A.K., Appellant-Petitioner v. M.R., Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.K. filed a petition for a protective order against a nearby neighbor, M.R. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition. On appeal, A.K., appearing pro se, argues that the trial court's ruling is clearly erroneous. We disagree and therefore affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] A.K. lives down the street from M.R. in New Carlisle. In June 2025, A.K., pro se, filed a petition for a civil protective order against M.R. A.K. alleged that he, his partner, and his thirteen-year-old daughter had been victims of stalking and repeated acts of harassment. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 9. He further described several incidents that had allegedly occurred earlier that month that served as the basis for his petition.¹

[3] In August, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition, at which A.K. appeared pro se and M.R. appeared in person and by counsel. A.K. testified on his own behalf and called no other witnesses. M.R. testified on her own behalf and also called her husband as a witness.² Later that month, the trial court issued an order that reads in pertinent part as follows:³

Parties presented testimony and exhibits as evidence for this Court to consider, including documents and a flash drive containing video. The Court reviewed all the evidence submitted.[4]

․.

3. The evidence presented to the Court established:

(a) [T]he Parties’ homes are not immediately next to or across from one another. Rather the homes have a house in between them and across the dividing road(s).

(b) [O]n or around June 14, 2025, M.R. called police about A.K. playing loud music for hours. At that time, A.K. was unaware which neighbor called in the complaint.

(c) A.K. posted a sign in his yard that said either, “My house is under constant surveillance by a nosey neighbor” or “I have a neighbor who is a ‘Karen’.”[5]

(d) On June 14, 2025, M.R. posted her own sign and faced the sign in the direction of A.K.’s home. M.R. clearly meant for A.K. to be able to see the sign versus for the purpose of public information, since M.R. lives at the end of a dead-end street. Even though the sign only appeared to be 2′ × 1″ in size, and hand-written, M.R. chose to retaliate by using vulgar or offensive language, as the sign said: “I have a neighbor with little d**k syndrome”.

(e) M.R.’s sign remained posted for four days.

(f) On June 15th, 19th, and 20th, 2025, M.R. made more calls to police, reporting that A.K. continues to play loud music every day from afternoon until late into the night. M.R.’s calls to police also referenced smelling marijuana, and/or suspect[ed] potential drug activity happening at that home.

(g) On June 20, 2025, M.R. posted a second sign which read: “Everyone out here hates the little d**k a*****e in the s**t hole red house.”

(h) M.R. admitted to posting the signs, blaming her conduct on her frustration over the loud music being played by A.K.

(i) M.R. further admitted to having a camera mounted on the corner of their home, which faces in the direction of A.K.’s home. However, M.R. said the camera merely captures the part of the road that leads to her driveway (which is the only way a person would enter onto their property by car).

(j) A.K. testified that he has partial custody of his daughter, who [sic] he shares parenting time, and that his daughter saw the signs and expressed her discomfort and upset about the signs as well as the camera that faces her father's house.

(k) M.R. testified that she was not aware A.K. had a daughter, that the signs were not intended to threaten anyone, and that she has no intention of causing harm to A.K. or his family.

In weighing the evidence and applying the law, the Court concludes that M.R.’s conduct could be described as juvenile, annoying and unneighborly behavior, and despite the vulgar language used by M.R. in her signs, her conduct fails to rise to the level of a “credible threat” to establish harassment for the purposes of issuing a protection order. The camera on M.R.’s house is situated in a place common for a homeowner to be able to see who may be entering upon their property. A.K. did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the camera is meant to harass the victim or his family.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREEED by the Court that the Petition for Order for Protection is hereby DENIED.

Appealed Order at 1-3. A.K. now appeals, pro se.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Before we address A.K.’s arguments, we note that “[i]t is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citation omitted).⁶ “These consequences include waiver for failure to present cogent arguments on appeal.” Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “Although we prefer to decide issues on the merits, where the appellant's noncompliance with the rules of appellate procedure is so substantial that it impedes our appellate consideration of the errors, we may deem the alleged errors waived.” Id.

[5] The purpose of our appellate rules, Indiana Appellate Rule 46 in particular, is to aid and expedite review and to relieve this Court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case. Id. “We will not become an advocate for a party, nor will we address arguments which are either inappropriate, too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.” Terpstra v. Farmers & Merchs. Bank, 483 N.E.2d 749, 754 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), trans. denied.

[6] Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(b) provides that an appellant's “argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts on the Record on Appeal relied on, in accordance with Rule 22.” Many of the authorities cited in A.K.’s brief do not support the propositions that he claims they do.⁷ And multiple North Eastern Reporter citations do not correspond to the case names stated in the brief.⁸ These errors could be chalked up to mere carelessness, but we think it more likely that they are a result of legal research using generative artificial intelligence (“AI”).

[7] We recently observed that “[c]itations to fictitious, AI-generated authority is a growing problem nationwide” and that “[c]ourts have sanctioned both attorneys and pro se litigants for including them in briefs.” Williams v. Kirch, 268 N.E.3d 284, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “Judges must be able to rely on the authenticity of the authorities cited by the parties to make just decisions.” Id. Because M.R. does not request any sanction or relief for this conduct, we deem it sufficient to admonish A.K. for his problematic citations and caution him “against using AI to conduct legal research without independently verifying the citations generated.” Id.

[8] A.K.’s overarching argument is that the trial court erred in denying his petition for a civil protective order against M.R. Civil protective orders are governed by the Civil Protection Order Act (“the Act”), Indiana Code Chapter 34-26-5, which we construe to promote the “protection and safety of all victims of harassment in a fair, prompt, and effective manner” and the prevention of future harassment. Ind. Code § 34-26-5-1. Indiana Code Section 34-26-5-2(a) provides that a person who is or has been a victim of domestic or family violence may file a petition for a protective order against a person who has committed stalking. For purposes of the Act, domestic or family violence includes stalking, as defined in Indiana Code Section 35-45-10-1, regardless of whether the stalking is committed by a family or household member. I.C. § 34-6-2-34.5 (2019).⁹ Indiana Code Section 35-45-10-1 defines “stalk” as “a knowing or an intentional course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another person that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened.”

[9] Furthermore, Indiana Code Section 34-26-5-2(b) provides that “[a] person who is or has been subjected to harassment may file a petition for an order for protection against a person who has committed repeated acts of harassment against the petitioner.” For purposes of the Act, “harassment” means “conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continuing impermissible contact: (1) that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress; and (2) that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress.” I.C. § 34-6-2.1-80(a). “Impermissible contact” includes following or pursuing the victim or communicating with the victim. I.C. § 35-45-10-3(a).

[10] To justify the issuance of a protective order, “the harassment must objectively include a present and credible threat.” E.W. v. J.K., 253 N.E.3d 1111, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214, 220 (Ind. 2020)), trans. denied. “A credible threat is ‘plausible or believable.’ ” Id. (quoting S.H., 139 N.E.3d at 220). The petitioner must establish harassment by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 34-26-5-9(h). If the petitioner meets his burden, “the court shall grant relief necessary to bring about a cessation of the violence or threat of violence.” Id.¹⁰

[11] In reviewing a trial court's judgment regarding a protective order, “we neither reweigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility.” N.E. v. L.W., 130 N.E.3d 102, 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment.” Id. We will reverse the judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. “A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Todd Heller, Inc. v. Ind. Dep't of Transp., 819 N.E.2d 140, 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. “We define the clearly erroneous standard based on whether the party is appealing a negative judgment or an adverse judgment.” Id. “Where, as here, the party who had the burden of proof at trial appeals, he appeals from a negative judgment and will prevail only if he establishes that the judgment is contrary to law.” Id. “A judgment is contrary to law when the evidence is without conflict and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence lead to only one conclusion, but the trial court reached a different conclusion.” Id.

[12] First, A.K. complains that the trial court “minimized” M.R.’s conduct by characterizing it as “juvenile[.]” Appellant's Br. at 15. But this is simply an invitation to reweigh the evidence and reassess credibility in his favor, which we may not do. More specifically, A.K. asserts that M.R.’s noise complaints were “unfounded[,]” id. at 17, but this assertion is misleading. The 911 call report for the first complaint indicates that the responding officer noted that A.K. and his family were “playing music and doing yard work” when he arrived, that he advised them “that a neighbor was upset about the noise level,” and that he “informed them there is no enforceable county ordinance.” Ex. Vol. at 16. This report does not establish that A.K. was not playing loud music, only that the noise level did not violate any ordinances. The same may be said for the subsequent 911 call reports regarding loud music.¹¹

[13] A.K. further asserts that the signs that M.R. “directed at [his] home ․ constitute[d] harassment and serve[d] no legitimate purpose.” Appellant's Br. at 17 (citing Costello v. Zollman, 51 N.E.3d 361, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied). But Costello says nothing about signage and harassment, and it is not our job to do further research on A.K.’s behalf. Terpstra, 483 N.E.2d at 754.

[14] A.K. also complains about the placement of M.R.’s surveillance camera, but we cannot second-guess the trial court's finding that the camera “is situated in a place common for a homeowner to be able to see who may be entering upon their property” and that A.K. “did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the camera is meant to harass [him] or his family.” Appealed Order at 3.¹²

[15] Next, A.K. focuses on instances of M.R.’s alleged “[v]erbal harassment and confrontational driving” and “repeated stop-sign violations in front of [his] home[.]” Appellant's Br. at 18 (bold omitted). But A.K. did not mention these incidents in his petition for a protective order, and he cites no authority for the proposition that the trial court erred in not addressing them in its order denying his petition.¹³

[16] Finally, A.K. raises claims of due process violations and judicial bias, which are waived because he failed to raise them below. See In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016) (“[A] party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal.”); Husainy v. Granite Mgmt., LLC, 132 N.E.3d 486, 500 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (finding that appellant waived claim of judicial bias “by raising it for the first time on appeal”).¹⁴

[17] In sum, A.K. has failed to establish that the trial court's denial of his petition for a protective order is clearly erroneous. Therefore, we affirm.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A.K. submitted a USB drive containing “digital evidence” with his petition. Tr. Vol. 2 at 13. The transcript of the evidentiary hearing indicates that A.K. mistakenly believed that the trial court would review the evidence before the hearing and that the files on the USB drive would “be admitted into evidence” as a matter of course. Id. at 13, 19-20.

2.   A.K. did not object to M.R.’s husband's testimony. Contrary to his assertion on appeal, A.K. was not prevented from objecting.

3.   Where appropriate, we have replaced “Petitioner” and “Respondent” with the parties’ initials.

4.   Among the evidence that A.K. submitted was a written statement from his thirteen-year-old daughter. M.R. objected to the statement on hearsay grounds, and the trial court sustained the objection. Tr. Vol. 2 at 9. On appeal, A.K. offers no cogent argument that this ruling was erroneous. A.K. also submitted a written statement from his partner; although M.R. did not specifically object to this statement on hearsay grounds, it is clear from the trial court's order that the court afforded it no weight, which it was entitled to do.

5.   A.K. claims that “this finding is unsupported by any evidence.” Appellant's Br. at 24. On the contrary, M.R. testified to this fact, and A.K. did not object. Tr. Vol. 2 at 53. Moreover, A.K. admitted in his petition that he posted this sign. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 11.

6.   To be fair, M.R.’s appellate submissions are also not without fault. For example, her brief does not include a statement of the case (or, in the alternative, an agreement with A.K.’s statement of the case) as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(B)(1), and her appendix includes a transcript of the evidentiary hearing in contravention of Appellate Rule 50(F).

7.   See, e.g., S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214, 219 (Ind. 2020) (does not state that the Civil Protection Order Act “is remedial and must be liberally construed to prevent escalation and protect victims from harassment and intimidation[,]” Appellant's Br. at 15); C.H. v. A.R., 72 N.E.3d 996, 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (does not contain a quote that harassment must be evaluated “in context and as a course of conduct[,]” Appellant's Br. at 15, and trial court was affirmed, rather than reversed, as A.K. claims); R.H. v. S.W., 142 N.E.3d 1010, 1014-15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (does not state that “[p]ublic messages, repeated police contacts, and indirect contact through third parties all fall within” statutory definitions of impermissible contact, harassment, and stalking, Appellant's Br. at 16); J.K. v. T.C., 25 N.E.3d 179, 183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (does not state that “[r]epeated drive-bys and traffic violations directed at the victim's home constitute harassment[,]” Appellant's Br. at 18).

8.   See, e.g., 994 N.E.2d 228 (links to People v. Carter from the Appellate Court of Illinois, rather than Maurer v. Cobb-Maurer from this Court); 106 N.E.3d 400 (links to Vassell v. Presence St. Francis Hosp. from the Appellate Court of Illinois, rather than L.G. v. S.L. from this Court); 212 N.E.3d 768 (links to Commonwealth v. Pfeiffer from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, rather than Torres v. Ind. Fam. & Social Servs. Admin. from this Court).

9.   This statute was recodified as Indiana Code Section 34-6-2.1-50 effective July 1, 2025.

10.   Indiana Code Section 34-26-5-9(h) also states, “A finding that domestic or family violence or harassment has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of an order under this section means that a respondent represents a credible threat to the safety of a petitioner or a member of a petitioner's household.” A.K. fixates on this phrase and repeatedly asserts that “[o]nce harassment is established, the statute imposes a mandatory presumption of credible threat, removing judicial discretion to minimize or reinterpret the conduct.” E.g., Appellant's Br. at 15. He then castigates the trial court for “fail[ing] to apply these statutory requirements.” Id. But this argument presupposes that A.K. carried his burden to establish harassment by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court concluded that A.K. failed to carry this burden, and A.K. has failed to persuade us that this conclusion is clearly erroneous.

11.   As for the complaints that referenced the smell of marijuana, the fact that the responding officer(s) did not detect the scent upon arrival does not establish that no marijuana had recently been consumed in the vicinity. More concerning are complaints that A.K. was selling drugs out of his home and that A.K. “is on a government watch list[,]” Ex. Vol. at 19, which A.K. denied. Tr. Vol. 2 at 45. But A.K. did not rely on any of the foregoing as a basis for a protective order in his petition.

12.   A.K. asserts that the trial court improperly failed to consider the impact of M.R.’s conduct on his daughter. Appellant's Br. at 38. Given that his daughter did not testify, and that the trial court excluded her written statement on hearsay grounds, we find no merit in this assertion.

13.   A.K. sought to document the alleged “confrontational driving” with low-quality video clips that do not, as he claims, show that M.R. “swerved her vehicle toward [his] partner while making obscene gestures[.]” Appellant's Br. at 18. And the stop sign at issue is at the end of A.K.’s street, not in front of his home.

14.   Waiver notwithstanding, we emphasize that A.K.’s claims of judicial bias are wholly unwarranted. Contrary to A.K.’s assertions, the record establishes that the trial court treated both sides with courtesy and respect and in full accordance with the Rules of Trial Procedure, the Rules of Evidence, and the Code of Judicial Conduct. A.K.’s unfounded contention that the court treated the parties “asymmetrically” (Appellant's Br. at 27) is based on M.R.’s counsel's good-faith objections to A.K.’s evidentiary presentation and the legally unsophisticated A.K.’s lack of objections to M.R.’s presentation. We note that A.K. has demonstrated a penchant for engaging in scorched-earth tactics against members of the legal profession who he feels have treated him unfairly: (1) he filed a disciplinary complaint against a magistrate who dismissed his petitions for protective orders against two other respondents, one of whom was M.R.’s husband, because the magistrate “was also set to hear this case” and he “felt that [he] was going to get an unfair hearing”; and (2) he filed a disciplinary complaint against M.R.’s counsel because he “felt that [counsel was] being used as a weapon.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 24-25. A.K.’s gratuitous personal attack on the trial court is consistent with his past conduct. We caution A.K. that raising meritless claims of judicial bias is not a recipe for success on appeal.

Bailey, Judge

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.