Justin Garcia, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] On July 9, 2025, Justin Garcia pled guilty at his initial hearing to Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent (ACE) of .15 or more and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. The court proceeded directly to sentencing. After the State gave its sentencing recommendation, Garcia verbally motioned to withdraw his guilty plea. The court denied Garcia's motion and sentenced him. In August, the court denied Garcia's motion to correct error. Garcia raises two issues for our review which we restate as: 1) whether the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to correct error, and 2) whether his sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Apellate Rule 7(B). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 20, 2025, Mount Vernon City Police officers heard Garcia “yelling and causing a scene” while they were investigating an unrelated matter down the street. App. Vol. II p. 20. One officer walked up to Garcia and advised him to stop. After continuing to yell “f**k you pigs” and “f**king racist[,]” officers “advised Garcia to again be quiet due to him causing a disturbance.” Id. On July 8, the State charged Garcia with Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct arising from the June 20 incident.

[3] On July 6, a Mount Vernon City Police officer stopped a vehicle driven by Garcia. Garcia was arrested after officers detected an “overwhelming odor of alcohol” and observed Garcia's slurred speech and glossy eyes. Id. at 17. At the Posey County Jail, Garcia consented to a portable breath test “with a result of .229.” Id. On July 7, the State charged Garcia with Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an ACE of .15 or more.

[4] Garcia signed an acknowledgement of rights form before his initial hearing which included the following advisements, each initialed by Garcia:

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Id. at 26-27.

[5] On July 9, Garcia appeared for an initial hearing. The court advised Garcia of his constitutional rights, including his rights to: counsel, a speedy trial, testify in his own defense, present evidence, confront and subpoena witnesses, and appeal. Before the court asked for his plea, Garcia confirmed he received and understood his rights and had no questions about his rights.

[6] The court then asked if Garcia pleaded guilty or not guilty. Garcia said he wanted “to know what [the State wanted] out of this thing” and that he “want[ed] to get it resolved[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 7. After reiterating that the State was not offering a plea agreement that day, Garcia said, “I guess I plead guilty.” Id. Upon the court's inquiry, Garcia confirmed he was pleading guilty to the “alcohol and driving” but did not offer a plea for the disorderly conduct. Instead, Garcia said, “I mean, I just need to know exactly what I'm going to get for both of them. If I'm going to plead guilty to them, I don't know how much time I'm going to get out of it.” Id. The court informed Garcia that it does not “give people what kind of time they're going to get before they decide what they're going to do.” Id. at 8.

[7] After more back and forth, the court said it would enter preliminary “not guilty” pleas in both matters. Id. But Garcia insisted, “Oh, I plead guilty to both of them.” Id. The court re-advised Garcia of his right to counsel, re-confirmed that he received his constitutional rights, and verified several more times that he wanted to plead guilty. The court also confirmed that Garcia understood he would be leaving sentencing to the court's discretion. Each time, Garcia confirmed that he understood his rights. He then pled guilty to both charges. The court accepted the pleas and proceeded to sentencing.

[8] Garcia waived his right to be heard on sentencing. The State asked the court to consider Garcia's “pretrial services report” that showed Garcia had six felony convictions including “battery against a public safety official, battery resulting in bodily injury ․ [and] multiple convictions for operating while intoxicated.” Id. at 13. The State recommended the court sentence Garcia to one year in jail for driving with an ACE of .15 or more and sixty days in jail for disorderly conduct. The court gave Garcia a second opportunity to be heard on sentencing, and Garcia said, “Wow. I don't know what to say[,]” and “Oh, shit.” Id. at 15. Garcia then offered that he had a job and he was “really not wanting to plead guilty to any of these charges right now because they're wanting to lock me up for a long time for this.” Id. The court treated Garcia's comments as a motion to withdraw his plea and denied the motion because it “d[id] not meet some statutory grounds to overturn a plea.” Id. at 16.

[9] In reviewing the pretrial services report, the court noted Garcia's additional criminal history including four revocations, a “three-year hiatus on a warrant,” and additional prior criminal acts. Id. The court sentenced Garcia to one year executed in the Posey County Jail for Class A misdemeanor driving with an ACE of .15 or more and sixty days executed in the Posey County Jail for Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct, served consecutively. At Garcia's request, the court appointed appellate counsel. In August, Garcia filed a motion to correct error, which the court denied. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

I. Denial of Motion to Correct Error

[10] Garcia appeals following the denial of his motion to correct error. “The trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion to correct error, and we reverse the court's decision only for an abuse of discretion.” Alvarez v. State, 147 N.E.3d 374, 377 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Id.

Withdrawal of Guilty Plea

[11] “A trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea arrives in this Court with a presumption in favor of the ruling, and a defendant seeking to overturn such a ruling faces a high hurdle.” Akins v. State, 245 N.E.3d 179, 183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quotations and brackets omitted). After entry of a guilty plea but before imposition of a sentence, a court may allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea “for any fair and just reason unless the state has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea.” Ind. Code. § 35-35-1-4(b) (1983). The court's ruling on such a motion “shall be reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Id. However, the court “shall allow the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty ․ whenever the defendant proves that withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Id. Garcia fails to overcome the presumption in favor of the court's ruling under either section 35-35-1-4(b) avenue for withdrawal.

[12] Garcia does not challenge whether he was informed of his constitutional Boykin rights. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (identifying only three federal constitutional rights the defendant must have been informed of before entering a voluntary and intelligent plea: the rights to a jury trial, to confrontation, and against self-incrimination). Garcia only contends the court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea, alleging his plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently since the court did not “personally” advise him of the possible minimum and maximum sentences for his charges or the potential for enhanced or consecutive sentences based on prior convictions. Appellant's Br. p. 9; 13. Garcia asserts “the trial court never confirmed on the record that Justin understood which range applied to each charge ․[,]” and that he expressed “complete confusion about his sentencing range.” Id. at 12.

[13] Indiana Code section 35-35-1-2 provides:

(a) The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime without first determining that the defendant:

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(3) has been informed of the maximum possible sentence and minimum sentence for the crime charged and any possible increased sentence by reason of the fact of a prior conviction or convictions, and any possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences[.]

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(b) A defendant in a misdemeanor case may waive the rights under subsection (a) by signing a written waiver.

(c) Any variance from the requirements of this section that does not violate a constitutional right of the defendant is not a basis for setting aside a plea of guilty.

[14] Garcia is correct that the court did not verbally advise him of the possible maximum or minimum sentences for his offenses or of the possibility of enhancement for prior convictions. But he does not argue he did not know the possible range of penalties—only that he was not verbally advised of them. Our Supreme Court has held that a defendant must plead “specific facts from which a finder of fact could conclude ․ that the judge's failure to make a full inquiry ․ rendered his decision involuntary or unintelligent.” White v. State, 497 N.E.2d 893, 905 (Ind. 1986).

[15] To provide such specific facts, Garcia points to his consistent demands that he needed to know what the trial court would sentence him to if he pleaded guilty, and asserts those demands demonstrate his “confusion” about the sentencing possibilities. Appellant's Br. p. 12. But his statements fail to show that Garcia was not informed or did not know what he could be sentenced to. Here, Garcia signed an acknowledgment of rights that provided the minimum and maximum sentences for his offenses, explained his sentences could be ordered served consecutively, and informed him that being convicted of a criminal offense could result in harsher penalties for other offenses. Further, the acknowledgment of rights clearly directed Garcia to “initial beside each number to inform the Court that you understand that individual right.” App. Vol. II p. 26. The lack of verbal sentencing advisement notwithstanding, we cannot conclude that Garcia was not informed of his sentencing possibilities. Garcia has failed to provide specific facts from which a fact finder could conclude his plea was involuntary or unintelligent. See White, 497 N.E.2d at 905.

[16] In addition, Garcia does not argue that his constitutional rights were violated by the trial court's failure to inquire into his understanding of the sentencing range. Indeed, the statute itself provides that a court's variance from the requirements does not constitute violation of a constitutional right or necessitate withdrawal of a plea. Ind. Code § 35-35-1-2(c) (2018). The court did not err in denying Garcia's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to correct error.

II. Inappropriateness of Sentence

[17] Garcia argues his aggregate “consecutive executed sentences” are inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).¹ Appellant's Br. p. 14. Appellate Rule 7(B) permits an appellate court to revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” We attempt only to “leaven the outliers” rather than achieve the “perceived ‘correct’ result” in every case. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222, 1225 (Ind. 2008)).

Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) is a rare avenue for appellate relief that is reserved for exceptional cases. Even with Rule 7(B), sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference. Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character). Absent such a sufficiently compelling evidentiary basis, we will not override the decision of ․ the trial court.

Sorenson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 717, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted), trans. denied. “And whether we regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the day turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224.

[18] Garcia received an aggregate term of one year and sixty days executed in jail, which was sixty days short of the maximum one-and-a-half years he could have received. See Ind. Code §§ 35-50-3-2 and 3 (1976). He asserts this sentence was inappropriate because his offenses were “minor, non-violent, and closely related in time” and “did not result in a threat or harm to any person.” Appellant's Br. p. 14. Garcia also contends his character is that of a “working man struggling with substance use but demonstrating honesty, respect, and remorse throughout the proceedings.” Id. at 15.

[19] His assertions notwithstanding, Garcia has not met his burden to show that his sentence is inappropriate. Regarding the nature of his disorderly conduct offense, Garcia was initially asked to stop yelling and causing a scene while officers investigated an unrelated matter down the street. Garcia displayed no restraint or regard when he escalated his conduct, yelling “f**k you pigs” and other expletives. App. Vol. II p. 20. As for his second offense, Garcia provided a breath sample “with a result of .229”—well above the .15 ACE required to support his conviction. Id. at 17. Garcia fails to point to any evidence that portrays this offense in a positive light.

[20] Turning to his character, we acknowledge Garcia's assertions that he had a job and needed to “take care of his household,” and his admission that he had “alcohol problems.” Tr. Vol. II p. 15, 19. But Garcia's extensive criminal history, including convictions for violent offenses and alcohol-related driving offenses, reflect poorly on his character. Garcia was even dismissive of his alcohol problems at his sentencing, saying, “I can understand [this sentence] if I was driving while suspended, but I wasn't. I was driving, you know, intoxicated. It was 4th of July weekend.” Id. at 15. Garcia's continued alcohol use while driving despite his previous convictions, coupled with his apparent justification thereof, demonstrates that he has little regard for the rule of law and does not exemplify good character to warrant revision. Garcia's sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses or his character.

III. Conclusion

[21] The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia's motion to correct error, and his sentence is not inappropriate. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and Garcia's sentence.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Throughout Garcia's Rule 7(B) argument, he also alleges the court “abused its discretion by imposing consecutive executed sentences[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 14. It is well-settled that a Rule 7(B) claim and an abuse of discretion in sentencing claim are to be argued separately. See Chastain v. State, 144 N.E.3d 732, 734 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Because Garcia did not provide independent argument or relevant authority to challenge the court's sentencing discretion, his abuse of discretion argument is waived.

Scheele, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.