Austin Lee Herron, Appellant-Respondent v. Kassia Jae Brooks, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In this paternity action, Austin Herron (Father) and Kassia Brooks (Mother) [collectively, Parents] initially agreed to share joint legal and physical custody of their minor children. After doing so for several years, Parents filed competing petitions to modify custody, parenting time, and child support. The trial court granted Father's motion and made him the sole legal and primary physical custodian. Mother then filed a motion to correct error and with it, a motion for a change of venue from the judge. A change of judge was granted without objection from Father, and the parties later consented to the appointment of a special judge. After a hearing, the special judge granted the motion to correct error, found there had not been a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of legal custody, and ruled it was in the children's best interest for Mother to be the primary physical custodian.

[2] Father raises numerous issues on appeal, which we partially consolidate and restate as follows:

1) Whether the trial court erred in granting Mother's motion for change of venue from the original judge,

2) Whether the special judge erred in failing to give deference to the trial court's original modification order, and

3) Whether the special judge applied the incorrect legal standard in determining whether legal and physical custody should have been modified.

Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In late 2020, the trial court issued a paternity order regarding Parents’ children, T.H. (born August 2016) and C.H. (born February 2018) [collectively, the Children]. Parents initially agreed to share joint legal and physical custody, and that agreement was approved by the court in the paternity order. At that time, Mother lived in Connersville and Father had moved to nearby Glenwood to be close to the Children. Parents’ proximity allowed them to exercise roughly equal parenting time with the Children for several years.

[4] Mother moved to Muncie in August 2023. She did not file a notice of relocation with the trial court and did not provide Father with her new address until October 8. Even so, the parties continued to exercise equal parenting time. On October 11, 2023, Father filed a petition to modify custody, child support, and parenting time. He alleged Mother had “failed to file the appropriate notice of her relocation.” Appellee's Appendix Vol. 2 at 2. He also alleged Mother's move was “a change in circumstances that ma[de] the previous order unreasonable and ․ not in the best interest of the [C]hildren.” Id.

[5] Mother then moved to Parker City in November, promptly informing Father of that move in a text message on November 6. Once again, she failed to file a notice of relocation with the trial court; however, she filed her own petition to modify on November 29. She alleged she and Father had been unable to agree on decisions concerning the Children's therapeutic and medical needs, and the Children would need to be enrolled in a new school district because of her relocation. She also asserted it was “in the best interests of the [C]hildren for Mother to be awarded physical custody ․” Id. at 5.

[6] The trial court held a two-day evidentiary hearing on the modification petition in May and July 2024. The court heard testimony from Father, Mother, the guardian ad litem (the GAL), and Mother's partner. Among other exhibits, the GAL's report was admitted into evidence. In that report, the GAL concluded, in part,

Mother and Father were able to co-parent, sharing custody, until Mother chose to move to Muncie in July 2023, making fifty-fifty custody difficult and making it necessary for the [C]hildren to change school districts. It is not apparent to this GAL that this move was necessary for Mother's career, as Mother is a CNA who has worked at different locations. Communication and cooperation have been difficult due to Father's unwillingness to medicate [T.H.] for ADHD. Given this, it is in the best interests of the [C]hildren for this GAL to focus on the stability of home life offered by each parent. At this time, this GAL believes that Father's home offers more stability. It is this GAL's wish that the parents can make the sacrifice of longer drives so that Mother's parenting time is in excess of the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, though the parents should default to the Parenting Time Guidelines if no agreement can be met.

Exhibits at 6. Based on these conclusions, the GAL recommended that Father be given primary physical custody, Parents be ordered to more fully cooperate in making medical decisions for the Children, and Father follow the providers’ recommendation and be required to give the Children all medications as prescribed.

[7] On July 24, 2024, the trial court issued an order giving Father primary physical custody and sole legal custody of the Children. In support of that decision, the court reasoned as follows:

Pursuant to [Indiana Code section] 31-14-13-6 ․ the Court may not modify a custody order unless modification is in the best interest of the [C]hildren and there is a substantial change in one or more of the factors that the Court may consider in section [31-14-13-2].

[Parents] testified that [M]other moved to three different locations in the last year. She lived in Connersville, Muncie, and now Parker City. Parker City is approximately one hour away from where [F]ather lives; which is on the border of Fayette County and Rush County.

Both [Parents] agreed that when [M]other moved to those locations she did not file a notice of intent to move. Which is required by law before a move in the State of Indiana.

Father testified that he lived at his place of residence for approximately [four] years. Father also testified that at [M]other's home it was chaotic and the children often times [sic] were being watch[ed] by no adults, but a child of the partner who had shot [Parents’] son with a BB gun and left a mark on the child. The [C]hildren will continue to live where they have lived for the last [four] years. However, the [C]hildren will go to a different school in Rush County.

Also, the [GAL] testified and gave a report ․ which stated that [F]ather should have custody of the minor children. Also, the GAL stated that the [C]hildren have a closer bond to [F]ather's wife, then [sic] they do with [M]other's partner. Also, the GAL stated in her report that the [C]hildren have not had time to adjust to [M]other's home or community․

Therefore, it is the best interest [sic] that [F]ather have physical custody of the minor children and that he have sole legal custody of the minor children.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 36-37. The court further ordered that Mother have parenting time as agreed to by Parents, and that “the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines shall apply” if the parties could not agree on a parenting time schedule. Id. at 37.

[8] Father's counsel withdrew his appearance from the case on August 6, 2024. On the 21st, Mother filed a motion to correct error in which she argued, among other things, the trial court had failed to adequately explain its decision. She also contended that if the court based its custody determination on the fact that she had moved, it erred by failing to analyze the factors provided by the relocation statute, Indiana Code section 31-17-2.2-1(c). And, according to Mother, even if the court properly considered the general best interest factors under section 31-14-13-2, it erred in concluding that it was in the Children's best interest for Father to have sole legal and primary physical custody.

[9] With the motion to correct error, Mother moved for change of venue from the judge. Two days later, on August 23, the trial court granted that motion and gave Parents “seven ․ days to agree to a Special Judge and file said agreement in this cause ․” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 34. According to Father, he did not receive a copy of the August 23 order until the 29th, and he then “sought to retain counsel on August 31 ․” Appellant's Amended Brief at 7.¹ On September 3, Mother filed a motion alleging she had not heard from Father “regarding the appointment of a Special Judge” and asked that one be appointed by the clerk. Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 35. The court granted that motion on September 4, and the clerk appointed a special judge that same day.

[10] Counsel for Father filed an appearance on September 18, together with a motion “to file a belated response to [the] motion to correct error ․” Id. at 43. Father's counsel did not, however, object to or otherwise seek relief from the change of judge or the appointment of a special judge. With the trial court's permission, Father responded to the motion to correct error on September 27. In his response, Father argued that the custody modification order was not erroneous and that Mother's arguments about “what the Court should have found or what the Court should have done [was] just sower [sic] grapes ․” Id. at 49.

[11] On November 21, 2024, Father filed a notice informing the trial court that Parents had agreed to the appointment of a “successor Special Judge ․”² Id. at 51. Pursuant to that notice, a new special judge was appointed in early December.

[12] The trial court held a hearing on the motion to correct error on March 10, 2025. Later, the court issued an order granting that motion and reasoning, in part,

the prior court's order was based on the modification statute, not the relocation statute. However, the prior court did not address the modification statute in a sufficiently detailed manner such that this was clear to the parties.

․

The final paragraph [of the prior court's order] simply reads: “Therefore, it is in the best interest [sic] that [F]ather have physical custody of the minor children and that he have sole legal custody of the minor children.” Despite making this statement, the prior court failed to explain why such an award was in the [C]hildren's best interest.

Having familiarized itself with the record and hearing the arguments of counsel, this Court finds a lack of evidence that such an award would, in fact, serve the [C]hildren's best interests. The evidence shows that the parties exercised substantially equal parenting time and [the Children]3 were comfortable in both homes and loved both parties. The evidence shows that Mother, not Father, was the primary parent addressing the [C]hildren's educational, healthcare, and therapeutic needs. The evidence shows that Mother was the parent most likely to follow the advice of the [C]hildren's treating professionals, particularly as it related to medication and therapy. The evidence shows that Mother researched and presented a plan for the [C]hildren's education, as well as a plan for parenting time for Father in excess of the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. Father, meanwhile, offered no such plans. Father offered only the minimal parenting time for Mother, despite the fact that the [C]hildren were used to spending equal time with the parties. Father had not been involved in the [C]hildren's healthcare or education, other than in a disruptive fashion. Since the underlying order, Father has interrupted the continuity of care the [C]hildren were enjoying as it relates to medication, life skills, and therapy, all of which is contrary to the [C]hildren's best interests.

This Court finds the prior court erred by granting Father physical custody.

Likewise, considering the evidence, this Court finds the prior court erred by granting sole legal custody to Father, particularly without any analysis regarding modification of legal custody.

․

․ There is simply no evidence to support a finding that a substantial change has occurred which would justify Father being granted sole legal custody.

As noted by [the] GAL, the parties have, prior to this litigation, agreed to share joint legal custody and have been able to make legal custody decisions for the [C]hildren. It benefits the [C]hildren to have stability and consistency in decision-making, which is promoted by allowing both parties authority in such matters. This Court finds that stability and consistency is best maintained by continuing an award of joint legal custody to the parties.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 25, 29-30, 32.

[13] In light of these findings, the trial court granted Mother primary custody and reinstated the previous joint legal custody arrangement. Father was ordered to have parenting time under the plan proposed by Mother, specifically, every other weekend with one midweek overnight. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[14] In an appeal following a motion to correct error, we review both that motion and the underlying order. Coronado v. Coronado, 243 N.E.3d 1121, 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). The denial of a motion to correct error is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, which “occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Id. (quoting Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Watson, 70 N.E.3d 380, 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)). When a motion to correct error involves questions of law, we review those questions de novo. Id.

[15] Here, the underlying order was a decision on competing petitions to modify child custody. Consistent with Indiana's policy that trial courts should have wide latitude and deference in family law matters, we give trial courts “discretion in both initial custody and modification of custody determinations ․” In re Paternity of A.R.S., 198 N.E.3d 423, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Accordingly, we likewise review such decisions for an abuse of discretion. Id.

[16] In both the underlying modification order and the order granting Mother's motion to correct error, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law sua sponte.⁴ When a court does so, we

review[ ] issues covered by the findings with a two-tiered standard of review that asks whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment. Any issue not covered by the findings is reviewed under the general judgment standard, meaning a reviewing court should affirm based on any legal theory supported by the evidence.

Payes v. Rivas, 270 N.E.3d 1, 6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123-24 (Ind. 2016)).

[17] We begin by noting that on appeal, Father does not challenge any of the special judge's findings of fact.⁵ Nor does he assert that the trial court's decision to grant Mother's motion to correct error or the resulting custody arrangement was necessarily unsupported by its findings or the evidence. Instead, Father focuses his arguments on what he describes as a series of procedural and legal errors that rendered these proceedings “fundamentally unfair” and divested the special judge of “proper jurisdiction to hear this matter.” Appellant's Amend. Br. at 26. But before discussing the merits of these arguments, we pause to address the tone of and serious deficiencies with the content of Father's brief.

[18] Father's statement of the case and statement of facts contain argumentative and hyperbolic assertions, which are not permitted by the appellate rules. See In re Walter Penner Tr., 22 N.E.3d 593, 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (recognizing that a statement of facts that was “rife with argument” was “not permitted under App. R. 46(A)(6)”), trans. denied; K.S. v. D.S., 64 N.E.3d 1209, 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“[T]he statement of facts should be devoid of argument.”). Starting with Father's statement of the case, we note that the purpose of that statement is to aid our understanding of “the nature of the case, the course of the proceedings relevant to the issues presented for review, and the disposition of these issues by the trial court ․” Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(5). Rather than comply with that rule, Father asserts, among other things, that “[t]he procedural history demonstrates a series of fundamental errors that deprived [him] of due process ․” Appellant's Amend. Br. at 5. He also claims that Mother's motion for a change of judge was “untimely” and that “the court's improper handling of the judge selection process created a cascade of jurisdictional defects ․” Id. These arguments have no place in the statement of the case and do not aid our understanding of the procedural history of the issues raised on appeal.

[19] As for Father's statement of facts, Father was “required to provide a narrative statement of the facts presented in accordance with the standard of review appropriate to the judgment or order being appealed.” Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Instead of doing that, Father's statement of facts argues, among other things, that by granting Mother's motion for a change of judge, the court “set[ ] in motion a fundamentally unfair process that would deprive [Father] of meaningful participation.” Appellant's Amend. Br. at 6. Similarly, “[t]he court's handling of the judge selection process violated basic principles of procedural fairness” and “Mother's counsel's precipitous action prevented any meaningful consultation or negotiation regarding judge selection.” Id. at 7. These are just a few examples of the argumentative statements that litter Father's statement of facts, and little can be found in Father's brief that aids our understanding of “the facts relevant to the issues presented for review ․” App. R. 46(A)(6).

[20] Particularly troubling is the accusation in Father's statement of facts that the special judge “abdicat[ed] [his] judicial responsibility” and “fail[ed] to perform the court's constitutional duty to make impartial, independent findings ․” Appellant's Amend. Br. at 13. Like all members of the Indiana bar, our trial court judges have each sworn an oath to the constitutions of the United States and the State of Indiana. An allegation that a trial judge violated that oath should not be made lightly. Appellate review gives the parties an opportunity to argue the trial court erred. But that does not give a party license to attack the integrity of the trial judge. We are confident that with rare exceptions, our trial judges comport themselves with dignity and strive to uphold the rule of law. Father's counsel makes this bold assertion as an officer of the court without any evidence, let alone substantial and compelling evidence, to support his accusation.

[21] That said, though these deficiencies hindered our review, the argument section of Father's brief is technically cogent in that we can ascertain the assertions made by Father with respect to each issue presented, and Mother's brief aided our understanding of the underlying facts and procedure. Thus, we do not find that Father's non-compliance with the appellate rules substantially hindered our review of the issues so as to waive them on appeal. But see Dridi, 172 N.E.3d at 364 (“[W]here the appellant's noncompliance with the rules of appellate procedure is so substantial that it impede[d] our appellate consideration of the errors, we may deem the alleged errors waived.”). Accordingly, we now turn to the merits of Father's arguments.

1. Change of Venue from Judge

[22] Father first argues that “the trial court erred by granting Mother's untimely motion for a change of venue from the judge ․” Appellant's Amend. Br. at 16. Father cites Trial Rule 76(C), which provides a motion for a change of judge must “be filed not later than ten ․ days after the issues are first closed on the merits.” Mother concedes for this appeal that her motion for change of judge was untimely but contends that Father waived his untimeliness argument because he “never made [it] in the trial court or in any way challenged Mother's request ․” Appellee's Br. at 18. We agree with Mother.

[23] A party's “failure to lodge [a] timely objection to [a] change of judge waives any claim of error on appeal ․” Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 908 N.E.2d 1223, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Angleton v. State, 714 N.E.2d 156, 159 (Ind. 1999), reh'g denied, cert. denied), trans. denied. Father attempts to shift the blame for his failure to do so here to the trial court. He argues that because his counsel had withdrawn from the case, the court's grant of Mother's motion was a “precipitous action” that prevented Father from “participat[ing] meaningfully” in the judge selection process “within the artificially compressed timeframe.” Appellant's Amend. Br. at 19. We are unpersuaded for two reasons.

[24] First, neither the trial court nor Mother can be blamed for the decision by Father's counsel to withdraw his appearance less than two weeks after the court issued the original custody modification order, which made Father a pro se litigant for the purposes of responding to any subsequent motions. It is common in family law matters for parties to file post-judgment motions, including motions to correct error. A party who proceeds pro se during the period between judgment and the deadline to file such motions is generally shown no leniency for failing to respond within the timeframes ordered by the trial court or set by the Trial Rules. See Health and Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Foreman, 51 N.E.3d 317, 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“A litigant who proceeds pro se is held to the same established rules of procedure that trained counsel is bound to follow.”). And though Father claims he did not receive the court's order granting a change of judge until “six days into the seven-day deadline” for the parties to agree on a special judge, Appellant's Amend. Br. at 7, our Trial Rules provide that service of a court order is complete upon mailing—not upon receipt. Ind. Trial Rule 5(B)(2) (“Service is deemed complete upon mailing.”).

[25] Second, even after Father's counsel re-appeared in the case, Father never sought relief from the order granting a change of judge, nor did he argue at any point that Mother's motion had been untimely. To preserve this issue for appeal, Father was required to raise it below, as a trial court “cannot be found to have erred as to an issue or argument that it never had an opportunity to consider.” GKC Ind. Theatres, Inc. v. Elk Retail Invs., LLC, 764 N.E.2d 647, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); see also Catt v. State, 749 N.E.2d 633, 644 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“[W]here a [party] does not object to an irregularity in the appointment of a special judge, he accepts the appointment, submits to the jurisdiction, and waives the irregularity.”), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

[26] Father not only failed to raise any procedural issue with the appointment of a special judge, but it was Father's counsel who filed a notice with the court informing it that because of the retirement of the first special judge, the parties had agreed on the appointment of his successor. Father then attended a hearing on the motion to correct error and presented arguments to the court without objecting to the motion being ruled on by the special judge that he and Mother selected. Thus, Father cannot now claim on appeal that the special judge was without authority. See Woodward v. Norton, 939 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“[A] party may not submit matters to and await rulings by a special judge before objecting to the special judge's presence in the action.” (quoting Thomas v. State, 656 N.E.2d 819, 821 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), reh'g denied)). Father simply misstates the law (and does so without citing supporting legal authority) when he argues the special judge “lacked proper jurisdiction to hear this matter.” Appellant's Amend. Br. at 26. It is well-established that “the authority of the officer appointed to try a case [does not affect] the jurisdiction of the court ․” M.M. v. L.P., 242 N.E.3d 490, 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Floyd v. State, 650 N.E.2d 28, 32 (Ind. 1994)), trans. denied.

[27] For all these reasons, we find no reversible error in the appointment of a special judge to rule on the motion to correct error.

2. Motion to Correct Error

[28] Father next argues “the Special Judge exceeded his authority in reviewing the findings of the original court in a de novo fashion[ ] and failing to give proper deference to his decision.” Appellant's Amend. Br. at 19. To support that contention, Father cites cases standing for the general proposition that appellate courts must give “considerable deference” to trial courts in family law matters. D.C. v. J.A.C., 977 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Ind. 2012). But the special judge was not acting as an appellate court, as has been long recognized by this Court:

The circumstances presented here more closely resemble the case where evidence is heard by a trial judge who thereafter dies or resigns from office before making findings or ruling on the evidence. The general rule in such case is that a successor judge may not make findings of fact or conclusions of law without a trial de novo. This is because a party to an action is entitled to a determination of the issues by the jury or judge that heard the evidence․ However, we find that like other elements of due process, this right may be waived. Thus, when the trial judge who heard the testimony and observed the demeanor of the witnesses at trial is unavailable to render a decision thereon, the parties may stipulate that the substitute judge should determine the case on the record.6 In such case, the substitute judge becomes clothed with all the jurisdiction and authority which originally resided in [the original judge].

Farner v. Farner, 480 N.E.2d 251, 257-58 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

[29] A trial “court has very broad powers on its own motion or upon that of any parties to modify, set aside[,] or vacate its judgment.” Mitchell v. 10th and The Bypass, LLC, 3 N.E.3d 967, 971 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Clouser v. Mock, 155 N.E.2d 745, 748 (Ind. 1959)). And our Trial Rules explicitly grant a court the authority to reconsider a judgment “[u]pon its own motion at any time before a motion to correct errors ․ is required to be made, or with or as part of a motion to correct errors by any party ․” T.R. 52(B). When the court does so, it

may open the judgment, if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend or make new findings of fact[,] and enter a new judgment or any combination thereof if: [among other things,] the judgment or findings are either against the weight of the evidence, or are not supported by or contrary to the evidence

․

T.R. 52(B)(1). As a result, the special judge, having been appointed to rule on Mother's motion to correct error without objection from Father, did not err in reviewing the court's earlier judgment anew.

3. Modification and Relocation

[30] Finally, Father “contends the application of the modification standard in this relocation setting was erroneous as a matter of law.” Appellant's Amend. Br. at 22. Specifically, Father claims the special judge erred in applying the general custody modification statute, Indiana Code section 31-14-13-6, instead of the relocation statute, section 31-17-2.2-1.

[31] Generally, a child custody order may be modified only if “(1) modification is in the best interests of the child; and (2) there is a substantial change in one ․ or more of the factors that the court may consider under section [31-14-13-2] ․” Ind. Code § 31-14-13-6. The general best interest factors include:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child's parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen ․ years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child's parents;

(B) the child's siblings; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest.

(5) The child's adjustment to home, school, and community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.

(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian ․

I.C. § 31-14-13-2.

[32] But when a party requests modification due to the relocation of the other parent, the “proposed relocation does not necessarily require a custody modification, and, in contrast to the Modification Statute, a relocation-based modification need not involve a substantial change to one of the original Best Interest Factors.” Jarrell v. Jarrell, 5 N.E.3d 1186, 1192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) trans. denied. Instead, the relocation statute instructs courts to consider:

(1) The distance involved in the proposed change of residence.

(2) The hardship and expense involved for the nonrelocating individual to exercise parenting time or grandparent visitation.

(3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the nonrelocating individual and the child through suitable parenting time and grandparent visitation arrangements, including consideration of the financial circumstances of the parties.

(4) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct by the relocating individual, including actions by the relocating individual to either promote or thwart a nonrelocating individual's contact with the child.

(5) The reasons provided by the:

(A) relocating individual for seeking relocation; and

(B) nonrelocating parent for opposing the relocation of the child.

(6) Other factors affecting the best interest of the child.

I.C. § 31-17-2.2-1(c).

[33] Here, it is undisputed that Mother failed to file a notice of her intent to relocate to Muncie or promptly notify Father of her move. And when Father became aware of Mother's relocation, he timely filed a petition to modify custody, as was his right to do. See Jarrell, 5 N.E.3d at 1192 (“[T]here are two ways to object to a proposed relocation: (1) by filing a motion to prevent relocation, or (2) by filing a motion to modify a custody order.”).⁷ Thus, we do not agree with Mother “that this case is analogous to Jarrell ․” Appellee's Br. at 21. The father in Jarrell waited two years after the mother moved to file a motion to modify custody, so this Court found that he had acquiesced to the relocation and the general best interest factors applied. 5 N.E.3d at 1193. In contrast, Father moved to modify custody two months after Mother moved, a delay which can be excused by Mother's failure to file a relocation notice as required by Indiana Code section 31-17-2.2-1(a) or otherwise promptly notify Father of her move. We therefore agree with Father insofar as he argues the trial court should have analyzed his petition “under the relocation standard rather than the general modification standard.” Appellant's Amend. Br. at 23.

[34] But below, it was Mother (not Father) who argued in her motion to correct error that since her relocation was the impetus for Father's modification petition, the original judge erred in applying the general best interest factors. Father did not address that argument in his written response to the motion to correct error. Instead, he simply asserted “it was in the best interest [sic] to change custody ․” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 49. And after Mother reiterated her relocation argument at the hearing on the motion to correct error, Father argued he had been awarded “physical custody[ ] [p]ursuant to [Indiana Code section] 31-14-13-6, basically, the best interest of the child[,]” and the resulting modification was proper on that basis:

[T]he [original] judge basically said, this is in the best interest of ․ the [C]hildren ․ [T]hat ․ [F]ather has a more stable home, and he should be granted custody in this case. [And Mother argues in her] motion to correct error that ․ the judge [was] wrong and the [GAL] [was] wrong ․

Transcript (Mar. 10, 2025) at 12-13.

[35] It is well-settled that “[u]nder the legal doctrine of invited error, a party may not take advantage of an error [he] commits, invites, or allows to happen as a natural consequence of [his] own neglect or misconduct.” Hickey v. Hickey, 111 N.E.3d 242, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). So to the extent Father now claims the special judge erred in agreeing with him that section 31-14-13-6 controlled, Father invited that error and cannot raise it on appeal as grounds for reversal. Id. (“Invited error is not subject to review by this court.”).

Conclusion

[36] For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[37] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father made this assertion in his brief but did not provide a record citation to support it. Indeed, his attorney did not file a new appearance in this case until September 18, 2024—two and a half weeks after Father claims he tried to re-retain counsel.

2.   The first special judge, the Honorable Charles K. Todd Jr., retired from the bench at the end of 2024.

3.   A literal reading of the trial court's order suggests that Parents, not the Children, were comfortable in each other's homes, as it reads, “The evidence shows that the parties exercised substantially equal parenting time and were comfortable in both homes and loved both parties.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 29. We've taken the liberty of inferring that the court intended to say that the Children were comfortable in both of their Parents’ homes and loved both Parents.

4.   Though the trial court was not required to do so here, as of July 1, 2025, trial courts are required to include “findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the custody order is based” in any final order establishing or modifying custody. Ind. Code § 31-14-13-7.5(b)(1).

5.   Though Father drew our attention to the fact that the special judge signed Mother's proposed order on the motion to correct error without revising it, our Supreme Court has expressed its disfavor of this practice. See Cook v. Whitsell-Sherman, 796 N.E.2d 271, 273 n.1 (Ind. 2003) (accepting a party's proposed order verbatim “weakens our confidence as an appellate court that the findings are the result of considered judgment by the trial court”). But while disfavored, this practice does not necessarily require reversal, especially when, as here, the appellant does not challenge any of the court's findings. See Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“[W]hen findings of fact are unchallenged, this Court accepts them as true.”), trans. denied.

6.   While the parties did not enter into a formal stipulation here, Father did notify the court that the parties had agreed to appoint a successor special judge and Father's counsel did not object at the subsequent hearing on the motion to correct error when the special judge said he had “received a copy of the audio recording of the hearing at issue” and would listen to the audio “at the conclusion of this hearing.” Transcript (Mar. 10, 2025) at 4.

7.   That said, Father's petition muddied the waters by alleging Mother's relocation was “a change in circumstances that ma[de] the previous order unreasonable and ․ not in the best interests of the [C]hildren.” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 2.

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.