Automotive Finance Corporation, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Ricardo Bridgmanhen, Appellee-Defendant (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In this debt collection case, Automotive Finance Corporation (AFC) appeals the trial court's decision to grant relief from a default judgment against Ricardo Bridgmanhen. Finding the court erred in granting that relief, we reverse and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 24, 2021, SkylifeCity Auto LLC (SkylifeCity) signed a Demand Promissory Note and Security Agreement in which it promised to repay a $55,000 loan from AFC. On the same day, Bridgmanhen executed an Unconditional and Continuing Guaranty in which he agreed to, among other things, “absolutely and unconditionally guaranty the full and prompt payment” of the debt. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 33.

[3] In January 2023, AFC filed a complaint against SkylifeCity and Bridgmanhen alleging, in part, that SkylifeCity had defaulted on the note. On April 5, AFC served alias summonses on both defendants via certified mail addressed to Bridgmanhen at “11855 180th Street, Jamaica NY 11434[.]”¹ Id. at 70, 75. Neither SkylifeCity nor Bridgmanhen timely appeared in the case after they were served.

[4] On May 18, 2023, AFC's counsel received an email from an attorney purporting to represent Bridgmanhen. The email represented that Bridgmanhen “ha[d] filed for a chapter 13 bankruptcy” and demanded that AFC “immediately stop all collection attempts” in this case. Id. at 151. Attached to that email was a “Notice of Bankruptcy Case Filing” from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York providing the following address for Bridgmanhen:

Ricardo Anthony Bridgmanhen

118-55 180th Street

Queens, NY 11434

Id. at 152. A month later, AFC filed a notice in this cause that it was voluntarily dismissing its claims against Bridgmanhen “without prejudice ․” Id. at 48. That same day, the trial court issued an order acknowledging the notice and dismissing Bridgmanhen from the case “without prejudice ․” Id. at 49.

[5] On March 11, 2024, the bankruptcy court issued an order dismissing Bridgmanhen's bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy proceedings were closed in August of that year, and later that month AFC filed a motion in this action pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 41(F) “to vacate and set aside the Notice of Dismissal ․” Id. at 52. AFC did not attempt to serve that motion on Bridgmanhen in any manner. The trial court granted the motion, finding “that [AFC's] motion demonstrate[d] good cause and [was] filed within a reasonable time pursuant to the provisions of Trial Rule 41(F) ․” Id. at 53.

[6] Several months later, in March 2025, AFC filed a motion for default judgment against SkylifeCity and Bridgmanhen. The trial court granted that motion on April 2 and entered judgment against both defendants. Later that month, AFC initiated proceedings supplemental, after which Bridgmanhen appeared in the case for the first time on May 21 when he filed a pro se motion to appear remotely at a garnishment hearing scheduled for July 8. The court granted that motion, but Bridgmanhen nonetheless failed to appear. At the hearing, the court issued an order garnishing one of Bridgmanhen's accounts and found him eligible for a wage garnishment upon the return of positive interrogatory answers from his suspected employer.

[7] One week later, on July 16, Bridgmanhen filed a motion to set aside the default judgment “pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)[,]” in which he alleged the following:

1. I failed to appear in court on July 8, 2025, due to a family emergency involving my infant child, which I could not postpone or resolve in time to attend the hearing.

2. I did not receive proper notice of the lawsuit prior to the default judgment being entered and was unaware of the judgment until wage garnishments began.

3. I did not intentionally avoid the case and respectfully request a chance to respond and defend myself.

4. I believe I have a meritorious defense to the claims in this case and am seeking to have this matter heard on its merits.

5. This motion is made in good faith and promptly after learning of the default judgment.

Id. at 119.

[8] The trial court held a hearing on Bridgmanhen's Rule 60(B) motion on August 12, 2025. Bridgmanhen, appearing pro se, presented only his own testimony in support of his motion. His direct examination was, in its entirety, as follows:

MR. BRIDGMANHEN: On record, I'd like to deny all allegation against me. I wasn't aware of this situation until a couple of --- maybe a month or two ago that these, they've been trying to reach out to me several times at the address. They have been sending me mails and stuff. I do not live at that address․

THE COURT: Where do you live? ․

MR. BRIDGMANHEN: I live in New Jersey and they're sending me all these --- they're saying --- I mean as I started looking into the case, I see that everything was getting sent to New York. I do not live in New York, so I wasn't aware of the situation until my job told me when they got a letter saying somebody want to put a hold on ․ my paychecks.

THE COURT: Alright. So, when did you move from the New York address?

MR. BRIDGMANHEN: At that New York address? I technically never lived there. I only lived there till --- I only did business there and I stopped business about six years ago.

Transcript at 4 [sic throughout].

[9] On cross-examination, Bridgmanhen testified he “filed bankruptcy ․ seven years ago or six years ago or something like that․ Not 2023 ․” Id. at 5. When asked who his bankruptcy attorney was, Bridgmanhen replied, “That I do not know of.” Id. AFC's counsel showed Bridgmanhen a copy of the 2023 bankruptcy notice. Bridgmanhen confirmed that his name was on the notice and that he “used to do business” at the address in Queens, but he denied that the social security number listed below the address was his. Id. at 7. He again denied that he filed for bankruptcy in 2023 and said “[t]hat's something [he] need[ed] to look into.” Id. AFC then showed Bridgmanhen a copy of a New York Secretary of State filing for SkylifeCity which listed him as the registered agent. Bridgmanhen confirmed that his “business was registered at that address”² but he refused to answer whether he “approve[d] of the filing of the document that listed [him] at that address ․” Id. at 8.

[10] After Bridgmanhen testified, AFC argued that he had been properly served with the complaint and alias summons before AFC voluntarily dismissed him from the case. And because Bridgmanhen did not timely appear before his dismissal, he was in default and AFC was not required to notify him of the motion for reinstatement or subsequent motion for default judgment. The trial court questioned whether that was proper under the Trial Rules and asked, “[Can] a party ․ be dismissed and then [not] get any other notice of, for example, the motion to reinstate or any notice of anything going forward ․ ?” Id. at 12. AFC's counsel answered in the affirmative and argued that “[T]rial Rule 41 does not require ․ there be a notice attached to ․ a motion for reinstatement of a dismissal without prejudice.” Id. at 13. AFC did concede, however, that Bridgmanhen would have been entitled to notice had he appeared in the case before his dismissal. In response, Bridgmanhen merely claimed he “wasn't aware of the situation until two months ago” and “wasn't issued a notice by anything in the mail or anything.” Id. at 13-14. The court then took the matter under advisement.

[11] Later that same day, the trial court issued a one-page order setting aside the default judgment. In it, the court reasoned

Bridgmanhen was not served with [AFC's] motion to set aside notice of dismissal and to reinstate action, or with [AFC's] motion for default judgment. The Court determines that [AFC's] motion to set aside notice of dismissal and to reinstate action is a new or additional claim for relief against Bridgmanhen. Bridgmanhen was entitled to service “in the manner provided by services of summons in Rule 4.” Indiana Trial Rule 5(A).

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 11. AFC filed a motion to correct error, which the court summarily denied. AFC now appeals.³

Discussion and Decision

[12] We begin by noting that Bridgmanhen did not file a brief in support of the trial court's decision. In such a case, “we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the [a]ppellee's behalf.” Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006)). Accordingly, “we will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error[,]” meaning error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. (quoting Trinity Homes, 848 N.E.2d at 1068).

[13] When, as here, a party appeals after a motion to correct error, we review both that motion and the underlying order. Coronado v. Coronado, 243 N.E.3d 1121, 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). The denial of a motion to correct error is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, which “occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Id. (quoting Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Watson, 70 N.E.3d 380, 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)). As with any other motion, when a motion to correct error involves questions of law, we review those questions de novo. Id.

[14] Trial Rule 60(B) permits a court to grant equitable relief from a judgment under certain circumstances enumerated by the rule's subsections. In re Paternity of P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d 737, 740-41 (Ind. 2010). Here, Bridgmanhen's motion failed to identify the specific subsection of Rule 60(B) under which he sought relief, and the trial court's order similarly failed to specify which subsection it relied upon to set aside the default judgment. But the court did articulate some reason for its decision (that is, that AFC was required to personally serve Bridgmanhen with the motion to reinstate), and our task on appeal is “to evaluate the action of the trial court upon the reasons it specifically articulated, rather than to attribute to it some legitimate but unexpressed reason.” DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. v. Brown, 29 N.E.3d 729, 731 n.2 (Ind. 2015) (quoting City of Elkhart v. Middleton, 356 N.E.2d 207, 210 (Ind. 1976)), reh'g denied. Thus, we confine our analysis to whether the trial court correctly interpreted the Trial Rules, which is a question of law we review de novo. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Poluciano, 272 N.E.3d 1009, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

[15] AFC argues the trial court “misinterpreted the plain language of Trial Rule 5(A) when it found the Motion to Reinstate was a new or additional claim for relief against Bridgmanhen.” Appellant's Brief at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). We agree.

[16] Trial Rule 5(A)(3) provides that “each party ․ must be served with ․ every written motion except one which may be heard ex parte ․” But “[n]o service need be made on parties in default for failure to appear, except that pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against them shall be served upon them in the manner provided by service of summons in Rule 4.” Ind. Trial Rule 5(A). As this Court has explained, “the expression ‘in default for failure to appear’ does not mean that the party has been ‘defaulted’ (i.e., has been judicially declared to be in default), but merely that he has not yet made an appearance in the prescribed manner.” Cordill v. City of Indianapolis Through Dep't of Parks and Recreation, 345 N.E.2d 274, 278 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).

[17] There is no question that Bridgmanhen was in default at the time AFC moved to voluntarily dismiss him in June 2023. On April 5 of that year, AFC served an alias summons via certified mail at Bridgmanhen's address in Queens, which was a valid manner of service under Trial Rule 4.1(A)(1). Despite Bridgmanhen's claim that he never lived at that address, the evidence showed he registered there as SkylifeCity's agent and the 2023 bankruptcy petition listed it as Bridgmanhen's. Under Trial Rule 6(D)(1), Bridgmanhen had twenty days after the date of service to respond to the complaint, which he failed to do. He was therefore in default and consequently not entitled to service of any motion filed by AFC, except one that asserted “new or additional claims for relief ․” T.R. 5(A).

[18] And we disagree with the trial court that the motion to reinstate asserted a “new or additional claim for relief ․” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 11 (quoting T.R. 5(A)). Dismissal and reinstatement of actions are governed by Trial Rule 41, which provides, in pertinent part:

(A) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.

․ By Plaintiff--By Stipulation. ․ [A]n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court:

․ by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs ․

․

Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal ․, the dismissal is without prejudice ․

․

(F) Reinstatement Following Dismissal. For good cause shown and within a reasonable time the court may set aside a dismissal without prejudice.

T.R. 41(A), (F).

[19] Indiana's appellate courts have had few occasions to rule on what notice, if any, is required before a case may be reinstated under Rule 41(F), but we find that the Seventh Circuit correctly summarized Indiana law as follows:

A voluntarily dismissed suit may be reinstated pursuant to Rule 41(F) ․, and “[w]hen a case is dismissed and then reinstated, it stands as if it had not been dismissed.” Waitt v. Waitt, 429 N.E.2d 6, 7 (Ind. [Ct.] App. 1981) (holding that a party who failed to move for a change of venue within 30 days of receiving the initial complaint was not entitled to a new 30-day time limit when the case was reinstated after voluntary dismissal).

․ Upon reinstatement, the notice rights and duties of the parties depend upon the position the parties were in when the action was voluntarily dismissed.

․

․ Lyerson v. Hogan, 441 N.E.2d 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) ․ involved a lawsuit that languished for two years without an appearance or answer by the defendants and without any activity from the plaintiffs. The court dismissed the case for failure to prosecute; the plaintiffs orally moved to reinstate without notifying the defendants. The Court of Appeals of Indiana held that no notice was necessary in these circumstances because the defendants were in default at the time the case was dismissed. Id. at 686. The court cited a provision in Rule 5(A) ․ that excludes parties in default from the notice requirement unless the pleading asserts new or additional claims for relief. Id. ․ Lyerson thus confirms that parties not in default at the time of dismissal must be served with the motion for reinstatement.

Price v. Wyeth Holdings Corp., 505 F.3d 624, 629-30 (7th Cir. 2007) (first alteration in original).

[20] We agree with AFC that under Indiana law as expressed in Price, Bridgmanhen, who was in default at the time of dismissal, need not have been served with the motion to reinstate or subsequent motion for default judgment. Id. at 629 (“[T]he notice rights and duties of the parties depend upon the position the parties were in when the action was voluntarily dismissed.”); see also Lake Cnty. v. House, 168 N.E.3d 278, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“It has long been established that, when a case is voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(A) and subsequently reinstated under Rule 41(F), ‘it stands as if it had not been dismissed.’ ” (quoting Waitt, 429 N.E.2d at 7)), trans. denied. AFC has therefore made a prima facie showing that the rationale provided by the trial court in its order granting relief from the default judgment was erroneous.

Conclusion

[21] For these reasons, we reverse the trial court's decision to grant Bridgmanhen's motion to set aside the default judgment and remand with instructions for the court to deny that motion.

[22] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We take judicial notice that Jamaica is a neighborhood in Queens, New York City. See Ind. Evidence Rule 201(a) (“The court may judicially notice ․ a fact that: (A) is not subject to reasonable dispute because it is generally known within [its] territorial jurisdiction, or (B) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”); Page v. State, 139 N.E. 143, 144 (Ind. 1923) (“Courts will take judicial notice of the geography of the country ․”).

2.   We've not been provided a copy of the Secretary of State filing that AFC's counsel showed to Bridgmanhen. From the context, however, it's clear to us that when Bridgmanhen said SkylifeCity “was registered at that address[,]” he was referring to the same address in Queens that was listed on the bankruptcy notice and where AFC had served the alias summonses. Tr. at 8.

3.   Bridgmanhen did not participate in this appeal. SkylifeCity did not participate in the proceedings below or in this appeal.

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.