trial court denies a motion to suppress evidence, we necessarily review that decision ‘deferentially, construing conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling.’ ” Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind. 2014)), cert. denied, [589 U.S. 923], 140 S.Ct. 113, 205 L.Ed.2d 36 (2019). We consider, however, any substantial and uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. Id. We review the trial court's factual findings for clear error, and we decline invitations to reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. “If the trial court's decision denying ‘a defendant's motion to suppress concerns the constitutionality of a search or seizure,’ then it presents a legal question that we review de novo.” Id. (quoting Robinson, 5 N.E.3d at 365).

Lindquist v. State, 179 N.E.3d 1051, 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[12] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 935 (Ind. 2006). “In spite of the similarity in structure of the federal and state constitutional provisions, interpretations and applications vary between them.” Id. Because Bisel has alleged violations under the federal and state constitutions, each supported by separate analyses, we examine each of Bisel's claims independently. See id.

I. Fourth Amendment

[13] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

[14] It is a “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law ․ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “In addition, the Supreme Court has held that the curtilage—the area ‘immediately surrounding and associated with the home’—is ‘part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.’ ” J.K. v. State, 8 N.E.3d 222, 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013)). As such, warrantless entry onto one's curtilage is also presumptively unreasonable. Id.

A. Knock and Talk

[15] Bisel argues that Lt. Lennartz's “repeated exercise of the limited license to conduct a ‘knock and talk’ was exceeded through his repeated unsuccessful attempts.” Appellant's Br. pp. 8-9 (emphasis in original). The record is unclear whether Lt. Lennartz's knock and talk attempts were separated by hours or days. In any event, Bisel emphasizes that it was not until Lt. Lennartz's third attempt that the door was answered and he detected the odor of marijuana. Bisel contends that Lt. Lennartz should not have made subsequent knock and talk attempts when he did not detect an odor from outside the home on his initial attempt. She concludes that Lt. Lennartz's subsequent attempts went beyond a traditional knock and talk and implicated the Fourth Amendment. We disagree.

[16] “It is generally accepted that law enforcement officers enjoy a limited invitation to approach a home through ordinary routes of ingress and egress open to visitors.” J.K., 8 N.E.3d at 229. “This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8. Thus, a police officer may approach a home and knock just like any private citizen—such as a Girl Scout selling cookies or a trick-or-treater seeking candy—might do. See id.

[17] However, “[c]onduct that occurs on one's curtilage that is beyond a traditional ‘knock and talk’ is subject to Fourth Amendment protection.” J.K., 8 N.E.3d at 229. When an officer, “by means of physical force or show of authority, has in Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A-CR-1055 | March 9, 2026 Page 9 of 17 some way restrained the liberty of a citizen[,]” a “seizure” occurs. Seidl, 939 N.E.2d 679, 684 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh'g. denied. A knock and talk converts to a seizure when, “taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.” Redden v. State, 850 N.E.2d 451, 458-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (internal quotations omitted), trans. denied. In considering the totality of the circumstances, the Supreme Court considers “the place and the time of the encounter” to be significant factors. U.S. v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 1997), reh'g. denied.

[18] Bisel compares her case to J.K., 8 N.E.3d 222, and Warren v. State, 73 N.E.3d 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). In J.K., officers surrounded a house and continuously knocked on the door for over forty-five minutes. During that time, they also looked in the windows and yelled into the house demanding that an occupant answer the door. These actions exceeded the scope of an ordinary knock and talk and violated the Fourth Amendment. In Warren, officers arrived at a home around 9:00 p.m. and detected a chemical odor emanating from the home. Officers knocked on the front door, other exterior doors and windows while loudly announcing their presence. These actions complied with the Fourth Amendment because the odor emanating from the home raised suspicion of a possible danger in the home.

[19] Here, Lt. Lennartz was surveilling Bisel's home after receiving multiple tips of suspicious traffic in and out of the home. Whether his knock and talk attempts Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A-CR-1055 | March 9, 2026 Page 10 of 17 were separated by an hour or a day, the record indicates that he attempted two knock and talks during daytime hours with no answer. There is no indication that either attempt went on for long or that Lt. Lennartz looked through windows or knocked on anything other than the door. He then approached the home and executed a third knock and talk attempt. Jackson answered the door, Lt. Lennartz detected the odor of marijuana, and then he left. That encounter lasted only a few moments. We cannot conclude these actions exceeded the scope of the limited license, equivalent to that afforded to a private citizen, to approach a home and knock. Certainly, a child eager to sell Girl Scout cookies or secure one more piece of Halloween candy might reasonably re-approach an unanswered door and knock a second or third time. Thus, Lt. Lennartz's knock and talk attempts, including the third attempt wherein he detected the odor of marijuana, did not constitute a seizure and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

B. Warrantless Entry

[20] Bisel also contends Lt. Lennartz's warrantless entry was unreasonable.⁶ She asserts Lt. Lennartz could not have had exigent circumstances to enter her home where he was investigating a minor offense of marijuana possession and there was nothing more than a mere possibility evidence might be destroyed. She argues Lt. Lennartz created any exigent circumstances, if they even existed, “by ordering the male and female back into the house without judicial authorization[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 12. The State, for its part, contends the smoke observed by Lt. Lennartz indicated marijuana “was actively being destroyed” and that Bisel's retreat into the living room furthered his reasonable belief that she intended to further destroy evidence. Appellee's Br. p. 19. The State thus concludes exigent circumstances justified entry to detain Bisel and prevent destruction of evidence.

[21] “The imminent destruction of evidence is a recognized exigent circumstance.” Nance v. State, 216 N.E.3d 464, 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). The State has the burden to establish “exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries.” Id. To determine whether an exigency exception applies, “courts review the totality of the circumstances to determine whether police ‘faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant.’ ” Id. (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013)). This inquiry is case-specific. Id. at 478.

[22] We find no such exigency here. During Lt. Lennartz's third knock and talk, he smelled marijuana odor and smoke. He appropriately retreated to his car with plans to apply for a search warrant, as the odor of marijuana and observation of smoke alone did not create exigent circumstances. See e.g., id. (where “a minor offense and no flight are involved, the kind of emergency that can justify a warrantless home entry seldom exists” (citing Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 305 (2021)).

[23] But Lt. Lennartz did not stop there. He chose to return to Bisel's door with Jackson and Adams in tow. After answering, Bisel attempted to slam the door and retreated to her living room.⁷ Throughout this encounter, the record is silent on whether Lt. Lennartz was readily identifiable as law enforcement or if any indicia of crime—drugs, the use or destruction thereof, paraphernalia or otherwise—was present. We cannot discern Bisel's motive in retreating into her living room and, even if we could, our Indiana Supreme Court has held that unprovoked flight into a home does not justify warrantless entry. Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563, 570-71 (Ind. 2006) (explaining an anonymous tip and a resident's unprovoked flight into a home following an officer's knock at the door did not furnish probable cause to believe the residents were about to destroy drug evidence and did not justify warrantless entry). And Lt. Lennartz's mere suspicion that Bisel might “possibly” destroy evidence, even coupled with her unprovoked flight, did not establish exigent circumstances. Tr. Vol. II p. 15; see also Nance, 216 N.E.3d at 480 (reasonable suspicion that someone in a home might possess and might have smoked marijuana is insufficient to create exigent circumstances). The State has not overcome the presumptive unreasonableness of a warrantless entry. Id. at 477.⁸ Lt. Lennartz's warrantless entry constituted an illegal seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

C. Independent Source

[24] Lt. Lennartz's unconstitutional entry notwithstanding, the State asserts the evidence found pursuant to the search warrant should survive suppression under the independent source doctrine. But we need not determine whether the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule applies because the evidence discovered pursuant to the search warrant here was not fruit of the poisonous tree.

[25] “Generally speaking, evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful seizure must be excluded under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 266 (Ind. 2013). “This extension of the exclusionary rule bars evidence directly obtained by the illegal search or seizure as well as evidence derivatively gained as a result of information learned or leads obtained during that same search or seizure.” Id. “The question is if the derivative evidence ‘has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ ” Id. (quoting Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)). “The defendant must first prove the Fourth Amendment violation and that the evidence was a ‘fruit’ of that search; the State must then show that the evidence may nevertheless be admitted.” Id. If the State proves “knowledge of [the evidence] is gained from an independent source” it may be admitted. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485.

[26] Here, nothing in the record indicates the evidence Bisel seeks to suppress was the fruit of Lt. Lennartz's warrantless and illegal seizure. Lt. Lennartz provides no testimony or assertion in his probable cause affidavit that he detected the odor of marijuana or saw any marijuana, methamphetamine or paraphernalia during his unconstitutional entry into Bisel's home.  ⁹ There is no indication that a search was conducted by any officers while Lt. Lennartz was illegally inside Bisel's residence. Instead, he left the residence, obtained a search warrant based upon facts obtained prior to and separate from his warrantless entry into Bisel's home, and returned approximately an hour later to execute a warranted search. Although Lt. Lennartz violated the Fourth Amendment by entering her home before the warrant was issued, Bisel has not proven that law enforcement obtained evidence as a fruit of that tainted seizure. See Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 266. Thus, we need not proceed to determine whether the independent source doctrine applies. See id.

II. Article 1, Section 11

[27] Bisel also argues Lt. Lennartz's conduct was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. She initially argues his multiple knock and talk attempts constituted a high degree of intrusion and were unreasonable because his suspicion of Bisel “was not linked to any specific articulable criminal activity.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. We have already concluded Lt. Lennartz was exercising a limited license equal to that of a private citizen, and his knock and talks did not constitute a search or seizure. See ¶19, supra. These knock and talks likewise did not violate the protections afforded against unreasonable searches or seizures under the Indiana Constitution.

[28] Bisel further asserts Lt. Lennartz's warrantless entry was unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution. The “focus of the exclusionary rule under the Indiana Constitution is the reasonableness of police conduct.” Hardister, 849 N.E.2d at 573. As discussed above, Lt. Lennartz's warrantless entry into Bisel's home was unsupported by exigent circumstances and violated the Fourth Amendment. See ¶23, supra. These actions were likewise unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11. See Hardister, 849 N.E.2d at 573. (explaining police conduct was reasonable under the Indiana Constitution for the same reasons it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). However, as explained above, the evidence at issue was not the fruit of Lt. Lennartz's illegal entry and is thus admissible.¹⁰ We affirm the trial court's denial of Bisel's motions to suppress.

[29] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The record contains conflicting evidence regarding the number and timing of Lt. Lennartz's knock and talk attempts. He either made a couple of attempts before March 13 and one attempt on March 13, or he made one attempt before March 13 and two attempts on the day of. See ¶9, infra.

3.   It is unclear from the record whether Lt. Lennartz was wearing plain clothes or a police uniform and whether he was driving a marked or unmarked police vehicle. It is unknown if Jackson recognized him as law enforcement during this encounter.

4.   After the warrant was executed, Jackson and Adams were transported to jail on the charge of visiting a common nuisance. They are not parties to this appeal.

5.   In her brief, Bisel also argued Lt. Lennartz's entry onto the curtilage of her home to knock on the back door violated the Fourth Amendment; she withdrew this issue at oral argument.

6.   The parties do not challenge whether Lt. Lennartz's warrantless entry constituted a seizure; rather, they debate the constitutionality of the seizure. Nevertheless, we note that a seizure occurs when an officer, “by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen[.]” Seidl, 939 N.E.2d at 684. There is no question that Lt. Lennartz restrained Bisel's liberty by a show of authority and force when he entered her home without a warrant and detained her. The trial court's finding that there was “no search or seizure in the home” until after the search warrant was issued is clearly erroneous. App. Vol. II p. 17.

7.   Lt. Lennartz provides conflicting testimony regarding Bisel's retreat. His suppression hearing testimony indicates Bisel retreated into the living room from the doorway; his affidavit indicates he entered Bisel's living room and she attempted to flee from there. Because we construe conflicting facts in favor of the court's ruling on a suppression motion, Lindquist, 179 N.E.3d at 1054, we consider whether Bisel's flight from the doorway created exigent circumstances.

8.   Because we find no exigency here, we need not determine whether Lt. Lennartz created any exigent circumstances by detaining Jackson and Adams and unconventionally using them to knock on Bisel's door.

9.   The affidavit goes on to recite details of the warrantless entry, but there are no statements that he smelled marijuana or obtained other evidence while illegally inside the home. See ¶7, supra.

10.   At oral argument, the State argued we should adopt the independent source doctrine under the Indiana Constitution. However, because the evidence was the fruit of a valid search warrant and not of Lt. Lennartz's illegal seizure, we need not determine whether the independent source doctrine applies under Article 1, Section 11.

Scheele, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Felix, J., concur.