Jeremy Meade, Appellant-Respondent/Cross-Appellee v. Katrina Cline, Appellee-Petitioner/Cross-Appellant (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] The Delaware Circuit Court dissolved Jeremy Meade and Katrina Cline's marriage. Jeremy appeals and raises several issues concerning the valuation and calculation of the marital estate. Katrina cross-appeals and argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to include a bank account in the marital estate.

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The parties married in September 2019. They lived together prior to their marriage in a home located on Sweet Gum Street in Yorktown. Katrina had purchased the home a few years before the parties moved in together. Both parties have children from prior relationships but there were no children born to their marriage. Jeremy was unable to contribute financially to the household when the parties first began living together.

[4] In 2018, before they were married, the parties began operating Glass Guys LLC, an automobile glass business. The parties both worked for the business, but Jeremy had the primary responsibility for installing glass. They also used their personal assets and credit cards to make purchases for the business. And the parties used proceeds from the business to pay their personal expenses, including their mortgage payments. Katrina had other part-time income after the parties started the business, including employment as a hair stylist and selling insurance policies.

[5] In May 2021, the parties sold the residence on Sweet Gum Street. The equity in the home was used to make the down payment for their new residence, also located in Yorktown. The parties owned eleven vehicles, including a 1969 Pontiac GTO. Katrina purchased that vehicle for $25,000 a few months before the parties married. After the purchase, they spent several thousand dollars restoring it.

[6] Katrina filed her verified petition for dissolution of marriage on October 13, 2023. During the final hearings, the parties’ major disputes centered around the division of equity in the marital residence, the reasons the parties had accumulated the marital debts, and whether the Pontiac GTO was a marital asset.

[7] The trial court issued its decree dissolving the parties’ marriage on December 30, 2024. The court issued the following pertinent findings of fact:

The parties started the Glass Guys business in 2018 which was jointly owned by Katrina and Jeremy. The parties used the proceeds from the business to pay all of their expenses, including the mortgage on the Sweet Gum residence and later the marital residence at 650 West.

The Sweet Gum residence was sold for $235,000.00 in May 2021. The parties purchased the marital residence located at 725 N. C.R. 650 W., Yorktown, Indiana (hereinafter “the marital residence”) in June 2021. A down payment of $84,895.44 was paid at the time of the purchase. Katrina testified that this amount came solely from the sale of the Sweet Gum residence and that it should be credited solely to her. Jeremy disagrees and argues that he put money into the Sweet Gum property as well as sweat equity into the property.

The marital residence on 650 West is now valued between $350,000 and $380,000. The parties had originally conducted an appraisal of the home which was valued at the $380,000 figure. Katrina later had a second appraisal which valued the home at $330,000. The mortgage debt on the residence is $231,115.08 at the time of separation.

The Court now values the home at the agreed upon appraisal of $380,000 with a debt of $231,115.08 which leaves equity of $148,884.92․

․ [T]he Court does find that [Katrina] contributed more to [the] Sweet Gum home than Jeremy but that does not mean the entire down payment used to buy the marital home should be attributed to her. The Court finds that Jeremy also added to the value of the home by paying for repairs on the home and contributing to the home in other ways than paying the mortgage. Further, once the Glass Guys business was up and running, the proceeds from the business were used to pay the mortgage and therefore should be attributed to both Katrina and Jeremy equally after that time.

***

The Court finds that as to the down payment of the marital residence, Katrina has rebutted the equal division based upon the fact that she owned the Washington home first and used the proceeds from the sale of such to purchase the Sweet Gum property. The Court further finds that Jeremy contributed, either monetarily or with sweat equity, to the Sweet Gum property․

Therefore, the Court attributes 75% of the down payment on the marital residence or $63,671.91 over to Katrina leaving the equity on the marital residence to be divided to be $85,213.01․

***

The 1976 Caprice Wagon was “won” by the parties in a raffle after purchasing a $100 raffle ticket. It is unclear who bought the raffle ticket or who paid the taxes on the win but no doubt the wagon has a value which is a marital asset․ The value of the Caprice Wagon was $4,500 pursuant to the RDH Classic Car Appraisal. As the only independent evaluation for the vehicle is the RDH one, the Court chooses to use this valuation. The Court hereby awards the 197[6] Chevy Caprice Wagon to Jeremy as his sole and separate property with a value of $4,500 attributable to him.

***

While the parties agree that Katrina may retain possession of the 196[9] Pontiac GTO, there is a large dispute as to the value of the car. Katrina argues that the car is hers and should not be considered marital property. She places a value of $0.00 on the GTO. Jeremy believes the GTO should be considered marital property, even though he considers [it] a gift from Katrina to him, and has an appraised value of $57,500 pursuant to the RDH Classic Car Appraisal.

The car was purchased [in] early 2019. Katrina claims she withdrew money from her 401k which she possessed prior to the marriage to purchase the car as an investment as its “a beautiful car.” Katrina denies that the car was a gift to Jeremy.

The Court agrees that the value of the car has appreciated over time and is currently valued at $57,500. That being said, the Court will also agree that Katrina used her 401k to purchase the car and will off-set the sum of $25,000 from the value toward the purchase price as this was money Katrina had prior to the marriage. The Court finds this evidence is sufficient to deviate from the 50/50 division. Therefore, the Court awards the 1969 Pontiac GTO to Katrina as her sole and separate property and attributes the sum of $32,500.00 to Katrina which is $57,500 - $25,000 purchase price.

***

The greatest issue causing the most dispute has been the Glass Guys Chase Account ending, at one time, in 8662. The Court notes that the account number has changed over the past few months but the court is referencing the Chase Account 8662 as the Glass Guys Account from which the parties ran their business and their lives for the entire relationship. The Court notes for this Decree that the Glass Guys LLC business is now defunct and therefore does not assign any business evaluation to the Glass Guys LLC. The Court only decides whether or not there are profits from the business to divide herein.

The Court first addresses the poor business practices by both in looking at this issue. It seems the parties simply deposited the money from the Glass Guys LLC business into this account and then paid all household and business expenses from the account without ever documenting what the expense was or whether it was business or personal․

After considering the testimony, the Court concludes that the account had a value of $30,865.20 at the time of separation. While Katrina wants the entire amount attributable to Jeremy, she is not accounting for the debts/business expenses which would need to pay from that sum from the prior month.

After reviewing the testimony and records herein, the Court finds that a customary amount of expenses per month was $23,194.95 as shown by the November bank statements for expenses incurred in October. However, upon review of the bank records, the floating balance in this account for the business which was used to pay all business and personal expenses was $23,000 in June 2023, $22,000 in July 2023, $32,171 in September 2023, [and] $30,865 in October. Once the parties separated, the Court is aware that Jeremy used a different account for the Glass Guys business as evidenced by the depletion of the 8662 account with a balance in November 2023 of $14,093 and December 2023 of $544.

The Court now finds that ․ on average, the 8662 account had approximately $27,009 at any given month after expenses were paid. The Court notes that Jeremy had access to this account and was the one responsible for paying the Glass Guys bills from this account. The Court will also note that it is apparent that Jeremy was “playing loose and fast” with this account in the months or so following the separation. Therefore, the Court will attribute the sum of $27,009 to Jeremy for purpose of this division of assets as he benefitted the most from the use of the 8662 account after the date of separation.

***

The testimony revealed that Jeremy has cryptocurrency or investments, whether it be cryptocurrency or other investments. No evidence was submitted by either party except through testimony of Jeremy that such investments [sic] was around $5,000. In the event that Jeremy has cryptocurrency or investments, the Court will assess the value of $5,000 and award such cryptocurrency or investments to Jeremy.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 27-36.

[8] The trial court concluded that “Katrina has failed to rebut the presumption that an equal division of assets is fair and reasonable except for a portion of the marital residence and the purchase value of the 1969 Pontiac GT[O] for the reasons stated above.” Id. at 39. Therefore, the court offset a total of $88,671.91 to Katrina and then divided the remainder of the marital estate equally between the parties. To equalize the division of the marital estate, Katrina was ordered to pay Jeremy $23,303.29. Id. at 41.

[9] Jeremy filed a motion to correct error challenging the court's valuation of certain assets and its division of the marital estate. The trial court denied the motion. The court granted Katrina's request for additional time to pay the equalization judgment, which Jeremy did not object to.

[10] Jeremy now appeals.

Standard of Review

[11] It is well-settled that our review of family law matters is conducted with a preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges. Anselm v. Anselm, 146 N.E.3d 1042, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

Appellate deference to the determinations of our trial court judges, especially in domestic relations matters, is warranted because of their unique, direct interactions with the parties face- to-face, often over an extended period of time. Thus enabled to assess credibility and character through both factual testimony and intuitive discernment, our trial judges are in a superior position to ascertain information and apply common sense․

Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011). “It is not enough on appeal that the evidence might support some other conclusion; rather, the evidence must positively require the result sought by the appellant.” Hamilton v. Hamilton, 103 N.E.3d 690, 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. “Accordingly, we will not substitute our own judgment if any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court's judgment.” Id.

[12] Here, the trial court entered sua sponte findings of fact and conclusions thereon pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). “ ‘As to the issues covered by the findings, we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.’ ” Hahn-Weisz v. Johnson, 189 N.E.3d 1136, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)). “We reverse ‘the findings only if they are clearly erroneous.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Adoption of I.B., 32 N.E.3d 1164, 1169 (Ind. 2015)). “We review any remaining issues under the general judgment standard, under which we will affirm the judgment ‘if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287). “We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo.” Id. (quoting Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. 2013)).

The trial court's valuation and division of the marital estate.

[13] A trial court “has broad discretion in valuing and dividing marital property.” Gatton v. Gatton, 249 N.E.3d 626, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). And “ ‘[i]t is well settled that in a dissolution action, all marital property goes into the marital pot for division, whether it was owned by either spouse before the marriage, acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before final separation of the parties, or acquired by their joint efforts.’ ” Meyer v. East, 205 N.E.3d 1066, 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Falatovics v. Falatovics, 15 N.E.3d 108, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)). Specifically, Indiana Code section 31-15-7-4(a) provides:

In an action for dissolution of marriage under IC 31-15-2-2, the court shall divide the property of the parties, whether:

(1) owned by either spouse before the marriage;

(2) acquired by either spouse in his or her own right:

(A) after the marriage; and

(B) before final separation of the parties; or

(3) acquired by their joint efforts.

For purposes of dissolution, property means “all the assets of either party or both parties.” Ind. Code § 31-9-2-98. “Marital property includes both assets and liabilities.” Meyer, 205 N.E.3d at 1072 (quoting McCord v. McCord, 852 N.E.2d 35, 45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied).

[14] “ ‘The requirement that all marital assets be placed in the marital pot is meant to insure [sic] that the trial court first determines that value before endeavoring to divide property.’ ” Id. (quoting Falatovics, 15 N.E.3d at 110). “ ‘Indiana's ‘one pot’ theory prohibits the exclusion of any asset in which a party has a vested interest from the scope of the trial court's power to divide and award.’ ” Id. (quoting Falatovics, 15 N.E.3d at 110).

[15] The court must divide the marital estate under the presumption that an equal division is just and reasonable. I.C. § 31-15-7-5; Leever v. Leever, 919 N.E.2d 118, 124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Although the court “may decide to award a particular asset solely to one spouse as part of its just and reasonable property division,” it “must first include the asset in its consideration of the marital estate to be divided.” Falatovics, 15 N.E.3d at 110. Finally, a party may present evidence to rebut the presumption that an equal division of the marital estate is reasonable, including evidence relevant to the factors enumerated in Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5, which are as follows:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, regardless of whether the contribution was income producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse:

(A) before the marriage; or

(B) through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of the property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:

(A) a final division of property; and

(B) a final determination of the property rights of the parties.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it set aside a percentage of the down payment for the marital residence to Katrina.

[16] First, we address Husband's arguments concerning the division of the equity in the marital residence. The trial court valued the equity in the marital residence at $148,884.92. When the parties purchased the marital residence in June 2021, they put a downpayment on the property in the amount of $84,895.44. These funds were obtained from the sale of Katrina's house on Sweet Gum Street. Katrina purchased the house on Sweet Gum Street in 2015 after she had sold her home in Washington State. Because Katrina purchased the Sweet Gum home before the parties began living together, Katrina argued that the $84,895.44 down payment for the marital residence, i.e., the equity from the Sweet Gum residence, should be set aside to her. The trial court agreed in part and set aside 75% of the down payment to Katrina (i.e., $63,671.91). The court reduced the equity in the marital residence accordingly and divided the remaining $85,213.01 in equity equally between the parties.

[17] Jeremy argues that he presented evidence that he contributed to the value of the Sweet Gum residence, and there was no evidence of the value of that residence when he and Katrina began cohabitating in the fall of 2017. Husband asserts that Katrina did not provide evidence “that there was any significant equity in the Sweet Gum Residence prior to the parties’ cohabitation and marriage.” Appellant's Br. at 18 (emphasis in original). Therefore, Jeremy argues that setting aside any amount of equity in the Sweet Gum residence to Katrina is not supported by the evidence. Likewise, Jeremy argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded $63,671.91 of equity in the marital residence, i.e., 75% of the downpayment, from the marital pot. And, by doing so, the court awarded Katrina more than an equal share of the marital estate.

[18] Katrina testified that she “was able to purchase” the Sweet Gum home “from ․ the money that [she] made” from the sale of her Washington State home. Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 20-21. And Katrina paid the mortgage on the Sweet Gum home for over three years before Jeremy began to contribute to the mortgage. From this evidence, it was reasonable for the trial court to infer that Katrina had gained equity in the Sweet Gum home before Jeremy began contributing to the household expenses.

[19] In deciding to set aside seventy-five percent of the down payment for the marital residence to Katrina, the trial court found that Katrina rebutted the presumption of an equal division because the down payment represented the equity in the Sweet Gum residence that Katrina had purchased prior to the marriage after selling her Washington State home. And Katrina paid the mortgage on that home without assistance from Jeremy for at least three years before he began to contribute financially to the household.

[20] Although it is not the best approach in dividing a marital estate,¹ trial courts have “the authority to divide [the] marital estate by considering some assets individually.” Kinder v. Kinder, 265 N.E.3d 550, 556 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 229 (Ind. 2022)).

So long as it expressly considers all assets and liabilities, and so long as it offers sufficient findings to rebut the presumptive equal division, a trial court need not follow a rigid, technical formula in dividing the marital estate and we will assume that it applied the law correctly.

Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 229. Therefore, a trial court may set aside a percentage of an asset to one party before dividing the remainder of the marital pot “ ‘so long as it offers sufficient findings to rebut the presumptive equal division.’ ” Kinder, 265 N.E.3d at 556 (quoting Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 229).

[21] Here, the trial court issued sufficient findings to rebut the presumption of an equal division of the equity in the marital residence. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it set aside to Katrina seventy-five percent of the down payment used to purchase the marital residence.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it set aside the purchase price of the parties’ Pontiac GTO to Katrina.

[22] The trial court also excluded the purchase price of the parties’ Pontiac GTO from the marital estate and set aside that $25,000 to Katrina. Jeremy argues that the trial court was required to include the entire value of the GTO in the marital estate and that, by setting aside $25,000 to Katrina, the court unreasonably deviated from an equal division of the marital estate. Jeremy also argues that his contributions toward restoring the GTO increased its value to $57,500. Therefore, Jeremy claims that the court abused its discretion when it “only considered [Katrina's] initial investment in purchasing the GTO and failed to take into any account the source of the 130% appreciation in value for the vehicle.” Appellant's Br. at 22.

[23] In 2019, Katrina withdrew funds from a retirement account, funded before the parties were married, to purchase the GTO. For this reason, the trial court set aside the purchase price of the GTO over to Katrina before dividing the remaining value of the vehicle equally between the parties. Because the trial court issued sufficient findings to rebut the presumption of an equal division of the GTO, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion when it set aside the purchase price to Katrina. See Kinder, 256 N.E.3d at 556. And the court properly considered the increase in value of the GTO as an equally divisible marital asset.

The trial court made a mathematical error in its calculation of the equalization payment Katrina owes to Jeremy.

[24] The trial court failed to include the GTO's entire $57,500 value in the total marital assets before subtracting the $25,000 purchase price the court set aside to Katrina. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 40-41 The trial court made a mathematical error when it equally divided $32,500 between the parties, which represented the post-purchase increased value of the GTO, and then offset to Katrina the $25,000 purchase price of the vehicle.² We therefore remand this case to the trial court to correct its equalization payment accordingly.

Valuation and Division of Various Financial Accounts

[25] The trial court awarded several of the parties’ financial accounts to Jeremy. Jeremey argues that the court's valuation of several of the accounts was not supported by the evidence. Specifically, the court awarded the following accounts and values to Jeremy:

The Chase Account ending in 7525 in the amount of $8,409.73

The Chase Account ending in 7480 in the amount of $5,000.00

The Chase Account ending in 8662 in the amount of $27,009.00

Zelle Payments to Jeremy totaling $2,000.00

Cryptocurrency/Investments totaling $5,000.00

Cash on Hand totaling $15,500.00

Id. at 40.

[26] First, Jeremy observes that the bank records establish that on October 13, 2023, $8,409.73 was transferred from the Chase Account ending in 7525 to the Chase Account ending in 8662 (“the Business Account”), and then that same amount was transferred from the Business Account to the Chase Account ending in 7480. Ex. Vol. pp. 26-28. Therefore, Jeremy claims that:

The trial court partially accounted for the $8,40[9].73 transfer when it attributed to [Jeremy] the $2,000 in Zelle payments and Account 7480 at a value of $5,000; however, the trial court failed to make any corresponding reductions from the values of the Business Account or Account 7525. By doing so, the trial court double counted $8,40[9].73 attributions of funds to [Jeremy].

Appellant's Br. at 23.

[27] In their proposed divisions of the marital estate, both parties agreed that the Chase Account ending in 7525 should be valued at $8,409.73, and the Chase Account ending in 7480 should be valued at $5,000.00. See Ex. Vol. pp. 32, 64, 216. The trial court accepted the agreed values in its findings. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 34-35. Thus, even if the values of those accounts are error, Jeremy invited that error. See Ex. Vol. p. 216. We will not consider his claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it valued those accounts. See Balicki v. Balicki, 837 N.E.2d 532, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining that “[t]he doctrine of invited error is grounded in estoppel and precludes a party from taking advantage of an error that he or she commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of his or her own neglect or misconduct”), trans. denied.

[28] Much of the parties’ disagreement centered around the value of the Business Account. The court observed that the “parties ran their business and their lives for the entire relationship” from the Business Account. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 35. The court noted the parties’ poor business practices before valuing the account. Id. The court reviewed the bank records and, using the account records from the five months preceding the parties’ separation, the court averaged “the floating balance in this account for the business which was used to pay all business and personal expenses.” Id. at 35-36. The court then found that, “on average, the [Business Account] had approximately $27,009 at any given month after expenses were paid.” Id. at 36. In its valuation of the Business Account, the court calculated the October 2023 balance at $30,865. This balance included the October 13, 2023 transfer of $8,409.73 from Jeremy's Chase Account ending in 7525. But those funds were only in the Business Account for one day, and the trial court utilized the five-month average of the balance in the account. For this reason, we do not agree with Jeremy's claim that the trial court double counted the $8,409.73 value of Chase Account ending in 7525.

[29] Jeremy also claims that the trial court's method for calculating the value of the Business Account was flawed. And Jeremy argues that the trial court ignored the fact that he was using a credit card to fund Glass Guys and he made many monthly payments toward that credit card to cover business costs. Although there are transactions on Jeremy's credit card that appear to be business expenses, those purchases also could have been made for Jeremy's new glass business that he began operating after the parties separated. And many purchases made on that credit card were clearly personal purchases made at restaurants, grocery and clothing stores, hotels, airlines, and entertainment venues.

[30] As we noted above, the parties’ business and personal financial obligations were co-mingled in the Business Account. And the court found that Jeremy “was ‘playing loose and fast’ with this account in the months or so following the separation” and he “benefited the most from the use of” the Business Account after the parties separated. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 36. Because of the parties’ poor record keeping and co-mingling of personal and business accounts, the trial court was faced with an almost impossible task of valuing the Business Account. The trial court's method of doing so was reasonable given the evidence provided by the parties. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it valued the Business Account.

[31] Finally, Jeremy argues that there is no evidence to support the trial court's finding that he had “cryptocurrency/investments” totaling $5,000.00. Jeremy's bank records establish a $2,000.00 transfer from Chase Account ending in 7480 to Kraken on November 16, 2023, which was after the date of filing. Ex. Vol. p. 18. Jeremy denied ever having a Kraken account and said he had no idea what a crypto wallet was. Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 97-98, 124. Jeremy was then asked if he had “ever made any investments that you haven't kept track of.” Id. at 124. Jeremy replied that he had and testified that he and Katrina invested $5,000 into what they believed were stocks “and then all of a sudden we lost our contact” for that investment. Id. He stated that their contact for that investment “ghosted” them. Id. In addition, neither party identified an investment or cryptocurrency account on their respective proposed divisions of the marital estate. Ex. Vol. pp. 32, 64, 216.

[32] The trial court issued the following relevant finding:

The testimony revealed that Jeremy has cryptocurrency or investments, whether it be cryptocurrency or other investments. No evidence was submitted by either party except through testimony of Jeremy that such investments was around $5,000. In the event that Jeremy has cryptocurrency or investments, the Court will assess the value of $5,000 and award such cryptocurrency or investments to Jeremy.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 36. The evidence that the parties had an existing investment account valued at $5,000.00 is speculative at best. Jeremy's testimony supports the conclusion that the parties may have had an investment account at some point during their marriage but that the funds no longer exist. And the transfer of funds to Kraken, assuming for the sake of argument that the transfer was used to purchase cryptocurrency, occurred after the date of filing and from an account which funds were accounted for in the division of the marital estate. For this reason, we reverse that portion of the trial court's order awarding $5,000.00 in other investments to Jeremy and remand with instructions to adjust the equalization payment between the parties accordingly.

The Fifth/Third Bank Account

[33] In her cross-appeal, Katrina argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to include Jeremy's Fifth/Third Bank Account in the marital estate. The court issued the following finding concerning this account:

There was very little testimony about an account at [Fifth/Third] Bank for Jeremy's military service. Katrina testified that the account held $14,433 at the time of separation but the Court cannot recall any other discussion from Katrina on this issue except to request her share. Jeremy only testified that the account was for his military disability which he received prior to the marriage. Without further testimony, the Court finds that this income received solely due to Jeremy's military service is not marital income and not subject to division herein. This account shall remain the sole and separate property of Jeremy.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 38.

[34] As we noted above, all marital property goes into the marital pot for division. Roberts. v. Roberts, 219 N.E.3d 767, 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). The “one pot” theory specifically prohibits the exclusion of any asset from the scope of the court's power to divide and award. Kendrick v. Kendrick, 44 N.E.3d 721, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. However, as Jeremy observes, military disability benefits cannot be divided in dissolution proceedings. See Severs v. Severs, 837 N.E.2d 498, 50 (Ind. 2005) (citing Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594-95 (1989)).

[35] But the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded the Fifth/Third Account from the marital pot in its entirety. The bank records for that account establish that funds transferred via Zelle were deposited into the account. Ex. Vol. pp. 67-75. Those funds were not veteran's disability payments. Therefore, on remand we direct the trial court to determine the value of the divisible marital property in the account and include that amount in its division of the marital estate.

Conclusion

[36] With a few exceptions, we affirm the trial court's order dividing the marital estate. We reverse the trial court's failure to include the total value of the Pontiac GTO in the marital estate, its inclusion of a non-existent investment account awarded to Jeremy, and its failure to include in the marital estate the non-disability payments deposited into Jeremy's Fifth/Third Account. We therefore remand this case to the trial court with instructions to 1) correct the mathematical error concerning the set off to Katrina for the $25,000 purchase of the Pontiac GTO, 2) remove from the marital estate the $5,000.00 in cryptocurrency or other investments awarded to Jeremy, and 3) calculate the funds deposited in the Fifth/Third Account that were not veteran's disability payments and include that amount in the marital pot, and 4) recalculate the division of the marital estate accordingly.

[37] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The better approach is to include all assets in the divisible pot and conduct one analysis of the statutory factors. See Kinder, 265 N.E.3d at 556.

2.   Katrina's claim that the $88,671.91 offset to her did not necessarily include the $25,000 purchase price for the GTO is incorrect in light of the trial court's findings setting aside $63,671.91 to Katrina for the downpayment for the marital residence and $25,000 for the purchase price of the GTO, which totals $88,671.91.

Mathias, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.